Market-Based Rates For Wholesale Sales Of Electric Energy, Capacity And Ancillary Services By Public by Debra A. Dalton (technical Information & Final Rule
119 FERC ¶ 61,295 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
18 CFR Part 35 
 
(Docket No. RM04-7-000; Order No. 697) 
 
Market-Based Rates For Wholesale Sales Of Electric Energy, Capacity And Ancillary 
Services By Public Utilities 
 
(Issued June 21, 2007) 
 
AGENCY:  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
 
ACTION:  Final Rule 
 
SUMMARY:  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is amending 
its regulations to revise Subpart H to Part 35 of Title 18 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations governing market-based rates for public utilities pursuant to the Federal 
Power Act (FPA).  The Commission is codifying and, in certain respects, revising its 
current standards for market-based rates for sales of electric energy, capacity, and 
ancillary services.  The Commission is retaining several of the core elements of its 
current standards for granting market-based rates and revising them in certain respects.  
The Commission also adopts a number of reforms to streamline the administration of the 
market-based rate program. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule will become effective [Insert_Date 60 days after 
publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER]. 
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:   
Debra A. Dalton (Technical Information) 
Office of Energy Markets and Reliability 
 
 Docket No. RM04-7-000   - 2 - 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
888 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C.  20426 
(202) 502-6253 
 
Elizabeth Arnold (Legal Information) 
Office of the General Counsel 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
888 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C.  20426 
(202) 502-8818 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:   
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
 
Market-Based Rates For Wholesale Sales Of Electric 
Energy, Capacity And Ancillary Services By Public 
Utilities 
Docket No.  RM04-7-000 
 
 
ORDER NO. 697 
 
FINAL RULE 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
  Paragraph Numbers
I.  Introduction....................................................................................................................1.
II.  Background...................................................................................................................7.
III.  Overview of Final Rule ............................................................................................12.
IV.  Discussion .................................................................................................................33.
A.  Horizontal Market Power.......................................................................................33.
1.  Whether to Retain the Indicative Screens...........................................................33.
2.  Indicative Market Share Screen Threshold Levels and Pivotal Supplier 
Application Period...................................................................................................80.
a.  Market Share Threshold.................................................................................82.
b.  Pivotal Supplier Application Period...............................................................94.
3.  DPT Criteria........................................................................................................96.
4.  Other Products and Models ..............................................................................118.
5.  Native Load Deduction.....................................................................................125.
a.  Market Share Indicative Screen ...................................................................125.
b.  Pivotal Supplier Indicative Screen...............................................................143.
c.  Clarification of Definition of Native Load...................................................150.
d.  Other Native Load Concerns........................................................................153.
6.  Control and Commitment.................................................................................156.
a.  Presumption of Control................................................................................164.
b.  Requirement for Sellers to have a Rate on File ...........................................212.
7.  Relevant Geographic Market............................................................................215.
a.  Default Relevant Geographic Market...........................................................215.
b.  NERC’s Balancing Authority Area and Default Geographic Area.............247.
c.  Additional Guidelines for Alternative Geographic Market and Flexibility  253.Docket No. RM04-7-000   ii 
 
d.  Specific Issues Related to Power Pools and SPP.........................................279.
e.  RTO/ISO Exemption....................................................................................285.
8.  Use of Historical Data ......................................................................................292.
9.  Reporting Format..............................................................................................302.
10.  Exemption for New Generation (Formerly Section 35.27(a) of the 
Commission’s Regulations)...................................................................................307.
a.  Elimination of Exemption in Section 35.27(a).............................................307.
b.  Grandfathering .............................................................................................327.
c.  Creation of a Safe Harbor.............................................................................335.
11.  Nameplate Capacity........................................................................................339.
12.  Transmission Imports.....................................................................................346.
a.  Use of Historical Conditions and OASIS Practices ....................................348.
b.  Use of Total Transfer Capability (TTC)......................................................363.
c.  Accounting for Transmission Reservations .................................................365.
d.  Allocation of Transmission Imports based on Pro Rata Shares of Seller's 
Uncommitted Generation Capacity...................................................................370.
e.  Miscellaneous Comments ............................................................................376.
f.  Required SIL Study for DPT Analysis.........................................................382.
13.  Procedural Issues............................................................................................387.
B.  Vertical Market Power .........................................................................................397.
1.  Transmission Market Power.............................................................................400.
a.  OATT Requirement .....................................................................................403.
b.  OATT Violations and MBR Revocation .....................................................411.
c.  Revocation of Affiliates’ MBR Authority....................................................422.
2.  Other Barriers to Entry.....................................................................................428.
3.  Barriers Erected or Controlled by Other Than The Seller................................452.
4.  Planning and Expansion Efforts.......................................................................454.
5.  Monopsony Power............................................................................................459.
C.  Affiliate Abuse ....................................................................................................464.
1.  General Affiliate Terms and Conditions ..........................................................464.
a.  Codifying Affiliate Restrictions in Commission Regulations......................464.
b.  Definition of “Captive Customers”..............................................................469.
c.  Definition of “Non-Regulated Power Sales Affiliate”.................................484.
d.  Other Definitions..........................................................................................496.
e.  Treating Merging Companies as Affiliates .................................................499.
f.  Treating Energy/Asset Managers as Affiliates.............................................503.
g.  Cooperatives.................................................................................................518.
2.  Power Sales Restrictions ..................................................................................529.
3.  Market-Based Rate Affiliate Restrictions (formerly Code of Conduct) for 
Affiliate Transactions Involving Power Sales and Brokering, Non-Power Goods and 
Services and Information Sharing .........................................................................544.Docket No. RM04-7-000   iii 
 
a.  Uniform Code of Conduct/Affiliate Restrictions - Generally......................546.
b.  Exceptions to the Independent Functioning Requirement...........................553.
c.  Information Sharing Restrictions .................................................................570.
d.  Definition of “Market Information”.............................................................590.
e.  Sales of Non-Power Goods or Services .......................................................595.
f.  Service Companies or Parent Companies Acting on Behalf of and for the 
Benefit of a Franchised Public Utility...............................................................599.
D.  Mitigation.............................................................................................................604.
1.  Cost-Based Rate Methodology.........................................................................606.
a.  Sales of One Week or Less...........................................................................606.
b.  Sales of more than one week but less than one year ...................................632.
c.  Sales of one year or greater..........................................................................658.
d.  Alternative methods of mitigation ...............................................................660.
2.Discounting.........................................................................................................699.
3.Protecting Mitigated Markets.............................................................................720.
a.  Must Offer ...................................................................................................720.
b.  First-Tier Markets ........................................................................................776.
c.  Sales that Sink in Unmitigated Markets.......................................................794.
d.  Proposed Tariff Language............................................................................825.
E.  Implementation Process........................................................................................832.
 
1.  Category 1 and 2 Sellers...................................................................................836.
a.  Establishment of Category 1 and 2 Sellers...................................................836.
b.  Threshold for Category 1 Sellers and Other Proposed Modifications.........845.
2.  Regional Review and Schedule........................................................................869.
F.  MBR Tariff ...........................................................................................................897.
1.  Tariff of General Applicability.........................................................................901.
2.  Placement of Terms and Conditions.................................................................925.
3.  Single Corporate Tariff.....................................................................................928.
G.  Legal Authority....................................................................................................938.
1.  Whether Market-Based Rates Can Satisfy the Just and Reasonable Standard 
Under the FPA.......................................................................................................938.
Consistency of Market-based Rate Program with FPA Filing Requirements ......956.
2.  Whether Existing Tariffs Must Be Found to Be Unjust and Unreasonable, and 
Whether the Commission Must Establish a Refund Effective Date......................973.
H.  Miscellaneous.......................................................................................................976.
1.  Waivers.............................................................................................................976.
a.  Accounting Waivers.....................................................................................980.
b.  Timing..........................................................................................................989.
c.  Part 34 Waivers Blanket Authorizations......................................................995.
2.  Sellers Affiliated with a Foreign Utility.........................................................1001.Docket No. RM04-7-000   iv 
 
3.  Change in Status.............................................................................................1009.
a.  Fuel Supplies..............................................................................................1012.
b.  Transmission Outages................................................................................1020.
c.  Control .......................................................................................................1028.
d.  Triggering Events.......................................................................................1034.
e.  Timing of Reporting...................................................................................1036.
f.  Sellers Affiliated with a Foreign Utility.....................................................1041.
4.  Third-Party Providers of Ancillary Services..................................................1047.
a.  Internet Postings and Reporting Requirements..........................................1053.
b.  Pricing for Ancillary Services in RTOs/ISOs ...........................................1063.
5.  Reactive Power and Real Power Losses.........................................................1073.
a.  Reactive Power...........................................................................................1074.
b.  Real Power Losses .....................................................................................1076.
V.  Section-by-Section Analysis of Regulations .........................................................1078.
VI.  Information Collection Statement.........................................................................1106.
VII.  Environmental Analysis.......................................................................................1125.
VIII.  Regulatory Flexibility Act..................................................................................1126.
IX.  Document Availability..........................................................................................1130.
X.  Effective Date and Congressional Notification......................................................1133.
 
Appendix A:  Standard Screen Format 
 
Appendix B:  Corporate Entities and Assets sample appendix 
 
Appendix C:  Required Provisions of the Market-Based Rate Tariff 
 
Appendix D:  Regions and Schedule for Regional Market power Update Process 
 
Appendix E:  List of Commenters and Acronyms    
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
 
Before Commissioners:  Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; 
                                        Suedeen G. Kelly, Marc Spitzer, 
                                        Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff. 
 
 
Market-Based Rates For Wholesale Sales Of Electric 
Energy, Capacity And Ancillary Services By Public 
Utilities 
Docket No.  RM04-7-000 
 
 
FINAL RULE 
 
ORDER NO. 697 
 
(Issued June 21, 2007) 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.  On May 19, 2006, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NOPR), pursuant to sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),
1 in which 
the Commission proposed to amend its regulations governing market-based rate 
authorizations for wholesale sales of electric energy, capacity and ancillary services 
by public utilities.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to modify all existing 
market-based authorizations and tariffs so they would reflect any new requirements 
ultimately adopted in the Final Rule.  After considering the comments received in 
                                              
1 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824e. 
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response to the  
NOPR, the Commission adopts in many respects the proposals contained in the NOPR, 
but with a number of modifications.   
2.  This Final Rule represents a major step in the Commission’s efforts to clarify and 
codify its market-based rate policy by providing a rigorous up-front analysis of whether 
market-based rates should be granted, including protective conditions and ongoing filing 
requirements in all market-based rate authorizations, and reinforcing its ongoing 
oversight of market-based rates.  The specific components of this rule, in conjunction 
with other regulatory activities, are designed to ensure that market-based rates charged by 
public utilities are just and reasonable.  There are three major aspects of the 
Commission’s market-based rate regulatory regime. 
3.  First is the analysis that is the subject of this rule: whether a market-based rate 
seller or any of its affiliates has market power in generation or transmission and, if so, 
whether such market power has been mitigated.
2   If the seller is granted market-based 
rates, the authorization is conditioned on:  affiliate restrictions governing transactions and 
conduct between power sales affiliates where one or more of those affiliates has captive 
customers; a requirement to file post-transaction electric quarterly reports (EQRs)  
 
                                              
2 The Commission also considers whether the seller or its affiliates can erect other 
barriers to entry (e.g., key sites for building new power supply; key inputs to power 
supply) in the relevant market and whether there is evidence of affiliate abuse or 
reciprocal dealing. Docket No. RM04-7-000   3 
 
containing specific information about contracts and transactions; a requirement to file any 
change of status; and a requirement for all large sellers to file triennial updates.
3  
4.  Second, for wholesale sellers that have market-based rate authority and sell into 
day ahead or real-time organized markets administered by Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs), they do so subject to 
specific RTO/ISO market rules approved by the Commission and applicable to all market 
participants.  These rules` are designed to help ensure that market power cannot be 
exercised in those organized markets and include additional protections (e.g., mitigation 
measures) where appropriate to ensure that prices in those markets are just and 
reasonable.  Thus, a seller in such markets not only must have an authorization based on 
an analysis of that individual seller’s market power, but it must also abide by additional 
rules contained in the RTO/ISO tariffs. 
5.  Third, the Commission, through its ongoing oversight of market-based rate 
authorizations and market conditions, may take steps to address seller market power or 
modify rates.  For example, based on its review of triennial market power updates 
required of market-based rate sellers, its review of EQR filings made by market-based 
rate sellers, and its review of required notices of change in status, the Commission may 
institute a section 206 proceeding to revoke a seller’s market-based rate authorization if it 
                                              
3 During the past three years, the Commission has initiated over 20 investigations 
under section 206 of the FPA because of concerns of possible market power.  Several of 
those investigations led to the revocation or voluntary relinquishing of market-based rate 
authority and the ordering of refunds by sellers. Docket No. RM04-7-000   4 
 
determines that the seller may have gained market power since its original market-based 
rate authorization.  The Commission may also, based on its review of EQR filings or 
daily market price information, investigate a specific utility or anomalous market 
circumstances to determine whether there has been any conduct in violation of RTO/ISO 
market rules or Commission orders or tariffs, or any prohibited market manipulation, and 
take steps to remedy any violations.  These steps could include, among other things, 
disgorgement of profits and refunds to customers if a seller is found to have violated 
Commission orders, tariffs or rules, or a civil penalty paid to the United States Treasury if 
a seller is found to have engaged in prohibited market manipulation or to have violated 
Commission orders, tariffs or rules. 
6.  The Commission recognizes that several recent court decisions by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
4 have created some uncertainty for 
sellers transacting pursuant to our market-based rate program.  The cases raise issues 
with respect to the circumstances under which sellers’ pre-authorized market-based 
rate sales may be subject to retroactive refunds and the circumstances under which 
buyers might be able to invalidate or modify contracts based on the argument that the 
contracts were entered into at a time when markets were dysfunctional.  The 
                                              
4 See State of California, ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 
2004), cert. denied (S. Ct. Nos. 06-888 and 06-1100, June 18, 2007) (Lockyer); Public 
Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (Snohomish); Public Utilities Commission of the State of California and 
California Electric Oversight Board v. FERC, 474 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 2007) (California 
Commission). Docket No. RM04-7-000   5 
 
Commission’s first and foremost duty is to protect customers from unjust and 
unreasonable rates; however, we recognize that uncertainties regarding rate stability 
and contract sanctity can have a chilling effect on investments and a seller’s 
willingness to enter into long-term contracts and this, in turn, can harm customers in 
the long run.  The Commission recently provided guidance in this regard, noting that 
these Ninth Circuit decisions addressed a unique set of facts and a market-based rate 
program that has undergone substantial improvement since 2001, and reiterating that 
an ex ante finding of the absence of market power, coupled with the EQR filing and 
effective regulatory oversight qualifies as sufficient prior review for market-based 
rate contracts to satisfy the notice and filing requirements of FPA section 205.
5  
Through this Final Rule, the Commission is clarifying and further improving its 
market-based rate program.  Moreover, the Commission will explore ways to 
continue to improve its market-based rate program and processes to assure 
appropriate customer protections but at the same time provide greater regulatory and 
market certainty for sellers in light of the above court opinions   
II.  Background 
7.  In 1988, the Commission began considering proposals for market-based 
pricing of wholesale power sales.  The Commission acted on market-based rate 
proposals filed by various wholesale suppliers on a case-by-case basis.  Over the 
                                              
5 CAlifornians for Renewable Energy, Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Util. Com’n, 119 FERC     
¶ 61,058 (2007). Docket No. RM04-7-000   6 
 
years, the Commission developed a four-prong analysis used to assess whether a 
seller should be granted market-based rate authority:  (1) whether the seller and its 
affiliates lack, or have adequately mitigated, market power in generation; (2) whether 
the seller and its affiliates lack, or have adequately mitigated, market power in 
transmission; (3) whether the seller or its affiliates can erect other barriers to entry; 
and (4) whether there is evidence involving the seller or its affiliates that relates to 
affiliate abuse or reciprocal dealing.   
8.  The Commission initiated the instant rulemaking proceeding in April 2004 to 
consider “the adequacy of the current analysis and whether and how it should be 
modified to assure that prices for electric power being sold under market-based rates 
are just and reasonable under the Federal Power Act.”
6  At that time, the Commission 
noted that much has changed in the industry since the four-prong analysis was first 
developed and posed a number of questions that would be explored through a series 
of technical conferences.  
9.  On April 14, 2004, the Commission issued an order modifying the then-
existing generation market power analysis and its policy governing market power 
mitigation, on an interim basis.
7  The April 14 Order adopted a policy that provided 
                                              
6 Market-Based Rates for Public Utilities, 107 FERC ¶ 61,019 at P 1 (2004) 
(initiating rulemaking proceeding). 
7 AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 (April 14 Order), order on 
reh’g, 108 FERC ¶ 61,026 (2004) (July 8 Order). Docket No. RM04-7-000   7 
 
sellers a number of procedural options, including two indicative generation market 
power screens (an uncommitted pivotal supplier analysis and an uncommitted market 
share analysis), and the option of proposing mitigation tailored to the particular 
circumstances of the seller that would eliminate the ability to exercise market power.  
The order also explained that sellers could choose to adopt cost-based rates.  On July 
8, 2004, the Commission addressed requests for rehearing of the April 14 Order, 
reaffirming the basic analysis, but clarifying and modifying certain instructions for 
performing the generation market power analysis.  Over the next year, the 
Commission convened four technical conferences, seeking input regarding all four 
prongs of the analysis. 
10.  On May 19, 2006, the Commission issued a NOPR in this proceeding.
8  The 
Commission explained that refining and codifying effective standards for market-
based rates would help customers by ensuring that they are protected from the 
exercise of market power and would also provide greater certainty to sellers seeking 
market-based rate authority. 
11.  The regulations proposed in the NOPR adopted in most respects the 
Commission’s existing standards for granting market-based rates, and proposed to 
streamline certain aspects of its filing requirements to reduce the administrative 
                                              
8 Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and 
Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 71 FR 33102 
(Jun. 7, 2006), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,602 (2006) (NOPR). Docket No. RM04-7-000   8 
 
burdens on sellers, customers and the Commission.  The Commission received over 
100 comments and reply comments in response to the NOPR.  A list of commenters 
is attached as Appendix E.   
III.  Overview of Final Rule  
12.  In this Final Rule, the Commission revises and codifies in the Commission’s 
regulations the standards for market-based rates for wholesale sales of electric 
energy, capacity and ancillary services.  The Commission also adopts a number of 
reforms to streamline the administration of the market-based rate program.  As set 
forth below, the Final Rule adopts in many respects the proposals contained in the 
NOPR, but with a number of modifications.  
Horizontal Market Power 
13.  In this Final Rule, the Commission adopts, with certain modifications, two 
indicative market power screens (the uncommitted market share screen (with a 20 
percent threshold) and the uncommitted pivotal supplier screen), each of which will 
serve as a cross check on the other to determine whether sellers may have market 
power and should be further examined.  Sellers that fail either screen will be 
rebuttably presumed to have market power.  However, such sellers will have full 
opportunity to present evidence (through the submission of a Delivered Price Test 
(DPT) analysis) demonstrating that, despite a screen failure, they do not have market 
power, and the Commission will continue to weigh both available economic capacity 
and economic capacity when analyzing market shares and Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Indices (HHIs). Docket No. RM04-7-000   9 
 
14.  With regard to control over generation capacity, the Commission finds that the 
determination of control is appropriately based on a review of the totality of 
circumstances on a fact-specific basis.  No single factor or factors necessarily results 
in control.  The Commission will require a seller to make an affirmative statement as 
to whether a contractual arrangement (energy management agreement, tolling 
agreement, specific contractual terms, etc.) transfers control and to identify the party 
or parties it believes controls the generation facility.  Regarding a presumption of 
control, the Commission will continue its practice of attributing control to the owner 
absent a contractual agreement transferring such control, and we provide guidance as 
to how we will consider jointly-owned facilities. 
15.  The Commission adopts its current approach with regard to the default 
relevant geographic market, with some modifications.  In particular, the Commission 
will continue to use a seller’s control area (balancing authority area)
9 or the RTO/ISO 
market, as applicable, as the default relevant geographic market.  However, where the 
Commission has made a specific finding that there is a submarket within an RTO, 
that submarket becomes the default relevant geographic market for sellers located 
within the submarket for purposes of the market-based rate analysis.  The 
Commission also provides guidance as to the factors the Commission will consider in 
                                              
9 As discussed below in the Horizontal Market Power section, the Commission 
adopts the use of balancing authority area instead of control area. Docket No. RM04-7-000   10 
 
evaluating whether, in a particular case, to adopt an alternative geographic market 
instead of relying on the default geographic market.   
16.  The Commission modifies the native load proxy for the market share screens 
from the minimum peak day in the season to the average peak native load, averaged 
across all days in the season, and clarifies that native load can only include load 
attributable to native load customers based on the definition of native load 
commitment in                      § 33.3(d)(4)(i) of the Commission’s regulations.  In 
addition, sellers are given the option of using seasonal capacity instead of nameplate 
capacity. 
17.  The Commission retains the snapshot in time approach based on historical data 
for both the indicative screens and the DPT analysis and disallows projections to that 
data.  A standard reporting format is adopted for sellers to follow when summarizing 
their analysis. 
18.  The Commission modifies the treatment of newly-constructed generation and 
adopts an approach that requires all sellers to perform a horizontal analysis for the 
grant of market-based rate authority.   
19.  With regard to simultaneous transmission import limit studies (SILs), the 
Commission adopts the requirement that the SIL study be used as a basis for 
transmission access for both the indicative screens and the DPT analysis.  Further, the 
Commission clarifies that the SIL study as shown in Appendix E of the April 14 
Order is the only study that meets our requirements.  The Commission provides Docket No. RM04-7-000   11 
 
guidance regarding how to perform the SIL study, including accounting for specific 
OASIS practices. 
20.  Finally, the Commission adopts procedures under which intervenors in section 
205 proceedings may obtain expedited access to Critical Energy Infrastructure 
Information (CEII) or other information for which privileged treatment is sought. 
Vertical Market Power 
21.  With regard to vertical market power and, in particular, transmission market 
power, the Commission continues the current policy under which an open access 
transmission tariff (OATT) is deemed to mitigate a seller’s transmission market 
power.  However, in recognition of the fact that OATT violations may nonetheless 
occur, the Commission states that a finding of a nexus between the specific facts 
relating to the OATT violation and the entity’s market-based rate authority may 
subject the seller to revocation of its market-based rate authority or other remedies 
the Commission may deem appropriate, such as disgorgement of profits or civil 
penalties.  In addition, the Commission creates a rebuttable presumption that all 
affiliates of a transmission provider should lose their market-based rate authority in 
each market in which their affiliated transmission provider loses its market-based rate 
authority as a result of an OATT violation. 
22.  With regard to other barriers to entry, the Commission adopts the NOPR 
proposal to consider a seller’s ability to erect other barriers to entry as part of the 
vertical market power analysis, but modifies the requirements when addressing other 
barriers to entry.  The Commission also provides clarification regarding the Docket No. RM04-7-000   12 
 
information that a seller must provide with respect to other barriers to entry 
(including which inputs to electric power production the Commission will consider as 
other barriers to entry).  The Commission adopts a rebuttable presumption that 
ownership or control of, or affiliation with an entity that owns or controls, intrastate 
natural gas transportation, intrastate natural gas storage or distribution facilities; sites 
for generation capacity development; and sources of coal supplies and the 
transportation of coal supplies such as barges and rail cars do not allow a seller to 
raise entry barriers, but intervenors are allowed to demonstrate otherwise.  The Final 
Rule also requires a seller to provide a description of its ownership or control of, or 
affiliation with an entity that owns or controls, intrastate natural gas transportation, 
intrastate natural gas storage or distribution facilities; sites for generation capacity 
development; and sources of coal supplies and the transportation of coal supplies 
such as barges and rail cars.  The Commission will require sellers to provide this 
description and to make an affirmative statement that they have not erected barriers to 
entry into the relevant market and will not erect barriers to entry into the relevant 
market.  The Final Rule clarifies that the obligation in this regard applies both to the 
seller and its affiliates, but is limited to the geographic market(s) in which the seller is 
located. 
Affiliate Abuse 
23.  With regard to affiliate abuse, the Commission adopts the NOPR proposal to 
discontinue considering affiliate abuse as a separate “prong” of the market-based rate 
analysis and instead to codify affiliate restrictions in the Commission’s regulations Docket No. RM04-7-000   13 
 
and address affiliate abuse by requiring that the provisions provided in the affiliate 
restrictions be satisfied on an ongoing basis as a condition of obtaining and retaining 
market-based rate authority.  As codified in this Final Rule, the affiliate restrictions 
include a provision prohibiting power sales between a franchised public utility with 
captive customers and any market-regulated power sales affiliates
10 without first 
receiving Commission authorization for the transaction under section 205 of the FPA.  
The Commission also codifies as part of the affiliate restrictions the requirements that 
previously have been known as the market-based rate “code of conduct” (governing 
the separation of functions, the sharing of market information, sales of non-power 
goods or services, and power brokering), as clarified and modified in this Final Rule.  
The Commission modifies certain of these provisions, including separation of 
functions and information sharing, consistent with certain requirements and 
exceptions contained in the Commission’s standards of conduct.
11  In the Final Rule 
the Commission defines “captive customers” as “any wholesale or retail electric 
energy customers served under cost-based regulation” and provides clarification that 
the definition of “captive customers” does not include those customers who have 
retail choice, i.e., the ability to select a retail supplier based on the rates, terms and 
                                              
10 In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to define the term “non-regulated 
power sales affiliate.”  As discussed below, this Final Rule uses the term “market-
regulated power sales affiliate” instead. 
11 18 CFR part 358. Docket No. RM04-7-000   14 
 
conditions of service offered.  In addition, among other clarifications, the 
Commission clarifies and modifies the definition of “non-regulated power sales 
affiliate,” and changes the term to “market-regulated power sales affiliate.”   
24.  The Commission also provides clarification as to what types of affiliate 
transactions are permissible and the criteria used to make those decisions, and how 
the Commission will treat merging partners.  In addition, the Commission codifies in 
the regulations a prohibition on the use of third-party entities, including energy/asset 
managers, to circumvent the affiliate restrictions, but does not adopt the NOPR 
proposal to treat energy/asset managers as affiliates.  The Commission also provides 
clarification regarding the Commission’s market-based rate policies as they relate to 
cooperatives.   
Mitigation 
25.  With regard to mitigation, in the Final Rule the Commission retains the 
incremental cost plus 10 percent methodology as the default mitigation for sales of 
one week or less; the default mitigation rate for mid-term sales (sales of more than 
one week but less than one year) priced at an embedded cost “up to” rate reflecting 
the costs of the unit(s) expected to provide the service; and the existing policy for 
sales of one year or more (long-term) sales.
12  The Commission will continue to 
                                              
12 We note here that we expect mitigated sellers adopting the default cost-based 
rates or proposing new cost-based rates will propose a cost-based rate tariff of general 
applicability for sales of less than one year, and sales of power for one year or longer will 
be filed with the Commission on a stand-alone basis.  Docket No. RM04-7-000   15 
 
allow sellers to propose alternative cost-based methods of mitigation tailored to their 
particular circumstances.  The Final Rule also states that the Commission will make 
its stacking methodology available for the public.
13  In addition, the Commission will 
continue the practice of allowing discounting and will permit selective discounting by 
mitigated sellers provided that the sellers do not use such discounting to unduly 
discriminate or give undue preference. 
26.  The Commission concludes that use of the Western Systems Power Pool 
(WSPP) Agreement may be unjust, unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or 
preferential for certain sellers.  Therefore, in an order being issued concurrently with 
this Final Rule, the Commission is instituting a proceeding under section 206 of the 
FPA to investigate whether, for sellers found to have market power or presumed to 
have market power in a particular market, the WSPP Agreement rate for coordination 
energy sales is just and reasonable in such market. 
27.  The Commission does not impose an across-the-board “must offer” 
requirement for mitigated sellers.  While wholesale customer commenters have raised 
concerns relating to their ability to access needed power, the Commission concludes 
that there is insufficient record evidence to support instituting a generic “must offer” 
requirement. 
                                              
13 This is addressed in the Mitigation section discussion concerning the cost-based 
rate methodology for sales of more than one week but less than one year.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   16 
 
28.  The Commission limits mitigation to the market in which the seller has been 
found to possess, or chosen not to rebut the presumption of, market power and does 
not place limitations on a mitigated seller’s ability to sell at market-based rates in 
areas in which the seller has not been found to have market power. 
29.  Finally, regarding mitigation, the Final Rule allows mitigated sellers to make 
market-based rate sales at the metered boundary between a mitigated balancing 
authority area and a balancing authority area in which the seller has market-based rate 
authority under the conditions set forth herein, including a record retention 
requirement, and provides a tariff provision to allow for such sales. 
 
 
Implementation Process 
30.  The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal to create a category of sellers 
(Category 1 sellers) that are exempt from the requirement to automatically submit 
updated market power analyses, with certain clarifications and modifications.  In 
addition, the Commission adopts the NOPR proposal to implement a regional 
approach to updated market power analyses, but reduces the number of regions from 
nine to six. 
31.  As for a standardized tariff, the Commission does not adopt the NOPR 
proposal to adopt a market-based rate tariff of general applicability that all market-
based rate sellers will be required to file as a condition of market-based rate authority 
and to require each corporate family to have only one tariff, with all affiliates with Docket No. RM04-7-000   17 
 
market-based rate authority separately identified in the tariff.  Instead, the 
Commission adopts specific market-based rate tariff provisions that the Commission 
will require to be part of a seller’s market-based rate tariff.  However, the 
Commission will allow a seller to include seller specific terms and conditions in its 
market-based rate tariff, but the Commission will not review any of these provisions, 
as they are presumed to be just and reasonable based on the Commission’s finding 
that the seller and its affiliates lack or have adequately mitigated market power in the 
relevant market. 
Miscellaneous Issues 
32.  The Commission also provides clarifications in the Final Rule with regard to 
accounting waivers, Part 34 blanket authorizations, sellers affiliated with foreign 
entities, and the change in status reporting requirement.  Further, the Commission 
abandons the posting requirements for third party sellers of ancillary services at 
market-based rates as redundant of other reporting requirements. 
IV.  Discussion 
A. Horizontal Market Power 
1.  Whether to Retain the Indicative Screens 
33.  As discussed in detail below, the Commission is adopting in this Final Rule 
two indicative horizontal market power screens, each of which will serve as a cross-
check on the other to determine whether sellers may have market power and should 
be further examined.  Although some sellers disagree with the use of two screens or 
find flaws in them, we conclude that this conservative approach will allow the Docket No. RM04-7-000   18 
 
Commission to more readily identify potential market power.  Sellers that fail either 
screen will be rebuttably presumed to have market power.  However, such sellers will 
have full opportunity to present evidence (through the submission of a DPT analysis) 
demonstrating that, despite a screen failure, they do not have market power.  No 
screen is perfect, but we believe this approach appropriately balances the need to 
protect against market power with the desire not to place unnecessary filing burdens 
on utilities. 
34.  The first screen is the wholesale market share screen, which measures for each 
of the four seasons whether a seller has a dominant position in the market based on 
the  
 
 
 
 
number of megawatts of uncommitted capacity owned or controlled by the seller as 
compared to the uncommitted capacity of the entire relevant market.
14
35.  The second screen is the pivotal supplier screen, which evaluates the potential 
of a seller to exercise market power based on uncommitted capacity at the time of the 
balancing authority area’s annual peak demand.  This screen focuses on the seller’s 
                                              
14 April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 100. Docket No. RM04-7-000   19 
 
ability to exercise market power unilaterally.  It examines whether the market 
demand can be met absent the seller during peak times.  A seller is pivotal if demand 
cannot be met without some contribution of supply by the seller or its affiliates.
15 
36.  Use of the two screens together enables the Commission to measure market 
power at both peak and off-peak times, and to examine the seller’s ability to exercise 
market power unilaterally and in coordinated interaction with other sellers.  Use of 
the two  
screens, therefore, provides a more complete picture of a seller’s ability to exercise 
market power.
16
37.  As discussed more fully in the following sections, with regard to determining 
the total supply in the relevant market, the horizontal market power analysis centers 
on and examines the balancing authority area where the seller’s generation is 
physically located.  Total supply is determined by adding the total amount of 
uncommitted capacity located in the relevant market (including capacity owned by 
the seller and competing suppliers) with that of uncommitted supplies that can be 
imported (limited by simultaneous transmission import capability) into the relevant 
market from the first-tier markets.   
                                              
15 Id. at P 72. 
16 Id. Docket No. RM04-7-000   20 
 
38.  Uncommitted capacity is determined by adding the total nameplate or seasonal 
capacity
17 of generation owned or controlled through contract and firm purchases, 
less operating reserves, native load commitments and long-term firm sales.
18  
Uncommitted capacity from a seller’s remote generation (generation located in an 
adjoining balancing authority area) should be included in the seller’s total 
uncommitted capacity amounts.  Any simultaneous transmission import capability 
should first be allocated to the seller’s uncommitted remote generation.  Any 
remaining simultaneous transmission import capability would then be allocated to 
any uncommitted competing supplies. 
39.  Capacity reductions as a result of operating reserve requirements should be no 
higher than State and Regional Reliability Council operating requirements for 
reliability (i.e., operating reserves).  Any proposed amounts that are higher than such 
requirements must be fully supported and will be considered on a case-by-case basis.  
Moreover, if an intervenor provides conclusive evidence that a seller did not in actual 
practice comply with the NERC or regional reliability council operating reserve 
requirements, then we will take this into account in determining the amount of the 
operating reserve deduction.  However, we emphasize that we expect each utility to 
                                              
17 As discussed more fully below, in this Final Rule, the Commission gives sellers 
the option of using seasonal capacity instead of nameplate capacity.  
18 Sellers may deduct generation associated with their long-term firm requirements 
sales, unless the Commission disallows such deductions based on extraordinary 
circumstances. Docket No. RM04-7-000   21 
 
meet its NERC and regional reliability council reserve requirements, and that absent a 
clear showing to the contrary by an intervenor, the required operating reserve 
requirement is what we will use as the deduction in the market-based rate 
calculation.
19 
40.  The Commission does not expect that sellers will have planned generation 
outages scheduled for the annual peak load day.  However, on a case-by-case basis, 
the Commission will consider credible evidence that planned generation outages for 
the peak load day of the year should be included based on the particular 
circumstances of the seller.
20 
41.  With regard to the pivotal supplier analysis, after computing the total 
uncommitted supply available to serve the relevant market, the next step in this 
analysis involves identifying the wholesale market.  The proxy for the wholesale load 
is the annual peak load (needle peak) less the proxy for native load obligation (i.e., 
the average of the daily native load peaks during the month in which the annual peak 
load day occurs).  Peak load is the largest electric power requirement (based on net 
energy for load) during a specific period of time usually integrated over one clock 
                                              
19 April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P96. 
20 As noted below, the market share screen deducts generation capacity used for 
planned outages (that were done in accordance with good utility practice) in all four 
seasons in order to reflect the typical operation of generation units. Docket No. RM04-7-000   22 
 
hour and expressed in megawatts, for the native load and firm wholesale 
requirements sales. 
42.  To calculate the net uncommitted supply available to compete at wholesale, 
the pivotal supplier analysis deducts the wholesale load from the total uncommitted 
supply.  If the seller’s uncommitted capacity is less than the net uncommitted supply, 
the seller satisfies the pivotal supplier portion of the generation market power 
analysis and passes the screen.  If the seller’s uncommitted capacity is equal to or 
greater than the net uncommitted supply, then the seller fails the pivotal supplier 
analysis which creates a rebuttable presumption of market power.  
43.  With regard to the wholesale market share analysis, which measures for each 
of the four seasons whether a seller has a dominant position in the market based on 
the number of megawatts of uncommitted capacity owned or controlled by the seller 
as compared to the uncommitted capacity of the entire relevant market, uncommitted 
capacity amounts are used, as described above, with the following variation.  Planned 
outages (that were done in accordance with good utility practice) for each season will 
be considered.  Planned outage amounts should be consistent with those as reported 
in FERC Form No. 714.  To determine the amount of planned outages for a given 
season, the total number of MW-days of outages is divided by the total number of 
days in the season.  For example, if 500 MW of generation that is out for six days 
during the winter period the calculation of planned outages would be: (500 MW X 
6)/91 or 33 MW.     Docket No. RM04-7-000   23 
 
44.  The market share analysis adopts an initial threshold of 20 percent.  That is, a 
seller who has less than a 20 percent market share in the relevant market for all 
seasons will be considered to satisfy the market share analysis.
21  A seller with a 
market share of 20 percent or more in the relevant market for any season will have a 
rebuttable presumption of market power but can present historical evidence to show 
that the seller satisfies our generation market power concerns. 
Commission Proposal 
45.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to retain the indicative screens 
(pivotal supplier and market share) to assess horizontal market power that were 
initially adopted in April 2004.
22  Because the indicative screens are intended only to 
identify the sellers that require further review, the Commission proposed to retain the 
20 percent threshold for the wholesale market share indicative screen, stating that the 
20 percent market share threshold strikes the right balance in seeking to avoid both 
“false negatives” and “false positives.”  The Commission also proposed to continue 
to measure pivotal suppliers at the time of the annual peak load in the pivotal supplier 
indicative screen, which is the most likely point in time that a seller will be a pivotal 
                                              
21 The 20 percent threshold is consistent with § 4.134 of the U.S. Department of 
Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines issued June 14, 1984, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. 
P13,103 (CCH 1988):  “The Department [of Justice] is likely to challenge any merger 
satisfying the other conditions in which the acquired firm has a market share of 20 
percent or more.” 
22 See April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018.Docket No. RM04-7-000   24 
 
supplier.  For this reason, the Commission did not propose to expand the pivotal 
supplier analysis to other time periods. 
Comments 
46.  Numerous commenters question whether the Commission should retain the 
current indicative screens in whole or in part.  For example, Southern, Duke and EEI 
advocate abandoning the market share indicative screen altogether.  They argue that 
the market share indicative screen is “fatally flawed” because it does not take into 
account wholesale demand in the relevant market
23 which makes it difficult for 
traditional utilities outside of RTOs/ISOs to pass.
24  E.ON. US. and PNM/Tucson 
separately argue that one must consider the level of demand that is seeking supply 
and, more particularly, what ability sellers have to exercise market power over those 
buyers.
25  In this regard, E.ON. US. and PNM/Tucson argue that to the extent the 
                                              
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
         
23 Southern at 11, Duke at 20, EEI at 6-7. 
24 Duke at 17, EEI at 8-9. 
25 E.ON. US. at 16-17 and PNM/Tucson at 5-6.  According to E.ON. US. and 
PNM/Tucson, the past decade has seen strong development in the West of open access to 
transmission and the ownership of generating assets, solely or jointly, by formerly 
“captive” wholesale customers.  As a result, any analysis that has as its foundation 
division of the market into suppliers and presumptively captive customers is at odds with 
present reality, in which wholesale customers have a host of suppliers seeking their 
business.  E.ON. US. and PNM/Tucson state that an illustration of how open access in the 
West has enhanced the ability of load serving entities to secure competitive resources on 
an efficient scale across control areas is provided by a recent Southwest Public Power 
Resources Group request for proposals for 255 MW in 2007, growing to 962 MW by 
2014 in four control areas – Arizona Public Service, Salt River Project, Western Area 
Power Administration-Desert Southwest Region and Tucson Electric. (The Southwest Docket No. RM04-7-000   25 
 
market share screen does not consider wholesale demand, it is not a useful indicator, 
and in fact is almost universally a false indicator of the ability of a seller to exercise 
market power over demand.  Also, EEI argues that because of design flaws inherent 
in the market share screen as well as the negative impact that the use of this test has 
had since 2004 on the development of competitive wholesale markets (through the 
inappropriate exclusion of the majority of non-RTO utilities from participating in that 
market), the market share screen should be eliminated for all market power screening 
and analysis purposes.
26  
47.  EEI contends that the Commission should use only the pivotal supplier screen 
for indicative screening purposes and the DPT pivotal supplier and market 
concentration analyses for the purposes of rebutting the presumption of generation 
market power that would result from the failure of the indicative pivotal supplier 
screen.  EEI argues that if the Commission continues to use the market share screen 
as an initial screen, the Commission should not include a market share test as a 
component of any subsequent DPT analysis of market power.   
48.  E.ON U.S. and PNM/Tucson generally agree, stating that market share is an 
unreliable measure of market power in competitive energy markets and that the courts 
                                                                                                                                                  
Public Power Resources Group represents thirty-nine public power entities in Arizona, 
California, and Nevada.) See Southwestern Public Utilities Issue Long-Term RFP, 
ELECTRIC POWER DAILY, July 14, 2006, at 3. 
26 EEI at 10. Docket No. RM04-7-000   26 
 
have long recognized that market share is not a reliable indicator of market power in 
regulated markets.
27  In particular, E.ON U.S. and PNM/Tucson argue that even a 
marginal failure of the market share screen results in a rebuttable presumption of 
market power that has tremendous consequences by forcing sellers to proceed to 
costly and time-consuming DPT analysis or agree to mitigation.  As a result, the 
“false positives” arising from the market share screen dampen the vigor of 
competitive wholesale market participation by unnecessarily curtailing the market-
based authority of entities that, in fact, lack market power (to the extent such entities 
choose not to pursue a costly and uncertain effort to rebut the presumption of market 
power created by the screen failure).
28 
49.  Duke and Southern suggest that a wholesale contestable load analysis (also 
described as a "competitive alternatives" analysis)
29 should be added to the indicative 
screens, which would consider the amount of excess market supply available to serve  
                                              
27 Citing Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Wash. Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 950-51 
(9th Cir. 1996) (Cost Management); Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 
1421, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995) (Rebel); S. Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T Co., 740 F.2d 
980, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Southern Pacific  Communications); MCI Communications 
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1107 (7th Cir. 1983) (MCI Communications); Mid-
Tex. Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1386-89 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(Mid-Tex Communications); Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,      
615 F.2d 343, 354 (5th Cir. 1980) (Almeda). 
 
28 E.ON U.S. at 16; PNM/Tucson at 5-6. 
29 Dr. Pace at 12. Docket No. RM04-7-000   27 
 
the amount of wholesale demand seeking supply.
30  Generally, if available non-
applicant supply is at least twice the contestable load, advocates of the contestable 
load analysis believe that is sufficient to make a finding that the market is 
competitive.
31  Other commenters agree that the market share indicative screen can 
diminish competition because sellers that are subjects of a FPA section 206 
investigation tend to choose mitigation rather than challenge the presumption of 
market power.
32   
50.  Duke argues that the Commission has yet to establish a need for using the 
market share indicative screen in addition to the pivotal supplier indicative screen in 
assessing the potential for the exercise of generation market power.  In this regard, 
Duke argues that the Commission itself acknowledged in the April 14 Order 
(establishing the new indicative market power screens) that if a supplier passes the 
pivotal supplier indicative screen, it would not be able to exercise generation market 
power.  Thus, Duke concludes that the use of any other indicative screens would 
appear to be redundant and an unwarranted burden on market-based rate sellers.
 33  
Further, Duke submits that neither of the rationales originally cited by the 
Commission in support of the market share screen – its ability to identify 
                                              
30 Duke at 21, Southern at 16-17.  
31 Dr. Pace at 16. 
32 E.ON U.S. at 15-16; PNM/Tucson at 5-6, EEI at 10. 
33 Duke reply comments at 15 and n. 21. Docket No. RM04-7-000   28 
 
“coordinating behavior,” or its ability to detect the exercise of market power in off-
peak periods – has been validated.  In this regard, Duke submits that the potential for 
“coordinating behavior” should consider overall market concentration levels as 
measured by HHIs and in any event, such behavior is already subject to oversight and 
substantial penalties under the antitrust laws and the Commission’s recently adopted 
rule prohibiting market manipulation.  Further, Duke claims that the nearly universal 
failure rate of load-serving utilities under the market share indicative screen in their 
control areas underscores its limited value as an indicator of off-peak market power.
34 
51.  Duke states that a review of filings by vertically integrated utilities that are not 
RTO participants shows that the vast majority have failed the market share screen in 
their control areas, and most have subsequently been forced to adopt some form of 
cost-based mitigation for wholesale sales in that market.  Yet Duke is unaware of any 
credible evidence suggesting that any form of generation market power has been 
exercised by these utilities.  Instead, Duke states that the Commission has revoked 
market-based rate authority and imposed mitigation on the basis of indicative screen 
results that suggest the potential for market power.
35  APPA/TAPS counter that the 
Commission should not limit its response to market power only to instances of its 
                                              
34 Duke reply comments at 15 and n. 22. 
35 Duke at 16. Docket No. RM04-7-000   29 
 
actual exercise; they note that the Commission considers whether a seller and its 
affiliates have market power or have mitigated it, not whether it has been exercised.
36 
52.  Another commenter suggests substituting the HHI for the market share 
indicative screen or supplementing the indicative screens with the HHI, reasoning 
that the market must be evaluated, not just the individual market share.
37 
53.  Southern states that the Commission should rely upon any indicative screens 
only in conjunction with an optional “expedited track” safe harbor review.  Under 
Southern’s proposal, the indicative screens would be voluntary and those submitting 
to and passing the screens would be permitted to retain or obtain market-based rate 
authority, subject to a proceeding under section 206 of the FPA, under which the 
party seeking to challenge the rate must submit substantial evidence justifying 
revocation.  If a seller fails the screen(s), or if it elects to submit a DPT rather than 
voluntarily submit the indicative screens,
 then a robust market power assessment 
should be used to determine whether (or the extent to which) the seller should be 
permitted to sell power at market-based rates. 
54.  In Southern’s view, failure of the indicative screens should not give rise to a 
presumption of market power.
38  Southern argues that mere failure to pass a screen, 
                                              
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
         
36 APPA/TAPS reply comments at 6-7, citing Duke at 16. 
37 Drs. Broehm & Fox-Penner at 2-4. 
38 Southern argues that, in the context of the indicative screens, the prejudice 
associated with integrated franchised public utility status is severe and instead of Docket No. RM04-7-000   30 
 
without more robust market power assessments, is an insufficient basis upon which to 
base a presumption of market power.  Southern argues this is because, in the case of 
the pivotal supplier screen, the Commission itself admits that it does not give a full 
picture and that the DPT provides better information.  With regard to the market 
share screen, Southern argues that the market share screen has even more basic 
problems as an indicator of market power.  Southern states that, because of the 
market share analysis’ serious flaws, the great majority of integrated franchised 
public utilities inevitably will fail the market share screen.  Thus, with respect to 
integrated franchised public utilities, the market share screen serves no real purpose 
other than to state the obvious: integrated franchised public utilities build and 
maintain adequate resources to serve their native loads and inevitably will have 
market shares greater than 20 percent in their home control areas under the 
Commission’s computational procedures.  Southern states that, since the DPT reduces 
the level of false positives and is a more definitive means for determining the 
existence of market power, the Commission should use the DPT as the default test.
39  
PPL agrees with Southern's proposal that the indicative screens be made voluntary.
40 
                                                                                                                                                  
providing a fair or meaningful measure of market power, the market share screen 
operates to create a priori evidentiary presumption of guilt, the screen is improper, creates 
due process concerns, and should not be adopted for purposes of the final rule. 
39 Southern at 8, 11-13. 
40 PPL reply comments at 8. Docket No. RM04-7-000   31 
 
55.  Southern states that if the market share screen is retained, it should be adjusted 
for forced outages because such capacity is not available.  Southern also notes that 
forced outages are tracked and reported to the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC), which presents generating unit availability statistics data for 
generator unit groups.
41 
56.  NRECA disagrees with Southern’s proposal, stating that forced outage 
deductions have little effect when applied to all sellers.
42  It also believes that sellers 
do not make forced outage deductions in long-term contracts; therefore, it is 
inappropriate to make the deduction for the market power tests.   
57.  While EPSA does not agree with some of the Commission’s proposed changes 
to the horizontal analysis in the NOPR (i.e., changes to the post-1996 exemption and 
the native load proxy), in general, EPSA supports the two indicative screens as a 
means for indicating that an entity might have market power.   
58.  EPSA notes that it is time to move beyond the battle over crafting the perfect 
screens, arguing:  1) it is likely no such perfect screens exist, as evidenced by the fact 
that stakeholders and the Commission have gone through several iterations to get to 
today’s screens; and 2) in the end, the screens are only indicative measures.  EPSA 
notes that failure of one or both of the screens does not brandish an entity with market 
                                              
41 Southern at 14-15. 
42 NRECA reply comments at 18. Docket No. RM04-7-000   32 
 
power, but merely raises a flag that further analysis is necessary in order to assess an 
entity’s ability to exercise market power.  The current state of wholesale electricity 
markets, EPSA argues, requires indicative screens that are neither definitive nor an 
aperture letting everything pass, but rather a sieve that catches potential problems for 
further examination.  EPSA agrees with retention of both of the current indicative 
screens and the “next steps” set forth for those entities that fail one or both of those 
screens. 
59.  Several other commenters also support retention of the indicative screens.  
Some of these commenters state that, because section 205 of the FPA requires rates to 
be just and reasonable, a market share indicative screen is appropriate to ensure that 
outcome.  NRECA adds that “[b]ecause of past or present state regulation, many 
traditional public utilities have acquired dominant market shares of generation 
capacity in their own control areas—sufficient to enable them to exercise market 
power absent regulation of their behavior.  NRECA submits that regardless of the 
cause the incumbent public utilities will remain the dominant firms in their own 
control areas absent significant new market entry in the form of new generation 
construction in the control area by independent firms, or significant transmission 
construction to permit entry by generation outside the control area.  Morgan Stanley 
also favors retaining the market share indicative screen, noting that failure of the 
market share indicative screen does not mean the process is unfair, and asserting that Docket No. RM04-7-000   33 
 
exclusive reliance on the pivotal supplier indicative screen may compromise market 
power detection.
43 
60.  With regard to the suggestion that the Commission adopt a contestable load 
analysis, several commenters criticize the contestable load analysis, stating that it 
changes the focus of the market power analysis from the seller to the market.  They 
counter that the contestable load analysis is unsound, with APPA/TAPS citing 
Federal  
Trade Commission (FTC) comments in this proceeding that such an analysis is flawed.
44  
NRECA states that commenters have not provided sufficient justification for using a 
contestable load analysis. 
61.  With regard to Southern's suggestion that the indicative screens be made 
voluntary and function as a safe harbor, such that screen failure would simply mean 
that further review of the seller would be appropriate, but not merit a section 206 
                                              
43 Morgan Stanley reply comments at 10-11. 
44 APPA/TAPS reply comments at 11, NRECA reply comments at 13-14.  The 
FTC filed comments in this proceeding in January 2006 on the contestable load test.  FTC 
states that "the historical contestable load proposal fails to include a number of 
potentially important considerations in its framework for assessing horizontal market 
power, and the elements that it does include are not considered in an economically sound 
manner.  In sum, the proposal does not represent an analytical advance over existing 
techniques to evaluate horizontal market power, and it falls far short of the economically 
sound framework for market power analysis presented in the Merger Guidelines."  The 
FTC defines the following specific problems with the contestable load analysis: the price 
is not considered in the assessment of available supply, contractual and legal restrictions 
on supply are ignored, and the contestable load analysis ignores transmission 
discrimination and transmission constraints, which delineate the market.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   34 
 
investigation, NRECA states that Southern's argument is contrary to law.  NRECA 
argues that, as the proponent of a tariff allowing it to charge market-based rates, the 
public utility has the burden of proof to demonstrate that its wholesale rates will be 
disciplined by competition.  NRECA submits that failing the indicative screens 
indicates that the seller has not yet provided "'empirical proof'" that competition will 
drive down prices to just and reasonable levels as the FPA requires.
45 
Commission Determination 
62.  We adopt the proposal in the NOPR to retain both of the indicative screens.  
The intent of the indicative screens is to identify the sellers that raise no horizontal 
market power concerns and can otherwise be considered for market-based rate 
authority.  At the same time, sellers that do not pass the indicative screens are 
allowed to provide additional analysis for Commission consideration.  Because the 
indicative screens are intended to screen out only those sellers that raise no horizontal 
market power concerns, as opposed to other sellers that raise concerns but may not 
necessarily possess horizontal market power, we find it appropriate to use 
conservative criteria and to rely on more than one screen.  A conservative approach at 
the indicative screen stage of the proceeding is warranted because, if a seller passes 
both of the indicative screens, there is a rebuttable presumption that it does not 
possess horizontal market power. 
                                              
45 NRECA reply comments at 20-21. Docket No. RM04-7-000   35 
 
63.  The rebuttable presumption of horizontal market power that attaches to sellers 
failing one of the indicative screens is just that—a rebuttable presumption.  It is not a 
definitive finding by the Commission; sellers are provided with several procedural 
options including the right to challenge the market power presumption by submitting 
a DPT analysis, or, alternatively, sellers can accept the presumption of market power 
and adopt some form of cost-based mitigation.
46  Accordingly, we will adopt the 
proposal to continue to use the two indicative screens and find that failure of either 
indicative screen creates a rebuttable presumption of market power.  We reiterate our 
finding that "[f]ailure to pass either of the indicative screens . . . will constitute a 
prima facie showing that the rates charged by the seller pursuant to its market-based 
rate authority may have become unjust and unreasonable and that continuation of the 
seller’s market-based rate authority may no longer be just and reasonable."
47 
64.  This approach, contrary to the claims of several commenters, will help to 
further competitive markets by allowing sellers without market power to sell power at 
                                              
46 In the April 14 Order, the Commission stated that proposals for alternative 
mitigation in these circumstances could include cost-based rates or other mitigation that 
the Commission may deem appropriate.  For example, a seller could propose to transfer 
operational control of enough generation to a third party such that the applicant would  
satisfy our generation market power concerns.  April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at n. 
142. 
47 April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 209. Docket No. RM04-7-000   36 
 
market-based rates, and it will similarly give customers security that sellers that fail 
the screens are required to submit to further scrutiny and/or mitigation.     
65.  The pivotal supplier and market share indicative screens measure different 
aspects of market power.  As the Commission stated in the April 14 Order, the 
uncommitted pivotal supplier indicative screen measures the ability of a firm to 
dominate the market at peak periods.  The uncommitted market share analysis 
provides a measure as to whether a supplier may have a dominant position in the 
market, which is another indicator of potential unilateral market power and the ability 
of a seller to effect coordinated interaction with other sellers.  The market share 
screen is also useful in measuring market power because it measures a seller’s size 
relative to others in the market, in particular, the seller’s share of generating capacity 
uncommitted after accounting for its obligations to serve native load.  The market 
share screen provides a snapshot of these market shares in each season of the year.  
Taken together, the indicative screens can measure a seller's market power at both 
peak and off-peak times.
48  Both market share and pivotal supplier indicative screens 
are appropriate first steps for the Commission to use in determining if it needs a more 
robust analysis to determine whether the seller has market power.  We conclude that 
having two screens as backstops to one another will better assist us in determining the 
existence of potential market power.  Accordingly, we reject the suggestion of several 
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commenters to abandon the market share indicative screen.  We will retain both the 
pivotal supplier and market share indicative screens as described in the NOPR, as 
well as apply the rebuttable presumption of market power for those sellers that fail 
either indicative screen.
49   
66.  In addition, the Commission will not adopt suggestions to alter the indicative 
screens in order to incorporate a contestable load analysis, as proposed by EEI and 
others.  As noted by the FTC, APPA/TAPS, and NRECA, the contestable load 
analysis is flawed because, among other things, it does not consider control of 
generation through contracts.  The Commission explained in the April 14 Order that 
the roles of the indicative screens are meant to be complementary.  The pivotal 
supplier indicative screen indicates whether demand can be met without some 
contribution of supply by the seller at peak times, while the market share indicative 
screen indicates whether the seller has a dominant position in the market and may 
therefore have the ability to exercise horizontal market power, both unilaterally and 
in coordination with other sellers.
 50  The contestable load analysis is essentially a 
variant on the pivotal supplier screen with differences in the calculation of wholesale 
load and the test thresholds, because, like the pivotal supplier screen, it addresses 
                                              
49 As we noted in the July 8 Order, a number of those commenters that proposed 
eliminating the market share screen had supported it as a viable alternative in the past.  
July 8 Order, 108 FERC ¶ 61,026 at P 87.   
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whether suppliers other than the seller can meet the demand in the relevant market.  
Therefore incorporating such an analysis would not improve our ability to establish a 
presumption of whether a seller has market power.  The contestable load analysis 
therefore would add little useful information, and without the market share indicative 
screen, the Commission would have insufficient information because there would be 
no analysis of a seller’s size relative to the other sellers in the market, and no 
information on the seller's market power during off-peak periods.   
67.  In addition, the contestable load analysis fails to consider the relative price of 
the competing supplies.  Commenters have argued that if available non-applicant 
supply is at least twice the contestable load, the market is competitive.  However, this 
analysis fails to consider whether the available non-applicant supply is competitively 
priced and, thus, in the market.  This weakness in the contestable load analysis is 
addressed in the DPT analysis which considers only supply that is competitively 
priced. 
68.  We also reject arguments by E.ON U.S. and PNM/Tucson that the wholesale 
market share screen should be replaced because, they argue, it does not consider the 
size of the wholesale supply in the relevant market relative to the wholesale demand 
in that market.  E.ON. U.S. and PNM/Tucson are requesting an analysis very similar 
to the contestable load analysis, whose defining characteristic is measuring the 
wholesale supply market relative to wholesale demand, which, as stated above, is 
essentially the same as the pivotal supplier screen, and would therefore add little 
useful information to the screening process.  Docket No. RM04-7-000   39 
 
69.  We reject Duke’s claim that because neither of the rationales originally cited 
by the Commission in support of the market share indicative screen – its ability to 
identify “coordinating behavior,” or its ability to detect the exercise of market power 
in off-peak periods – has been validated, the wholesale market share indicative screen 
is unnecessary.  Specifically, the Commission believes that the ability of market 
participants to exercise market power through "coordinating behavior" is a legitimate 
concern under the FPA, in addition to the fact that it has long been recognized by the 
antitrust authorities.
51  The Commission also believes it is possible to exercise market 
power in off-peak periods because during such times the amount of supply in the 
market may be greatly reduced (e.g., because of planned outages for plant 
maintenance), meaning that a seller that is not dominant at peak times might be at off-
peak.   
70.  Moreover, we agree with APPA/TAPS that market-based rate assessments are 
used to determine the ability to exercise, not the exercise of, market power.  The 
Commission need not wait passively until market power is exercised.  Rather, it is 
incumbent on the Commission to set policies that will ensure that rates remain just 
and reasonable under section 205 of the FPA.  Requiring sellers to submit screens 
that analyze the sellers’ potential to exercise market power is consistent with such a 
policy. 
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71.  We are unpersuaded by E.ON U.S.’s and PNM/Tucson's argument that “false 
positives” arising from the market share screen dampen the vigor of competitive 
wholesale market participation by unnecessarily curtailing the market-based rate 
authority of entities that, according to E. ON. U.S. and PNM/Tucson, lack market 
power.  We recognize that a conservative screen may result in some false positives, 
but must weigh that against the cost of the false negatives that would occur if we 
adopted a less conservative screen or eliminated the market share indicative screen.   
72.  E.ON U.S. and PNM/Tucson, to support their point, cite several court cases in 
which market shares were alleged not to be reliable indicators of market power in 
regulated markets.  However, the cases cited are not relevant to the issue of whether 
the Commission should retain the wholesale market share screen.  The purpose of our 
indicative screens is to distinguish sellers that may raise horizontal market power 
concerns and those that do not; the market share screen is not the end of our 
horizontal  
market power analysis.  In contrast, the cases cited by E.ON U.S. and PNM/Tucson
52 
involve allegations of unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act,
53 a 
                                              
52 Cost Management, 99 F.3d 937; Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d 1421; S. Pac. 
Communications, 740 F.2d 780; MCI Communications, 708 F.2d 1081; Mid-Tex 
Communications, 615 F.2d 1372; and Almeda, 615 F.2d 343. 
53 15 U.S.C. 2, which states:  Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
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federal antitrust statute prohibiting trade monopolies.  The focus in such cases (whether a 
company has violated the Sherman Act) and the standard for making such a 
determination is different than the focus of the Commission at the indicative screen stage 
of the horizontal market power analysis (identifying sellers that require further horizontal 
market analysis without making a definitive finding regarding market power). 
73.  On both theoretical and practical grounds, we reject the argument by EEI and 
others that the market share indicative screen can diminish competition because some 
sellers that are the subject of a section 206 investigation choose mitigation rather than 
challenge the presumption of market power.  First, mitigating a seller with market 
power ensures that the other sellers in the market cannot benefit from an artificially 
high market price due to the seller with market power exercising market power.  
Second, in our experience, sellers that choose mitigation rather than challenge the 
presumption of market power have market shares that are likely to indicate a 
dominant position in a geographic market.
54  In addition, many sellers have 
                                                                                                                                                  
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of 
the court.” 
54 See, e.g., Aquila, Inc., 112 FERC ¶ 61,307 (2005); Carolina Power & Light Co,. 
113 FERC ¶ 61,130 (2005); The Empire District Electric Co., 116 FERC ¶ 61,150 
(2006); MidAmerican Energy Co., 117 FERC ¶ 61,178 (2006); Xcel Energy Services 
Inc., 117 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2006).  Docket No. RM04-7-000   42 
 
successfully rebutted the presumption of market power after failing one of the 
indicative screens.
55  
74.  Further, we will not adopt the suggestion to substitute the HHI for the market 
share indicative screen or to supplement the indicative screens with the HHI.  The 
indicative screens are used to separate sellers who are presumed to have market 
power from those that, absent extraordinary and transitory circumstances, clearly do 
not.  We will not substitute the market share screen with an HHI screen because, as 
we have stated above, the seller’s market share conveys useful information about its 
ability to exercise market power, so eliminating the market share screen in favor of 
the HHI could increase the risk of false negatives.
56  In addition, a high HHI can be 
the result of high market shares of sellers in the market other than the seller, and the 
focus of our analysis is on the sellert’s ability to exercise market power, so the HHI 
would provide little additional information to allow us to identify those sellers who 
clearly do not have market power.  Finally, the HHI primarily provides information 
on the ability of sellers to exercise market power through coordinated behavior, while 
                                              
55 See, e.g., Kansas City Power and Light Co., 113 FERC ¶ 61,074 (2005); PPL 
Montana, LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,204 (2006); PacifiCorp, 115 FERC ¶ 61,349 (2006); 
Tucson Electric Power Co., 116 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2006); Acadia Power Partners, LLC, 
113 FERC ¶ 61,073 (2005).   
56 For example, in a market with one seller with a 35 percent market share and 13 
sellers each with 5 percent market shares, the HHI would be 1,550 (1,225 + 13(25)), 
which would not fail the 2,500 HHI threshold or even the proposed lower 1,800 HHI 
threshold.  In such a market, a firm with a 35 percent market share could have the ability 
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the market share screen primarily provides information on a particular seller’s ability 
unilaterally to exercise market power.  We will not supplement the indicative screens 
with the HHI screen because the indicative screens are sufficiently conservative to 
identify those sellers that have a rebuttable presumption of market power, without 
having to add an additional layer of review at the initial stage. 
75.  We clarify that sellers and intervenors may present alternative evidence such 
as a DPT study or historical sales and transmission data to support or rebut the results 
of the indicative screens.  For example, intervenors could present evidence based on 
historical wholesale sales data or challenge the assumption that competing suppliers 
inside a balancing authority area have access to the market (such a challenge could 
take into account both the actual historical transmission usage at the time of the study 
as well as the amount of available transmission capacity at that time).
57  A seller may 
present evidence in support of a contention that, notwithstanding the results of the 
indicative screens, it does not possess market power.
58  However, sellers should not 
expect that the Commission will postpone initiating a section 206 investigation to 
protect customers  
 
                                              
57 Id. at P 37. 
58 Id. at n. 11. Docket No. RM04-7-000   44 
 
while it examines this supplemental information if screen failures are indicated.
59  
Nevertheless, the Commission may factor in this alternative evidence before deciding 
whether to initiate a section 206 investigation if the alternative evidence is appropriately 
supported, comprehensive and unambiguous, and conducive to prompt review by the 
Commission.   
76.  We will not adopt Southern's suggestion that the indicative screens be made 
voluntary.  We will continue to require that sellers submit the indicative screens or 
concede the presumption of market power before they file a DPT.  However, as 
discussed above, a seller may submit with its indicative screens a DPT as alternative 
evidence.  As stated above, submission of a DPT analysis as alternative evidence at 
the same time a seller submits the indicative screens may result in the Commission 
instituting a section 206 proceeding to protect customers, based on failure of an 
indicative screen, while the Commission considers the merits of the DPT analysis. 
77.  We do not agree with Southern’s view that failure of the indicative screen(s) 
does not provide a sufficient basis to establish a rebuttable presumption of market 
power.  The indicative screens are intended to identify the sellers that raise no 
horizontal market power concerns and can otherwise be considered for market-based 
rate authority.  Sellers failing one or both of the indicative screens, on the other hand, 
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109 FERC ¶ 61,282 at P 36 (2004).  Docket No. RM04-7-000   45 
 
are identified as sellers that potentially possess horizontal market power and for 
which a more robust analysis is required.  The uncommitted pivotal supplier screen 
focuses on the ability to exercise market power unilaterally.  Failure of this screen 
indicates that some or all of the seller’s generation must run to meet peak load.  The 
uncommitted market share analysis indicates whether a supplier has a dominant 
position in the market.  Failure of the uncommitted market share screen may indicate 
the seller has unilateral market power and may also indicate the presence of the 
ability to facilitate coordinated interaction with other sellers.  It is on this basis that 
we find that a rebuttable presumption of market power is warranted when a seller 
fails one or both of the indicative screens.  However, we agree with Southern that the 
DPT is a more definitive means for determining the existence of market power.  As a 
result, we allow sellers that have failed one or both of the indicative screens to rebut 
the presumption of market power by performing the DPT.  Further, because failure of 
one or both of the indicative screens only creates a rebuttable presumption of market 
power and sellers have a Commission-endorsed analysis that they can use to rebut 
that presumption (the DPT), we find without merit Southern’s view that the indicative 
screens create a priori evidentiary presumption of guilt, are improper, and create due 
process concerns.   
78.  With regard to Southern’s suggestion that we use the DPT as the default test, 
we find that if we were to do so our ability to protect customers while the analysis is 
evaluated could be compromised.  The DPT is a more involved and complex analysis.    
The Commission has also at times set a DPT analysis for evidentiary hearing which Docket No. RM04-7-000   46 
 
greatly extends the time between when the DPT is submitted to the Commission and 
when a final decision is rendered.  The rates customers are subject to during the time 
period before the issuance of a Commission order addressing a seller’s DPT would 
not be subject to refund and, accordingly, the customers would be unprotected if the 
seller ultimately is found to have market power.  However, under our current policy, 
and as adopted herein, if a seller wishes to file a DPT rather than the indicative 
screens it may do so.  In doing so, the seller concedes that it fails the indicative 
screens, which concession establishes a rebuttable presumption of market power, and 
the Commission will issue an order initiating a section 206 proceeding to investigate 
whether the seller has market power and establishing a refund effective date for the 
protection of customers while the Commission evaluates the filed DPT.  In the case 
of a seller that concedes the failure of  one or both of the screens and submits the 
DPT in the same filing, the Commission is able to establish a refund effective date at 
an earlier time than if the seller were able to skip the screen stage entirely and file a 
DPT without conceding a screen failure.   
79.  We will reject Southern's request that forced outages be deducted from 
capacity.  As we stated in the July 8 Order, "forced outages are non-recurring events 
that do not reflect normal operating conditions."
60  Allowing deduction of forced 
outages will generally not change indicative screen results, because all sellers will be 
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able to deduct forced outages, offsetting each other.  In the unlikely event that forced 
outage numbers were not completely offsetting, allowing forced outages in the 
indicative screens would benefit owners of relatively unreliable fleets at the expense 
of owners of relatively reliable fleets.   
2.  Indicative Market Share Screen Threshold Levels and Pivotal 
Supplier Application Period 
Commission Proposal 
80.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to retain the 20 percent threshold for 
the wholesale market share screen (i.e., with a market share of less than 20 percent, 
the seller would pass the screen).  The Commission stated that since the screens are 
indicative, not definitive, a relatively conservative threshold for passing them was 
appropriate.  Indeed, pursuant to the horizontal market power analysis, the 
Commission will not make a definitive finding that a seller has market power unless 
and until the more robust analysis, the DPT, is considered. 
81.  The Commission proposed to continue the use of annual peak load in the 
pivotal supplier analysis and not to expand the pivotal supplier analysis to include 
monthly assessments.  It stated that the pivotal supplier analysis examines the seller’s 
market power during the annual peak, and that the hours near that point in time are 
the most likely times that a seller will be a pivotal supplier. Docket No. RM04-7-000   48 
 
a.  Market Share Threshold 
Comments  
82.  A number of commenters argue that 20 percent is too low a threshold for the 
market share indicative screen.  Some point out that, given native load requirements, 
it is very difficult for investor-owned utilities outside of RTOs/ISOs to fall below the 
20 percent threshold for the market share indicative screen.
61  Duke also notes that 
the 20 percent criterion is incompatible with regional planning requirements because, 
according to Duke, the amount of capacity needed to satisfy regional planning reserve 
margins "would place the utility at substantial risk of exceeding the 20 percent 
threshold."
62  
83.  E.ON U.S. argues that, because the courts have not considered a 20 percent 
market share to indicate a market power concern, associating a market share 
indicative screen failure with a presumption of market power is inappropriate.
63  
Additionally, Progress Energy argues that it is inappropriate to associate failure of the 
market share screen with a presumption of market power when U.S. Department of 
                                              
61 See, e.g., Southern at 8-9, Duke at 15-16, EEI at 8-9. 
62 Duke at 17. 
63 See E.ON U.S. at 14-15, n.18, citing PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 
101, 109 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Absent additional evidence, such as an ability to control prices 
or exclude competition, a 64 percent market share is insufficient to infer monopoly 
power.”); AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 229 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding 
that 33 percent market share is insufficient to show a dangerous probability of monopoly 
power); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1989) 
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Justice (DOJ) merger guidelines state that only firms with 35 percent or more market 
share have market power.
64 
84.  PPL states that it agrees that the 20 percent threshold should be replaced by a 
35 percent threshold in the market share screen and argues that such an increase will 
avoid the false-positive failure rate of the indicative screens, and the cost, time and 
repercussions in the financial markets of the extended pendency of a market-based 
rate renewal proceeding while a DPT is conducted and considered.
65   
85.  In reply, APPA/TAPS state that there is no reason to raise the market share 
indicative screen threshold above 20 percent simply because investor-owned utilities 
have trouble passing the market share indicative screen.
66  NRECA and TDU 
Systems note that the factors that EEI believes make it difficult to pass the indicative 
screens—a large amount of reserves and little available transfer capability—are 
precisely the factors to consider when evaluating whether a market is competitive.
67   
86.  Rather than raising the threshold level, TDU Systems propose to lower the 
threshold to 15 percent for the market share indicative screen, claiming that 20 
                                              
64 Progress Energy at 7, citing EEI at 6-10.  
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66 APPA/TAPS reply comments at 12. 
67 NRECA reply comments at 16, TDU Systems reply comments at 10, citing EEI 
at 8.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   50 
 
percent was never justified by the Commission or shown to be the right balance.
68  
Citing Commission and judicial precedent, TDU Systems also note that the grant of 
market-based rate authority cannot be made without the discipline of market forces.
69   
87.  These commenters cite a recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit
70 to buttress their positions, arguing that even market shares lower than 
20 percent can lead to market manipulation.   
88.  In reply to these arguments, Duke states that certain commenters’ reliance on 
this is mistaken because that decision addressed market manipulation, not market 
power.
71  Duke asserts that virtually any supplier, regardless of its market share, has 
some ability to manipulate market outcomes by engaging in anomalous bidding 
practices. 
Commission Determination 
89.  The Commission will retain the 20 percent market share threshold for the 
indicative market share screen.  EEI and others argue that the Commission should use 
a 35 percent threshold as a presumption of market power because the DOJ merger 
                                              
68 TDU Systems at 7. 
69 TDU Systems at 5. 
70 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Calif. v. FERC, 462 F.3d 1027, at 1039 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(CPUC) (“As became clear in hindsight, even those who controlled a relatively small 
percentage of the market [in the California market during 2000 and 2001] had sufficient 
market power to skew markets artificially.”).   
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guidelines state that only firms with 35 percent or more market share have market 
power.  As the Commission stated in the July 8 Order, however, in a market 
comprised of five equal-sized firms with 20 percent market shares, the HHI is 2,000, 
which is above the DOJ/FTC HHI threshold of 1,800 for a highly concentrated 
market, and in markets for commodities with low demand price-responsiveness like 
electricity, market power is more likely to be present at lower market shares than in 
markets with high demand elasticity.
72  Therefore, we will retain a conservative 20 
percent threshold for this indicative screen. 
90.  When arguing that a 20 percent threshold for the market share screen is too 
low, E.ON. U.S. and PNM/Tucson ignore that the indicative screens are based on 
uncommitted capacity, not total capacity.  When calculating uncommitted capacity 
for the market share screen, a seller deducts from its total capacity the capacity 
dedicated to long-term sales contracts, operating reserves,
73 planned outages, and 
native load
74 as measured by the appropriate native load proxy.  As a result, a 
substantial amount of seller capacity may not be counted in measures of market share.  
Therefore, it is inappropriate to compare market shares based on uncommitted 
capacity to the market shares in the cases that E.ON. U.S. and PNM/Tucson cite.    
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91.  We further note that other commenters have argued that the 20 percent 
threshold is too high.  We disagree.  The 20 percent threshold is meant to strike a 
balance between having a conservative but realistic screen and imposing undue 
regulatory burdens.  The Commission’s experience in the context of market-based 
rate proceedings demonstrates this point.  In the three years since the April 14 Order, 
the Commission has revoked the market-based rate authority of two sellers, thirteen 
sellers relinquished their market-based rate authority, and six companies satisfied the 
Commission’s concerns for the grant of market-based rate authority at the DPT 
phase.  In addition, intervenors have the opportunity to present other evidence such as 
historical data in order to rebut the presumption that sellers lack market power.
75  
Moreover, no commenter advocating a 15 percent threshold for the market share has 
shown why it is superior to the current 20 percent threshold.  Therefore, we find that 
the 20 percent market share threshold strikes the right balance in seeking to avoid 
both “false negatives” and “false positives” and we will not reduce the wholesale 
market share screen to 15 percent, as suggested by TDU Systems. 
92.  The Commission does not accept Duke's assertion that the market share 
indicative screen is incompatible with regional planning requirements.  The April 14 
Order allows operating reserves necessary for reliability, as determined by state or 
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regional reliability councils,
76 to be deducted from total capacity attributed to the 
seller. 
93.  We also reject the argument that the 20 percent threshold is too low because of 
native load obligations of investor-owned utilities outside of RTOs.  First, the 
calculation of 20 percent is the same regardless of whether a seller is located in an 
RTO or not.  Second, as discussed herein, we allow for a native load deduction in the 
wholesale market share screen and are increasing the deduction to address concerns 
raised by investor-owned utilities and others.  Given the increased native load 
deduction, our market share screen adequately incorporates investor-owned utilities’ 
native load obligations while necessarily maintaining the conservative nature of the 
screens.    
b.  Pivotal Supplier Application Period 
Comments 
94.  Some commenters recommend that the pivotal supplier indicative screen 
should be applied monthly, rather than just in a seller’s peak month.  They reason that 
sellers, though not pivotal in the highest demand period, might be pivotal at different 
times of the year or in off-peak periods, such as in the spring or fall when power 
plants are on planned outages.
77 
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Commission Determination 
95.  The Commission will not require the pivotal supplier indicative screen to be 
applied monthly, as some commenters suggest, because we believe it is unnecessary 
and overly burdensome to do so.  Even though conditions of tight supply may occur 
at other times of the year or in abnormal operating conditions, the combination of the 
pivotal supplier analysis and the wholesale market share screen is sufficient, because 
suppliers with market power at such times are also likely to fail at least one of these 
screens.  Moreover, if intervenors believe that a seller is pivotal during non-peak 
periods, they are permitted to file evidence to that effect.  Accordingly, using only the 
peak month in the pivotal supplier indicative screen is appropriate.  We note that if a 
seller fails the indicative screens and submits a DPT, it is required to provide a 
pivotal supplier analysis for each season and for both peak and non-peak hours. 
3.  DPT Criteria 
Commission Proposal 
96.  With regard to the DPT analysis, the Commission proposed to retain the 
current thresholds (20 percent for the market share analysis and 2,500  for the HHI 
analysis), as well as the current practice of weighing all the relevant factors presented 
in determining whether a seller does or does not have horizontal market power.  The 
Commission proposed to continue to do so on a case-by-case basis, weighing such Docket No. RM04-7-000   55 
 
factors as available economic capacity, economic capacity, market share, HHIs, and 
historical sales and transmission data.
78 
Comments 
97.  Several commenters suggest changes to the DPT criteria.  One suggested 
change is to emphasize
79 or rely exclusively
80 on the available economic capacity 
measure, in order to properly account for native load.  For example, one commenter 
argues that the economic capacity prong of the DPT analysis is not a useful indicator 
of the presence or absence of market power when applied to vertically integrated 
utilities in their home control areas because that analysis completely disregards native 
load obligations, making this prong virtually unpassable by such utilities.  This 
commenter also notes that even using the available economic capacity measure, a 
seller with a market share above 35 percent would fail the DPT “even though there is 
no real market power problem because the in-area wholesale customers have access 
to ample supplies of competitively priced power.”
81  In this regard, he argues that the 
                                              
78 Economic capacity means the amount of generating capacity owned or 
controlled by a potential supplier with variable costs low enough that energy from such 
capacity could be economically delivered to the destination market.  Available economic 
capacity means the amount of generating capacity meeting the definition of economic 
capacity less the amount of generating capacity needed to serve the potential supplier's 
native load commitments.  See generally April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at 
Appendix F. 
79 Dr. Pace at 9. 
80 Southern at 20-21, EEI at 15. 
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DPT should be changed to take into account “competitive alternatives available for 
wholesale customers.”
82 
98.  Several other commenters disagree with the 2,500 HHI threshold for the DPT.  
Some reason that a 2,500 HHI threshold is not well justified and that an 1,800 HHI 
threshold is more appropriate because this is the criterion used in a highly 
concentrated market.  They argue that if a 2,500 HHI threshold is used, it should be 
used with a 15 percent market share because these are the criteria of the oil-pipeline 
test from which the HHI 2,500 criterion is obtained.
83  State AGs and Advocates note 
that the Commission has never systematically attempted to correlate the results of the 
pivotal supplier indicative screen, the market share indicative screen, or the DPT 
(including HHI results) proposed in the NOPR with actual independently derived data 
and measures as to the existence of market power in any wholesale electricity market 
in the U.S.
84  Without having done this type of systematic and quantitative evaluation 
of the proposed market power tests based on some type of independent verification, 
State AGs and Advocates contend that the Commission cannot be confident that the 
three proposed tests are reasonably accurate and, therefore, useful tests to determine 
                                              
82 Dr. Pace at 12-13. 
83 APPA/TAPS at 78-79, TDU Systems at 18, Montana Counsel at 15 (referring to 
APPA/TAPS comments). 
84 State AGs and Advocates state that by “independently” derived measures of 
market power they mean measures derived using different methodologies (and more 
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the existence of market power in any electricity market.  For example, State AGs and 
Advocates ask how the Commission knows if an HHI corresponds to the point at 
which market power begins, and whether it varies by factors such as input price, 
generation mix and different market structures through the country.
85 
99.  Furthermore, State AGs and Advocates claim that the DPT is not an adequate 
tool for assessing market power "in any context."  First, they state that the DPT will 
not discern bidding strategies of different suppliers.  In addition, they assert that a 
DPT does not consider the differences between fundamentally different types of 
market structures:  short-term energy only markets, short-term capacity markets, 
ancillary service markets, and long-term contract markets for energy and capacity.
86 
100.  A number of commenters believe that the HHI threshold sufficient for passage 
of the DPT should remain at 2,500.
87  PPL states that lowering the HHI threshold to 
1,800 will cause more false positives and direct capital away from the generation 
sector.   
101.  EEI and Progress Energy recommend that only the pivotal supplier and HHI 
analyses of the DPT should be retained, particularly if the market share analysis 
under the indicative screens is retained.  They argue that the pivotal supplier and HHI 
                                              
85 States AGs and Advocates at 36-37. 
86 State AGs and Advocates reply comments at 6-7. 
87 MidAmerican reply comments at 2, citing EEI comments; PPL reply comments 
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analyses are more than sufficient to determine whether the potential for market power 
exists.
88   
102.  A few commenters are skeptical about the need for a DPT.  Southern states 
that "granting market-based rates should not require the same analysis as for a 
merger," and that the Commission should reconsider using the DPT.
89  In this regard, 
Southern argues that unlike mergers, which are difficult and costly to undo, the 
Commission has the ability to continuously police the exercise of market power.  
Further, Southern states that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides for stiff civil and 
criminal penalties.  Southern adds that the Commission recently issued new rules 
against market manipulation to thwart exercises of market power. 
103.  AARP expresses concern about the lack of competition in wholesale electric 
markets.  It argues that market-based rate reviews are intended to determine whether 
the seller’s market-based rates will be just and reasonable, not whether a seller passes 
the various tests.  AARP argues that real-world evidence that may not fit neatly 
within the specified market-based rate criteria must be considered before the 
Commission can conclude that a seller lacks market power.  AARP states that, as the 
NOPR recognizes (PP 63-64), both historical and forward-looking evidence should 
be considered. 
                                              
88 EEI at 10-12, Progress at 8. 
89 Southern at 19-20. Docket No. RM04-7-000   59 
 
Commission Determination 
104.  The Commission will continue to use the DPT for companies that fail the 
market power indicative screens.  The DPT is a well-established test that has been 
used routinely by the Commission to analyze market power in the merger context  
The fact that it is used in section 203 cases does not demonstrate that it is 
inappropriate for market-based rate cases.  Rather, it provides a well-established tool 
for assessing market power that is known and widely used in the electric industry.  
Moreover, in both contexts, the DPT allows for the calculation of market shares and 
market concentration values under a wide range of season and load conditions. 
105.  Sellers failing one or more of the initial screens will have a rebuttable 
presumption of market power.  If such a seller chooses not to proceed directly to 
mitigation, it must present a more thorough analysis using the DPT.  The DPT is also 
used to analyze the effect on competition for transfers of jurisdictional facilities in 
section 203 proceedings,
90 using the framework described in Appendix A of the 
Merger Policy Statement and revised in Order No. 642.
91 
                                              
90 16 U.S.C. § 824b (2000). 
91 Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy Under the Federal Power 
Act: Policy Statement, Order No. 592, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595 (1996), FERC Stats. & Regs., 
Regulations Preambles July 1996-December 2000 ¶ 31,044 (1996), reconsideration 
denied, Order No. 592-A, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,341 (1997), 79 FERC ¶ 61,321 (1997) (Merger 
Policy Statement); see also Revised Filing Requirements Under Part 33 of the 
Commission’s Regulations, Order No. 642, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,983 (2000), FERC Stats. & 
Regs., Regulations Preambles July 1996-December 2000 ¶ 31,111 (2000), order on reh’g, 
Order No. 642-A, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,121 (2001), 94 FERC ¶ 61,289 (2001). Docket No. RM04-7-000   60 
 
106.  The DPT defines the relevant market by identifying potential suppliers based 
on market prices, input costs, and transmission availability, and calculates each 
supplier’s economic capacity and available economic capacity for each season/load 
condition.
92  The results of the DPT can be used for pivotal supplier, market share 
and market concentration analyses.   
107.  Using the economic capacity for each supplier, sellers should provide pivotal 
supplier, market share and market concentration analyses.  Examining these three 
factors with the more robust output from the DPT will allow sellers to present a more 
complete view of the competitive conditions and their positions in the relevant 
markets.   
108.  Under the DPT, to determine whether a seller is a pivotal supplier in each of 
the season/load conditions, sellers should compare the load in the destination market 
to the amount of competing supply (the sum of the economic capacities of the 
competing suppliers).  The seller will be considered pivotal if the sum of the 
competing suppliers’ economic capacity is less than the load level (plus a reserve 
requirement that is no higher than State and Regional Reliability Council operating 
requirements for reliability) for the relevant period.  The analysis should also be 
performed using available economic capacity to account for sellers’ and competing 
suppliers’ native load commitments.  In that case, native load in the relevant market 
                                              
92 Super-peak, peak, and off-peak, for Winter, Shoulder and Summer periods and 
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would be subtracted from the load in each season/load period.  The native load 
subtracted should be the average of the native load daily peaks for each season/load 
condition. 
109.  Each supplier’s market share is calculated based on economic capacity.  The 
market shares for each season/load condition reflect the costs of the sellers’ and 
competing suppliers’ generation, thus giving a more complete picture of the sellers’ 
ability to exercise market power in a given market.  For example, in off-peak periods, 
the competitive price may be very low because the demand can be met using low-cost 
capacity.  In that case, a high-cost peaking plant that would not be a viable competitor 
in the market would not be considered in the market share calculations, because it 
would not be counted as economic capacity in the DPT.  Sellers must also present an 
analysis using available economic capacity and explain which measure more 
accurately captures conditions in the relevant market. 
110.  Under the DPT, sellers must also calculate the market concentration using the 
HHI based on market shares.
93  HHIs have been used in the context of assessing the 
impact of a merger or acquisition on competition.  However, as noted by the U.S. 
Department of Justice in the context of designing an analysis for granting market-
based pricing for oil pipelines, concentration measures can also be informative in 
                                              
93 The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares.  For example, in a market 
with five equal size firms, each would have a 20 percent market share.  For that market, 
HHI = (20)
2 + (20)
2  + (20)
2 + (20)
2  + (20)
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assessing whether a supplier has market power in the relevant market.  “The 
Department and the Commission staff have previously advocated an HHI threshold of 
2,500, and it would be reasonable for the Commission to consider concentration in 
the relevant market below this level as sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption 
that a pipeline does not possess market power.”
94 
111.  A showing of an HHI less than 2,500 in the relevant market for all season/load 
conditions for sellers that have also shown that they are not pivotal and do not 
possess a 20 percent or greater market share in any of the season/load conditions 
would constitute a showing of a lack of market power, absent compelling contrary 
evidence from intervenors.  Concentration statistics can indicate the likelihood of 
coordinated interaction in a market.  All else being equal, the higher the HHI, the 
more firms can extract excess profits from the market.  Likewise a low HHI can 
indicate a lower likelihood of coordinated interaction among suppliers and could be 
used to support a claim of a lack of market power by a seller that is pivotal or does 
have a 20 percent or greater market share in some or all season/load conditions.  For 
example, a seller with a market share of 20 percent or greater could argue that that it 
would be unlikely to possess market power in an unconcentrated market (HHI less 
than 1,000).  As with our initial screens, sellers and intervenors may present evidence 
                                              
94 See Comments of the United States Department of Justice in response to Notice 
of Inquiry Regarding Market-Based Ratemaking for Oil Pipelines, Docket No. RM94-1-
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such as historical wholesale sales.  Those data could be used to calculate market 
shares and market concentration and could be used to refute or support the results of 
the DPT.  The Commission encourages the most complete analysis of competitive 
conditions in the market as the data allow.   
112.  We will continue to weigh both available economic capacity and economic 
capacity when analyzing market shares and HHIs.  Based on our substantial 
experience in applying the DPT over the past decade, we have found that both 
analyses are useful indicators of suppliers' potential to exercise market power, and we 
are unwilling to rely solely on one measure or the other.
95  For example, in markets 
where utilities retain significant native load obligations, an analysis of available 
economic capacity may more accurately assess an individual seller’s competitiveness, 
as well as the overall competitiveness of a market, because available economic 
capacity recognizes the native load obligations of the sellers.  On the other hand, in 
markets where the sellers have been predominantly relieved of their native load 
obligations, an analysis of economic capacity may more accurately reflect market 
conditions and a seller’s relative size in the market. 
                                              
95 See, e.g., Tampa Electric Company, 117 FERC ¶ 61,311 (2006); PacifiCorp, 
115 FERC ¶ 61,349 (2005); Tucson Electric Power Company, 116 FERC                         
¶ 61,051(2006); Duke Power, a Division of Duke Energy Corporation, 111 FERC            
¶ 61,506 (2005); and Kansas City Power and Light Company, 113 FERC ¶ 61,074 
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113.  Likewise, we find the HHI market concentration measure to be useful in 
assessing the market power of individual sellers, and it complements the market share 
and pivotal supplier measures in the DPT stage of the analysis.  Furthermore, no 
commenter has presented a compelling argument for why the Commission should 
lower or raise the HHI threshold in the DPT.  Accordingly, we will retain 2,500 as the 
appropriate threshold for passing this part of the DPT for the reasons we stated in the 
April 14 Order.
96   We will not adopt the suggestion to lower the market share 
threshold to 15 percent from 20 percent, for the reasons set forth above, in the NOPR 
and July 8 Order.
97  Commenters have presented no compelling reason to do so, and 
in our experience since the April 14 Order, we have not seen cases where the HHI 
was over 2,500 and the seller’s market share was between 15 and 20 percent, which 
would be the type of situation about which APPA/TAPS and others are concerned.  
Accordingly, such a reform would not likely result in additional findings of market 
power.   
114.  State AGs and Advocates claim that the DPT is not an adequate tool for 
assessing market power because it will not discern bidding strategies of different 
suppliers.  However, State AGs and Advocates miss the point of the analysis:  by 
                                              
96 April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 111 (explaining that at less than 2,500 
HHI in the relevant market for all season/load conditions there is little likelihood of 
coordinated interaction among suppliers in a market). 
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determining whether a seller has capacity that can compete in the market under 
various season and load conditions, the DPT provides an accurate picture of market 
conditions.  Examining market conditions allows the Commission to determine 
whether a seller has market power.  The DPT does this by examining short-term 
energy markets and, in particular, sellers’ available generation capacity.  In addition, 
absent entry barriers, and a specific finding of market power, the Commission has 
said that long-term markets are competitive.  With regard to ancillary services, as 
discussed herein, the Commission requires market power analyses for those services 
to support a request for market-based rate authority.  Assessing competing suppliers’ 
bidding strategies, ex ante, would not illuminate the state of the market and the ability 
of sellers to alter prices within it.   
115.  We also reject Southern’s argument that the DPT analysis is unnecessary 
because of the Commission’s enhanced civil penalty authority and continuing 
policing of sellers with market-based rate authorization.  While those are critical 
components of our program to ensure just and reasonable market-based rates, they are 
not a substitute for an analysis of the potential market power of sellers seeking 
market-based rate authority.  In addition, Southern’s argument that rules against 
market manipulation will thwart all exercises of market power is speculative.  
116.  We will not change the DPT to take into account competitive alternatives 
available for wholesale customers as proposed by a commenter.  We stated above our 
reasons for rejecting use of a contestable load analysis in the indicative screens, and 
we reject it for the DPT for the same reasons.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   66 
 
117.  AARP and State AGs and Advocates argue that the Commission should 
consider evidence from actual market data in determining whether market power 
exists rather than rely on the results of the DPT to determine whether a seller has 
market power.  We agree that actual market data is an important part of a 
determination of whether a seller may have market power.  In this regard, we look at 
actual market data, both in the initial analysis and in ongoing monitoring of the EQR 
data.  As the Commission stated in the April 14 Order, “[a]s with our initial screens, 
applicants and intervenors may present evidence such as historical wholesale sales.  
Those data could be used to calculate market shares and market concentration and 
could be used to refute or support the results of the Delivered Price Test.”
98  In 
addition, as part of our ongoing monitoring activities, we examine the EQR data in an 
effort to identify whether market prices may indicate an exercise of market power.   
4.  Other Products and Models 
Comments 
118.  ELCON expresses concern over the entire horizontal market power analysis 
process:  indicative screens, followed by DPT or mitigation for those that fail the 
indicative screens.  ELCON notes that the evolution of these practices generally 
occurred in a series of highly contested proceedings, and did not benefit from the 
broader and more balanced review afforded by a generic rulemaking.  ELCON states 
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that its concern is that the practices unduly shift the burden of proof to potential 
victims of market power abuse.  This concern would only be academic, ELCON 
continues, if the market structures were truly competitive and there were strong 
structural protections against the exercise of market power.  But the hybrid nature of 
most regional markets, combined with inadequate infrastructure, creates an 
environment that discourages trust in market outcomes.
99   
119.  Some commenters urge the Commission to allow different product definitions, 
e.g., short-term power and long-term power, in the calculation of the indicative 
screens and the DPT.  For example, NRECA argues that the Final Rule must require 
sellers to identify the relevant product markets, including the distinct products for 
which they seek market-based rate authority, and demonstrate that they lack market 
power in those product markets.
100  The Montana Counsel argues that the 
Commission’s screens and DPT analysis models measure market power during 
certain test days for current time periods,
101 and that capacity that is available to 
make short-term energy sales may not be available for long-term, firm power sales.  
Thus, the Montana Counsel asserts that the Commission may not rely exclusively on 
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short-term or spot markets to measure whether there are competitive long-term 
markets.   
120.  Other commenters remain divided over whether long-term power markets 
should be included in the market power analysis.  PPL urges that long-term markets 
should not be considered in a market power analysis because of infeasibility and also 
because it violates the Commission's precedent that there is no long-term market 
power unless there exist barriers to entry.
102  In contrast, NRECA and TDU Systems 
state that long-term markets need to be analyzed in the market power analysis 
because monopolies will probably persist into the future for many consumers
103 and 
these consumers need protection.  TDU Systems suggest using an installed capacity 
indicative screen for long-term markets.
104    
121.  State AGs and Advocates and NASUCA suggest that the Commission adopt 
behavioral modeling, such as game theory, rather than structural analysis, because the 
latter cannot capture market power behavior.
105  NASUCA suggests that the 
Commission hold a technical conference to consider behavioral modeling.  Duke 
disagrees with NASUCA's and others' calls for behavioral models, contending that 
                                              
102 PPL reply comments at 2-3 and n.6, citing Exelon Corp., 112 FERC ¶ 61,011 at 
P 136 (2005). 
103 NRECA reply comments at 11, TDU Systems reply comments at 5-7. 
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they are theoretically complex and data-intensive and do not meet the prerequisite of 
being simple, easily understood and readily verifiable by the Commission.       
Commission Determination 
122.  We will not generically alter the indicative screens or the DPT to allow 
different product analyses for short-term or long-term power as some commenters 
suggest.  As the Commission has stated in the past, absent entry barriers, long-term 
capacity markets are inherently competitive because new market entrants can build 
alternative generating supply.  There is no reason to generically require that the 
horizontal analysis consider those products that are affected by entry barriers.  
Instead, we will consider intervenors' arguments in this regard on a case-by-case 
basis.   
123.  We reject ELCON’s contentions regarding the development of our horizontal 
market power analysis.  While the screens and DPT criteria did arise out of specific 
cases, there have been numerous opportunities in this rulemaking for interested 
parties to express any concerns and propose alternatives, including technical 
conferences and numerous rounds of written comments.  We believe that this 
rulemaking has given all interested parties ample opportunity to voice any and all 
options for revising the screens and DPT criteria and proposing alternatives, and has 
given us the opportunity to evaluate whether these tools remain appropriate.  We 
conclude that they do. 
124.  Finally, we will not adopt the suggestion by some commenters that behavioral 
modeling be used in addition to, or in place of, the indicative screens and the DPT.  Docket No. RM04-7-000   70 
 
Although game theory has been used in laboratory experiments and in theoretical 
studies where the number of players and choices available to players are limited, we 
do not consider it a practical approach for the volume of analyses we must perform, 
particularly since a vast amount of choices are available and many of those are 
unobservable.  The data gathering and analysis burden imposed on sellers and the 
Commission would be overly burdensome and impractical. 
5.  Native Load Deduction 
a.  Market Share Indicative Screen 
Commission Proposal 
125.  To reduce the number of “false positives” in the wholesale market share 
indicative screen, the Commission proposed in the NOPR to adjust the native load 
proxy for this screen.  The Commission proposed to change the allowance for the 
native load deduction under the market share indicative screen from the minimum 
native load peak demand for the season to the average native load peak demand for 
the season.  This change makes the deduction for the market share indicative screen 
consistent with the deduction allowed under the pivotal supplier indicative screen. 
Comments 
126.  TDU Systems argue that the Commission provides no empirical evidence 
supporting this change—i.e., no evidence of an excessive number of false positives 
produced by the Commission’s current policy.  TDU Systems also state that the Docket No. RM04-7-000   71 
 
Commission does not explain why it believes its current proxy “results in too much 
uncommitted capacity attributable to the seller.”
106  In particular, TDU Systems state 
that the Commission does not explain what factors it used to determine the 
appropriate level of uncommitted capacity to which it compared the current proxy. 
127.  APPA/TAPS agree, adding that the Commission proposal appears to be a 
results-driven effort to eliminate the need for some public utilities to submit a 
DPT.
107  APPA/TAPS argue that the Commission’s “false positives” justification 
loses sight of the stakes involved in the market-based rate determination.  They state 
that the price of a false positive associated with the initial screens will be the seller’s 
submission of the DPT.  APPA/TAPS argue that that price pales in comparison to the 
unreasonably high prices and market power exercise that can result from a false 
negative.  According to APPA/TAPS, it is thus entirely appropriate for the 
Commission to take a closer look when a utility fails the initial screens, even when 
the Commission ultimately allows market-based rate authorization.
108 
                                              
106 TDU Systems at 13. 
107 APPA/TAPS at 68, citing Acadia Power Partners LLC, 111 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,239 
(2005), and Kansas City Power & Light Co., 111 FERC ¶ 61,395 (2005), where the 
applying utilities failed the market share screen, but passed the pivotal supplier screen.  In 
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LLC, 113 FERC ¶ 61,073 (2005); Kansas City Power & Light Co., 113 FERC ¶ 61,074 
(2005). 
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128.  In addition, APPA/TAPS state that, as well as lacking evidentiary basis, the 
proposed adjustment is not based on sound economic principles.  APPA/TAPS argue 
that when the Commission originally adopted the native load proxy for the market 
share screen, it said the screen should reflect “all of the capacity that is available to 
compete in wholesale markets at some point during the season.”
109 APPA/TAPS state 
that now the Commission proposes to eliminate even more of the capacity that is 
available to compete at some point in the season by increasing the proxy to the 
average native load peak demand for the season. 
129.  APPA/TAPS further argue that adoption of the Commission’s proposal would 
mean that the market-based rate screens would make no assessment of off-peak 
periods, even though the Commission has said that the market share screen is 
intended to measure market power during off-peak times.
110  They state that “screens 
should examine market power for the on-peak and off-peak periods of the different 
seasons.”
111 
130.  Finally, APPA/TAPS argue that consistency across the two screens defeats the 
purpose of having more than one screen.  The market share screen is intended to 
reflect capacity that could compete, including during off-peak periods.  By contrast, 
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the pivotal supplier screen is specifically intended to measure market power risks at 
system peak.   
131.  APPA/TAPS offer that if the Commission nonetheless believes some 
consistency is desired it can achieve it by using a native load proxy for the market 
share screen based upon the average minimum loads.  Such a proxy would be 
consistent with the Commission’s original intent of a screen that identifies “all of the 
capacity that is available to compete in wholesale markets at some point during the 
season.”
112   
132.  Other commenters generally support the Commission’s proposal to use 
seasonal average native load as the native load proxy for the market share indicative 
screen.  Many state that the proposed native load proxy is a more accurate 
representation of native load obligations.
113  Several commenters suggest excluding 
weekends and holidays from the proxy native load calculation because these periods 
are not representative of normal load hours.
114  
                                              
112 April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 92. 
113 See, e.g., Ameren at 3, FirstEnergy at 4-5. 
114 See, e.g., EEI at 17, PG&E at 6-7, Allegheny at 7-8, and Pinnacle at 34, both 
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133.  EEI argues that even with this proposed change, the generation capacity 
required by a utility to serve its native load is still being understated.
115  It states that 
utilities are required to meet the peak demands of their native load customers plus 
maintain a reserve margin for reliability purposes.  This requirement directly 
determines the amount of generation capacity that a supplier can commit to the 
wholesale opportunity sales market.  As such, EEI argues that the change proposed in 
the NOPR is a step in the right direction in terms of more accurately recognizing the 
amount of generation capacity required by a utility to meet native load requirements, 
but still understates the actual requirements.   
134.   EEI contends that from a generation planning perspective, no one with any 
expertise in that area doubts the native load proxy described in the April 14 Order 
underestimates the amount of capacity that a supplier needs to meet native load 
requirements and therein both overstates the amount of capacity that the supplier has 
to compete in the wholesale market as well as the supplier’s market share.  As a result 
of this overestimation of the capacity that a supplier would have to compete in the 
wholesale market, EEI contends that non-RTO vertically integrated utilities have 
failed the market share screen using the current native load proxy when many simply 
do not have market power.
 116  EEI concludes that such a high number of “false 
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positives” for market power that have occurred using the current proxy clearly 
supports the Commission’s proposal to move the native load proxy to the average 
peak load in the season. 
Commission Determination 
135.  We adopt the NOPR proposal to change the native load proxy under the 
market share indicative screen from the minimum native load peak demand for the 
season to the average of the daily native load peak demands for the season, making 
the native load proxy for the market share indicative screen consistent with the native 
load proxy under the pivotal supplier indicative screen. 
136.  In this regard, we find that the market share screen should be calculated using 
as accurate a representation of market conditions for each season studied as possible.  
We find that using the current native load proxy using the minimum native load level 
for the season does not provide an accurate picture of the conditions throughout the 
season.     
137.  We recognize that increasing the native load proxy will have the effect of 
reducing the market share for traditional utilities with significant native load 
obligations, and therefore may result in fewer failures of the wholesale market share 
screen for some sellers.  However, we believe that such a result is justified.  We are 
seeking a screen that provides a reasonably accurate picture of a seller’s position 
given market conditions across seasons, so that we can eliminate those sellers who 
clearly do not have market power and focus our analysis on those who might.  We 
believe that a native load proxy based on the average of peak load conditions is more Docket No. RM04-7-000   76 
 
representative, and thus more accurate, than a proxy based on extreme (i.e., 
minimum) peak load conditions.  We also believe that basing the native load proxy 
on the average of the peaks will make the screens more accurate in eliminating sellers 
without market power while focusing on ones that may have market power.   
138.  For sellers that contend that the proposed native load proxy will result in too 
many false positives, we note that under the existing native load proxy, fewer than 25 
companies have been the subject of § 206 investigations since the April 14 Order.  
For entities that fear this change in native load proxy will lead to too many "false 
negatives," (companies with market power passing under the indicative screens), we 
note that intervenors can always challenge the presumption of no market power.  
Moreover, no intervenor in this proceeding has pointed to specific companies that 
have passed the screens but still have market power. 
139.  We reject APPA/TAPS’ argument that changing the native load proxy would 
result in the market-based rate screens making no assessment of off-peak periods.  In 
fact, the native load proxy we approve here is based on the average of the native load 
daily peaks which also include low load days.  The use of the average peak demand 
for the native load proxy provides for an assessment of all periods, peak and off-peak 
seasons, because such a proxy considers peak native load of each day in each season.  
Combined with the pivotal supplier screen that captures the annual peak conditions, 
we find that the two screens adequately capture market conditions over the year. 
140.  We also reject APPA/TAPS’ argument that consistency across the two screens 
defeats the purpose of having more than one screen.  The screens in and of Docket No. RM04-7-000   77 
 
themselves are inherently different methodologies in that the pivotal supplier screen 
considers whether the seller’s generation must run to meet peak load, whereas the 
market share screen looks at the seller’s size relative to other sellers in the market.  
We are looking for an assessment of the uncommitted seasonal capacity available to 
sellers to compete in wholesale markets and, as stated above, find that the average of 
the daily peak loads in a season more accurately reflects seller’s commitments.   
141.  APPA/TAPS suggest that if we do raise the native load deduction, we only 
raise it to the average minimum for the season, rather than the average native load 
peak demand for the season.  The intent of the wholesale market share screen is to 
assess market conditions during the season, not only during off-peak hours.  
APPA/TAPS is misplaced in its assertion that our original intent was for the market 
share screen to focus solely on off-peak conditions.  In the April 14 Order we stated 
that “by using the two screens together, the Commission is able to measure market 
power both at peak and off-peak times.”
 117  Our statement simply recognizes that a 
seller with a dominant position in the market could have market power in the off-peak 
as well as the peak.  Clearly the pivotal supplier analysis is designed to assess market 
power at peak times, but that does not imply that the wholesale market share screen is 
designed only to assess market power in the off-peak period. 
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142.  Finally, we will not exclude weekends and holidays from the market share 
native load proxy.  Since we adopt herein the use of an average peak demand for the 
native load proxy for the market share screen, the exclusion of weekends and 
holidays would inappropriately skew the results.  Use of an average load addresses 
the issue of the variability between unusually high or low load days, is more 
objective, and easily applied.  If weekends and holidays are excluded, only 
approximately 70 percent of total load hours would be accounted for.  The average 
native load measure that includes weekends and holidays, and which we adopt, is 
truly an average of all load conditions. 
b.  Pivotal Supplier Indicative Screen 
Commission Proposal 
143.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to retain the pivotal supplier screen’s 
native load proxy at its current level of the average of the daily native load peaks 
during the month in which the annual peak day load occurs.
118   
Comments 
144.  Southern states that the pivotal supplier screen is conceptually sound; 
however, the manner of its current implementation reflects a significant flaw.  In 
particular, Southern claims that the wholesale load (market size) is determined by the 
difference between the control area’s needle peak demand and the average of the 
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daily peaks in that peak month.  Southern argues that it is not at all clear how or why 
this mathematical exercise (which in its opinion reflects an “apples and oranges” 
comparison) provides any meaningful measure of competitive wholesale demand 
during any relevant period. 
145.  For example, Southern continues, under some circumstances, all or a large 
portion of the wholesale load determined in this fashion could be the seller’s own 
native load.  Subtracting the average daily peaks in the peak month from a single 
needle peak to derive a “proxy” for competitive wholesale demand necessarily 
assumes that all of this difference is unsatisfied wholesale market demand that is 
subject to competition.  Southern argues that this is not a valid assumption and the 
Commission has provided no reason to believe that it is.  Southern therefore urges the 
Commission to abandon this aspect of the interim pivotal supplier analysis and 
instead use an estimate of actual wholesale load, rather than deriving it indirectly 
through an arithmetic exercise.  For example, the seller’s native load peak could be 
subtracted from the control area peak load on an “apples to apples” basis (for 
example, needle peaks, seasonal peaks, or average  
daily peaks) to derive, in Southern's view, a much better wholesale load proxy.
119   
Southern asserts that such a reform would be relatively easy to implement and would 
yield much more meaningful results.
120   
                                              
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
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146.  NRECA disagrees with Southern's proposed modification to the pivotal 
supplier screen to use actual wholesale load, stating Southern provides no evidence 
that this modification would provide a more accurate estimate of the wholesale load 
than the current approach.
121 
 
Commission Determination 
147.  We retain the average daily peak native load as the native load proxy used in 
the pivotal supplier screen, as proposed in the NOPR, and we reject Southern’s 
argument that our method of computing the native load proxy is unreasonable.  
Southern argues that because the wholesale demand is determined by subtracting the 
average daily peaks in the peak month from a single needle peak, the Commission is 
relying on an invalid assumption with regard to the wholesale demand during any 
relevant period.  However, Southern’s claim that our deduction of the average of the 
daily native load peaks from the needle peak is a “mixing of apples and oranges” 
ignores our reasoning in the April 14 Order: 
                                                                                                                                                  
would undoubtedly be covered with existing supply arrangements.  It states that if it were 
required to net out the amount of wholesale load covered by those existing supply 
arrangements, a similar amount should be subtracted from the market resources deemed 
to be competing to serve the net wholesale load. 
120 Southern at 18-19. 
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conditions in peak periods can provide significant opportunity to exercise 
market power. As capacity is utilized to meet demand there is less available 
to sell on the margin and often less competition. Only focusing on needle 
peaks that occur for a single hour and that are only known after the fact 
does not give an accurate reflection of the competitive dynamics of peak 
periods. As demand increases during peak periods, buyers and sellers are 
positioning themselves in the market with similar but incomplete 
information.  Buyers are projecting their needs and trying to secure needed 
power, while sellers are negotiating to obtain the highest price for that 
power.  With increasing demand, fewer units are available to serve 
anticipated peak needs and buyers bid to secure dwindling supply load 
increases.  In addition, buyers must be prepared for the contingency that a 
unit will be forced out and they will need to purchase in a period of even 
greater scarcity.[
122] 
 
148.  Further, both native load proxies provide an adequate solution to a 
complicated issue.  Resources used to serve native load fluctuate over the course of 
the day and through the seasons.  As the Commission stated in the April 14 Order, 
"we recognize that not all generation is available all of the time to compete in 
wholesale markets and that some accounting for native load requirements is 
warranted here.  However, wholesale and retail markets are not so easily separated 
such that a clear distinction can be made between generation serving native load and 
generation competing for wholesale load.  Most utility generation units are not 
exclusively devoted to serving native load, or selling in wholesale markets."
123  
149.  For these reasons we continue to believe that the average of the native load 
peaks in the peak month is a reasonable proxy for the native load deductions under 
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this screen.  Moreover, we also find that Southern’s proposed method of estimating 
the actual wholesale load is inappropriate because it would artificially reduce the 
seller’s share of that load.  This is because Southern’s methodology only deducts the 
seller’s native load peak from the control area peak (not the native load peaks of any 
other sellers in the control area), leaving the seller with a disproportionately small 
share of the remaining market.    
c.  Clarification of Definition of Native Load 
Commission Proposal 
150.  In the NOPR, the Commission expressed its belief that there has been some 
inconsistency in the way in which sellers have reflected native load in performing 
both the screens and the DPT analysis.  Because the states are under various degrees 
of retail restructuring, the definition of native load customers has lacked precision.  
Accordingly, the Commission proposed to clarify that, for the horizontal market 
power analysis, native load can only include load attributable to native load 
customers as defined in §33.3(d)(4)(i) of the Commission’s regulations,
124 as it may 
be revised from time to time. 
Comments 
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151.  APPA/TAPS support the native load clarification, without providing 
additional explanation.  A number of other commenters discussed the native load 
clarification in the context of defining retail contracts or provider of last resort 
(POLR) load as native load.  PPL Companies request that this clarification not be 
adopted unless the Commission provides further clarification that an entity selling 
power to a retail customer under a long-term contract is able to deduct that capacity.
 
125 
Commission Determination 
152.  We will adopt the NOPR proposal that, for the horizontal market power 
analysis, native load can only include load attributable to native load customers as 
defined in § 33.3(d)(4)(i) of our regulations.  We address the comments of PPL 
Companies' and others below in the "Other Native Load Concerns" section.  
d.  Other Native Load Concerns 
 Comments  
153.  Some commenters suggest alterations to the definition of native load or to the 
circumstances when contract capacity may be deducted from total capacity.  One 
commenter recommends that POLR load be counted as native load.
126  Sempra 
argues that generators should be allowed to take native load deductions for power 
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supplied to franchised utilities that divested their generation.
127  It argues that 
allowing such suppliers to claim native load deductions correctly assigns these 
obligations to the entities that actually commit the generation resources necessary to 
serve native load and results in a more accurate assessment of the suppliers’ 
remaining uncommitted capacity.  It notes that such sales may be for terms of less 
than one year, and that under the Commission’s policy such suppliers cannot deduct 
those commitments as long-term firm sales.  Sempra further points out that franchised 
utilities do not need a one-year or greater commitment to take a native load 
deduction.  It concludes that marketers and other suppliers should thus be allowed to 
account for the native load commitments they undertake, regardless of the term of 
each underlying contract.
128  
 
Commission Determination 
154.  We will not adopt suggestions that sellers receive native load deductions for 
all their POLR contracts or for all contracts that serve utilities that have divested their 
generation.  Even in cases where independent power producers (IPPs) serve what 
used to be franchised public utilities' native load, IPPs do not serve it under the same 
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terms as those utilities.
129  Unlike franchised public utilities, IPPs may choose to exit 
the market once the contracts they sell power under have expired.  However, we 
remind IPPs that POLR contracts with a term of one year or more may be deducted 
from total capacity under some circumstances.  As the Commission explained in the 
July 8 Order, “applicants may deduct ‘load following’ and ‘provider of last resort’ 
contracts for terms of one year or more under certain conditions.  Specifically, we 
will allow sellers to deduct long-term firm load following contracts to the extent that 
the seller has included in its total capacity a corresponding generating unit or long-
term firm purchase contract that will be used to meet the obligation.  The seller’s 
contractual peak load obligation under the contract should be used as the capacity 
adjustment in the pivotal supplier analysis and the seasonal baseline demand levels 
served under the contract should be used as the adjustments in the market share 
analysis.  The residual capacity will be considered available for sales in the wholesale 
spot markets and treated as uncommitted capacity.”
130  Also, in response to PPL 
Companies, we note that long-term (one year or more) firm contracts that cede 
control may always be deducted from total capacity. 
155.  We will allow IPPs to deduct short term native load obligations if they can 
show that the power sold to the utility was used to meet native load.  We agree with 
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Sempra that allowing such suppliers to claim native load deductions correctly assigns 
these obligations to the entities that actually commit the generation resources 
necessary to serve native load and results in a more accurate assessment of the 
suppliers’ remaining uncommitted capacity, and that such sales may be for terms of 
less than one year.  Under our current policy such suppliers cannot deduct those 
commitments as long-term firm sales, whereas franchised utilities do not need a one-
year or greater commitment to take a native load deduction.   
6.  Control and Commitment 
Commission Proposal 
156.  The Commission noted in the NOPR that uncommitted capacity is determined 
by adding the total capacity of generation owned or controlled through contract and 
firm purchases less, among other things, long-term firm requirements sales that are 
specifically tied to generation owned or controlled by the seller and that assign 
operational control of such capacity to the buyer.
131
  The Commission further stated 
that long-term firm load following contracts may be deducted to the extent that the 
seller has included in its total capacity a corresponding generating unit or long-term 
firm purchase that will be used to meet the obligation even if such contracts are not 
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tied to a specific generating unit and do not convey operational control of the 
generation.
132  
157.  Noting that contracts can confer the same rights of control of generation or 
transmission facilities as ownership of those facilities, the Commission stated that if a 
seller has control over certain capacity such that the seller can affect the ability of the 
capacity to reach the relevant market, then that capacity should be attributed to the 
seller when performing the generation market power screens.  The capacity 
associated with contracts that confer operational control of a given facility to an 
entity other than the owner must be assigned to the entity exercising control over that 
facility, rather than to the entity that is the legal owner of the facility.
133 
158.  In the NOPR, the Commission stated that in recent years some owners have 
outsourced to third parties pursuant to energy management agreements the day-to-day 
activities of running and dispatching their generating plants and/or selling output.  
The Commission noted that the agreement may, directly or indirectly, transfer control 
of the capacity.  The Commission expressed concern that under such third-party 
agreements, there may be instances where control of capacity has changed hands, but 
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133 Reporting Requirement for Changes in Status for Public Utilities with Market- 
Based Rate Authority, Order No. 652, 70 F. R. 8253 (Feb. 18, 2005), FERC Stats. & 
Regs., Regulations Preambles 2001-2005 ¶ 31,175 at P 47, order on 
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this capacity has not been attributed to the correct seller for the purposes of the 
generation market power screens.
134   
159.  In cases examining whether an entity is a public utility, the Commission has 
examined the totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether the entity effectively 
has control over capacity that it manages.
135
   Likewise, in providing guidance 
regarding events that trigger a requirement to submit a notice of change in status, the 
Commission has indicated that, to determine whether control has been acquired, 
sellers should examine whether they can affect the ability of capacity to reach the 
relevant market. 
160.  The Commission asked in the NOPR whether, in the interest of providing 
greater certainty and clarity regarding the determination of control, it should make 
generic findings or create generic presumptions regarding what constitutes control.  
In particular, the Commission sought comment on whether any of the following 
functions should merit a finding or presumption of control and, if so, on what basis:  
directing plant outages, fuel procurement, plant operations, energy and capacity sales, 
and/or credit and liquidity decisions.
136   
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161.  Alternatively, rather than focusing on these discrete functions, the 
Commission asked if it should establish a presumption of control for any entity that 
has some discretion over the output of the plant(s) that it manages.  The Commission 
asked whether such an approach would promote greater certainty.  The Commission 
also asked, if it adopted such a presumption, how it should address instances where 
discretion over plant output may be shared between more than one party.
137   
162.  The Commission proposed to clarify that, in the event it adopted any such 
presumptions, an individual seller could rebut the presumption of control on the basis 
of its particular facts and circumstances.  In addition, the Commission proposed to 
clarify that an entity that controls generation from which jurisdictional power sales 
are made is required to have a rate on file with the Commission.  If the rate authority 
sought is market-based rate authority, then that entity is subject to the same 
conditions and requirements as any other like seller.
 138    
163.  The intent of the Commission’s proposals was to provide greater certainty and 
clarity as to the treatment of capacity that is subject to energy management 
agreements and outsourcing of functions so that the capacity is properly reported (and 
studied) and to make clear that any entity to which control is attributed must receive 
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the necessary authorizations under the FPA in order to provide jurisdictional 
services.
139 
a.  Presumption of Control 
164.  As an initial matter, most commenters support the Commission’s desire to 
provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the determination of control.
140  In this 
regard, many commenters express concerns that attributing generation capacity to 
sellers that do not necessarily control that generation may result in the seller falsely 
appearing to have market power and ultimately result in unnecessary mitigation.  
Commenters also express the need for the determination of control to be consistent 
for both the market-based rate authorizations and the change in status filings. 
165.  However, most commenters also oppose the Commission’s proposal to 
establish generic findings or generic presumptions regarding what constitutes control, 
arguing that such findings must be made on a case-by-case basis.  Others suggest a 
rebuttable presumption that control lies with the owner unless specific facts indicate 
otherwise. 
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i.  Fact Specific Determinations 
Comments 
166.  Various commenters argue for a fact specific determination of control.
141  For 
example, Alliance Power Marketing, a supplier of energy management services, 
argues that a case-by-case approach provides increased certainty for generators and 
asset managers who relied upon Commission precedent in developing their current 
arrangements.
142  
167.  Several commenters state that they have some sympathy with the 
Commission’s desire to provide certainty and clarity in this area, however, they do 
not agree that there should be generic presumptions regarding the indicia of control.  
One commenter argues that details of each contract vary, depending upon parties and 
circumstances involved as well as on conditions in the market place, and therefore it 
must be reviewed and evaluated with care.
143  This commenter suggests that an 
individual seller should be obligated to submit its contracts to the Commission for 
review, and allowed to present its case on the basis of its particular facts and 
circumstances. 
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168.  Similarly, APPA/TAPS believe that the Commission is correct to assign 
capacity to a seller for purposes of running the screens/DPT; however, they point out 
that generic findings or presumptions would be helpful only if the particulars of a 
contract aligned with the factual assumptions underlying a presumption.  Otherwise, 
they state that a presumption could produce wrong results.
144  APPA/TAPS suggest 
that any arrangement that could create opportunities for sellers to coordinate their 
behavior with other competitors should be reported and that as part of the seller’s 
assigning control over long-term contracts for purposes of the screens/DPT, the 
Commission should require a seller to submit the relevant contracts with the market-
based rate application or triennial update and identify the contractual provisions that 
support the seller’s control determinations.
145  APPA/TAPS suggest that marketing 
alliances or joint operating agreements can affect a seller’s market position and 
should be considered in the determination of control.
146  
169.  Powerex argues that clarity is particularly important as the new market 
manipulation rule makes it unlawful “to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
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were made, not misleading.”
147  In this regard, Powerex urges the development of a 
single principle or set of principles that need to be met to establish control over an 
asset.  Powerex argues that the development of such principles will help take the 
guesswork out of compliance and provide greater certainty for the market, as 
compared to a laundry list of possible contract types.  Powerex states that the control 
principle should focus on physical output as opposed to financial terms, since it is 
physical output that addresses the Commission's physical withholding concerns and 
relates to the agency's market screens.
148 
170.  EEI, EPSA, and Reliant argue that the Commission should continue to look at 
the totality of circumstances and attach the presumption of control when an entity can 
affect the ability of capacity to reach the market.
149 
171.  NYISO states that based on its experience in the administration of bid-based 
markets, what matters in the control of a plant is the ability to determine or 
significantly influence (a) the levels of the bids from the plant, and (b) the level of 
output from the plant.  Accordingly, the Commission should focus directly on these 
critical facts, rather than creating presumptions based on indirect indicia of an ability 
to control these key competitive parameters.  NYISO claims that plant engineering or 
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technical operations may be outsourced without conferring an ability to control price 
or output, so that the outsourcing is not of particular competitive significance.  If, 
however, an entity could determine or significantly influence bids or output, then it 
would be reasonable for the Commission to place a burden on that entity to 
demonstrate that it is not in a position to benefit from a possible exercise of market 
power.  NYISO claims that if more than one party is in a position to exercise control 
over bids or output, then both such parties should have the burden of rebutting this 
presumption.  NASUCA concurs.
150  Because of the fact-specific nature of these 
issues, the NYISO endorses the Commission’s proposal to allow individual sellers to 
rebut the presumption on the basis of their particular facts and circumstances.
151 
172.  Westar argues determinations of control over generating plants are essential 
elements of the negotiated risk sharing arrangement in virtually every energy 
management contract and that the Commission should not change its precedent 
absent clear evidence of market uncertainty or a finding that the established 
guidelines are inappropriate.
152   
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173.  Southern suggests that the approach taken in Order No. 652, where the 
Commission provided an illustrative list of contracts and arrangements that involve 
changes of control, is reasonable.
153 
Commission Determination 
174.  As discussed in the sections that follow, the Commission concludes that the 
determination of control is appropriately based on a review of the totality of 
circumstances on a fact-specific basis.  No single factor or factors necessarily results 
in control.  The electric industry remains a dynamic, developing industry, and no 
bright-line standard will encompass all relevant factors and possibilities that may 
occur now or in the future.  If a seller has control over certain capacity such that the 
seller can affect the ability of the capacity to reach the relevant market, then that 
capacity should be attributed to the seller when performing the generation market 
power screens.
154 
175.  Though we note the widespread support among commenters for the 
Commission’s effort to provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the 
determination of control, there are differing points of view as to what circumstances 
or combination of circumstances convey control.  These circumstances vary 
depending on the attributes of the contract, the market and the market participants.  
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Thus, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to make a generic finding or generic 
presumption of control, but rather that it is appropriate to continue making our 
determinations of control on a fact-specific basis. 
176.  We agree with commenters such as Powerex and Westar that the Commission 
should rely on a set of principles or guidelines to determine what constitutes control.  
This has been our historical approach and we find no compelling reason to modify 
our approach at this time.  Accordingly, as suggested by EEI, EPSA and others, we 
will consider the totality of circumstances and attach the presumption of control when 
an entity can affect the ability of capacity to reach the market.  Our guiding principle 
is that an entity controls the facilities when it controls the decision-making over sales 
of electric energy, including discretion as to how and when power generated by these 
facilities will be sold.
155    
177.  With regard to suggestions that we require all relevant contracts to be filed for 
review and determination by the Commission as to which entity controls a particular 
asset (e.g., with an initial application, updated market power analysis, or change in 
status filing), we will not adopt this suggestion.  Under section 205 of the FPA, the 
Commission may require any contracts that affect or relate to jurisdictional rates or 
services to be filed.  However, the Commission uses a rule of reason with respect to 
the scope of contracts that must be filed and does not require as a matter of routine 
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that all such contracts be submitted to the Commission for review.  Our historical 
practice has been to place on the filing party the burden of determining which entity 
controls an asset.  As discussed below, we will require a seller to make an affirmative 
statement as to whether a contractual arrangement transfers control and to identify the 
party or parties it believes controls the generation facility.  Nevertheless, the 
Commission retains the right at the Commission’s discretion to request the seller to 
submit a copy of the underlying agreement(s) and any relevant supporting 
documentation.    
ii.  Rebuttable Presumption Regarding Ownership 
Comments 
178.  MidAmerican argues that the Commission should adopt a presumption of 
control based on physical ownership of the generation (as adjusted for long-term sales 
or purchase power agreements).  MidAmerican states that it is physical ownership 
that typically determines which entity controls the output of the generation and 
determines its ability to reach relevant markets.  While many entities may have partial 
control over a unit’s output, it is the owner that is most likely to affect market 
power.
156 
179.  Morgan Stanley states that as a general rule, when assessing market power, the 
Commission should specifically adopt a rebuttable presumption that the entity that 
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owns
157 the generation asset controls the generation capacity.
158  This presumption 
would shift if the asset owner relinquishes to a third-party the final decision-making 
authority over whether a unit runs (i.e., if the third-party can trump the asset owner's 
dispatch instruction, then the third-party has control over whether the capacity 
reaches the market).  Morgan Stanley states that such final decision-making authority 
would include authority to schedule outages.
159 
180.  FirstEnergy proposes that where a generation owner is a public utility under 
Part II of the FPA, the Commission should adopt a rebuttable presumption that such 
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owner controls all of the generating capacity that it owns.
160  FirstEnergy asserts that 
even where another entity is responsible for day-to-day operation of a generating unit, 
the generation owner generally will retain managerial discretion over the operation of 
the unit and over the sale of power from that unit into the market.
161 
181.  A number of commenters argue that jointly-owned plants should be assigned 
based on percentage of ownership.
162  For example, Pinnacle states that, in the 
Southwest region, the joint ownership of base-load generating plants is the norm, and 
there is typically one party that has operational control over the facility.  However, if 
the Commission refines the criteria for assigning generation to an entity based on 
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seller rather than the purchaser.  FirstEnergy argues that in many cases, the purchaser has 
little, if any, discretion over the dispatch of such units or the price at which energy is 
purchased. 
161 In its reply comments, PPL disagrees stating that, in assessing the entity that 
should be deemed to control capacity, whether assessing a contract to sell capacity or an 
asset management contract, the Commission should ask which party can benefit from an 
exercise of market power with regard to the supply at issue.  PPL asserts that the flaw in 
FirstEnergy’s proposal is that when a firm obligation to sell power is in effect, the seller 
cannot benefit from exercising market power with regard to the MWs sold pursuant to 
that firm obligation.  Likewise, a buyer that can count on delivery of firm power is the 
ultimate decision-maker as to its resale.  The seller will have to buy replacement power 
(at the prevailing market rate) if its expected source is not available, and therefore cannot 
benefit from withholding that amount of power.  Thus such an approach would overstate 
one counter party’s controlled capacity and understate the other’s.  PPL reply comments 
at 11-13. 
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factors such as directing plant outages, fuel procurement, and plant operations (or 
similar factors), there is concern that jointly-owned generation may be attributed in 
whole to each of the owners if there is joint decision-making on such factors (e.g., if 
such decisions are made through a consortium of utilities forming a plant’s joint 
operating committee) and result in unintentional double counting.  Pinnacle also 
raises a concern that where joint plant owners appoint one of the joint owners to 
operate the plant, the entire plant will be attributed to the operator, rather than being 
attributed to each of the joint owners in shares.  According to Pinnacle, the Final Rule 
should clarify that capacity of jointly-owned plants operated by one of the owners 
will be assigned to each joint owner based on its percentage interest.
163  Pinnacle 
states that the current rules under the  
 
interim screens with regard to assigning generating capacity to an entity appear to be 
workable. 
164   
182.  Many other commenters raise concerns about double counting in cases of 
shared control.
165  For example, with regard to shared facilities, FirstEnergy states 
                                              
163 Pinnacle at 4-5.  See also MidAmerican at 6-7. 
164 EEI agrees that in such a situation, if both owners have input on how and where 
the capacity is sold, then the asset should be allocated based on ownership percentages.  
EEI at 20. 
165 See, e.g., Alliance Power Marketing reply comments at 8-9; Constellation at 6; 
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that control of the plant should be attributed to the entity that is deemed to own the 
energy supplied from the plant.  FirstEnergy offers that, if circumstances arise in 
which discretion over plant output is shared among more than one party, the 
Commission should permit the affected parties to resolve between themselves the 
entity to which capacity available in the unit will be attributed.  FirstEnergy 
concludes that if the Commission adopts a regional approach to updated market 
power analyses, the Commission will be able to monitor those circumstances in 
which specified generation capacity is attributed to the wrong market participant.
166 
Commission Determination 
183.  With regard to the suggestion that we adopt a rebuttable presumption that the 
owner of the facility controls the facility, our historical approach has been that the 
owner of a facility is presumed to have control of the facility unless such control has 
been transferred to another party by virtue of a contractual agreement.  We will adopt 
that approach.  Accordingly, while we do not specifically adopt a rebuttable 
presumption that the owners control the facility, we will continue our practice of 
assigning control to the owner absent a contractual agreement transferring such 
control. 
184.  We note that the Commission has developed precedent regarding the 
contractual arrangements that can transfer control.  In these cases, the Commission 
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has stated that control refers to arrangements, contractual or otherwise, that confer 
control of generation or transmission facilities just as effectively as they could 
through ownership.
167  The capacity associated with contracts that confer operational 
control to an entity other than the owner thus must be assigned to the entity 
exercising control over that facility, rather than to the entity that is the legal owner of 
the facility, when performing the generation market power screens.
168 
185.  With regard to FirstEnergy’s suggestion that the affected parties make a 
determination regarding the entity to whom capacity available in the generating unit 
will be attributed in order to avoid any unwarranted double counting in the attribution 
of control,
169 the Commission agrees that this is a constructive and appropriate 
                                              
167 Citizens Power and Light Corp., 48 FERC ¶ 61,210 at 61,777 (1989). See also 
Bechtel Power Corp., 60 FERC ¶ 61,156 (1992) (finding that an entity that was 
contractually engaged to provide operation and maintenance services was not an 
“operator” of jurisdictional facilities because the entity did not “operate” the facilities at 
issue but rather, in essence, was functioning merely as the owner’s agent with respect to 
the operation of the jurisdictional facilities); D.E. Shaw, 102 FERC ¶ 61,265 at P 33-36 
(finding that a power marketer’s “investment adviser” affiliate was a public utility where 
it had sole discretion to determine the trades to be entered into by the power marketer, as 
well as the power to execute the contracts, and therefore operated jurisdictional facilities 
rather than acted as merely an agent of the owner); R.W. Beck , 109 FERC ¶ 61,315 at P 
15 (finding R.W. Beck Plant Management, Ltd. (Beck) was a public utility subject to the 
FPA in connection with its activities as manager of public utility Central Mississippi 
Generating Company, LLC because Beck effectively governed the physical operation of 
certain jurisdictional transmission and interconnection facilities and served as the 
decision-maker in determining sales of wholesale power). 
168 NOPR at P 47-48 (citing July 8 Order, 108 FERC ¶ 61,026 at P 65). 
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approach.  However, although we wish to avoid double counting as a general matter, 
the Commission will not rule out the possibility of double counting in circumstances 
where it is unclear what entity has control.  For example, if different parties could 
control dispatch decisions under various circumstances, to err on the conservative 
side, the Commission may attribute generation to more than one seller for the 
purposes of the horizontal analysis. 
186.  To determine whether there are contracts transferring control to a seller 
seeking market-based rate authority, similar to the requirements for change in status 
filings,
170 the Commission will require sellers when filing an application for market-
based rate authority or an updated market power analysis, to make an affirmative 
statement as to whether any contractual arrangements result in the transfer of control 
of any assets, including whether the seller is conferring control to another entity or 
obtaining control of another entity’s assets.  Moreover, in addition to requiring such 
affirmative statements as to whether any contractual arrangements result in the 
transfer of control of any assets,
171 the Commission will require sellers, when filing 
                                              
170 See Calpine Energy Services, L.P., 113 FERC ¶ 61,158 at P 13 (2005) (sellers 
making a change in status filing to report an energy management agreement are required 
to make an affirmative statement in their filing as to whether the agreement at issue 
transfers control of any assets and whether the agreement results in any material effect on 
the conditions that the Commission relied upon in the grant of their market-based rate 
authority). 
171 Such a statement should include contracts that transfer control to another party 
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an application for market-based rates, an updated market power analysis, or a 
required change in status report with regard to generation, to specify the party or 
parties they believe has control of the generation facility and to what extent each 
party holds control. 
187.  We understand that affected parties may hold differing views as to the extent 
to which control is held by the parties.  Accordingly, we also will require that a seller 
making such an affirmative statement seek a "letter of concurrence" from other 
affected parties identifying the degree to which each party controls a facility and 
submit these letters with its filing.  Absent agreement between the parties involved, or 
where the Commission has additional concerns despite such agreement, the 
Commission will request additional information which may include, but not be 
limited to, any applicable contract so that we can make a determination as to which 
seller or sellers have control. 
188.  With regard to Pinnacle's concern regarding joint plant owners appointing one 
of the joint owners to operate the plant, we reserve judgment as a general matter.  
However, we understand that there may be situations where a jointly-owned 
generation facility is operated by one of the joint-owners for the benefit of and on 
behalf of all of the joint-owners.  Under these circumstances, it may be reasonable to 
allocate capacity based on ownership percentages.  Such a determination should be 
made on a case-specific basis. 
189.  We remind sellers that in performing the horizontal market power analysis all 
capacity owned or controlled by the seller must be accounted for.  In this regard, we Docket No. RM04-7-000   105 
 
expect that sellers, in performing such market power analyses, will clearly identify all 
assets for which they have control, or relinquished control, through contract.   
iii.  Energy Management Agreements 
Comments 
190.  Most commenters state that energy management agreements and the functions 
listed in the NOPR (directing plant outages, fuel procurement, plant operations, 
energy and capacity sales, and/or credit and liquidity decisions) should not be 
presumed to convey control.  Financial Companies state that a generic presumption of 
control by energy managers will “chill a seller's willingness to provide energy 
management services.”
172  Others suggest that the Commission should not adopt such 
a presumption and, in the alternative, should consider the specific aspects of an 
agreement.  Additionally, some commenters request clarification on contract terms 
that are widely used in energy management agreements and may or may not convey 
control. 
191.  Sempra and financial entities argue that the Commission should not adopt a 
presumption that energy management agreements confer control over generating 
capacity.
173  They state that energy management and comparable agreements do not 
                                              
172 Financial Companies at 9. 
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convey unlimited discretion and should not shift the presumption of control away 
from the entity that has final authority to dispatch the physical output of the plant.   
192.  Constellation agrees that the Commission should focus on whether an energy 
manager may make decisions about physical operation without final authority from a 
plant owner.
174   
193.  Westar expresses concerns that the NOPR’s invitation to consider ultimate 
control to reside with any entity that has some discretion over the output of a plant 
would invite confusion and undercut the Commission’s declared objective to provide 
greater certainty and clarity in this area.
175  Alliance Power Marketing also expresses 
concern that a presumption that some discretion constitutes control will discourage 
innovation in the market, particularly with regard to option contracts and third-party 
arrangements.
176 
194.  Alliance Power Marketing differentiates between asset/energy managers 
acting purely as agents and those that do not meet the legal definition of agents, 
suggesting that a market facilitator meeting the criteria of an agent should be exempt 
from attribution of control.  The agent criteria identified by Alliance Power 
Marketing are: (1) the entity holds legal indicia of an agent’s role; (2) the entity is 
                                              
174 Constellation at 18. 
175 Westar at 28. 
176 Alliance Power Marketing reply comments at 8-9. Docket No. RM04-7-000   107 
 
neither a market participant nor an affiliate of a market participant; (3) the entity has 
limited, if any, financial stake in power market outcomes; and (4) the entity is subject 
to supervision or control in its activities on behalf of its principals.
177  Alliance Power 
Marketing submits that agents do not control generation if they are acting on behalf 
of their clients, do not assume the risk of transactions, and never take title to power.  
Constellation notes that the Commission has previously recognized that an agent who 
is acting subject to the direction of the owner should be not found to have control of a 
facility.
178  
195.  Financial Companies disagree with Alliance Power Marketing’s 
differentiation.  They caution the Commission about imposing overly restrictive 
limitations on which entities qualify as agents or independent contractors and 
recommend that the Commission reject Alliance Power Marketing’s proposal and 
suggest instead that ultimate decision-making authority is most relevant whether or 
not an agent is or is not a market participant.
179   
196.  In contrast, NASUCA submits that the Commission should presume that 
energy management agreements convey control when energy managers can control 
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178 Constellation at 20 (citing Bechtel Power Corp., 60 FERC ¶ 61,156 at 61,572 
(1992)). 
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generation output or the price or quantity of service offered.
180  Even more 
specifically, NASUCA recommends that the Commission reject formulations that 
would cloak market power of energy managers who control or affect electricity 
pricing, or the pricing of critical cost components such as fuel.  Instead the 
Commission should adopt a rule that at a minimum encompasses the exercise of 
control over prices, bids, or output, including the ability to affect the cost of fuel and 
other inputs to generation.
181 
Commission Determination 
197.  After careful consideration of the comments, the Commission will not adopt a 
presumption of control regarding energy management agreements or the functions 
outlined in the NOPR.
182  We agree with commenters that energy management and 
comparable agreements do not necessarily convey unlimited discretion and control 
away from the entity that owns the plant.  In this regard, as noted above, it is the 
totality of the circumstances that will determine which entity controls a specific asset. 
198.  Further, the Commission will not adopt a presumption of control in the case of 
shared discretion over the output and physical operation of a plant.  The Commission 
is aware that varying degrees of discretion may be shared in some cases, and believes 
that the determination of control in these cases is best addressed on a fact-specific 
                                              
180 NASUCA reply comments at 13 (citing NYISO at 6). 
181 Id. at 15. 
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basis.  As noted by Sempra, there may always be an element of discretion associated 
with the implementation of instructions or guidelines included in energy management 
agreements.
183   
199.  With regard to Alliance Power Marketing’s differentiation between 
asset/energy managers acting purely as agents and those that do not meet the legal 
definition of agents, and suggestion that “a market facilitator meeting the criteria of 
an agent should be exempt from attribution of control,” we find this differentiation in 
and of itself not determinative.  Instead, consistent with our conclusion that the 
determination of control is appropriately based on a review of the totality of the 
circumstances on a fact-specific basis such that no single factor or factors necessarily 
results in control, it is the combination of the rights conveyed that determine control, 
not whether an entity considers itself to be an agent and not a market participant. 
iv.  Specific Functions and Contract Terms 
Comments 
200.  With regard to specific functions and specific contract terms, many 
commenters do not believe that functions such as directing plant outages, fuel 
procurement, plant operations, energy and capacity sales, and credit and liquidity 
merit a presumption of control. 
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201.  NYISO and FirstEnergy both suggest that the functions listed in the NOPR 
may be outsourced without conveying ultimate control.  According to EEI, the list of 
functions described in the NOPR would not provide greater guidance.
184  Rather, EEI 
believes a focus on the ability to withhold will be more effective than establishing 
presumptions based on the functions described in the NOPR.  In particular, EEI 
argues that establishing presumptions for these individual functions would be 
difficult, because often it would be a combination of various functions that would 
result in the ability to affect bringing the capacity to market.
185 
202.  Duke believes that the Commission should avoid simplistic presumptions as to 
what constitutes control over resources for market power purposes and how and when 
specific generation should be imputed to market participants for purposes of the 
screen analysis.  Duke argues that in a market power context, such determinations 
should be fact-driven and based on a pragmatic assessment of which party has the 
ability to withhold a specific amount of capacity from the market.  For example, the 
Commission should not automatically impute control over capacity based solely on 
contract language that appears to convey some element of discretion over unit 
operation to a particular party, notwithstanding the absence of any real world ability 
for that entity to withhold that capacity from the market.  Duke states that the 
                                              
184 EEI reply comments at 25. 
185 EEI at 22. Docket No. RM04-7-000   111 
 
Commission should recognize that the ability to economically or physically withhold 
output from the market rests with the party that makes the final determination of 
whether generation (energy and/or capacity) will be offered into the market.  Even a 
purchaser with dispatch rights may not have the ability to withhold supply, if the 
capacity owner has the right to schedule energy when the purchaser chooses not to do 
so.  Similarly, a party with a contractual right to capacity (as opposed to energy), 
even with a call option for energy priced at market, does not have operational control 
over energy.  Duke states that any contract in which rights to the energy ultimately 
revert to the owner/operator or for which energy is available only at a market price 
leaves control in the hands of the owner/operator.  According to Duke, there should 
not be a blanket presumption that certain types of commercial arrangements or 
contractual language imply control in all instances.
186 
203.  PG&E argues that any presumptions about control over generation should be 
based on whether a seller controls the dispatch of energy (i.e., can affect the ability of 
the capacity to reach the relevant market).  This general presumption should cover all 
types of transactions and business arrangements, rather than trying to address every 
possible function.  Such an approach will be more effective than establishing 
presumptions based on individual functions, as various factors may intersect or 
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combine to provide this control.  Relevant factors include authority over the use or 
provision of fuel to the plant.
187 
204.  PPL expresses concern that any arrangement in which a gas supplier could 
receive the output of a gas-fired generator as payment for the gas it supplies to the 
generator, if it is the only supplier to that generator, may convey control.  PG&E 
appears to agree, stating that authority over the use or provision of fuel to the plant is 
a relevant factor with regard to control.
188   
205.  EEI also appears to agree that fuel ownership may result in a change in control 
of plant output when, in the context of what triggers a change in status filing, it states: 
“The Commission should continue the current policy that changes in the ownership of 
fuel supplies in and of themselves need not be reported.  Only if the change in 
ownership of inputs results in a change of control of the output of the plant should a 
change in status filing be required.  If a public utility acquires fuel supplies, there is 
no need to notify the Commission, unless the business structure, like a tolling 
agreement, actually results in discretion over the plant output.”
189 
206.  Sempra states that the Commission has generally treated energy management 
agreements as tolling agreements and requests that the Commission acknowledge the 
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differences between the two.
190  APPA/TAPS state that particularly under tolling 
arrangements, while the supplier of fuel may not be operating the plant, it controls the 
plants’ production of energy for sale, thus affecting market outcomes.
191  
Constellation argues that plant operations and sales of output are functions that may 
convey control, but notes that the variety of case-specific facts limits the benefit of a 
blanket presumption of control.   
207.  Commenters also request that the Commission provide guidance regarding 
other contract types and terminology such as call option contracts (with liquidated 
damages), contracts that allow variance in volume or delivery point, QF contracts, 
RMR contracts, capacity contracts, and load obligations.
192  
208.  Finally, EEI seeks clarification that energy only contracts over 100 MW for a 
term greater than one year that do not include rights to specific capacity are one type 
of contract that does not transfer control. 
                                              
190 Sempra at 11-12.  According to Sempra, under energy management 
agreements, energy managers typically sell power according to instructions or guidelines 
provided by the owner, and the energy manager is compensated on a fee-basis.  Sempra 
states that in the case of tolling agreements, the tolling party generally has complete 
discretion over sales of output and assumes risk of sales transactions with the owner 
typically receiving a flat compensation and retaining authority over when to operate the 
facility. 
191 APPA/TAPS at 90. 
192 See, e.g., EEI reply comments at 25; EPSA at 38; Financial Companies reply 
comments at 7; FirstEnergy at 6; Reliant at 5; Duke at 25; PG&E at 7-8; PowerEx at 9-
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Commission Determination 
209.  In Order No. 652, the Commission provided a non-exclusive, illustrative list of 
contractual arrangements that are subject to the change in status filing requirement.  
The list includes agreements that relate to “operation (including scheduling and 
dispatch), maintenance, fuel supply, risk management, and marketing [of plant 
output].  These types of arrangements have in some cases also been referred to as 
energy management agreements, asset management agreements, tolling agreements, 
and scheduling and dispatching agreements.”
193  The Commission clarifies that the 
illustrative list included in Order No. 652 provides guidance with regard to new 
applications for market-based rate authority and updated market power analyses as 
well as to change in status filings. 
210.  With respect to requests for clarification of whether certain contractual 
arrangements transfer control (such as call option contracts; liquidated damages 
contracts; contracts that allow variance in volume, source, or delivery point; QF 
contracts; RMR contracts; capacity contracts; and load obligations), for the reasons 
stated above, the Commission declines to address particular contractual terminology 
in isolation.  The label placed on a specific contract does not determine whether it 
conveys control.  Such determination necessarily must be made on a fact-specific 
basis. 
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211.  Similarly, with regard to EEI’s request for clarification that energy-only 
contracts over 100 MW for a term greater than one year that do not include rights to 
specific capacity are one type of contract that does not transfer control, for the 
reasons stated above, the Commission declines to address such a specific contractual 
arrangement generically. 
b.  Requirement for Sellers to have a Rate on File 
Comments 
212.  Alliance Power Marketing questions the Commission’s proposal to clarify that 
any entity that controls generation from which jurisdictional sales are made is 
required to have a rate on file.  Alliance Power Marketing believes that this proposal 
appears more akin to an inquiry than a Proposed Rulemaking.
194  Pinnacle requests 
clarification as to whether a non-jurisdictional entity is required to have a rate on file 
if that entity is the operator of a facility jointly-owned by jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional entities.
195  
Commission Determination 
213.  With regard to comments concerning the Commission’s statement in the 
NOPR as to the need for an entity that controls generation from which jurisdictional 
power sales are made to have a rate on file, the Commission is reiterating, not 
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modifying, the existing obligation to make rate filings.  Under section 205 of the 
FPA, 
every public utility shall file with the Commission… schedules 
showing all rates and charges for any… sale subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission, and the classifications, practices, 
and regulations affecting such rates and charges, together with all  
contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, 
classifications, and services.[
196] 
Part II of the FPA defines a public utility as “any person who owns or operates facilities 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”
197  Any entity not otherwise exempted 
from the Commission’s regulations that owns or operates jurisdictional facilities from 
which jurisdictional power sales are made is a public utility required to have a rate on file 
with the Commission, unless the Commission has determined that such an entity does not 
in fact have “control” over the jurisdictional facilities sufficient to deem it a public utility 
(for example, if its ownership is passive, or its operation of facilities is as an agent subject 
to the control of the owner of the facilities).  For any entity that is a public utility, if its 
rate authority is market-based, then it is subject to the conditions of authorization by the 
Commission (including the requirement to demonstrate lack of generation market power 
by the submission of market screens as spelled out in the horizontal market power section 
of this Final Rule).  If an entity is a public utility and making jurisdictional sales without 
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having a rate on file, those sales may be subject to refund, and the entity may be subject 
to a civil penalty.
198   
214.  In response to Pinnacle, we clarify that if an entity has control of a 
jurisdictional facility and that entity is making jurisdictional sales, it would be a 
public utility subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission and would be required to 
have a rate on file with the Commission.  However, if an entity is specifically 
exempted from the Commission’s regulation pursuant to FPA section 201(f), it would 
not be considered a public utility under the FPA and, accordingly, would not be 
required to have a rate on file. 
7.  Relevant Geographic Market 
a.  Default Relevant Geographic Market 
Commission Proposal 
215.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to continue to use its historical 
approach with regard to the relevant geographic market.  The Commission stated that 
the default relevant geographic market is the control area where the generation owned 
or controlled by the seller is physically located and each of the control areas directly 
interconnected to that control area (with the exception of a generator interconnecting 
to a non-affiliate owned or controlled transmission system, in which case the relevant 
market is only the control area in which the seller is located).  The Commission also 
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proposed to continue to designate RTOs/ISOs with sufficient market structure and a 
single energy market in which a seller is located and is a member as the default 
relevant geographic market.  In such circumstances the Commission would not 
require sellers to consider the first-tier markets to such RTOs/ISOs as being part of 
the default relevant geographic markets.  In addition, the Commission noted in the 
NOPR that its experience with corporate mergers and acquisitions indicates that the 
same RTOs/ISOs that the Commission has identified as meeting the criteria for being 
considered a single market for purposes of performing the generation market power 
screens have, at times, been divided into smaller submarkets for study purposes 
because frequently binding transmission constraints prevent some potential suppliers 
from selling into the destination market.  Therefore, the Commission sought comment 
on its approach under the market-based rate program of considering the entire 
geographic region under control of the RTO/ISO, with a sufficient market structure 
and a single energy market, as the default relevant market.  We asked whether the 
Commission should continue its approach of considering the entire geographic region 
as the default market for purposes of the indicative screens but consider RTO/ISO 
submarkets for purposes of the DPT.    
Comments 
216.  With regard to the RTO/ISO market, several commenters state that, based on 
all the protections associated with structured RTO/ISO markets with Commission-
approved market monitoring and mitigation, the Commission should continue its 
current approach of allowing the entire geographic region of an RTO/ISO to be the Docket No. RM04-7-000   119 
 
default relevant market for the horizontal market power analysis.
199  They state that 
retention of this standard will simplify preparation of market power analyses by 
sellers within qualified RTOs.  
217.  Several commenters as well urge the Commission not to consider RTO or ISO 
submarkets.  Sempra states that it recognizes that RTOs are at times divided into 
submarkets, such as for purposes relating to corporate merger and acquisition 
analyses, but it submits that the Commission should not consider RTO or ISO 
submarkets when conducting a market power analysis.  Sempra states that the use of 
submarkets will result in uncertainty, confusion, and increased litigation as to the 
geographic boundaries of the “right” submarket that should be analyzed.  According 
to Sempra, sellers that operate in RTO and ISO markets currently know with certainty 
the relevant geographic market for purposes of regulatory obligations such as 
reporting relevant changes in status, and the use of submarkets will eliminate that 
certainty and will open the door to competing definitions of submarkets.  Sempra 
states that the existence of internal transmission constraints does not justify breaking 
up RTOs and ISOs into submarkets for purposes of the Commission’s market power 
analysis.  Sempra states that notably, only RTOs and ISOs with sufficient market 
structure and a single energy market can be used as default geographic markets.  
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These attributes allow RTOs, ISOs, and their members to adopt mechanisms, 
including local markets or mitigation, that address potential concerns about local 
market power resulting from transmission constraints.
200 
218.  Similarly, EPSA, PG&E, PPL, ISO-NE, CAISO and NYISO support use of 
the entire RTO/ISO as the relevant geographic market where the RTOs/ISOs operate 
a single centralized market and generally where there are measures for monitoring 
and oversight.
201   
219.   In addition, EPSA offers that changes to the size of markets can be addressed 
on a case-by-case basis by sellers or when an intervenor presents specific evidence 
supporting reduction of the relevant geographic market.
202  PG&E states that in the 
case of a single control area like CAISO, there is little rationale or basis to determine 
how to subdivide a control area.  Where there may be intermittent congestion within 
certain areas, the control area as a whole has regional planning and monitoring, 
avoiding the need to subdivide.  In addition, the empirical fact that most sellers make 
no effort to justify an alternate geographic market – whether larger or smaller – 
supports the control area as the appropriate measure.
203 
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220.  PPL states that if the Commission were to impose stringent market power tests 
based upon temporary transmission limitations beyond generators’ control (e.g., 
infrequent intra-control area transmission system limitations), the Commission could 
make worse an already tenuous financial situation for existing generators in such 
areas and continue to deter new generation investment.  Defining a geographic 
market smaller than a control area may lead to high failure rates of the screens.  PPL 
states that associated loss of market-based rate authority (if that is the remedy 
imposed by the Commission) could precipitate economic retirements of those needed 
generators. 
221.  Finally, Ameren suggests that, for purposes of the DPT, the relevant 
geographic market should be the applicable RTO/ISO footprint, just as it is for 
purposes of the indicative screens, unless the Commission already has found the 
existence of a submarket in the relevant portion of the RTO/ISO.  In such cases, the 
Commission should give due consideration to any existing Commission-approved 
market monitoring and mitigation regime already in place within the RTO/ISO that 
provides for mitigation of the submarket.  If the relevant RTO/ISO does not have in 
place a mitigation program for an identified submarket, the Commission may then 
consider appropriate submarket-specific mitigation in connection with granting 
market-based rate authorization.   
222.  On the other side of the issue, several commenters urge the Commission to 
consider internal transmission constraints and possible submarkets within 
RTOs/ISOs.  The California Board proposes that the Commission permit RTOs to Docket No. RM04-7-000   122 
 
identify submarkets within their control area, as needed, to help determine possible 
local market power.  The California Board states that if the Commission develops or 
approves criteria which sellers may use to expand their geographic market, then the 
same criteria must be applicable in RTOs to limit the size of a geographic market.  
The New Jersey Board states that intervenors should be allowed to present evidence 
that the relevant geographic market is smaller (or larger) than the default RTO/ISO 
market and states that evidence of binding transmission constraints is relevant when 
examining horizontal market power.
204   
223.  State AGs and Advocates state that almost any large default geographic 
market will have many transmission-constrained areas (load pockets) within it and 
that the Commission must require applicants for market-based rate authority to do a 
proper analysis of the degree of market power that is likely to be exercised by all 
sellers, including the applicants, in all relevant load pockets or transmission-
constrained regions or subregions in which the sellers control generation capacity.  
They state that all load pockets must be considered as appropriate geographic markets 
whenever they exist. 
224.  APPA/TAPS state that the presumption of the RTO footprint as the default 
geographic market must be truly rebuttable, including rebuttals based upon evidence 
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that the RTO itself treats an area as a separate market.
205  APPA/TAPS state that in 
practice, however, the presumption appears to be irrebuttable.  They argue that if 
known load pockets such as WUMS (or, for example, the Delmarva Peninsula, 
Southwest Connecticut, or the City of San Francisco, among others) do not rebut the 
geographic market presumption, the rebuttable presumption effectively becomes 
irrebuttable.  APPA/TAPS recommend that in advance of each region’s market-based 
rate review, RTOs should provide market participants with transmission studies that 
reveal where binding transmission constraints arise so that those data can be used in 
addressing the proper relevant geographic market.  In addition, APPA/TAPS state 
that in the § 203 context, the Commission has correctly found that transmission 
constraints lead to distinct geographic markets, at least when those constraints are 
binding.  They submit that no reasonable basis exists to distinguish between the 
competitive analyses used to establish relevant geographic markets in the section 203 
and the section 205 contexts.
206 
225.  In response to APPA/TAPS, EPSA states that in cases where the Commission 
denied a seller’s argument to change its relevant geographic market, the Commission 
carefully considered the positions of parties advocating a different market and simply 
found their arguments insufficient to warrant a modification to the market 
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definition.
207  
 EPSA states that it cannot be said that a presumption is irrebuttable 
simply because the Commission has, to date, deferred to RTO/ISO mitigation 
mechanisms to this point.   
226.  With regard to non-RTO areas, APPA/TAPS states that while the control area 
provides a reasonable starting point, the Commission’s obligation to base its market-
based rate decision on “empirical proof” requires reliance on specific facts that 
demonstrate whether the relevant geographic market should be the control area, or a 
smaller or larger area.  APPA/TAPS further state that, for non-RTO areas, the seller 
should affirmatively address whether the geographic market should default to the 
control area or whether a smaller or larger area is appropriate, and support that result 
with evidence.  They add that intervenors should also be allowed to introduce 
evidence regarding the question.
208 
227.  With regard to both RTO/ISO and non-RTO areas, several other commenters 
urge the Commission to consider changing its existing policy on the default 
geographic market.  State AGs and Advocates state that the best policy would be to 
have no “default” market criteria, but to have each applicant for market-based rates 
determine on an analytical basis what market area makes the most sense for its 
                                              
207 EPSA reply comments at 9-11, citing APPA/TAPS at 56. 
208 APPA/TAPS at 53-62. Docket No. RM04-7-000   125 
 
circumstances based on the actual transmission constraints that it faces.
209  NRECA 
states that using individual control areas or RTOs as the default market for evaluating 
a transmission provider’s market power fails to account for the binding transmission 
constraints and load pockets that have developed within those markets.
210   
228.  Morgan Stanley states that it supports the Commission's practice of relying on 
control areas and RTO/ISO regions when assessing market power as the default 
markets, but believes the Commission may be missing instances of market power by 
failing to also review known events that can create narrower or broader markets.  For 
example, Morgan Stanley states that the Commission acknowledges that binding 
transmission constraints and the existence of load pockets can cause considerable 
market power issues.  Therefore, Morgan Stanley asserts that the Commission should 
indeed consider whether a seller may possess the ability to exercise market power in a 
portion of an otherwise competitive market.  To enable the Commission to do so, 
sellers should address known constraints in their description of the relevant 
geographic market in their market power filings, particularly in markets for which 
they are the control area operator.
211 
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229.  The California Commission states that while it agrees that designating a 
relevant geographic area will reduce uncertainty to all market participants, 
designation of a static geographic market in a dynamic market may defeat the 
purpose of market certainty and may have unintended adverse consequences over 
time.  For example, with the implementation of locational marginal pricing (LMP) in 
the CAISO control area, there will be many submarket areas known as local areas.  
This will trigger “false negatives” (i.e., absence of market power even when there is 
market power) in a control area analysis.  A seller may pass both screens and receive 
market-based rate authority when tested against the broader geographic control area, 
such as the entire CAISO control area market.  However, the same seller may not 
pass the screens when tested against a particular sub-area or local area.  Accordingly, 
the California Commission states that the Commission should be flexible in 
designating geographic areas to determine market power.  The Commission should 
designate geographic areas by considering current and reasonably foreseeable 
regional developments, as the Commission currently does in merger cases following 
DOJ/FTC merger guidelines.
212  Similarly, the Commission should consider the 
presence or absence of market power due to continuous developments of major 
market events (e.g., area outages, congestion due to new market developments, and 
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the development of load) that can have significant impact as inputs in the market 
power screening calculation.   
230.  In contrast, EEI disagrees with those commenters that would require the seller 
in each filing to affirmatively address with supporting evidence whether the 
geographic market should default to the control area or RTO/ISO area.  EEI states 
that this requirement would defeat the purpose of having default areas to expedite and 
simplify the  market-based rate filing process, noting that it is more efficient for any 
affected party to have the right to challenge the selection of the default market, as 
exists under the proposed regulations.
213 
Commission Determination 
231.  The Commission will adopt in this Final Rule its current approach with regard 
to the default relevant geographic market, with some modifications.  In particular, the 
Commission will continue to use a seller’s balancing authority area
214 or the 
RTO/ISO market, as applicable, as the default relevant geographic market.
215  
However, where the Commission has made a specific finding that there is a 
                                              
213 EEI reply comments at 26-27. 
214 As we discuss fully below, the Commission will adopt the use of “balancing 
authority area” instead of control area.  As a result we use hereon the term balancing 
authority area.  In addition, even though commenters use the term “control area” we will 
use the term “balancing authority area” in our response. 
215 In addition, the Commission will continue to require sellers located in and a 
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submarket within an RTO/ISO, that submarket becomes the default relevant 
geographic market for sellers located within the submarket for purposes of the 
market-based rate analysis. 
232.  With regard to traditional (non-RTO/ISO) markets, our default relevant 
geographic market under both indicative screens will be first, the balancing authority 
area  where the seller is physically located,
216 and second, the markets directly 
interconnected to the seller’s balancing authority area  (first-tier balancing authority 
area markets).
217  We also clarify that if a transmission-owning Federal power 
marketing agency (e.g., the Tennessee Valley Authority, Bonneville Power 
Administration) is the home or first-tier market to the seller, then that seller must treat 
that Federal power marketing agency’s balancing authority area as a relevant 
geographic market and file market power analysis  
on it just as it would any other relevant market.
218  Under the indicative screens, we will 
consider only those supplies that are located in the market being considered (relevant 
                                              
216 For applications by sellers with no physical generation assets (such as power 
marketers) that are affiliated with generation asset owning utilities, we will continue to 
evaluate the affiliate generation owner’s market power when evaluating whether to grant 
market-based rate authority to the power marketer.  
217 Where a generator is interconnecting to a non-affiliate owned or controlled 
transmission system, there is only one relevant market (i.e., the balancing authority area  
in which the generator is located.). 
218 See, e.g., Portland General Electric Co., 111 FERC ¶ 61,151 at P 7 (2005); 
Idaho Power Co., 110 FERC ¶ 61,219 at n.6, P 10 (2005); Florida Power Corp.,           
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market) and those in first-tier markets to the relevant market.  For non-RTO sellers, we 
adopt a rebuttable presumption that the seller’s balancing authority area and each of its 
neighboring first-tier balancing authority areas are each relevant geographic markets. 
233.  Although a number of commenters oppose the use of the balancing authority 
area as the default geographic market in traditional markets, they have submitted no 
compelling evidence that our historical approach is inadequate or insufficient for the 
typical situation.  Indeed, using balancing authority areas allows the Commission and 
public to rely on publicly available data provided for balancing authority areas that 
are relevant to the market-based rate analysis discussed herein.  These data are 
accurate and generally available.  We will, however, continue to allow sellers and 
intervenors to present evidence on a case-by-case basis to show that some other 
geographic market should be considered as the relevant market in a particular case.
219  
We clarify that the seller must provide the Commission with a study based on the 
default geographic market, and we will allow sellers and intervenors to present 
additional sensitivity runs as part of their market power studies to show that some 
other geographic market should be considered as the relevant market in a particular 
case.  This evidence would be an addition to the required study based on the relevant 
geographic market as referred to in this Final Rule. 
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234.  We do not adopt the suggestion by APPA/TAPS that the seller should 
affirmatively address whether the geographic market should default to the balancing 
authority area.  We believe that EPSA’s argument that such a requirement would 
defeat the purpose of having default areas and add uncertainty into the market is more 
persuasive.  By defining default geographic markets, we provide the industry as much 
certainty as possible while also providing affected parties the right to challenge the 
default geographic market definition and provide evidence in that regard.  
235.  With regard to RTO/ISO markets, we agree with many commenters that 
RTOs/ISOs with a sufficient market structure and a single energy market with 
Commission-approved market monitoring and mitigation provide strong market 
protections.  As a general matter, sellers located in and members of the RTO/ISO 
may consider the geographic region under the control of the RTO/ISO as the default 
relevant geographic market for purposes of completing their horizontal analyses, 
unless the Commission already has found the existence of a submarket. 
236.  Where the Commission has made a specific finding that there is a submarket 
within an RTO/ISO, we believe that the market-based rate analysis (both indicative 
screens and DPT) should consider that submarket as the default relevant geographic 
market.  This is consistent with how the Commission has treated such submarkets in 
the merger context.  For example, in some merger orders, the Commission has found Docket No. RM04-7-000   131 
 
that PJM-East, and Northern PSEG are markets within PJM;
220 Southwestern 
Connecticut (SWCT) and Connecticut Import interface (CT) are separate markets 
within ISO-NE;
221 and New York City and Long Island are separate markets within 
NYISO.
222  Accordingly, we conclude that sellers located in these RTO/ISO 
submarkets should not use the entire PJM, ISO-NE and NYISO footprints as their 
relevant geographic markets for purposes of the market-based rate analysis.  Instead, 
they should use as the default geographic market for their market-based rate analysis 
the submarkets that the Commission already has found constitute separate markets in 
those RTOs/ISOs. 
237.  We agree with APPA/TAPS that if the Commission makes a specific finding 
that the relevant geographic market is one other than the balancing authority area or 
RTO/ISO geographic region, the Commission’s finding should define the default 
market going forward.  For example, if the Commission finds that a submarket exists 
within an RTO, that submarket becomes the default geographic market for all sellers 
that own or control generation capacity within that submarket. 
                                              
 
220 Exelon Corp., 112 FERC ¶ 61,011, reh’g denied, 113 FERC ¶ 61,299 (2005) 
(Exelon).  We note that Exelon later terminated the merger. 
221 Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 96 FERC ¶ 61,101 (2001).  The parties later 
withdrew their application under FPA section 203. 
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238.  To the extent that the Commission finds that a submarket exists within an 
RTO/ISO, intervenors or sellers can provide evidence to the contrary (i.e., the 
submarket, like our other default geographic markets, is rebuttable).  In addition, if a 
seller or intervenor argues that the seller operates in an RTO/ISO submarket and 
presents sufficient evidence to support that conclusion, we will consider those 
arguments even if the Commission has not previously found that a submarket exists.   
239.  As a general matter, because we recognize the arguments raised by 
commenters that defining default geographic markets (whether balancing authority 
area, RTO/ISO footprint or RTO/ISO submarket) may not be appropriate in all 
circumstances, on a case-by-case basis, we will allow sellers and intervenors to 
present additional sensitivity analyses
223 as part of their market power analysis to 
show that some other geographic market should be considered as the relevant market 
in a particular case.  For example, sellers or intervenors could present evidence that 
the relevant market is broader than a particular balancing authority area.  Sellers and 
intervenors may also provide evidence that because of internal transmission 
limitations (e.g., load pockets) the relevant market (or markets) is smaller than the 
balancing authority area, RTO/ISO footprint or RTO/ISO submarket.  We believe this 
is a balanced approach because it establishes a presumption that the Commission will 
in most cases rely on default geographic markets, while at the same time, the 
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Commission will give sellers and intervenors the opportunity to argue that the facts of 
a particular case support the use of some other geographic area as the relevant 
market.  
240.  We also provide, as discussed further below, guidance regarding the type of 
analysis required to rebut the default geographic markets including default markets 
for balancing authority areas, RTO/ISO markets, and RTO/ISO submarkets. 
241.  In this regard, sellers can incorporate the mitigation they are subject to in 
RTO/ISO markets or RTO/ISO submarkets with Commission-approved market 
monitoring and mitigation as part of their market power analysis.  For example, if a 
market power analysis shows that a seller has local market power, the seller may 
point to RTO/ISO mitigation rules as evidence that this market power has been 
adequately mitigated.  We believe the added protections provided in structured 
markets with market monitoring and mitigation generally result in a market where 
prices are transparent and attempts to exercise of market power will be sufficiently 
mitigated. 
242.  With respect to market concentration resulting within RTO/ISO submarkets, 
we will continue to consider existing RTO mitigation.  The Commission will consider 
an existing Commission-approved market monitoring and mitigation regime already 
in place within the RTO/ISO that provides for mitigation of the submarket.  For 
example, New York City will be treated as a separate default market for market-based 
rate study purposes.  However, because it has existing In-City mitigation, we will 
assess whether any concerns over market power are already mitigated.  We agree Docket No. RM04-7-000   134 
 
with Ameren that if the relevant RTO/ISO does not have in place a mitigation 
program for an identified submarket, the Commission may then consider whether 
and, if so, to what extent appropriate submarket-specific mitigation is needed. 
243.  In response to APPA/TAPS’ statement that in practice the presumption of the 
RTO footprint as the default geographic market appears to be irrebuttable, this is 
simply not the case.  The Commission carefully considers the positions and evidence 
submitted by parties advocating a different geographic market.  Although we may 
have found that arguments made in a particular case were unconvincing, or that 
market power was adequately mitigated by existing mitigation,
224 we did, and will 
continue to, provide the opportunity for sellers to rebut the presumption.  Moreover, 
as discussed above, where the Commission has made a specific finding that there is a 
                                              
224 See, e.g., Mystic I, LLC, 111 FERC ¶ 61,378 at P 14-19 (2005) (rejecting 
challenge to use of ISO-NE market as the relevant geographic market on the basis that 
local market power mitigation is in place:  “[W]ithout specific evidence to the contrary, 
we are satisfied that ISO-NE has Commission-approved tariff provisions in place to 
address instances where transmission constraints would otherwise allow generators to 
exercise local market power and that these rules and procedures will apply in the 
NEMA/Boston zone within ISO-NE.”); Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 110 FERC            
¶ 61,340 at P 19-20, reh’g denied, 111 FERC ¶ 61,361 at P 13-15 (2005) (rejecting 
challenge to use of Midwest ISO market as the relevant geographic market on basis that 
local market power mitigation measures exist: “The tighter thresholds in NCAs such as 
WUMS in the Midwest ISO, and the resulting tighter mitigation of bids, are local market 
power mitigation measures” and should adequately address specific concerns regarding 
the possibility that Wisconsin Electric can exercise market power in the WUMS region). 
Accord AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,276 (2004), reh’g denied, 112 FERC 
¶ 61,320 at P 23-25 (2005), aff’d, Industrial Energy Users-Ohio v. FERC, No. 05-1435 
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2007) (use of PJM footprint as relevant geographic market; noting 
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submarket within an RTO, that submarket (not the RTO footprint) becomes the 
default relevant geographic market for sellers located within the submarket for 
purposes of the market-based rate analysis.  
244.  In this proceeding, we have considered expanding the default geographic 
region of a single RTO/ISO where contiguous RTOs/ISOs may have a common 
market as suggested by Ameren and find that there is insufficient support to make a 
generic finding that any contiguous RTOs/ISOs form a single geographic market. 
245.  With regard to the California Board’s proposal that the Commission permit 
RTOs to identify submarkets within their balancing authority area, as needed to help 
determine possible local market power, we agree that this is an appropriate approach.  
However, we note that this is neither a new nor a novel approach.  The Commission 
has historically considered the views of RTOs/ISOs in this regard and will continue 
to do so.  We note, however, that to the extent RTOs/ISOs believe there is a market 
power issue within their RTO/ISO, they should notify the Commission promptly and 
not wait for an application by an entity seeking market-based rate authority or a 
current seller submitting an updated market power analysis. 
246.  Finally, to avoid any possible uncertainty or confusion about the RTO/ISO 
submarket, we identify RTO/ISO submarkets that the Commission to date has found 
to constitute a separate market.  The Commission found submarkets in the PJM Docket No. RM04-7-000   136 
 
market, PJM East and Northern PSEG.
225   In Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, the 
Commission also found two submarkets, SWCT and CT in ISO-NE.
 226  In National 
Grid plc, the Commission again found two submarkets, New York City and Long 
Island, in NYISO.
227  These RTO/ISO submarkets will be the default geographic 
markets for purposes of the market-based rate analysis. 
b.  NERC’s Balancing Authority Area and Default Geographic Area 
Commission Proposal 
247.  In the NOPR, the Commission noted that the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) no longer uses the designation of control area since it 
approved the Reliability Functional Model (Functional Model).  The Commission 
sought comment as to whether or not the adoption of the NERC Functional Model 
should change the criteria for specifying the default relevant geographic market, and 
                                              
 
225 See Exelon, 112 FERC ¶ 61,011 at P 122. 
226 The Commission stated that “clearly, during periods when transmission 
becomes so constrained such that no additional imports from outside the region are 
possible and generators located inside the region are the only suppliers that can sell inside 
the region, the region should be defined as a separate relevant geographic market. Such is 
the case with SWCT and CT in this proceeding.”  SWCT was defined as the area inside 
the Southern Connecticut Import interface, and CT was defined as the area inside the  
 
Connecticut Import interface, which is essentially contiguous with the state of 
Connecticut itself.  Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 96 FERC ¶ 61,101 at 61,401-02.  
 
 
227 In National Grid plc, 117 FERC ¶ 61,080 at P 26, the Commission used Sellers’ 
HHI numbers for two of the NYISO submarkets (New York City and Long Island) to 
assess horizontal market power, and found screen failures in both submarkets under the 
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if so, in what way it should be specified and how readily available the relevant data 
is. 
Comments 
248.  Several commenters state that since NERC no longer uses control area 
designations, and its Functional Model refers to “balancing authority areas,” the 
Commission should modify slightly its approach to default geographic markets by 
simply replacing the term “control area” with “balancing authority area.”  They state 
that such a change will align the Commission’s rules with NERC’s Functional Model, 
thus helping to avoid confusion.
228   
249.  NYISO states that the control area is a valid starting point for the analysis of 
market-based rates.  NYISO states that under the most recent version of the 
Reliability Functional Model posted on the NERC website (version 3, April 21, 
2006), the “Balancing” and “Market Operations” functions appear to correlate to the 
traditional notion of a control area operator for purposes of assessing competitive 
markets.  Thus, the adoption of the Functional Model would appear to create issues 
more of terminology than substance.  NYISO states that, whatever the terminology, 
the process of defining geographic markets should focus on the area in which grid 
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operations generally facilitate the ability of generators to compete in the scheduling 
and dispatch of resources, and the ability of loads to purchase from such resources.
229 
Commission Determination 
250.  With regard to the use of the Functional Model by NERC, we agree with 
commenters that the Commission should modify slightly its approach to default 
geographic markets by replacing the term “control area” with “balancing authority 
area.”   
251.  A balancing authority area means the collection of generation, transmission, 
and loads within the metered boundaries of a balancing authority, and the balancing 
authority maintains load/resource balance within this area.
230  Similar to control area, 
a balancing authority area is physically defined with metered boundaries that we refer 
to as the balancing authority area.  Every generator, transmission facility, and end-use 
customer must be in a balancing authority area.
231  The responsibilities of a balancing 
authority include the following: (1) match, at all times, the power output of the 
generators within the balancing authority area and capacity and energy purchased 
from or sold to entities outside the balancing authority area, with the load within the 
                                              
229 NYISO at 2-4. 
230 See “Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards,” at 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/standards.asp 
231 See Basic Operating Functions and Responsibilities: A White Paper by the 
Control Area Criteria Task Force. 
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balancing authority area in compliance with the Reliability Standards; (2) maintain 
scheduled interchange and control the impact of interchange ramping rates with other 
balancing authority areas, in compliance with Reliability Standards; (3) have 
available sufficient generating capacity, and Demand Side Management to maintain 
Contingency Reserves in compliance with Reliability Standards; and (4) have 
available sufficient generating capacity, Demand Side Management, and frequency 
response to maintain Regulating Reserves and Operating Reserves in compliance 
with Reliability Standards.
232  It is the interconnection and coordination between 
balancing authority areas that provides a foundation for the Commission to analyze 
transmission limitations and other transfers of energy and provides a reasonable 
measure of the relevant geographic market under typical circumstances. 
252.  The Commission adopts in this Final Rule “balancing authority area,” instead 
of “control area.”  We believe that such a change will align the Commission’s rules 
with NERC’s Functional Model, thus helping to avoid confusion. 
c.  Additional Guidelines for Alternative Geographic Market and 
Flexibility  
Commission Proposal 
253.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to continue to provide flexibility by 
allowing sellers and intervenors to present evidence that the market is smaller or 
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larger than the default market.  The Commission explained that when assessing an 
expanded geographic market pursuant to the horizontal analysis, it looks for 
assurance that no frequently recurring physical impediments to trade exist within the 
expanded market that would prevent competing supply in the expanded area from 
reaching wholesale customers.  The Commission stated that any proposal to use an 
expanded market should include a demonstration regarding whether there are 
frequently binding transmission constraints during historical seasonal peaks examined 
in the screens and at other competitively significant times that prevent competing 
supply from reaching the customers within the expanded market.  The Commission 
proposed to require that such a demonstration be made based on historical data, and 
said it would require that a sensitivity analysis be performed analyzing under what 
circumstances transmission constraints would bind. 
254.  The Commission explained that it also considers whether there is other 
evidence that would support the existence of an expanded market, such as evidence 
that customers can access the resources outside of the default geographic market on 
similar terms and conditions as those inside the default geographic market.  It stated 
that such evidence could be empirical or it could point to factors that indicate a single 
market.  It noted that the Commission has previously stated that the operation of a 
single central unit commitment and dispatch function for the proposed geographic 
market would be an indicator of a single market, but that other evidence of a single 
market could include a demonstration that:  there is a single transmission rate; there is 
a common OASIS platform for scheduling transmission service across separate Docket No. RM04-7-000   141 
 
control areas; or there is a correlation of price movements between the areas being 
considered as an expanded geographic market or other information regarding 
wholesale transactions in the proposed single market.  The Commission stated that 
evidence of active trading throughout the proposed geographic market would also be 
considered.  It stated that in determining whether two or more control areas are a 
single market it would weigh, on a case-by-case basis, all the factors presented.  The 
Commission noted that once it has been established that historically there were no 
physical impediments to trade, there are several factors the Commission would 
consider, and no one factor would be dispositive.  The Commission sought comment 
on this proposed guidance and, in particular, whether there are other factors it should 
consider when assessing a proposed expanded market and whether there are any 
factors that should be given more weight or are essential in determining the scope of 
the market.   The Commission also asked whether it should apply the same criteria 
when determining whether the geographic market is smaller than the default 
geographic market. 
Comments 
255.  A number of commenters agree that it is appropriate to provide sellers 
flexibility in presenting evidence that the appropriate geographic market is broader 
than the default geographic market.
233  Several state that greater Commission 
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guidance is needed so that sellers wishing to argue for a broader market definition 
have clear objective criteria and can provide evidence that the Commission will find 
probative.   
256.  Puget submits that the examples listed in the NOPR provide some guidance 
but are still too general to be of use to a seller submitting a new market power study.  
It states that the Commission should:  (1) provide additional guidance on the levels of 
price convergence and trading activity across a proposed alternative market that will 
support a seller’s filing; (2) be more specific regarding the level of transmission 
constraints that will preclude a finding of an expanded market; and (3) not rely 
heavily, if at all, on transmission operation factors – such as common OASIS or 
common unit commitment and dispatch – that are not necessarily indicative of a 
common market.
234 
257.  Southern states that the Commission’s proposed focus on evidence pertaining 
to frequently binding transmission constraints for purposes of considering a larger 
geographic market seems appropriate.  However, Southern argues that the NOPR’s 
apparent requirement of additional evidence (beyond the absence of transmission 
constraints) to support a larger geographic market is unnecessary.  Moreover, 
Southern submits that evidence of a single unit commitment and dispatch function, a 
single transmission rate, and a common OASIS platform is not likely to exist in the 
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absence of an RTO or ISO.  Accordingly, making such evidence a requirement for a 
larger geographic market would render illusory the opportunity for expansion for 
non-RTO/ISO sellers.
235   
258.  Avista agrees that the absence of these factors does not necessarily mean that a 
market contains impediments to trading or that wholesale customers are unable to 
secure supply from alternative sources.  Avista supports the Commission’s proposal 
to state what type of evidence demonstrates active trading throughout the proposed 
geographic market.  Avista submits that a regional geographic market could and 
should be established based upon:  (1) the presence of an actively traded liquid 
trading hub within the relevant defined market area; (2) transparent pricing 
information from that hub being widely available; and (3) the presence of extensive 
direct or single-wheel transmission access, both for sellers into the competitive hub 
market and for buyers’ access to the hub market for purposes of serving load.
236  
259.  Powerex supports the Commission's initial specification of evidence that may 
be used to support a demonstration of a broader or smaller geographic market.  
However, Powerex is concerned that the Commission's enumeration of relevant 
categories of evidence is at present a partial list, and is not sufficiently comprehensive 
to address the unique circumstances that are likely to be present in various regions.  
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Powerex states that the Commission should clarify that additional types of evidence 
may also be used to support the propriety of a broader or smaller market definition.  
260.  One commenter states that the appropriate definition of the relevant 
geographic market can be (and very often will be) conditional -- that is, when there 
are no binding transmission constraints on imports into the relevant control area, the 
relevant market appropriately encompasses a broader area than the default geographic 
market; and when transmission constraints into the control area are binding, the 
control area is the appropriate geographic market.  Accordingly, sellers should be 
allowed (or encouraged) to present analytical results for several market definitions, 
dependent on the existence or nonexistence of binding transmission constraints, to 
sharpen the focus on when market power might be a real concern.
237 
261.  APPA/TAPS generally agree that the factors set forth by the Commission for 
assessing whether an alternative geographic market is appropriate are reasonable, but 
urge that the factors be non-exclusive and non-prescriptive.  In addition to the factors 
the Commission identified in the NOPR, APPA/TAPS suggest that a seller be 
allowed to point to any joint transmission planning and coordinated construction 
processes as evidence that the relevant market should be larger than its own control 
area.
238 APPA/TAPS state that a seller that is correctly advancing efforts to expand 
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markets deserves to have that recognized and a seller that is not undertaking such 
efforts should live with the consequences of the resulting smaller market. 
262.  PPL states that if the Commission is to consider the potential existence of 
geographic markets smaller or larger than a control area, it should carefully consider 
the specific circumstances surrounding the control area of concern, and use an 
objective review process.  That is, the Commission should consider these factors 
through the following means:  (1) evaluation of the historical frequency of, and times 
when, physical transmission constraints limit the ability to transmit power within and 
between control areas, RTOs, and other defined regions within which electricity 
system supply and demand are balanced in real-time; (2) consideration of correlations 
of electricity prices, and electricity price day-to-day changes, within and between 
control areas, RTOs, and other defined regions within which electricity supply and 
demand are balanced in real time; (3) reference to historical evidence of actual 
transactions (including swaps/exchanges, etc.) wherein power is delivered within, 
imported to, or exported from, control areas, RTOs and sub-regions of RTOs; and (4) 
consideration of operational paradigms for obtaining transmission services and the 
extent to which the system allows for transparent access to transmission services.
239 
263.  Several commenters urge the Commission to provide flexibility by suggesting 
a trading hub for an alternative geographic market.  E.ON U.S. and PNM/Tucson 
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state that the Commission should take regional commercial patterns into account 
when evaluating proposals to use a larger or smaller market, and they support 
allowing a seller to present a market power analysis specific to a trading hub.
240  
264.  Indianapolis P&L asks that the Commission clarify that sellers can propose 
different geographic definitions in their screen analyses.  Indianapolis P&L states that 
the NOPR is unclear as to whether different geographic markets can be proposed for 
the indicative screen analyses or only for additional, “second stage” analyses, such as 
the DPT.
241  
265.  Powerex seeks clarification on how the definition of "home control area" (the 
control area where the seller is located) applies to an entity that has small-volume 
contracts in multiple control areas remote from its physical location.  Powerex asks 
whether contracts with third parties, to the extent they confer some level of "control," 
create a multitude of home control areas.  Powerex seeks additional guidance, 
including whether the answer to the question depends on the quantity of generation 
available under each contract, the level of control, whether the seller is affiliated with 
the transmission provider in that control area, or the remoteness of the contracted 
generation from the sellers' physical location.
242 
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266.  Duke requests clarification of whether first-tier markets, which are part of a 
larger RTO/ISO market (with an energy market that has central commitment and 
dispatch and Commission-approved market monitoring and mitigation) can be 
represented as the entire RTO/ISO market.  For example, in the case of the Duke 
Energy Carolinas’ control area, which is directly interconnected to the AEP 
transmission system, Duke queries whether all of PJM would be the relevant first-tier 
market for purposes of determining the simultaneous import limitations into the Duke 
Energy Carolinas control area.
243 
Commission Determination 
267.  As an initial matter, we acknowledge the desire for the Commission to provide 
greater guidance to sellers wishing to argue for a broader or smaller market 
definition.  We continue to believe that default geographic markets are adequate and 
sufficient for the typical situation.  However, defaults may not be appropriate in all 
circumstances.  Therefore, we will attempt to provide additional guidance and 
clarification to help inform  
market participants regarding the factors we believe are significant to consider when 
defining the market.
244  
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268.  First, we reiterate that reaching beyond the default geographic market in which 
an entity is located can mean addressing additional physical and other challenges than 
when trading within that market.  When assessing an alternative geographic market, 
the Commission looks for assurance that no frequently recurring physical 
impediments to trade exist within the alternative geographic market that would 
prevent competing supply in the alternative geographic market from reaching 
wholesale customers.  Any proposal to use an alternative geographic market (i.e., a 
market other than the default geographic market) must include a demonstration 
regarding whether there are frequently binding transmission constraints during 
historical seasonal peaks examined in the screens and at other competitively 
significant times that prevent competing supply from reaching customers within the 
proposed alternative geographic market.  We will require that a demonstration be 
made based on historical data and that a sensitivity analysis be performed analyzing 
under what circumstances transmission constraints would bind.  If the seller fails to 
show that there are no frequently binding constraints at these critical times, then the 
Commission may not consider other evidence of an expanded market  
since we regard this as a necessary condition that must be satisfied to justify an expanded 
market. 
269.  The Commission also considers whether there is other evidence that would 
support the existence of an alternative geographic market.  In deciding whether 
customers may be considered as part of an expanded geographic market, the 
Commission will consider evidence that they can access the resources outside of the Docket No. RM04-7-000   149 
 
default geographic market on similar terms and conditions as those inside the default 
geographic market. 
270.  Any such evidence submitted to show that the seller’s customers have access 
to resources outside of their balancing authority area at terms and conditions similar 
to those at which they can access resources inside the balancing authority area could 
be empirical or it could point to factors that indicate a single market.  For example, 
the Commission has previously stated that the operation of a single central unit 
commitment and dispatch function for the proposed geographic market would be an 
indicator of a single market.  However, there are other ways to demonstrate that two 
or more balancing authority areas are indeed a single market.  For example, other 
evidence of a single market could include a demonstration that:  there is a single 
transmission rate; there is a common OASIS platform for scheduling transmission 
service across separate balancing authority areas; or there is a correlation of price 
movements between the areas being considered as an expanded geographic market or 
other information regarding wholesale transactions in the proposed single market.  
Evidence of active trading throughout the proposed geographic market would also be 
considered.   
271.  In determining whether two or more balancing authority areas are a single 
market, the Commission would weigh, on a case-by-case basis, all relevant factors 
presented.  As discussed above, there are several factors the Commission would 
consider once it has been established that historically there were no physical 
impediments to trade, and no one factor or factors would be dispositive.  Rather, all Docket No. RM04-7-000   150 
 
factors will be considered and as a whole will indicate whether there exists a single 
market.
245   
272.  With regard to Puget’s request that the Commission provide additional 
guidance with regard to the levels of price convergence, trading activity, and 
transmission constraints that define a market, no such generic finding will encompass 
all possibilities and, therefore, in all instances define the market.  Accordingly, we 
will not attempt to do so here.   
273.  We also reject Southern’s contention that the Commission has somehow 
rendered “illusory” the opportunity for entities outside RTOs and ISOs to 
demonstrate a larger geographic market.
 246  The examples provided by the 
Commission of ways an entity could demonstrate a larger geographic market were 
just that: examples.
247  The Commission does not require an entity proposing an 
alternative geographic market to provide evidence other than historical transmission 
access.  Sellers and intervenors in both RTO/ISO and non-RTO/ISO markets may 
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present any probative evidence based on historical data of transmission availability, 
wholesale sales, resource accessibility, and market prices.   
274.  In response to Indianapolis Power & Light’s comments, we clarify that when a 
seller submits its screen analysis, it can also propose an alternative analysis based on 
the use of a geographic market larger than the default geographic market.  However, 
such proposal should be made in addition to, not in lieu of, the screen analysis based 
on the default geographic market.   
275.   With regard to using trading hubs as alternative market areas, the Commission 
understands that numerous electricity trading hubs have emerged over the past few 
years.  A trading hub is a representative location at which multiple sellers buy and 
sell power and ownership changes hands, typically with trading of financial and 
physical products.  For physical trades, the hub may represent a specific delivery 
point or set of points.  Currently only select trading hubs account for the majority of 
physical power trading although there remains the possibility that market demand 
could initiate trading hubs for each balancing authority area.  In evaluating market 
power, however, trading hub data alone does not provide a foundation for the 
Commission to analyze transmission limitations and other transfers of energy.  
Moreover, with regard to trading hubs, the combination of physical and diverse 
financial products, the low barriers for entry of new participants, and the unlimited 
potential for resale of limited physical output may not provide a reasonable measure 
of the relevant geographic market under typical situations, as a balancing authority 
area does.  Therefore, while trading data may be considered in the illustration of Docket No. RM04-7-000   152 
 
relevant price correlation or of liquid trading activity to demonstrate that two or more 
balancing authority areas are indeed a single market, the Commission will not allow 
use of a trading hub to define a relevant geographic market.  
276.  With regard to one commenter’s suggestion that the Commission should allow 
(or encourage) sellers to present analytical results for several market definitions 
because the appropriate definition of the relevant geographic market can be 
conditioned on the existence or nonexistence of binding transmission constraints, the 
Commission  agrees in principle.  The Commission provides an opportunity for 
sellers who fail one or more of the initial screens to present a more thorough analysis 
using the DPT.  As the April 14 Order states “the [DPT] defines the relevant market 
by identifying potential suppliers based on market prices, input costs, and 
transmission availability, and calculates each supplier’s economic capacity and 
available economic capacity for each season/load condition.”
248  In addition, in the 
Merger Policy Statement the Commission stated that the flows on a transmission 
system can be very different under different supply and demand conditions (e.g. peak 
vs. off-peak).  Consequently, the amount and price of transmission available for 
suppliers to reach wholesale buyers at different locations throughout the network can 
vary substantially over time.  If this is the case, the DPT analysis should treat these 
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narrower periods separately and separate geographic markets should be defined for 
each period.
249 
277.  The Commission believes that the DPT can address the dynamic nature of 
markets.  Under the DPT, the amount and price of transmission available for 
suppliers to reach wholesale buyers at different locations throughout the network 
during different season/load conditions (e.g., peak vs. off-peak) can be analyzed.  For 
example, an area may become constrained only during the highest load levels, in 
which case the relevant geographic market could differ across seasons, and separate 
geographic markets could be defined for each period.  However, as discussed earlier, 
in an effort to provide as much regulatory certainty as possible, the Final Rule adopts 
as the default geographic market the balancing authority area or the RTO footprint, as 
applicable, but allows sellers or intervenors to propose alternative markets based on 
historical transmission and sales data. 
278.  We clarify in response to Powerex that sellers should do market power studies 
for each balancing authority area where they own or control assets (i.e., should study 
all balancing authority areas where generation assets they own or control are located) 
regardless of the quantity or location of generation they control (subject to the terms 
adopted herein regarding Category 1 sellers).  Also, to the extent a market power 
study is required, sellers should study each balancing authority area where they own 
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or control assets regardless of whether the seller is affiliated with the transmission 
provider in that balancing authority area.  The Commission also clarifies for Duke 
that if the first-tier markets for a seller (whether or not the seller is a member of the 
RTO) are part of a larger RTO/ISO market, all of the RTO/ISO market would be a 
relevant first-tier market for purposes of determining the simultaneous import 
limitations.  
d.  Specific Issues Related to Power Pools and SPP 
Commission Proposal 
279.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to continue its practice of designating 
an RTO/ISO in which a seller is located as the default relevant geographic market if 
the RTO/ISO has sufficient market structure and a single energy market with 
Commission approved market monitoring and mitigation. 
Comments 
280.  A number of commenters urge the Commission to consider power pools as 
geographic market areas.  Midwest Energy claims that, “under current Commission 
policy, sellers of power in RTOs/ISOs with a full-fledged single central commitment 
and dispatch system are allowed to treat the full RTO footprint as the relevant 
geographic market, thereby facilitating qualification for market-based rates.  Sellers 
in a Commission-approved RTO without a single central commitment and dispatch Docket No. RM04-7-000   155 
 
system are relegated to a relevant market defined by their own control area.”
250  
Midwest Energy urges the Commission to consider changing its existing policy to 
create a presumption that the relevant geographic market for a Commission-approved 
RTO is the region covered by a single transmission tariff.
251  Alternatively, Midwest 
Energy states that the Commission could require, in addition to a regional tariff, the 
implementation of a Commission-approved market monitor and a centrally 
dispatched energy imbalance market.  It states that these changes would allow sellers 
to treat the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) region as the relevant geographic market.  
281.  Westar states that the Commission should find that a transmission region with 
a single OATT, non-pancaked transmission rates, a common OASIS platform for 
scheduling transmission, and approved market monitoring  (e.g., SPP) presumptively 
qualifies as a single region for purposes of the market power screens.  Westar states 
that although the NOPR identifies single unit commitment and/or centralized dispatch 
of generation to be an important characteristic of a regional market, the Commission 
has not always done so.  For example, the Commission did not identify this as a 
defining characteristic when it accepted other RTOs/ISOs as a single region for 
market-based rate purposes, such as New England.  The Commission also did not rely 
upon centralized dispatch in authorizing market-based power sales across the 
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California, New York or PJM markets.  Westar states that the Commission should 
find that SPP meets the criteria for a single market once its energy imbalance market 
(EIM) becomes operational.
252 
282.  In its reply comments, Southwest Coalition disagrees with those commenters 
requesting that SPP qualify as a single geographic region for sellers in its region once 
its EIM is operational.  Southwest Coalition states that Westar has not presented any 
evidence for the Commission to change course with SPP in this rulemaking.  It 
asserts that SPP currently has underway a variety of market implementation 
proceedings, of which Westar is a party, through which the Commission can make a 
reasoned decision regarding SPP's status.  As such, Southwest Coalition states that 
this generic rulemaking proceeding is not the appropriate vehicle for considering 
Westar's request.  In addition, Southwest Coalition states that Westar’s request 
represents an improper request for rehearing of the Commission's March 20, 2006 
Order in SPP's market implementation proceeding.  Southwest Coalition requests 
that, if the Commission were to consider Westar's request in this proceeding, the 
Commission should reject Westar's request for a Commission finding that SPP is a 
single geographic region for purposes of the Commission's market power screens.
253 
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283.  Puget argues that applying the control area default to utilities in the Pacific 
Northwest is arbitrary, and does not result in an accurate measurement of a seller’s 
potential market power in the region’s energy markets.  According to Puget, the 
relevant geographic market for the purpose of measuring horizontal market power in 
the Pacific Northwest is the United States portion of the Northwest Power Pool, 
which is dominated by a transmission system operated by Bonneville Power 
Administration.  Puget submits that many of the criteria outlined in the NOPR – 
particularly those addressing parallel price movements, single transmission rates, and 
active trading – are met in this geographic region.  Utilities in the Pacific Northwest 
would like to have the opportunity to make a showing to the Commission that the 
relevant geographic market for measuring market power in their region is an area 
other than their home and first-tier control areas.
254  
Commission Determination 
284.  We decline to address whether additional regions of the country qualify as 
relevant geographic markets.  Through this Final Rule, we set forth several examples 
of criteria that sellers can use in proposing an alternative geographic market.  
Individual sellers can challenge our default geographic market and provide evidence 
to support their proposal.  Intervenors will have the opportunity to comment prior to 
the Commission rendering a decision.  
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e.  RTO/ISO Exemption 
Commission Proposal 
285.  In the April 14 Order, the Commission concluded that it would no longer 
exempt sellers located in markets with Commission-approved market monitoring and 
mitigation from providing generation market power analyses, on the basis that 
requiring sellers located in such markets to submit screen analyses provides an 
additional check on the potential for market power.
255  The Commission did not 
address this point in the NOPR. 
Comments 
286.  In their comments in this proceeding, Reliant, NRG and FirstEnergy urge the 
Commission to reinstate the exemption.
256  Reliant states that reinstating the 
exemption would be appropriate because real-time market monitoring by an 
independent market monitor consistent with Commission-approved rules and 
Commission-approved targeted mitigation address identification of market power 
concerns as well as mitigation of market power in those markets and, therefore, 
eliminate the value of any separate market power analysis submitted by an individual 
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seller.  Reliant states that Commission-approved market monitoring and mitigation 
provide the Commission with a better and more sophisticated picture of market power 
issues in RTO/ISO markets as compared to a seller’s market power analysis, which 
looks only at market power at a fixed moment in time. 
287.  Reliant states that if the Commission decides not to reinstate the exemption, it 
is critical that the Commission continue to use RTO/ISO markets as the default 
geographic market for sellers with generation located in those markets.  Reliant states 
that the key to the determination of relevant geographic markets is the extent to which 
sellers can compete in the defined market.  RTO/ISO markets with centralized 
markets provide a platform for all sellers located in the pertinent RTO/ISO market to 
compete.  Thus, Reliant states that it is entirely appropriate to consider such markets 
as the default market unless and until an intervenor can show that this is no longer 
appropriate (e.g., due to transmission constraints).
257 
288.  In its reply comments, PSEG states that while it believes that the RTO/ISO 
exemption would be warranted at least for regions with pervasive market monitoring 
unit (MMU) oversight such as PJM, it recognizes that some affected parties may not 
be comfortable with a blanket exemption.  It suggests that the Commission’s 
regulations should take account of the fact that the Commission has approved 
comprehensive MMU oversight of markets and that MMUs take their duties seriously 
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and routinely exercise their authority.  Accordingly, PSEG proposes that evidence of 
active MMU oversight supply the basis for obviating the need to conduct a market 
power study for a particular zone or sub-zone of an RTO or ISO.
258  
289.  APPA/TAPS, in contrast, state that reinstating the RTO/ISO exemption would 
represent an abdication of the Commission’s responsibilities
259  
Commission Determination 
290.  The Commission declines the request that it reinstate the pre-April 14 Order 
exemption for sellers located in markets with Commission-approved market 
monitoring and mitigation from providing generation market power analyses.  The 
Commission will continue to require generation market power analyses from all 
sellers, including those in RTO/ISO markets.  All sellers are required to receive 
authorization from the Commission prior to undertaking market-based rate sales, and 
as discussed herein, all new applicants for market-based rate authority are required to, 
among other things, provide a horizontal market power analysis.  The first step for a 
seller seeking market-based rate authority is to file an application to show that it and 
its affiliates do not have, or have adequately mitigated, market power.  Sellers can 
refer to RTO/ISO monitoring and mitigating as a factor.  We believe that a single 
market with Commission-approved market monitoring and mitigation and transparent 
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prices provides added protection against a seller’s ability to exercise market power 
but cannot replace the generation market power analysis. 
291.  To address Reliant’s concern, we note that, as discussed above, we will use 
RTO/ISO markets (including Commission findings with regard to RTO/ISO 
submarkets) as the default geographic market for the indicative screens for sellers 
with generation in those markets.    
8.  Use of Historical Data 
Commission Proposal 
292.  The Commission proposed in the NOPR to retain the “snapshot in time” 
approach for the indicative screens, so that sellers are required to use the most 
recently available unadjusted 12 months’ historical data.  The Commission stated that 
historical data are more objective, readily available, and less subject to manipulation 
than future projections.  The Commission proposed to continue to permit sellers to 
make adjustments to data that are essential to perform the indicative screens provided 
that the seller fully justifies the need for the adjustments, justifies the methodology 
used, provides all workpapers in support, and documents the source data. 
293.  However, the Commission proposed to allow, for the DPT analysis, sellers and 
intervenors to account for changes in the market that are known and measurable at the 
time of filing.
260  The Commission noted that this proposal mirrors the Commission’s 
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approach in connection with its merger analysis.  Sellers and intervenors proposing 
known and measurable changes to be considered in the DPT analysis would bear the 
burden of proof for their adjustments to historical data.  The Commission sought 
comment on whether the Commission should provide a limitation on the time period 
past the historical test period for which sellers can account for changes, what that 
time period should be, and how flexible or inflexible that limitation should be.  In 
addition, the Commission sought comment on exactly what types of changes should 
be allowed and under what circumstances. 
Comments 
294.  Various commenters generally support the Commission’s proposal to use 
historical data for the indicative screens and allow known and measurable changes for 
the DPT.
261  Some suggestions made as to what should be considered known and 
measurable changes include:  allowing only changes that occur between updated 
market power analysis filings
262 and allowing only publicly available data or 
company information.
263 Powerex expresses concern that known and measurable 
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changes may not be publicly available.
264  PG&E suggests that the Commission 
evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether the seller or intervenor can prove that the 
change is both foreseeable and reasonable.  It says that the Commission should not 
impose a time restriction on such changes provided that the seller provides the 
necessary support for changes that it claims are known and measurable.
265 
295.  A number of commenters suggest that sellers should be permitted to account 
for known and measurable changes in both the indicative screens and the DPT.
266  
Southern states that the Commission “should not . . . restrict the ability of parties to 
provide the Commission with the best possible information and analysis.”
267  Duke 
states that in all instances the objective should be to obtain the most accurate and 
timely assessment of the seller’s ability to exercise market power under current 
market conditions.
268   
296.  NRECA states that the screens should incorporate imminent changes and that 
an example of known and measurable changes that should be included in initial 
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applications and triennial filings is the capacity freed up by expiring long-term 
contracts.  It submits that these contracts will expire on a known schedule and, if the 
market is competitive, the seller should not be allowed to assume that the capacity 
will remain committed to the buyer.
269 
297.  PPL argues that long-term contracts should retain the current definition as 
those expiring in one year or more, and recommends not considering contracts that 
take effect after one year but before the triennial update is due.  It argues that buyers 
could withhold signing contracts and force a market power finding.  PPL also notes 
that a notice of change in status must be filed at the expiration of contracts that 
increase the seller's capacity by 100 MW or more and that the Commission can 
initiate a section 206 investigation at that point if need be.
270 
Commission Determination 
298.  We will continue to require the use of historical data for both the indicative 
screens and the DPT in market-based rate cases.  The indicative screens are designed 
as a tool to identify those sellers that raise no generation market power concerns and 
can otherwise be considered for market-based rate authority.  Accordingly, the 
indicative screens are conservative in nature and not generally subject to debates over 
projected data, which may unnecessarily prolong proceedings and create regulatory 
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uncertainty.  However, in light of adopting a regional approach with regard to 
regularly scheduled updated market power analyses, we will require the use of the 
actual historical data for the previous calendar year.  Requiring all sellers in a region 
to provide analyses using the same data set further enhances the Commission’s ability 
to evaluate market power and identify any discrepancies between market studies. 
299.  After careful consideration of the comments received, the Commission will 
not adopt the NOPR proposal that the DPT analysis allow sellers and intervenors to 
account for changes in the market that are known and measurable at the time of filing.  
Instead, the Commission will adopt its current practice that sellers are required to use, 
in the preparation of a DPT for a market-based rate analysis, unadjusted historical 
data and, consistent with the above discussion, the Commission will require the use 
of the actual historical data for the previous calendar year.  The Commission has 
stated that historical data are more objective, readily available, and less subject to 
manipulation than future projections.   
300.  We acknowledge that the Commission’s approach in its merger analysis 
requires applicants and intervenors to account for changes in the market that are 
known and measurable at the time of filing.  However, we find that the purpose of 
using the DPT in market-based rate proceedings is different from that in merger 
analysis.  Intrinsically, a merger analysis is forward-looking to identify what effect, if 
any, there will be on competition if the proposed merger is consummated.  Even 
though the Commission has the ability to reopen a merger proceeding under its 
section 203(b) authority, it is difficult and costly to undo a merger, so the Docket No. RM04-7-000   166 
 
Commission is cognizant of the need to analyze what might happen as a result of a 
proposed merger and put any necessary mitigation in place prior to consummation of 
the merger. 
301.  In contrast, the market-based rate analysis is a “snapshot in time” approach.  
When the Commission evaluates an application for market-based rate authority, the 
Commission’s focus is on whether the seller passes both of the indicative screens 
based on unadjusted historical data.  Likewise, when a seller fails one of the screens 
and the Commission evaluates whether that seller passes the DPT, the Commission’s 
focus is on whether the seller passes the DPT based on unadjusted historical data.  
The Commission’s grant of market-based rate authority is conditioned, among other 
things, on the seller’s obligation to inform the Commission of any change in status 
from the circumstances the Commission relied upon in granting it market-based rate 
authority.  As such, the Commission’s market-based rate program is designed to 
require sellers to report, and enable the Commission to examine, changes in facts and 
circumstances on an ongoing basis.  Such a reporting requirement provides the 
Commission with ongoing monitoring in addition to its right to require any market-
based rate seller to provide an updated market power analysis at any time.  
Accordingly, the market-based rate change in status reporting requirement allows the 
Commission to evaluate changes when they actually happen rather than relying on 
projections, making it unnecessary and redundant for the Commission to allow sellers 
to account for known and measurable changes in the DPT for market-based rate 
purposes.  For these reasons and the reasons explained in the April 14 and July 8 Docket No. RM04-7-000   167 
 
Orders and existing Commission precedent, the Commission reaffirms that the 
indicative screens and DPT analyses should be based on unadjusted historical data. 
9.  Reporting Format 
Commission Proposal 
302.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require all sellers to submit the 
results of their indicative screen analysis in a uniform format to the maximum extent 
practicable and appended a proposed format.  This format, provided in Appendix C of 
the NOPR, was intended to promote consistency and aid the Commission in the 
decision-making process.  The Commission sought comment on this proposal.  
Comments 
303.  Although only a few comments were received on this topic, those comments 
support the proposal to adopt a uniform reporting format for the indicative screens.  
APPA/TAPS suggest that the proposed uniform format should help all market 
participants, especially when assessing the filings of a number of public utilities as 
part of the proposed regional review process.  APPA/TAPS state that the uniformity 
should also help the Commission analyze market-based rate filings on a consistent 
basis, thus increasing market participant confidence in those assessments.
271  Other 
commenters concur with the Commission's proposal for a uniform reporting format.  
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They state that a uniform reporting format will increase consistency and thus aid the 
Commission in its decision making process.
272  
304.  One commenter suggests formatting and presentation changes to the NOPR’s 
Appendix C reporting form.  These changes include creating sections for items such 
as the calculation of seller and market uncommitted capacity and rearranging some in 
a more logical fashion.
273  
Commission Determination 
305.  We will adopt the reporting format as proposed in the NOPR, maintaining the 
same order of items as in the form provided in Appendix C of the NOPR, but note 
that this form now appears as Appendix A of this Final Rule.  We believe 
standardizing the submission format has benefits to all market participants.  As noted, 
it appears that commenters as well are generally supportive of this proposal to require 
all sellers to submit the results of their indicative screen analyses in a uniform format.   
306.  Also, we will adopt many of the formatting changes suggested in the 
comments.  The row letter will be the first column and a better delineation of sections 
will increase the comprehensibility of the form.  The revised form can be found in 
Appendix A.
274    
                                              
272 Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner at 12. 
273 Dr. Pace at 8-9. 
274 The "Workpapers" column is meant to provide an easy way to find sources and 
ensure that all submissions are properly sourced.  Hence, the items in that column (e.g., 
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
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10.  Exemption for New Generation (Formerly Section 35.27(a) of the 
Commission’s Regulations) 
a.  Elimination of Exemption in Section 35.27(a) 
Commission Proposal 
307.  The Commission’s regulations provide that any public utility seeking 
authorization to engage in market-based rate sales is not required to demonstrate a 
lack of market power in generation with respect to sales from capacity for which 
construction commenced on or after July 9, 1996.
275  In the NOPR, the Commission 
noted that when it established the exemption in Order No. 888 it indicated that it 
would consider whether a seller citing § 35.27(a) nevertheless possesses horizontal 
market power if specific evidence is presented by an intervenor.
276   
308.  The Commission stated in the NOPR that although it remains committed to 
encouraging new entry of generation, it is concerned that the continued use of the § 
35.27(a) exemption may become too broad and, over time, would encompass all 
                                                                                                                                                  
"Workpaper 5") were merely meant to be illustrative and do not require that information  
be submitted on specific workpapers or that workpapers be submitted in a particular 
order. 
275 18 CFR 35.27(a).  The regulation reads:  “Notwithstanding any other 
requirements, any public utility seeking authorization to engage in sales for resale of 
electric energy at market-based rates shall not be required to demonstrate any lack of 
market power in generation with respect to sales from capacity for which construction 
has commenced on or after July 9, 1996. 
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market participants as all pre-July 9, 1996 generation is retired.  Accordingly, the 
Commission proposed in the NOPR to eliminate the exemption in § 35.27(a) and to 
require that all new sellers seeking market-based rate authority on or after the 
effective date of the Final Rule and all sellers filing updated market power analyses 
on or after the effective date of the Final Rule must provide a horizontal market 
power analysis of all of their generation, whether or not it was built after July 9, 
1996.  Because the Commission allows a seller to make simplifying assumptions 
where appropriate and to submit a streamlined analysis, the Commission explained 
that any additional burden imposed on sellers by this reform would be minimal.  In 
addition, the Commission anticipated that those entities that otherwise would have 
relied on the exemption would, in most cases, qualify as Category 1 sellers and 
therefore no longer be required to file updated market power analyses as a routine 
matter.  The Commission sought comment on this proposal. 
Comments 
309.  Many commenters support the Commission’s proposed elimination of the § 
35.27(a) exemption, stating that there should be a level playing field for market-based 
rate sellers so that all market participants would be required to perform the generation 
market power screens.
277  A number of commenters support the Commission’s 
position that there is a valid concern that over time the exemption would encompass 
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all generation as older generating units are retired and new generation is built.
278  
Several commenters state that the Commission correctly observes that the indefinite 
continuation of the exemption would ultimately result in the automatic grant of 
market-based rate authority to all sellers as pre-1996 generation is retired.
279  They 
further state that eliminating the exemption will not impose significant new burdens, 
deter new entry into a market, or create any unreasonable disincentive or impediment 
for the construction of future generating capacity.
280  Contrary to the assertions of 
several commenters, FirstEnergy states that the elimination would encourage 
merchant power developers to expand generation in markets where they do not 
already have a dominant position which, in turn, would dilute market power concerns 
in these markets.    
310.  NRECA and APPA/TAPS maintain that, despite EPSA’s, Mirant’s, and PPL’s 
assertions to the contrary,
281 the Commission did not create the exemption as an 
incentive to encourage new generation investment.
282  APPA/TAPS elaborates 
further, agreeing with the Commission that many new entrants would qualify as 
                                              
278 See PG&E at 10; APPA/TAPS at 27; NRECA at 11; Carolina Agencies at 1. 
279 APPA/TAPS at 27; NRECA at 11; Carolina Agencies at 1. 
280 See FirstEnergy at 10; APPA/TAPS at 27; NRECA at 11; Carolina Agencies at 
1. 
281 EPSA at 12-13; Mirant at 11; PPL at 19- 20. 
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Category 1 sellers and, therefore, would not have to submit updated market power 
analyses and that other entrants could make simplifying assumptions to demonstrate 
that they qualify for market-based rate authority.
283  These commenters contend that 
the benefits of eliminating the exemption far outweigh any added burdens to ensure 
that all market participants are treated equally and to ensure that rates for 
jurisdictional sellers are just and reasonable.
284 
311.  In support of the elimination of the § 35.27(a) exemption, NASUCA 
acknowledges that under current procedures, if all the generation owned or controlled 
by an applicant for market-based rate authority and its affiliates in the relevant 
control area is new generation, such seller is not required to provide a horizontal 
market power analysis because of the exemption under § 35.27(a).
285  NASUCA 
asserts that under the current rule, there is no limit on the amount of post-July 9, 1996 
generation that could be exempt from the Commission’s analysis of market power.  In 
addition, a commenter explains that the potential to exercise market power has no 
relation to whether generating plants were built before or after 1996.
286  ELCON 
suggests that generators that were built after July 9, 1996 are capable of exercising 
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market power.
287  In addition, FirstEnergy points out that merchant power plant 
developers have begun to aggregate fleets of newer generating plants to which this 
exemption is applicable, and may now be able to exercise generation market 
power.
288  PG&E adds, “in situations where all generation owned or controlled by an 
applicant and its affiliates in the relevant market is new generation, should they 
control sufficient generation, the applicants and its affiliates may freely exercise 
market power.”
289  In addition, Morgan Stanley supports elimination of the 
exemption stating that maintaining the exemption would have unintended 
consequences going forward.
290   
312.  Among those who oppose elimination of the exemption, Constellation asserts 
that it would send an unfavorable signal to market participants that the rules may be 
changed with a retroactive effect, which in turn would deter investment.
291  
Constellation also contends that the Commission offers no support and/or analysis to 
demonstrate its inference that older generating units will be retired in significant 
quantities to make a substantial difference to the screening analysis of any seller.  
PPL submits, among other ill-effects, that the elimination will deter investment in 
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areas where there is a limited supply and the new entrant may be deemed pivotal.  In 
addition, PPL contends that some sellers relied on the presumption that they would 
not need to demonstrate a lack of market power in financing, constructing, and 
operating their new power plants.
292 
313.  EPSA opposes the elimination of the exemption under § 35.27(a).  EPSA 
states that the electric industry needs incentives for new generation and does not need 
disincentives if capital is to be invested on a timely basis to meet future demand and 
enhance competition.
293  EPSA asserts that the exemption encourages the 
development of competitive supply outside of organized markets.
294  Similarly, NRG 
contends that the elimination of the § 35.27(a) exemption will delay and deter 
investment in load pockets.  NRG also argues that eliminating the exemption runs 
counter to the Commission’s policy of encouraging investment in electric power 
infrastructure to enhance reliability and market liquidity.
295     
314.  In addition, EPSA argues that the purpose of the exemption was to encourage 
new generation investment by competitive suppliers especially in areas of the country 
that are mostly dominated by utility-owned generation.
296  Specifically, EPSA 
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explains that it is in these regions of the country where affiliated generation is largely 
treated as native load and, thus, is excluded from the market power analysis even 
though it represents most of the capacity in the region.
297  EPSA explains that, even if 
a small increment of competitive supply is introduced into the market, the analysis 
might detect market power when measured against relatively small existing 
generation.  Therefore, without the exemption, a new competitive supplier would fail 
the test and would have to utilize cost-based rates.
298  
315.  Allegheny argues that the Commission overlooks the reason why it initially 
adopted the exemption.  Allegheny states that, in Order No. 888, the Commission 
determined that long-term generation markets are competitive.
299  Allegheny further 
argues that “the Commission cannot ‘gloss over’ its prior reasoning without 
discussion, and without showing that there has been a fundamental change in facts 
                                              
297 In its reply comments NASUCA disagrees, submitting that there are other 
regions where a seller with a fleet of newer exempted generating plants could exercise  
market power or bid the output strategically to drive prices up.  NASUCA reply 
comments at 4-5. 
298 EPSA at 13. 
299 Allegheny at 8-9 (citing Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open 
Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of 
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, FERC Stats. 
& Regs.Regulations Preambles January 1991-June 1996 ¶ 31,036 at 31,657 (1996), order 
on reh'g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. Regulations Preambles July 1996-
December 2000 ¶ 31,048 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 
(1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff'd in part and rev'd 
in part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC,  225 F.3d 667 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002)). Docket No. RM04-7-000   176 
 
and circumstances that have [sic] caused long-term markets to be no longer 
competitive.”
300  PPL asserts that the Commission in Order No. 888 recognized the 
power that the opportunity of free entry has to eliminate market power concerns and 
stated that open access advancements removed structural impediments for new 
entrants competing with existing market participants.
301   
316.  Mirant and EPSA expand on arguments that eliminating the exemption will 
deter investment.  They argue that, when reserve levels are tight in a control area 
where the host utility has lost or forgone its market-based rate authority, a 
competitive supplier would have to weigh the risks as to whether the Commission 
would authorize it to make market-based rate sales if it were to build a new asset in 
that control area.
302  They contend that there is no incentive for a competitive supplier 
to build new generation if its sales will be mitigated at some level of cost-based 
rates.
303  In particular, Mirant explains that if a municipal utility issued a request for 
proposals (RFP) for 600 MW of power commencing in 2010 and terminating in 2020, 
with the current exemption competitive suppliers could bid on the RFP knowing that 
the supplier would be authorized to sell the output of its new generating station at 
market-based rates.  However, Mirant asserts that if the exemption were eliminated, a 
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supplier would have to get Commission approval for market-based rate sales prior to 
bidding on the RFP.
 304 
317.  Mirant disagrees with the Commission’s contention that eliminating the 
exemption would not affect many sellers and that the cost of compliance would be 
minimal.  Mirant states that five of its subsidiaries would have to file updated market 
power analyses if the exemption were eliminated because they own more than 500 
MW in the relevant market or control area and would not qualify as Category 1 
sellers.  Mirant argues that its cost of compliance would increase because it would 
have to prepare four updated market power analyses, each costing $20,000 to prepare 
and file.
 305  In its reply comments, APPA/TAPS state that Mirant’s increased cost is 
paltry compared to the over $3.4 billion in generation revenues reported by Mirant in 
2005, which APPA/TAPS suggest is in no small part due to Mirant’s market-based 
rate sales.
306  
                                              
304 Mirant at 11-12.  Mirant elaborates:  “In calculating the pivotal supplier and 
market share screens, an applicant is allowed to deduct from its installed capacity the 
amount of capacity that is committed under a long-term sale, but the seller is presented 
with a Catch-22.  The seller cannot enter into a long-term sales contract at market-based 
rates without prior Commission authorization, but the seller cannot pass the applicable 
indicative screens without deducting the amount of the capacity sold under long-term 
contract.  Retaining the exemption eliminates this problem and is consistent with 
Commission precedent regarding competitive forward markets.”  Id. at 12. 
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318.  Some commenters contend that the Commission’s concern that over time all 
older generation will be retired and the Commission will be unable to analyze sellers 
for market power is not a valid concern in the immediate or mid-term; they state that 
the most recent retirement announcements concern generation assets that were built 
in the  
1940s and 1950s.
307  PPM and Allegheny argue that the Commission offers no evidence 
or observations to quantify the magnitude of future retirements.
308  Some commenters 
assert that, in order for this speculative concern to become realistic, the retirement of 
generating units that were constructed in the 1980s would have to become commonplace, 
and it will take decades for this situation to materialize.  As such, they suggest that the 
Commission revisit this issue in 5 to 10 years rather than act prematurely.
309
319.  PPM suggests that, if the Commission wishes to limit the overall amount of 
generation that is exempt for purposes of conducting a horizontal market power 
analysis, an alternative approach would be to keep the exemption and phase in 
exempted units over time.  Thus, units that were built after 1996 but before 1999 
                                              
307 Mirant at 10; EPSA at n.2, citing for example:  
http://pjm.com/planning/project-queues/gen-retirements/20060601-pjm-gen-retir-list-
public-future.pdf. 
308 PPM at 6; Allegheny at 8. 
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would lose the exemption in 2010, while facilities built in 2001 would lose it in 2015, 
and so on.
310  
Commission Determination 
320.  The Commission adopts the proposal set forth in the NOPR and eliminates the 
exemption provided in § 35.27(a).  All sellers seeking market-based rate authority, or 
filing updated market power analyses, on or after the effective date of this Final Rule 
must provide a horizontal market power analysis for all of the generation they own or 
control.  As a number of commenters recognize, over time the exemption would 
become too broad and would encompass all market participants as pre-July 9, 1996 
generation is retired.  In addition, we note that even assuming for the sake of 
argument that there are not a large number of retirements, the current exemption 
would allow sellers to grow unabated as load increases and could result in such 
sellers gaining a dominant position in the market without being subject to any 
horizontal market power analysis.  Thus, continuing the exemption would result in 
unintended consequences where all sellers would be given an automatic presumption 
that they lack market power in generation.  Accordingly, the Commission finds that 
eliminating the exemption in § 35.27(a) and requiring every new seller to submit a 
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generation market power analysis will allow the Commission to ensure that the seller 
does not have market power in generation.
311 
321.  We do not believe that this change will have an adverse effect on the majority 
of sellers that have previously relied on the § 35.27(a) exemption.  The sellers that 
have taken advantage of the exemption will largely qualify as Category 1 sellers, and 
thus will be unaffected to the extent that they will not be required to file a regularly 
scheduled updated market power analysis.  For those sellers seeking market-based 
rate authority for the first time (e.g., building new generation facilities), and those 
that do not qualify as Category 1 sellers, there are several mechanisms or alternatives 
that can help to minimize the burden of submitting a horizontal market power 
analysis.  For example, a seller, where appropriate, can make simplifying 
assumptions, such as performing the indicative screens assuming no import capacity 
or treating the host balancing authority area utility as the only other competitor.
312  
We expect that, for most sellers, the cost of compliance and document preparation 
occasioned by the elimination of § 35.27(a) will not be burdensome.  To the extent 
that there are greater costs for some sellers, we find that the benefit of ensuring that 
markets do not become less competitive over time outweighs any additional costs.  
                                              
311 We note that the Commission may change its policy if it provides, as it does 
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Equally important, the elimination of § 35.27(a) will place all sellers on the same 
footing.  On this basis, we disagree with commenters that eliminating the exemption 
would send an unfavorable signal to market participants and deter investment. 
322.  We also disagree with commenters that find our rationale for adopting the 
exemption in 1996 necessarily constrains our decision making at this time.  In light of 
our experience over the past decade and our desire to have a more rigorous market-
based rate program, combined with the concern that over time generation will be 
retired, we believe a more conservative approach for granting market-based rate 
authority is appropriate and will provide us a better means to ensure that customers 
are protected. 
323.  We find unpersuasive Mirant’s concern that, if the § 35.27 exemption were 
eliminated, a seller would have to get Commission approval for market-based rate 
sales prior to bidding on an RFP.  If Mirant is concerned that certain RFPs require, 
among other things, that all bidders have in place all regulatory requirements 
including any applicable market-based rate authority, we find that RFPs typically 
afford bidders ample opportunity to put together their bids and put in place any 
necessary regulatory approvals.  In this regard, we note that if a potential seller 
wishes to participate in an RFP but does not have market-based rate authority, the 
seller can file for such authorization and request expedited treatment and the 
Commission will use its best efforts to process the request as quickly as possible. 
324.  With regard to the specific argument raised by Mirant, if a prospective seller 
wins an RFP, then the capacity would be counted as committed capacity, and Docket No. RM04-7-000   182 
 
therefore would not adversely affect the results of the seller’s generation market 
power screen (which analyzes uncommitted capacity).  If the entity loses the RFP, 
then it would not build the plant.  In either case, the need for market-based rate 
authorization does not appear to discourage new investment by competitive suppliers 
as Mirant suggests.   
325.  Some commenters assert that the retirement of generating units that were 
constructed in the 1980s would have to become commonplace before the 
Commission’s concern is realized that over time all older generation will be retired.  
Others contend that it will take decades for this situation to materialize.  However, 
commenters have provided no evidence that the elimination of § 35.27(a) will create 
a regulatory barrier to new construction or otherwise depress the building of new 
generation facilities, and we need not wait for an inevitable adverse circumstance to 
materialize.   
326.  Finally, we will not implement PPM’s suggestion that we retain the exemption 
and apply a phasing in approach whereby generating units would lose the exemption 
over time based on the date on which the units were built.  Such an approach would 
create several “classes” of generation facilities which would result in confusion for 
both the Commission and market participants.  This confusion would become more 
acute in situations where market participants may own a number of generating 
facilities located in the same balancing authority area or relevant geographic market, 
each of which may be considered a different “class” of generator in terms of filing 
horizontal market power analyses.  Moreover, given the regional review and schedule Docket No. RM04-7-000   183 
 
for updated market power analyses discussed below in this rule, we believe that a 
phased-in approach would become overly problematic and unmanageable for market 
participants as a whole.  Therefore, we will not accept PPM’s suggestion.   
b.  Grandfathering 
Comments 
327.  EPSA and Mirant suggest grandfathering units for which construction 
commenced between July 9, 1996 and May 19, 2006, the date of issuance of the 
NOPR, when generation owners were put on notice that the Commission was 
considering eliminating the exemption in § 35.27(a).
313  Constellation proposes that 
the exemption not be eliminated entirely but be limited to generation with 
construction that commenced on or after July 9, 1996, but before the effective date of 
the Final Rule in this proceeding.
314  Constellation and EPSA also contend that this 
would be consistent with the Commission’s prior decision to grandfather from PJM’s 
mitigation any generating units that were built in reliance on the post-1996 
exemption.
315   
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328.  Although NASUCA agrees with the Commission’s proposal to eliminate the 
new generator exemption, NASUCA raises a concern about the prospective treatment 
of sellers with generating plants built after July 9, 1996 that initially received market-
based rate authority without any generation market power assessment.  NASUCA 
notes that its understanding is that, “the Commission would effectively “grandfather” 
the market-based rate status for owners of these newer power plants,
316 at least until 
the time of the next applicable triennial review, when a market power analysis would 
be required for continuation of market-based rate authority.”
317  Specifically, 
NASUCA explains that a Category 2 seller who recently obtained market-based rate 
authority, could have up to three years of future market-based rate sales with no 
review of its horizontal market power, while any that fall into Category 1 would be 
exempted entirely from the triennial review process and thus “grandfathered” 
indefinitely and able to sell at market-based rates without passing any market power 
test.  If this “grandfathering” is not intended, then, according to NASUCA, the 
                                              
316 NASUCA at 10 n.12, “[T]he Commission would require that all new applicants 
seeking market-based rate authority on or after the effective date of the final rule issued 
in this proceeding, whether or not all of their or their affiliates’ generation was built after 
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of when it was built, thus eliminating any special treatment of generation built after     
July 9, 1996.” Citing NOPR at P 72. Docket No. RM04-7-000   185 
 
Commission should clarify that new market power assessments must be made now 
for those sellers whose market power has never been reviewed.
318  Otherwise, 
NASUCA contends that their rates could be vulnerable to challenge because they are 
established solely on the basis of market price.
319 
Commission Determination 
329.  We will not adopt commenters’ proposals with regard to the grandfathering of 
any generating units that were built relying on the exemption in § 35.27(a).  As 
discussed above, we find establishing "classes" of generation facilities would result in 
confusion for both the Commission and market participants.  In this regard, no 
commenter has demonstrated that harm would result from having to submit a 
horizontal market power analysis, and no commenter has claimed that it would lose 
its financing or that its financing would be adversely affected as a result of the 
elimination of the exemption in   § 35.27(a).  Moreover, as the Commission stated in 
Order No. 888, intervenors could present evidence that a seller seeking market-based 
rates for sales from new generation possesses market power, and sellers were aware 
that they may have to submit a horizontal market power analysis even if their 
                                              
318 NASUCA at 10-11. 
319 Id. at 11, citing FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974) (stating that the 
prevailing price in the marketplace cannot be the final measure of just and reasonable 
rates) (Texaco).  See also NASUCA reply comments at 7-8 (asserting that for any 
grandfathered sellers the market is the final determinant of price, an impermissible result 
under Texaco.) Docket No. RM04-7-000   186 
 
generation fell within the exemption.
320  Therefore, we will require that all sellers 
seeking market-based rate authority for the first time on or after the effective date of 
the Final Rule in this proceeding must provide a horizontal market power analysis 
that includes all generation that the seller owns or controls.   
330.  All existing sellers that fall in Category 2 must provide a horizontal market 
power analysis that includes all generation that each seller owns or controls when it 
files its regularly scheduled updated market power analysis.  To the extent a Category 
1 seller acquires enough generation to be reclassified as a Category 2 seller, that 
seller will be required to submit a change in status report and provide a horizontal 
market power analysis.  
331.  Further, with regard to PJM, in establishing whether units constructed after 
July 9, 1996 should be exempt from PJM’s existing market power mitigation rules, 
we initially approved the post-1996 exemption based on the concern that the price 
cap regulation or the mitigation rules in PJM might deter market entry and would 
create certain equity issues.  However, we reconsidered our position and found that 
the exemption was unduly discriminatory by creating two classes of reliability must 
run generators:  one that is price or offer capped and another that is not.  Equally 
important, other RTOs/ISOs applied local market mitigation rules to all generation 
                                              
320 See Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats.& Regs.Regulations Preambles July 1996-
December 2000 ¶ 31,048 at 30,188 (“[T]he policy eliminates the [generation dominance] 
showing only as a matter of routine in each filing.”) Docket No. RM04-7-000   187 
 
within their respective areas regardless of when the generator was built, and we 
determined that comparable authority for PJM would allow it to address local market 
power issues.
321  We concluded that units built on or after July 9, 1996 had the same 
ability to exercise market power as counterparts that were built prior to July 9, 1996.  
Accordingly, the Commission terminated the blanket exemption, but in the case of 
units that were built with the expectation that they would not be subject to mitigation, 
the Commission allowed the exemption to be grandfathered.
322 
332.  Our reasons for grandfathering units in PJM are dissimilar enough that our 
holding in the PJM orders should not affect our decision here.  The factors that led to 
the establishment and later the termination of the exemption from mitigation in PJM 
are unrelated to the reasons for instituting and, now, eliminating the express 
exemption in § 35.27(a).  In PJM and PJM II, the Commission considered whether 
local market power mitigation might deter new entry and whether new units were 
built with the expectation that they would not be subject to mitigation.  The 
Commission grandfathered units that could reasonably have relied on the exemption 
after it went into effect in their zone.
323  In contrast, in this proceeding the 
                                              
321 PJM, 110 FERC ¶ 61,053 at P 59. 
322 PJM II, 112 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 38. 
323 Nevertheless, the Commission stated that the units would still be subject to 
mitigation if PJM or its market monitor concluded that they exercised significant market 
power.  Id. at P 60. Docket No. RM04-7-000   188 
 
Commission desires a more rigorous market-based rate program and is concerned that 
over time generation will be retired leaving less and less generation subject to our 
horizontal analysis or sellers relying on the § 35.27 exemption will otherwise grow to 
a degree that they have market power in the relevant market in which they are 
located.  The Commission’s primary statutory obligation under FPA sections 205 and 
206 is to ensure that rates are just and reasonable, and we believe the elimination of 
the exemption will better provide us with the ability to screen all market participants’ 
ability to exercise horizontal market power regardless of whether their generation 
units were constructed before or after July 9, 1996.  Therefore, we will not allow any 
grandfathering as part of this proceeding. 
333.  NASUCA’s concerns regarding entities that originally enjoyed the § 35.27 
exemption are addressed by our decision, discussed below in the Implementation 
Process section of this Final Rule, to require a seller that believes it qualifies as 
Category 1 to make a filing with the Commission at the time that its updated market 
power analysis for the seller’s region would otherwise be due (based on the regional 
schedule set forth in Appendix D).  That filing should explain why the seller meets 
the Category 1 criteria and should include a list of all generation assets (including 
nameplate or seasonal capacity amounts) owned or controlled by the seller and its 
affiliates grouped by balancing authority area.  Thus, a seller that previously qualified 
for the § 35.27 exemption and that believes it qualifies as a Category 1 seller would 
be required to provide support for its claim to Category 1 status.  This filing will give 
the Commission and interested parties an opportunity to review and, if appropriate, Docket No. RM04-7-000   189 
 
challenge a seller’s claim that it qualifies as a Category 1 seller.  To the extent that an 
intervenor has concerns about a seller’s potential to exercise market power, the 
Commission will entertain them at that time.
324  In addition, a seller that previously 
qualified for the § 35.27 exemption and that believes it qualifies as a Category 2 
seller will be required to file an updated market power analysis based on the regional 
schedule set forth in Appendix D.  
334.  While it is true that a portion of these sellers will continue to sell at market-
based rates for a time until their updated market power analyses (in the case of 
Category 2 sellers) or their filings addressing qualification as Category 1 sellers are 
due, no commenter has submitted compelling evidence that Category 1 sellers have 
unmitigated market power.  We will rely on our change in status requirements that 
require, among other things, all sellers that obtain or acquire a net increase of 100 
MW in owned or controlled generation to make a filing with the Commission and to 
provide the effect, if any, such an increase in generation has on the indicative screens.  
Additionally, all sellers must file EQRs of transactions no later than 30 days after the 
end of each reporting quarter.  Furthermore, the Commission retains the ability to 
require an updated market power analysis from any seller at any time.  With these 
procedures in place, we believe NASUCA’s concerns are addressed.    
                                              
324 Moreover, if specific concerns regarding market power exist, interested persons 
may file a complaint pursuant to FPA section 206. Docket No. RM04-7-000   190 
 
c.  Creation of a Safe Harbor 
Comments 
335.  NRG urges the Commission to create a “safe harbor” such that “if the 
generation owner controls less than 20 percent of the capacity in an organized market, 
the Commission should irrebuttably presume that the new entry will not contribute to 
market power and thus no demonstration is required to obtain market-based rate 
authority for the new capacity.”
325  NRG states that only where an owner controls 
more than 20 percent of capacity in a relevant market should the presumption be 
rebuttable and subject to challenge by intervening parties.  It is NRG’s contention that 
the creation of such a “safe harbor” retains most of the benefits of the Commission’s 
current policy under § 35.27(a), while preserving its flexibility to investigate where a 
seller adding generating capacity already has a large market share.  NRG believes that 
this codifies the general approach the Commission took in Order No. 888
326 and 
                                              
325 NRG at 5 & n.8, suggesting that the use of a 20 percent market share in the safe 
harbor proposal replicates one of the two screens that the Commission proposes in the 
NOPR to use as a general screen for market power in all markets reviewed for market-
based rate authority.  NRG argues that a 20 percent market share screen is well-
established and appropriate for use in reviewing the market power implications 
associated with the addition of new generation.  The use of a lightened, single screen 
approach to review the market power implications of new generation is appropriate, 
argues NRG, in that new generation expands the supply available in a market.  According 
to NRG, for organized markets administered by RTOs that have in place Commission-
approved market monitoring and mitigation authority, subjecting new generation only to 
a 20 percent market share screen is appropriate in light of the existing controls over the 
exercise of market power.  
326 Id. at n.9, citing Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs.  Regulations Preambles 
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responds to the Commission’s evolving concerns in this area, while at the same time 
facilitating new entry in the organized markets where sufficient safeguards exist.
327  
NRG contends that new generation, timely developed and brought online, is 
imperative; thus, a “safe harbor” for new generation is necessary. 
336.  Ameren agrees that there is a need for the Commission to address the § 35.27 
exemption before it encompasses all generating capacity, however, Ameren submits 
that the Commission should allow an exemption for new generation under certain 
circumstances.  Ameren argues that “the Commission should amend its regulations to 
provide that new generation that represents less than 20 percent of the uncommitted 
capacity at peak in the relevant geographic market be exempt from the requirement of 
a horizontal market power analysis, so long as the owner of, or entity that controls, 
such capacity and its affiliates own no other generation or transmission facilities 
(other than interconnection facilities) in the relevant market.”
328  Ameren submits that 
the Commission should allow the seller to file a letter which identifies:  (1) the 
transmission system it is interconnected to; (2) the amount of uncommitted capacity it 
                                                                                                                                                  
January 1991-June 1996 ¶ 31,036 at 31,657. 
327 Id. at n.10.  Under NRG’s proposal, the Commission would also need to apply 
the safe harbor analysis to the notice of change of status for the suppliers’ existing 
generation, when the notice of change is triggered by the addition of new generation 
capacity.  Failure to do so would mean the lightened review appropriate for new 
generation would not, in effect, produce the intended lessening of regulatory burden.  
328 Ameren at 7-8. Docket No. RM04-7-000   192 
 
controls; and  (3) the Commission-approved market power study that it relied on to 
determine that its uncommitted capacity is less than twenty percent of the net 
uncommitted capacity in the relevant geographic market.  Ameren contends that this 
abbreviated process would reduce a seller’s cost of compliance and administrative 
burdens.
329 
Commission Determination 
337.  The Commission will not create a safe harbor.
330  For the reasons set forth in 
the April 14 Order and reiterated in the July 8 Order, there will be no safe harbor 
exemption from the generation market power screen based upon a seller’s size.
331  
While there is no safe harbor exemption from the screens based on the seller’s size, 
any seller, regardless of size, has the option of making simplifying assumptions in its 
analysis where appropriate that do not affect the underlying methodology utilized by 
these screens.  
338.  Further, while we eliminate the § 35.27 exemption in this Final Rule, we note 
that sellers that have enjoyed that exemption historically have been required to 
                                              
329 Id. 
330 We note that although Category 1 sellers are not required to provide a regularly 
scheduled updated market analysis, such an approach does not establish a safe harbor 
because all sellers will be required to perform the indicative screens as part of their initial 
applications, make change in status filings and file EQRs. 
331 See April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 69, 117; July 8 Order, 108 FERC 
¶ 61,026 at P 107 (the Commission explained that small sellers are able to use 
simplifying assumptions). Docket No. RM04-7-000   193 
 
address the other parts of the market-based rate analysis, vertical market power, 
affiliate abuse, and other barriers to entry.
332  Therefore, the Commission believes 
that, on balance, any additional cost of compliance or administrative burden due to 
this change will not be substantial compared to a seller’s investment and revenues.
333  
11.  Nameplate Capacity 
Commission Proposal 
339.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to allow sellers the option of using 
seasonal capacity instead of nameplate capacity, as is currently required.  The 
Commission indicated that the seller must be consistent in its choice and thus must 
choose either seasonal or nameplate capacity and use it consistently throughout the 
analysis.  The Commission stated that it believed the use of seasonal capacity ratings 
more accurately reflects the seasonal real power capability and is not inconsistent 
with industry standards and, therefore, it may be more convenient for sellers to 
acquire and compile the associated data.  The Commission added that it did not think 
the use of such ratings will materially impact results.  The Commission sought 
comment on this proposal, including comment as to whether this information is 
publicly available to all market participants. 
                                              
332 As described in this Final Rule, we consolidate the transmission market power 
and other barriers to entry analyses into one vertical market power analysis.  In addition, 
we discontinue considering affiliate abuse as a separate part of the analysis and instead 
codify affiliate restrictions in our regulations. 
333 NOPR at P 71. Docket No. RM04-7-000   194 
 
Comments 
340.  Many commenters on this topic express strong support for the proposal to 
substitute seasonal capacity for nameplate capacity.
334  The reason most commonly 
cited is that seasonal capacity is a more accurate representation of actual output.  
Several commenters state that firms should be allowed to use net seasonal 
capacity,
335 which allows for station service requirements and energy consumed by 
environmental equipment.  MidAmerican points out that station usage, including 
environmental equipment, can approach 10 percent of overall output in steam 
plants.
336  EEI states that coal plants, which make up 51 percent of generation in the 
United States, are required to comply with both federal and state regulations that 
mandate emission reductions.  The plants are equipped with scrubbers and other 
emissions reduction technology that require a portion of the power produced by the 
plant in order to operate, thereby reducing the output available to serve customers.  
For companies with a large percentage of their generation coming from coal, the 
reduced output from such equipment could be significant.
337  PG&E favors using 
                                              
334 Duke at 22; First Energy at 10; Southern at 26; SoCal Edison at 8. 
335 EEI at 18; PNM/Tucson at 10; Allegheny at 7-8; Pinnacle West at 5-6; PPL at 
17. 
336 MidAmerican at 8. 
337 EEI at 18. Docket No. RM04-7-000   195 
 
seasonal capacity if it could be filed confidentially, because it maintains that it is 
commercially sensitive information.
338   
341.  PG&E requests clarification that if sellers are allowed to submit seasonal 
capacity, they are allowed to de-rate hydroelectric capacity resources based on 
historical output for the past five years, as specified in the April 14 Order.
339  
Powerex supports seasonal ratings as more accurate, because hydroelectric systems 
are often able to generate in excess of nameplate ratings and these “peak capability” 
ratings are typically reflected in seasonal determinations, and seasonal ratings better 
reflect operating conditions that can impact the capacity ratings of renewable 
resources.
 340   
342.  APPA/TAPS support the adoption of seasonal capacity ratings if they are 
consistently used, and request that the Commission clarify that the seasonal capacity 
ratings be used for all plants in a geographic region “so that the consistency benefits 
of the regional reviews are not diminished.”
341  
                                              
338 PG&E at 10-11. 
339 April 14 Order, 108 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 126.  The July 8 Order allowed this 
method to be used for wind resources as well.  July 8 Order, 108 FERC ¶ 61,026 at P 
129. 
340 Powerex at 20. 
341 APPA/TAPS at 35.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   196 
 
Commission Determination 
343.  We will adopt the NOPR proposal that allows sellers to use seasonal capacity.  
We clarify that each seller must be consistent in its choice and thus must choose 
either seasonal or nameplate capacity and use it consistently throughout the analysis.  
In addition, a seller using seasonal capacity must identify in its submittal from what 
source the data was obtained.
342  We also note and adopt the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) definition of seasonal capacity as it is reported on Form EIA-
860, Schedule 3, Part B, Line 2, which provides that seasonal capacity is the "net 
summer or winter capacity."
343  EIA instructions elaborate that "net capacity should 
reflect a reduction in capacity due to electricity use for station service or 
auxiliaries,"
344 which includes scrubbers and other environmental devices. 
344.  With regard to energy-limited resources, such as hydroelectric and wind 
capacity, in lieu of using nameplate or seasonal capacity in their submissions, we will 
allow such resources to provide an analysis based on historical capacity factors 
                                              
342 In the July 8 Order, the Commission stated that “[w]ith respect to data that is 
only available from commercial sources, we clarify that commercial sources may be used 
to the extent the data is made available to intervenors and other interested parties.  
Applicants utilizing commercial information to perform the screens should include it in 
their filing.”  July 8 Order, 108 FERC ¶ 61,026 at P 121. 
343 EIA-860 Instructions are available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/forms/eia860/eia860.pdf 
344 Tip Sheet for Reporting on Form EIA-860, “Annual Electric Generator Report” 
at item "III. Schedule 3B, Line 2 and Schedule 3D, Line 2: Net Capacity" available at   
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/forms/eia860/tipsheet.doc  Docket No. RM04-7-000   197 
 
reflecting the use of a five-year average capacity factor including a sensitivity test 
using the lowest capacity factor in the previous five years, and in recognition of 
Powerex’s concern that hydroelectric systems can generate in excess of nameplate 
ratings and these “peak capability” ratings, the highest capacity factor in the previous 
five years.  Our approach in this regard will more accurately capture hydroelectric or 
wind availability.
345  
345.  We will not adopt APPA/TAPS’ suggestion that we require use of either 
nameplate capacity or seasonal capacity throughout a region.  While we appreciate 
APPA/TAPS’ concern for data consistency for analysis purposes, we note that 
although we adopt a regional approach for the filing of updated market power 
analyses, the horizontal market power analysis itself continues to focus on the seller 
seeking to obtain or retain market-based rate authority.  We find that consistency of 
data is critical within each individual analysis as results could vary depending on the 
assumptions taken.  However, because we are not necessarily analyzing the entire 
region within a single study, we will not mandate the use of either nameplate capacity 
                                              
 
345 In the April 14 Order, we explained that commenters expressed concerns 
regarding the appropriate measure of the capacity of hydroelectric units given that 
hydroelectric facilities are energy-limited units.  Our experience with Western markets 
shows that market outcomes can be significantly different during low water years.  We 
agree with the comments raised by Western market participants and conclude that 
properly accounting for water availability will provide a better picture of competitive 
conditions in the West.  Moreover, while not as critical in other parts of the country as in 
the West, the same principle regarding water availability applies to all electricity markets, 
and we will permit all sellers to de-rate hydroelectric capacity in the analysis. Docket No. RM04-7-000   198 
 
or seasonal capacity on a regional basis, but instead will allow sellers to choose either 
nameplate or seasonal capacity, and require them to identify the choice and use it 
consistently throughout the analysis.
346  
12.  Transmission Imports 
346.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to continue to measure limits on the 
amount of capacity that can be imported into a relevant market based on the results of 
a simultaneous transmission import capability study.  A seller that owns, operates or 
controls transmission is required to conduct simultaneous transmission import 
capability studies for its home control area and each of its directly-interconnected 
first-tier control areas consistent with the requirements set forth in the April 14 Order, 
as clarified in Pinnacle West Capital Corp.
347  These studies are used in the pivotal 
supplier screen, market share screen, and DPT to approximate the transmission 
import capability.  When centering the generation market power analysis on the 
transmission providing utility’s first-tier control area (i.e., markets), the transmission-
providing seller should use the methodologies consistent with its implementation of 
its Commission-approved OATT, thereby making a reasonable approximation of 
simultaneous import capability that would have been available to suppliers in 
                                              
346 When submitting a change in status filing regarding horizontal market power, 
sellers should use the same assumptions they used (e.g., use of nameplate or seasonal 
ratings) in their most recent market power analysis. 
347  110 FERC ¶ 61,127 (2005). Docket No. RM04-7-000   199 
 
surrounding first-tier markets during each seasonal peak.  The transfer capability 
should also include any other limits (such as stability, voltage, Capacity Benefit 
Margin, or Transmission Reliability Margin) as defined in the tariff and that existed 
during each seasonal peak.  The “contingency” model should use the same 
assumptions used historically by the transmission provider in approximating its 
control area import capability.  
347.  The Commission also proposed to reaffirm the exclusion of control areas that 
are second-tier to the control area being studied.  In addition, it proposed that a 
seller’s pro rata share of simultaneous transmission import capability should be 
allocated between the seller and its competitors based on uncommitted capacity.  The 
Commission sought comment on this proposal. 
a.  Use of Historical Conditions and OASIS Practices  
Comments 
348.  Montana Counsel states that transmission capability used in the tests should 
not be greater than the capability measures that are shown on the OASIS or that are 
used to measure ATC into markets unless there is a demonstrated change in available 
transmission capability.
348  In particular, Montana Counsel states that the 
Commission’s requirement that sellers follow historical OASIS practice during each 
historical seasonal peak is essential; otherwise, companies could submit screens using 
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transmission availability numbers that differ substantially from those which sellers 
and transmission providers use in day-to-day activities in providing transmission 
market access.
349  In Montana Counsel’s view, one cannot rely on capacity being able 
to reach a market based upon hypothetical transmission availability, as the 
Commission appropriately recognizes.   
349.  In response to Montana Counsel’s assertion to use OASIS postings, PPL 
Companies maintain that the Commission should continue to use simultaneous import 
limit studies.  OASIS postings do not adjust for transmission rights controlled by 
unaffiliated resources that may be used to compete against the seller in wholesale 
markets.  PPL Companies state: “The Commission should reject this proposal and 
continue to rely on [SILs].  The Commission properly has found that using actual 
OASIS postings understates import capability because OASIS postings do not take 
into account the capacity that may be imported as a result of existing reservations.”
350 
350.  EEI and Southern request clarification of a perceived conflict in Appendix E, 
which instructs sellers to use Commission criteria for calculating simultaneous import 
capability and also to strictly follow their OASIS practices.
351  They recommend that 
the Commission clarify that if historical practices are different from Appendix E, 
                                              
349 Id. at 14. 
350 PPL Companies reply comments at 9-11. 
351 EEI at 27-29; Southern at 32. Docket No. RM04-7-000   201 
 
historical practices should be used to calculate simultaneous transmission import 
capability and to allocate this transmission capability.   
351.  Duke asserts that scaling methods for calculating simultaneous transmission 
import capability should not be solely limited to historical practices used by the seller 
to post ATC on OASIS.  Duke proposes a collaborative method involving the seller 
and transmission customers.  Duke states:  "the Commission should allow applicants 
flexibility to use the appropriate methodology for SIL determinations including 
collaborative, regional efforts – so that screen results for control area markets can be 
accurate.  For example, the Commission should not be overly prescriptive as to the 
scaling methodology to be used in such a collaborative effort, as long as the 
methodology is clearly defined and supported by the applicants."
352  PPL Companies 
support the collaborative effort proposed by Duke, stating that sellers should have 
“the option of proposing alternative [SILs] for first-tier markets, but would have to 
justify and document the proposed deviations.”
353 
352.  Southern states that the SIL study requires “blind” scaling (scaling that does 
not consider economic dispatch) because only generation that is “on-line” is used.  
Southern states that to the extent a transmission provider does not customarily 
employ blind scaling, its use would not be consistent with historical practice.  It 
                                              
352 Duke at 27-28. 
353 PPL Companies reply comments at 9-11 Docket No. RM04-7-000   202 
 
asserts that a problem with blind scaling is that it does not necessarily reflect reality 
and therefore has the potential to understate, perhaps significantly, the simultaneous 
import limit.
354  EEI seeks clarification that the Commission is not requiring blind 
scaling in a manner that requires proportionate increases and decreases to generation 
resources.  EEI requests clarification that scaling is allowed to include expert 
judgment reflecting how generation resources would likely be scaled up or down in a 
real-time operating environment.  EEI contends that expert judgment in some cases 
may determine simultaneous import capability by scaling load rather than generation 
resources.  EEI requests that the Commission defer to expert judgment in scaling and 
not be overly prescriptive as to whether generation or load is scaled to determine 
simultaneous import capability.
355  
353.  PPL Companies contend the simultaneous import capability should not be 
limited by load in a control area.  Since generators within the control area may sell 
power within or outside the control area, the Commission should consider the market 
prices of surrounding regions.  If the prices are 105 percent or less, compared to 
control area prices, then the Commission should assume the resident control area 
                                              
354 Southern at 35 and 36. 
355 EEI at 24. Docket No. RM04-7-000   203 
 
resources will remain within the control area and not result in economic withholding 
within the seller’s area.
356 
Commission Determination   
354.  The Commission will continue to require sellers to submit the Appendix E 
analysis, i.e., the SIL study, to calculate aggregated simultaneous transfer capability 
into the balancing authority area being studied.
357  The Commission reaffirms that the 
SIL study is “intended to provide a reasonable simulation of historical conditions”
358 
and is not “a theoretical maximum import capability or best import case scenario.”
359  
To determine the amount of transfer capability under the SIL study, “historical 
operating conditions and practices of the applicable transmission provider (e.g., 
modeling the system in a reliable and economic fashion as it would have been 
operated in real time) are reflected.”
360  In addition, the “analysis should not deviate 
from” and “must reasonably reflect” its OASIS operating practices
361 and “the 
                                              
356 PPL Companies at 8. 
357 Benefits of using a uniform transmission import model include:  transparency, 
consistency, clarity, and reasonable assurance that system conditions have been 
adequately captured. 
358 In this regard, actual flows during the study periods may be used as a proxy for 
the simultaneous transmission import limit. 
359 NOPR at P 77. 
360 Id. 
 
361 By OASIS practices, we mean sellers shall use the same OASIS methods and 
studies used historically by sellers (in determining simultaneous operational limits on all 
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
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techniques used must have been historically available to customers.”
362  We also 
reaffirm that the power flow cases (which are used as inputs to the SIL study) should 
represent the transmission provider’s tariff provisions and firm/network reservations 
held by seller/affiliate resources during the most recent seasonal peaks.
363   
355.  The Commission will also continue to allow sensitivity studies, but the 
sensitivity studies must be filed in addition to, and not in lieu of, an SIL study.  We 
clarify that sensitivity studies are intended to provide the seller with the ability to 
modify inputs to the SIL study such as generation dispatch, demand scaling, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
transmission lines and monitored facilities) to estimate import limits from aggregated 
first-tier control areas into the study area.  In this sense, sellers are modeling first-tier 
balancing authority areas as if they are the transmission operator/security coordinator 
(monitoring reliability) operating an OASIS for the aggregated first-tier footprint.  We 
recognize that sellers are not the balancing authority area operators of first-tier balancing 
authority areas and in some instances, sellers may not be familiar with all aspects of their 
first-tier balancing authority areas' transmission system limits.  However, sellers should 
be familiar with major constraints, path limits, and delivery problems in these 
neighboring transmission systems.  If a seller participates in regional planning studies and 
day-to-day coordination with neighboring first-tier balancing authority areas then this 
will provide a reasonable basis for including transmission system constraints of first-tier 
balancing authority areas in SIL study calculations.  In using OASIS practices the SIL 
study shall capture real-life physical limitations of first-tier balancing authority areas that 
impede power flowing from remote first-tier resources into the seller’s study. 
362 Id. at P 77, 78. 
363 Network reservations include any grandfathered transmission rights applicable 
to the seller or its affiliated companies. Docket No. RM04-7-000   205 
 
addition of new transmission and generation facilities (and the retirement of 
facilities), major outages, and demand response.
364 
356.  The Commission agrees with Montana Counsel and clarifies for PPL 
Companies that a SIL study must reflect transmission capability no greater than the 
capability measures that were historically shown on the OASIS or that were 
historically used to measure transmission capability into markets unless there is a 
demonstrated change in transmission capability, and account for the actual practice of 
posting ATC to OASIS in order to capture a realistic approximation of first-tier 
generation access to the seller’s market.  Further, and in response to EEI and 
Southern’s comments, the Commission clarifies that when actual OASIS practices 
conflict with the instructions of Appendix E, sellers should follow OASIS practices 
and must provide adequate support in the form of documentation of these processes.    
357.  We disagree with Duke's argument that a seller's (generation or load) scaling 
methods should not be limited to historical OASIS practices when conducting an SIL.  
Using historical practices provides an appropriate method to obtain a transparent and 
measurable analysis of a seller's actual balancing authority area transmission 
conditions and practices.  Improper or theoretical scaling methods which do not 
represent a seller’s actual transmission practices may have the effect of allowing 
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more competing generation into the balancing authority area than could actually be 
accommodated.  This in turn has the effect of reducing a seller's generation market 
share and perhaps causing the seller to inappropriately pass the market share screen (a 
false negative).
365  In addition, relying on historical OASIS practices gives a seller 
the data needed to support its conclusions.   
358.  With regard to Duke and PPL's request that the Commission allow sellers to 
submit a flexible SIL study based on regional collaboration, the Commission finds 
that such an approach does not satisfy our concerns and may result in an unrealistic 
representation of the market.   
359.  Southern states that to the extent a transmission provider does not customarily 
employ blind scaling, its use would not be consistent with historical practice.   
We agree and, as noted herein, the horizontal analysis and the SIL study are designed to 
study historical and realistic conditions during peak seasons.  Accordingly, in this 
circumstance, sellers should follow their OASIS practices and must provide adequate 
support in the form of documentation of these processes.   
360.  With regard to EEI's argument that the Commission should consider allowing 
expert judgment in predicting real-time scaling techniques that will likely be used in 
real-time market environments, the Commission requires the use of a study that 
captures historical transmission operating practices.  The SIL study is not a prediction 
                                              
365  See, e.g., Pinnacle West Capital Corp., 117 FERC ¶ 61,316 (2006). Docket No. RM04-7-000   207 
 
of import possibilities; rather, it is a simulation of historical conditions.  We assume 
that such historical conditions are the result of "expert judgment" used when 
determining generation dispatch and/or scaling techniques to make transmission 
capacity available during actual system conditions.  Accordingly, this expert 
judgment is captured when conducting an SIL study that is based on historical 
operating practices.   
361.  In response to PPL’s comments that the SIL should not be limited by load in a 
balancing authority area, the Commission reiterates that the SIL study is a benchmark 
of historical conditions, including peak load.  It is a study to determine how much 
competitive supply from remote resources can serve load in the study area.  
Increasing the load in the study area beyond historical peak levels makes the study 
less realistic and can bias the study.
366  The Commission does, however, consider 
sensitivity studies on a case-by-case basis, when submitted in addition to the SIL 
study and supported by record evidence.  For example, in Puget Sound Energy, Inc.'s 
(Puget) updated market power analysis filing, Puget demonstrated that the 
simultaneous transmission import limit was greater than the peak load in its balancing 
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authority area, and the Commission allowed Puget to use a simultaneous transmission 
import limit based on its peak load.
367   
362.  PPL also contends the simultaneous import capability should not be limited by 
load in a balancing authority area since generators within the balancing authority area 
may sell power within or outside the balancing authority area.  Accordingly, PPL 
believes that the Commission should consider the market prices of surrounding 
regions.  The Commission disagrees.  We base the SIL on historical conditions that 
actually existed during the study periods.  In this regard, PPL has provided no 
compelling reason for the Commission to abandon historical evidence in favor of a 
theoretical estimation of what could have occurred.  We find that PPL’s approach 
would make the studies more subjective and thus less accurate and more prone to 
dispute and controversy. 
b.  Use of Total Transfer Capability (TTC) 
Comments 
363.  Southern asserts that the Commission’s assumption that all TTC values posted 
on OASIS platforms are non-simultaneous is not correct.  Southern states that 
although many TTC values may be calculated on a point-to-point non-simultaneous 
basis, some TTC values are simultaneous, thus accounting for "loop flow" created by 
other paths.  Southern contends that those transmission providers that post 
                                              
367 Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 111 FERC ¶ 61,020 at P 13 (2005). Docket No. RM04-7-000   209 
 
simultaneous TTC values on OASIS should have the flexibility to add these TTC 
values to calculate simultaneous transmission import capability for the control area.  
Southern believes that conflicts can occur between the generic methods presented in 
the Appendix E interim market screen order and actual OASIS practices used by 
transmission providers to post TTC.   
Commission Determination 
364.  Southern’s suggestion that the Commission allow the use of simultaneous TTC 
values is consistent with the SIL study provided that these TTCs are the values that 
are used in operating the transmission system and posting availability on OASIS.  
The simultaneous TTCs
368 must represent more than interface constraints at the 
balancing authority area border and must reflect all transmission limitations within 
the study area and limitations within first-tier areas.  The source (first-tier remote 
resources) can only deliver power to load in the seller's balancing authority area if 
adequate transmission is available out of its first-tier area, adequate transmission is 
available at the seller’s balancing authority area interface, and transmission is 
internally available.  Thus, the TTC must be appropriately adjusted for all applicable 
(as discussed below) firm transmission commitments held by affiliated companies 
that represent transfer capability not available to first-tier supply.  Sellers submitting 
simultaneous TTC values must provide evidence that these values account for 
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simultaneity, account for all internal transmission limitations, account for all external 
transmission limitations existing in first-tier areas, account for all transmission 
reliability margins, and are used in operating the transmission system and posting 
availability on OASIS. 
c.  Accounting for Transmission Reservations 
Comments 
365.  Duke and EEI propose that short-term firm reservations should not be 
subtracted from simultaneous import limits because longer firm reservation requests 
can displace control of these transmission holdings.
369  EEI explains, “it is 
inappropriate to net out transmission capacity that is not reserved to commit long-
term generation resources to load.  Short-term firm transmission reservations, some 
as short as one week in duration, provide flexibility to the market and will not 
necessarily persist for the duration, or even large portions, of the MBR authorization 
period.  Therefore, they should not be used to reduce the estimate of simultaneous 
import capability."
370   
366.  Southern agrees, referring to the nature of short-term reservations as “transient 
and unpredictable.”
371  Southern states: "In most cases, short-term purchases by the 
applicant essentially allow the market to provide generation within the applicant’s 
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control area instead of the applicant utilizing its ‘owned’” generation capacity.  
Alternatively, the associated import capability is released to the market.  In either 
case, these short-term reservations should not be used to inflate artificially the 
applicant’s market share in conjunction with a screen or DPT evaluation."
372 
367.  APPA/TAPS state that the Commission should revisit the treatment of firm 
transmission reservations held by third parties.  In the July 8 Rehearing Order (at P 
49), the Commission stated that the SIL study assumed that “all reservations 
historically controlled by non-affiliates would have been used to compete to inject 
energy into the transmission provider’s control area market if market power or 
scarcity was driving market prices above other regional prices.”  However, if the 
holder of the reservation is using the transfer capability to serve its own load, it will 
not be available to third parties to respond to a price increase on the part of the 
transmission provider/sellers.  APPA/TAPS state that presumably the capacity 
resources associated with the import will be reflected in the capacity total of the party 
that controls the resource’s output.  Excluding the transfer capability associated with 
the resource will not result in a double-deduction.  Rather, failing to exclude the 
transfer capability will result in a double-counting of competing supply.  Thus, 
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APPA/TAPS assert that the Commission should revise the treatment of transfer 
capability held by third parties on a firm basis.
373 
Commission Determination 
368.  The Commission agrees with Duke, EEI and Southern that short-term firm 
reservations can be unpredictable, driven by real time system conditions, and do not 
necessarily indicate that the associated transmission capacity is not available for 
competing supplies (or to import seller’s supplies during the study periods).  
Accordingly, we conclude that, in calculating simultaneous transmission import 
limits, short-term firm reservations of 28 days or less in effect during the study 
periods need not be accounted for.
374  While we find that firm transmission 
reservations less than or equal to 28 days in duration are usually unpredictable, we 
believe that firm transmission reservations of a longer duration are not related to the 
unpredictable nature of real time events and are based upon planned and predictable 
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events.  Therefore, the Commission will require sellers to account for firm and 
network transmission reservations having a duration of longer than 28 days.
375 
369.  With regard to APPA/TAPSs’ concern, we clarify that the seller’s firm, 
network, and grandfathered transmission reservations longer than 28 days, including 
reservations for designated resources to serve retail load, shall be fully accounted for 
in the simultaneous import limit study.  We further clarify that reservations held by 
third parties to import power into the seller’s home area should be accounted for by 
allocating transmission import capability to those parties, and then allocating the 
remaining SIL pro rata.   
d.  Allocation of Transmission Imports based on Pro Rata Shares of 
Seller's Uncommitted Generation Capacity 
Comments 
370.  Duke and EEI support the Commission proposal to allocate imports on a pro 
rata basis into a study area based on uncommitted capacity in surrounding areas.
376   
371.  However, Powerex expresses concern that pro rata allocation of uncommitted 
capacity is not a realistic representation of the physical capability of the system, since 
pro rata allocation assumes that the system can import up to the simultaneous import 
limit over any combination of transmission paths.  Powerex argues that, in reality, 
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some paths become constrained before others, so the allocation of import capability 
should take account of the physical limitations of the transmission system.  Powerex 
asks that the Commission allow sellers to use allocation methods that are consistent 
with physical system limitations, where sellers provide documentation showing that 
the allocation methods used in the screens are realistic or conservative.
377   
372.  Morgan Stanley asks the Commission to clarify its proposal of allocating 
transmission imports pro rata between the seller and its competitors based on 
uncommitted capacity.  Morgan Stanley wonders if the Commission made a 
typographical error and intended to propose an allocation based on committed 
capacity.  Morgan Stanley believes only the transmission provider (seller) would have 
uncommitted capacity.
378 
Commission Determination 
373.  The Commission agrees with Duke and EEI that the current practice of 
allocating simultaneous import capability pro rata to sellers based on uncommitted 
capacity should be continued.
379  However, some clarification may be helpful.   
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374.  Powerex raises concern over the pro rata allocation of uncommitted generation 
capacity and asserts that this is not a realistic representation of the physical capability 
of the system since pro rata allocation assumes that the system can import up to the 
simultaneous import limit over any combination of transmission paths.  In this regard, 
we note that pro rata allocation of transmission capacity based on first-tier 
uncommitted generation capacity is an approximation and is consistent with the 
manner in which we conduct the SIL study.  In particular, when determining the 
simultaneous import limit, first-tier balancing authority areas are combined into a 
single area.  The import capability of the study area is the simultaneous transfer limit 
from the aggregated first-tier market area into the study area.
380  We then allocate 
imports based on transmission capacity (limited by the physical capabilities of the 
transmission system as determined by the SIL  
study) pro rata based on sellers' first-tier uncommitted generation capacity.
381  We 
recognize that such an approximation may not fit all cases.  Accordingly, with regard to 
allocating transmission imports, sellers can submit additional sensitivity studies based on 
factors suggested by Powerex, and intervenors may rebut the allocations of import 
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capability made by seller.  The Commission will consider such arguments on a case-by-
case basis.  
375.  Morgan Stanley asks if the Commission made a typographical error and 
intended to propose an allocation based on committed capacity rather than 
uncommitted capacity.  The Commission clarifies that pro rata allocation is used to 
assign shares of simultaneous transmission import capability to uncommitted 
generation capacity in the aggregated first-tier balancing authority areas to determine 
how much uncommitted generation capacity can enter the study area.  Morgan 
Stanley appears to confuse our use of the term uncommitted capacity, apparently 
believing we are referring to uncommitted transmission capacity.  That is not the case 
as we are referring to uncommitted generation capacity.  The reason the use of 
uncommitted generation capacity is appropriate is because our screens analyze 
seller’s relative uncommitted generation capacity rather than installed generation 
capacity or, as suggested by Morgan Stanley, committed generation capacity.  In 
particular, the SIL study determines the amount of simultaneous transmission 
capacity available to be imported by competing supplies from remote resources in 
first-tier markets.  The supplies that are available to be imported and thus compete are 
necessarily “uncommitted.”  Further, it is our experience that uncommitted generation 
capacity can be held by any number of market participants based on market 
conditions at a given time.  In other words, we do not agree with an assumption that 
the transmission provider is likely to be the only market participant with uncommitted 
power supplies. Docket No. RM04-7-000   217 
 
e.  Miscellaneous Comments  
Comments  
376.  PG&E states that RTOs/ISOs having knowledge and control over the entire 
control area are best suited to perform SIL studies.  PG&E requests that the 
Commission allow an exemption where, in the absence of an accepted SIL study by 
an RTO/ISO, the seller may substitute historical import levels in place of the SIL 
study.  In addition, PG&E requests that the Commission confirm that sellers that pass 
screens for each  
 
relevant geographic market without considering imports need not provide a simultaneous 
import analysis.
382
377.  Powerex has concerns about how feasible it is for marketers to obtain non-
public data from their transmission provider that is needed to conduct a screen (e.g., a 
SIL study) on their own.  Powerex notes that Bonneville Power Administration 
(BPA) and Northwest Power Pool (NWPP) do not, as a practice, conduct and post 
simultaneous transmission import capability studies.  Therefore, Powerex asserts that 
                                              
382 PG&E at 11-12.  PG&E also requests that the Commission clarify how to 
perform the simultaneous import limitation to avoid the need for repetitive studies.  
However, PG&E did not specify what clarification was sought in this regard.  Docket No. RM04-7-000   218 
 
the Commission should maintain the current flexibility of allowing marketers to 
submit credible proxy study calculations based on publicly available information.
383 
Commission Determination 
378.  The Commission will continue to require the SIL study for the indicative 
screens and DPTs in order to assure that restrictions regarding importing first-tier 
supply are captured for seasonal peak conditions.  Benefits of using a uniform 
transmission import model include:  transparency, consistency, clarity, and 
reasonable assurance that system conditions have been adequately captured.  As also 
stated above, the Commission provides sellers flexibility to provide sensitivity 
analyses by modifying inputs to the SIL study.    
379.  In regard to PG&E's belief that RTOs/ISOs are best equipped to conduct SIL 
calculations, the Commission will continue to require transmission-providing sellers 
to perform the SIL studies as necessary.  To the extent that an RTO/ISO conducts 
transmission studies and makes that information available, a seller may rely on the 
information obtained from its RTO/ISO to conduct its SIL study.  Further, the 
Commission clarifies that to the extent the transmission-owning seller can 
demonstrate it passes the screens for each relevant geographic market without 
considering imports, it need not submit a SIL study.
384   
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380.  Powerex requests that it be able to submit proxies in place of a SIL study.  The 
Commission notes that transmission-providing sellers are required to be the first to 
file SIL studies, which makes the required data available to non-transmission owning 
sellers for use in performing their generation market power analyses.
385  However, as 
the Commission stated in the April 14 Order,  
an applicant may provide a streamlined application to show that it passes our 
screens.  Thus, with respect to simultaneous import capability, if an applicant can 
show that it passes our screens for each relevant geographic market without 
considering imports, no such simultaneous import analysis needs to be provided.  
Further, we recognize that certain applicants will not have the ability to perform a 
simultaneous import capability study.  Accordingly, if an applicant demonstrates 
that it is unable to perform a simultaneous import study for the control area in 
which it is located, the applicant may propose to use a proxy amount for 
transmission limits.  We will consider such proposals on a case-by-case basis.[
386] 
381.  In this regard, we note that we have accepted proxy amounts for transmission 
limits and will continue to consider such requests on a case-by-case basis.
387   
f.  Required SIL Study for DPT Analysis 
Comments 
382.  EEI and Southern propose that the Commission not mandate SIL studies as the 
only method for calculating import limits for DPT analysis.  EEI states that while 
such a study may be an appropriate tool for indicative screens, the DPT is a more 
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comprehensive study and the Commission should allow for more precise, non-
standardized approaches for calculating simultaneous import capability for use in the 
DPT.
388  Southern states that the apparent purpose of Appendix E is to provide a 
somewhat standardized approach to assessing simultaneous import capability that 
goes hand-in-hand with the simplified tools used to develop a preliminary assessment 
of generation market power.  It argues that where a seller presents a more thorough 
generation analysis pursuant to a DPT, it should be permitted to offer a more 
thorough analysis of transmission import capability.
389  
383.  NRECA responds that the Commission should not allow sellers to substitute 
alternative measures of simultaneous import capability in the DPT.  NRECA states 
that while a seller should be allowed to conduct a SIL study that is more refined than 
the one required of all sellers, “the applicant’s alternative analysis should be 
submitted in addition to, and not in lieu of, the required analysis” in the DPT.
390  It 
argues that otherwise, each seller will do the analysis a bit differently so that the 
analysis will favor passing the tests.  According to NRECA, the worst-case scenario 
is that there will be no standardized approach, which would exacerbate the existing 
problems created by inadequate access to the data underlying the sellers’ market 
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power analysis and the lack of standard reporting and increase the burdens on 
intervenors and the Commission staff in evaluating applications for market-based 
rates and market power updates.  NRECA states that one advantage of requiring all 
sellers to use a standard analysis, in addition to whatever other analysis they may 
choose to offer, is that it can more effectively bring to light the problems now hidden 
from view in the seller’s historical practices, resulting in increased transparency. 
Commission Determination 
384.  For the reasons stated herein regarding the need to as accurately as possible 
account for transmission limitations when considering power supplies that can be 
imported into the relevant market under study, the Commission adopts the 
requirement for use of the SIL study as a basis for transmission access for both the 
indicative screens and the DPT analysis.  
385.  The lack of flexibility in creating a simultaneous transmission import limit has 
been identified by several commenters.  However, the Commission believes it has 
provided sellers sufficient flexibility to adequately represent their process for making 
transmission available to unaffiliated supply.  The Commission shares NRECA’s 
concerns that opening the process to alternative study methods without a specified 
standard may result in deviations from reasonable depictions of transmission limits 
historically applied to first-tier suppliers and will likely bias such studies to the 
benefit of the seller. 
386.  With regard to the DPT analysis, there are several primary reasons for the 
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modeling affiliated and unaffiliated supply, consideration of simultaneity, 
consideration of seller and affiliate transmission commitments and reservations, 
consideration of all internal transmission limitations, consideration of all external 
transmission limitations existing in first-tier areas, consideration of the seller’s (or the 
seller’s transmission provider’s) practices for posting ATC, and consideration of peak 
seasonal conditions.  By requiring the SIL study in the DPT analysis, the Commission 
assures that all factors important in determining transmission access to the seller’s 
market are taken into account.   
13.  Procedural Issues 
Commission Proposal 
387.  In the NOPR, the Commission noted that Order No. 662
391 addressed concerns 
that CEII claims in market-based rate filings are overbroad.  In Order No. 662, the 
Commission stated that it is willing to consider on a case-by-case basis requests for 
extensions of time to prepare protests to market-based rate filings where an intervenor 
demonstrates that it needs additional time to obtain and analyze CEII.  In Order No. 
662, the Commission encouraged the parties in cases in which CEII is filed to 
promptly negotiate a protective order governing access to the CEII, or privately 
negotiate for the submitter to provide the data to interested parties pursuant to an 
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appropriate non-disclosure agreement.  The Commission sought comments in the 
NOPR on whether CEII designations remain a concern since issuance of Order No. 
662. 
388.  The Commission also sought comments regarding whether the comment 
period (generally 21 days from the date of filing) provided for parties to file 
responses to the indicative screens and DPT analyses is sufficient.  The Commission 
asked what would be an appropriate comment period if it were to establish a longer 
period for submitting comments on indicative screen and DPT analyses. 
Comments 
389.  A number of commenters note that intervenors should be given adequate time 
to respond to CEII designations.  APPA/TAPS suggest that the Commission provide 
a process to allow interested market participants to obtain CEII authorization in 
advance of a region’s triennial updates.  They submit that such authorization would 
apply to all sellers in the region where market-based rate authority is up for review 
and would necessitate that the requester file only one request.
392  Montana Counsel 
states that intervenors should also be given adequate time to respond to 
confidentiality claims with regard to non-CEII data.
 393 
390.  A number of commenters support extending the comment period for market-
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based rate filings.  Ameren supports a 30-day comment period on the basis that 30 
days has proven to be a sufficient comment period for § 203 filings.
394  Morgan 
Stanley recommends a 45- to 60-day comment period if the Commission adopts a 
regional approach for updated market power analyses.
395  NRECA states that under a 
regional filing process, a 21-day comment period is inadequate when several updated 
market power analysis filings are reviewed at once, and instead advocates a 90-day 
comment period from the notice of the filing or from the date of a completed filing if 
additional data is requested by the Commission.
396   
Commission Determination 
391.  In this Final Rule, we adopt procedures under which intervenors in section 205 
proceedings may obtain expedited access to CEII or other information for which 
privileged treatment is sought.  A request for access to information for which CEII 
status or privilege treatment has been claimed generally takes a few weeks for the 
Commission to process under the standard process found in 18 CFR 388.112 and 
388.113.
397  Such a delay in receiving such information may make it difficult for an 
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intervenor to submit timely comments. 
392.  An expedited process does exist for section 203 filings.  Section 33.9 of the 
Commission's regulations
398 states that a seller seeking to protect any part of its 
application from public disclosure must also submit a proposed protective order.  
Parties may sign the proposed protective order and obtain CEII or privileged 
materials in a more  
 
timely manner, without having to spend time negotiating the terms of a protective order 
or waiting for the Commission to process the request through its standard request process. 
393.  In order to ensure that intervenors have access in a timely manner to relevant 
information for which privileged treatment is claimed, we will adopt language similar 
to § 33.9 in this Final Rule, to be codified at 18 CFR 35.37(f).  We intend that the 
proposed protective order will be self implementing and not require action by the 
Commission; once a party signs the proposed protective order and returns it to the 
party submitting protected material, the submitter is expected to provide the material 
promptly to the requester.  We note that the Commission’s Model Protective Order is 
available on the Commission’s Internet site and may be used as a guide in preparing 
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proposed protective orders.
399  To expedite processing, the regulation will require that 
the seller provide the CEII or privileged material to the requester within five days 
after the protective order is signed and submitted to the seller. 
394.  With respect to APPA/TAPS’s suggestion to make CEII authorization region-
wide to coincide with region-wide analysis, we do not believe such a step is 
necessary or advisable at this time.  Our goal with CEII has always been to limit 
access to those with a legitimate need for the information.  We do not expect that all 
market participants in a region will want to comment on all updated market power 
analyses within that region.  Moreover, we anticipate that our regulatory change 
requiring submission of a proposed protective order will go a long way to resolving 
past difficulties in obtaining non-public information in a timely manner. 
395.  With regard to the comment period for parties to file responses to updated 
indicative screens, we believe, as we discuss below in the section on Implementation, 
that extending the comment period for regional updated market power analyses will 
allow intervenors a better opportunity to review and comment on those filings, 
especially considering the large number of filings that will be submitted at one time.  
Hence, we will establish a 60-day comment period for updated market power 
analyses that are filed in accordance with the schedule in Appendix D. 
396.  With regard to the comment period for initial applications and for DPT 
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analyses ordered as part of a section 206 proceeding, the Commission will retain the 
current 21-day comment period.  However, we remain willing to consider on a case-
by-case basis requests for extensions of time beyond 21 days to submit comments on 
these filings. 
B.  Vertical Market Power 
397.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to replace the existing four-prong 
analysis (generation market power, transmission market power, other barriers to 
entry, affiliate abuse/reciprocal dealing) with an analysis that focuses on horizontal 
market power and vertical market power.  Accordingly, it proposed that issues 
relating to whether the seller and its affiliates have transmission market power or 
whether they can erect other barriers to entry be addressed together as part of the 
vertical market power part of the analysis.   
Comments 
398.  As a general matter, commenters expressed support for the proposed 
consolidation of the transmission market power and other barriers to entry prong into 
one vertical market power analysis.
400  According to EPSA, analyzing vertical market 
dominance in one single prong could be a positive step, provided that the elements of 
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the prong are explicitly specified and effectively enforced.
401  No commenter 
opposed the Commission’s proposal in this regard. 
Commission Determination 
399.  In light of the reasons discussed in the NOPR and the comments received, the 
Commission will adopt the NOPR proposal to consolidate the transmission market 
power analysis and other barriers to entry analysis into one vertical market power 
analysis.   
1.  Transmission Market Power 
Commission Proposal 
400.  In the NOPR, the Commission noted that it recognized that Order No. 888 did 
not eliminate all potential to engage in undue discrimination and preference in the 
provision of transmission service,
402 and that it had issued a Notice of Inquiry and a 
NOPR regarding whether reforms are necessary to the Order No. 888 pro forma 
OATT.
403  The Commission concluded that any concerns regarding the adequacy of 
                                              
401 EPSA at 18-19. 
402 In Order No. 2000, the Commission found that “opportunities for undue 
discrimination continue to exist that may not be remedied adequately by [the] functional 
unbundling [remedy of Order No. 888]…”  Regional Transmission Organizations, Order 
No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations Preambles July 1996-December 2000          
¶ 31,089 at 31,105 (1999), order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, FERC Stats. & Regs., 
Regulations Preambles July 1996-December 2000 ¶ 31,092 (2000), aff’d sub nom. Public 
Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
403 See Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 
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the OATT should be addressed in that proceeding and not in the MBR Rulemaking 
proceeding.  Therefore, in the NOPR the Commission proposed to continue to find 
that, where a seller or any of its affiliates owns, operates or controls transmission 
facilities, a Commission-approved OATT, as modified as a result of the OATT 
Reform Rulemaking, will adequately mitigate transmission market power. 
401.  In the NOPR, the Commission further stated that the finding that an OATT 
adequately mitigates transmission market power rests on the assumption that 
individual sellers comply with their OATTs.  If they do not, violations of the OATT 
may be cause to revoke market-based rate authority or to subject the seller to other 
remedies the Commission may deem appropriate, such as disgorgement of profits or 
civil penalties.
404  However, before the Commission will consider revoking an 
entity’s market-based rate authority for a violation of the OATT, there must be a 
nexus between the OATT violation and the entity’s market-based rate authority. 
402.  In addition, the Commission proposed that, if it determines, as a result of a 
significant OATT violation, that the market-based rate authority of a transmission 
provider will be revoked within a particular market, each affiliate of the transmission 
                                                                                                                                                  
70 FR 55796 (Sept. 23, 2005), FERC Stats. & Regs., ¶ 35,553 (2005); Preventing Undue 
Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
71 FR 32636 (Jun. 6, 2006), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,603 (2006); Preventing Undue 
Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 72 FR 12266 
(Mar. 15, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 (2007), reh’g pending. 
404 NOPR at P 91 (citing The Washington Water Power Co., 83 FERC ¶ 61,282 
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provider that possesses market-based rate authority will have it revoked in that same 
market on the effective date of revocation of the transmission provider’s market-
based rate authority.
405   
a.  OATT Requirement  
Comments 
403.  Several commenters state that merely having an OATT on file does not 
sufficiently mitigate vertical market power and that a utility’s interpretation and 
implementation of its OATT can effectively eviscerate market power protections.
406  
Some commenters do not believe that tariff changes alone will effectively mitigate 
vertical market power in the future and therefore request a post-implementation 
proceeding one year after the issuance of a final rule in the OATT Reform 
Rulemaking to explore the effectiveness of the updated OATT in assessing vertical 
market power.
407 
404.  EPSA states that the outcome of the OATT Reform Rulemaking will 
determine the strength and efficacy of the vertical market power screen and stresses 
the interrelationship of that proceeding to this proposed rule; EPSA continues to 
                                              
405 NOPR at P 91. 
406 See, e.g., Suez/Chevron at 6; Reliant at 8. 
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advocate that the reform of Order No. 888 and the ability of the OATT to mitigate 
against market power effectively be evaluated on an ongoing basis.
408 
405.  APPA/TAPS similarly state that, for purposes of the vertical market power 
analysis, it is too early to tell whether the OATT, as modified in the OATT Reform 
Rulemaking, will mitigate transmission market power.
409  TDU Systems argue that 
the proposals governing transmission planning and expansion in the OATT Reform 
Rulemaking are inadequate to mitigate the vertical market power of transmission-
owning public utilities.
410 
406.  The New York Commission states that the presence of an OATT may mitigate 
a seller’s transmission market power, but only with respect to generator access to the 
transmission system.  It submits that vertically integrated utilities may be able to 
exercise transmission market power in a manner that would not necessarily violate 
their OATTs, such as through outage scheduling (e.g., delaying repair and 
maintenance of transmission lines in a load pocket in which an affiliated generator is 
located), transmission investment (e.g., delaying or minimizing its investment in the 
bulk electric transmission system in a load pocket in which an affiliated generator is 
located), or voltage support (e.g., inadequate support of voltage requirements and 
                                              
408 EPSA reply comments at 2, 5. 
409 APPA/TAPS at 6. 
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being slow to correct voltage support shortcomings).
411  EPSA agrees with the New 
York Commission that the Commission cannot assume that any transmission provider 
with a Commission-approved OATT on file has adequately mitigated transmission 
market power and that “the Commission should require these utilities to demonstrate 
that they do not have the incentive or ability to engage in such behavior, before they 
are granted MBR status.”
412   
407.  On the other hand, several commenters support the Commission’s proposal to 
maintain the long-standing presumption that a Commission-approved OATT will 
adequately mitigate transmission market power.
413  EEI states that the comprehensive 
approach that the Commission has taken to reform the OATT in the OATT Reform 
Rulemaking is the best approach to assess the adequacy of the OATT to mitigate 
transmission market power.  EEI states that the Commission should continue to find 
that a Commission-approved OATT, as modified as a result of the OATT Reform 
Rulemaking, adequately mitigates transmission market power.
414 
                                              
411 New York Commission at 2-4.
412 EPSA reply comments at 5-6 (citing New York Commission at 2-4).  
413 Duke at 29-32; EEI at 44-45; Southern at 38-40; MidAmerican reply comments 
at 2. 
414 EEI reply comments at 31-35. Docket No. RM04-7-000   233 
 
Commission Determination 
408.  The Commission will adopt the NOPR proposal that, to the extent that a public 
utility with market-based rates, or any of its affiliates, owns, operates, or controls 
transmission facilities, the Commission will require that a Commission-approved 
OATT be on file before granting such seller market-based rate authorization.  We 
recognize that the Commission has granted a number of entities waiver of the 
requirement to file an OATT where the filing entity satisfies the Commission’s 
standards for the grant of such waivers.
415  The Commission will continue to grant 
waiver of the OATT requirement on a case-by-case basis, and will continue to allow 
sellers to rely on the grant of such waiver to satisfy the vertical market power part of 
the analysis.  If a seller that previously received waiver of the OATT requirement 
seeks to continue to rely on that waiver to satisfy the vertical market power part of the 
analysis, it must make an affirmative statement in its updated market power analysis 
that it previously received such a waiver, that such waiver remains appropriate, and 
the basis for that claim.  In addressing our vertical market power concerns, a seller, 
including its affiliates, that does not own, operate or control transmission facilities 
                                              
415 Black Creek Hydro, Inc., 77 FERC ¶ 61,232 at 61,941 (1996) (granting waiver 
of Order No. 888 for public utilities that can show that they own, operate, or control only 
limited and discrete transmission facilities (facilities that do not form an integrated 
transmission grid), until such time as the public utility receives a request for transmission 
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must make an affirmative statement that neither it, nor any of its affiliates, owns, 
operates or controls any transmission facilities. 
409.  In the NOPR, we stated that concerns regarding the adequacy of the OATT 
should be addressed in the OATT Reform Rulemaking.  The Commission received 
over 6,000 pages of comments relating to potential reforms to the pro forma OATT in 
that proceeding, and on February 16, 2007 issued a Final Rule adopting numerous 
improvements to the pro forma OATT that will further limit opportunities for 
transmission providers to unduly discriminate against transmission customers.  As a 
result, we do not address in this Final Rule specific reforms to the OATT.  In 
addition, the Commission declined in Order No. 890  to establish a one-year review 
period for the reformed pro forma OATT.  The Commission stated it will continue to 
actively monitor compliance with its orders and, as necessary, institute further 
proceedings to meet its statutory obligation to remedy undue discrimination.
416 
410.  In response to the concerns of the New York Commission and EPSA that 
vertically integrated utilities may exercise vertical market power without violating 
their OATTs through actions such as outage scheduling, investment decisions and 
inadequate voltage support, we note that the OATT does address such matters as the 
planning and expansion of facilities, the duty to provide firm and non-firm service 
and good utility practice.  These provisions impose definite obligations on 
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transmission providers.  As additional examples, outage scheduling aimed at affecting 
market prices may constitute market manipulation, and inadequate voltage support 
may violate a reliability standard under FPA section 215.  These provisions 
adequately address the concerns of the New York Commission and EPSA.  
b.  OATT Violations and MBR Revocation  
Comments 
411.  A number of commenters agree with the Commission that market-based rate 
authority should not be revoked unless and until the Commission finds a direct nexus 
between the OATT violation and the entity’s market-based rate authority.
417  EEI 
states that the Commission should not presume that an OATT violation is sufficient 
cause to revoke a transmission provider’s market-based rate authority because there is 
no basis for such a presumption.
418  Instead, EEI argues that the Commission should 
carefully review all facts and circumstances before determining that an OATT 
violation was a willful exercise in undue discrimination intended to benefit a seller’s 
sales at market-based rates.
419   
                                              
417 EEI reply comments at 31-35; MidAmerican reply comments at 2.  See also 
Duke at 29 (OATT violation should be a material violation and related in some way to 
the seller exercising market power). 
418 EEI reply comments at 31-35. 
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412.  EPSA asserts that any violation of an entity’s OATT in order to favor its own 
sales or its affiliates would create a nexus to the entity’s market-based rate authority.  
If the Commission does not clarify this point, EPSA requests explanation regarding 
what exactly would constitute a nexus between an OATT violation and an entity’s 
market-based rates.
420 
413.  TDU Systems state that it is unclear what the nexus requirement entails.  They 
propose that if the transmission provider or one of its affiliates has market-based rate 
authority, there should be a rebuttable presumption that a violation of the OATT has 
the requisite nexus to support revocation of the market-based rate authority of the 
transmission provider and its affiliates.
421  TDU Systems state that it should be up to 
a seller to rebut that presumption. 
414.  APPA/TAPS assert that the nexus standard adds an unnecessary and counter-
productive test.
422  APPA/TAPS submit that if an OATT violation denies, delays, or 
diminishes the availability of transmission service or raises its costs, that alone should 
suffice for consideration of revocation of market-based rate authority.  They argue 
that whether the violation had a nexus to the seller’s market-based rate sales may be 
irrelevant.  APPA/TAPS state that a nexus requirement could divert the Commission 
                                              
420 EPSA at 23-24. 
421 TDU Systems at 21-23. 
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and injured parties through needless disputes about whether the alleged violator used 
the OATT violation to enable a specific sale under its market-based rate tariff 
authority, ignoring the larger picture painted by the transmission provider’s 
anticompetitive conduct and exercise of transmission market power.  Thus, instead of 
the “nexus” standard, APPA/TAPS states that the Commission should require that the 
OATT violation be “material,” i.e., one that denies customers the just, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory and comparable transmission service that is essential to mitigation 
of transmission market power.
423 
415.  Reliant suggests that the Commission should strengthen its vertical market 
power analysis by looking at the extent to which a transmission provider has denied 
transmission access to competing suppliers and should seek justification for such 
denials.
424  For those transmission providers seeking market-based rate authority, 
Reliant asserts that any suppliers unable to reach a customer as a result of an 
inappropriate denial should not be included as competing generation in the 
transmission provider’s horizontal market power screens until the transmission 
provider remedies the problem.
425 
                                              
423 Id. at 82. 
424 See Reliant at 8-9. 
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416.  Duke urges the Commission to clarify that a seller’s market-based rate 
authority should not be subject to limitation or revocation if it participates in an RTO 
that is the subject of an OATT violation.  According to Duke, once the transmission 
owner transfers control over its facilities to an RTO, adherence to the OATT is in the 
control of the RTO, not the transmission owner.
426 
Commission Determination 
417.  We will adopt the NOPR proposal to revoke an entity’s market-based rate 
authority in response to an OATT violation only upon a finding of a nexus between 
the specific facts relating to the OATT violation and the entity’s market-based rate 
authority, and reiterate our statement in the NOPR that an OATT violation may 
subject the seller to other remedies the Commission may deem appropriate, such as 
disgorgement of profits or civil penalties.
427  As stated in the NOPR, the finding that 
an OATT adequately mitigates transmission market power rests on the assumption 
that individual entities comply with the OATT and there may be OATT violations in 
circumstances that, after applying the factors in the Enforcement Policy Statement,
428 
merit revocation or limitation of market-based rate authority.  We find, however, that 
                                              
426 Duke at 29-32. 
427 NOPR at P 91 (citing The Washington Water Power Company, 83 FERC         
¶ 61,282 (1998)). 
428 Enforcement of Statutes, Orders, Rules and Regulations, Policy Statement on 
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it is inappropriate to revoke a seller’s market-based rate authority for an OATT 
violation unless there is a nexus between the specific facts relating to the OATT 
violation and the seller’s market-based rate authority.  This will ensure that our 
actions are not arbitrary or capricious and that they are based on an adequate factual 
record.  We will not, as TDU Systems suggest, adopt a rebuttable presumption that 
any OATT violation has the requisite nexus to support revocation of market-based 
rate authority.  There is a wide range of types of OATT violations, including ones 
that may be inadvertent and ones that are neither intended to affect, nor in fact affect, 
the market-based rate sales of the transmission provider or its affiliates.  We therefore 
believe adoption of a general rebuttable presumption of a nexus for any and all OATT 
violations is not justified. 
418.  Several commenters sought clarification regarding what would constitute a 
sufficient nexus between the specific facts relating to the OATT violation and the 
seller’s market-based rate authority.  Determining what constitutes a sufficient factual 
nexus is best left to a case-by-case consideration.  The wide range of positions among 
commenters on how to define a sufficient factual nexus itself suggests that this 
finding is best made after review of a specific factual situation.  Some commenters 
assert that a finding of a “material” violation of the OATT would be sufficient.  We 
disagree.  While a seller’s inconsequential OATT violation would not serve as a basis 
for revoking that entity’s market-based rate authority, our view is that revocation is 
warranted only when an OATT violation has occurred and the violation had a nexus 
to the market-based rate authority of the violator or its affiliates.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   240 
 
419.  The Commission emphasizes that we have discretion to fashion remedies for 
OATT violations that relate to the violator’s market-based rate authority in instances 
in which we do not find sufficient justification for revocation of that authority.  For 
example, in appropriate circumstances, we may modify or add additional conditions 
to the violator’s market-based rate authority or impose other requirements to help 
ensure that the violator does not commit future, similar misconduct.  We also will 
consider whether to impose sanctions such as assessment of civil penalties for 
particularly serious OATT violations in addition to revocation of the violator’s 
market-based rate authority.  
420.  We agree with Duke that a seller’s market-based rate authority should not be 
subject to limitation or revocation if it participates in an RTO that is the subject of an 
OATT violation committed by the RTO.  We note, however, that if the seller itself is 
involved in an OATT violation, the Commission will investigate the seller’s actions 
where appropriate, and may revoke market-based rate authority even though the seller 
is in an RTO. 
421.  With regard to Reliant’s suggestion that the Commission should examine the 
extent to which a transmission provider has denied transmission access to competing 
suppliers as part of its vertical market power analysis, we will allow intervenors on a 
case-by-case basis to file evidence if they believe they have been denied transmission 
access in violation of the OATT.  Depending on specific facts, such denials could 
constitute an OATT violation and could warrant remedies such as a reduction of 
competing supplies for purposes of the horizontal analysis. Docket No. RM04-7-000   241 
 
c.  Revocation of Affiliates’ MBR Authority 
Comments 
422.  Some commenters oppose the proposal to revoke the market-based rate 
authority of all affiliates of a transmission provider within a particular market, 
regardless of whether they were involved in the transmission provider’s violation of 
its OATT.  These commenters argue that the proposal to revoke all affiliates’ market-
based rate authority ignores the principles of the Commission’s code of conduct and 
standards of conduct, including provisions restricting the sharing of market 
information and requiring separation of functions.
429  They argue that, in light of the 
separation of a company’s marketing function and transmission function under the 
standards of conduct, a company’s market-based rates should not be revoked because 
of an OATT violation by an affiliated transmission owner unless there has also been a 
violation of the standards of conduct, and there is a nexus between the standards of 
conduct violation and the OATT non-compliance.
430  They assert that, unless there is 
a violation of the standards of conduct, merchants will have no involvement in the 
actions of transmission providers.
431   
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423.  Xcel submits that, before imposing a penalty that would effectively penalize 
the merchant function, the Commission should require a demonstration that a utility’s 
transmission function violated the OATT so as to knowingly benefit the activities of 
its merchant function.
432  Xcel and Allegheny Energy state that the Commission 
should not penalize the merchant side of an entity when the OATT violation by the 
transmission provider causes no harm, was not the result of deliberate manipulative 
conduct, was not part of a pattern of misconduct, or did not involve senior 
management of the transmission provider.
 433  Similarly, Indianapolis P&L advocates 
punishment of a marketing or generation-only affiliate only to the extent such affiliate 
colludes or conspires with such OATT mis-administration or if such an affiliate 
financially benefits from such an act.
434   
Commission Determination 
424.  In response to concerns raised by commenters, we do not adopt the proposal 
from the NOPR to revoke the market-based rate authority of each affiliate of a 
transmission provider that loses its market-based rate authority within a particular 
market as a result of the transmission provider’s OATT violation.  Rather, we will 
create a rebuttable presumption that all affiliates of a transmission provider should 
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lose their market-based rate authority in each market in which their affiliated 
transmission provider loses its market-based rate authority as a result of an OATT 
violation.  We will allow an affiliate of a transmission provider to retain its market-
based rate authority in a market area if the affiliate overcomes the rebuttable 
presumption with respect to that market area. 
425.  This issue generally will arise when a transmission provider merits revocation 
of its market-based rate authority as a result of an OATT violation.  We have long 
held that the existence of an OATT is deemed to mitigate vertical market power by a 
transmission provider and its affiliates in a particular market.  An OATT violation by 
a transmission provider that merits revocation of the transmission provider’s market-
based rate authority in a particular market will, at a minimum, raise the question 
whether the transmission provider’s affiliates continue to qualify for market-based 
rates in that market under the standards that we have established.
435  As a result, we 
                                              
435 We observe that specific situations in which transmission providers have 
agreed to resolve staff allegations that they engaged in OATT violations have involved 
transactions with affiliates.  See Idaho Power Company, et al., 103 FERC ¶ 61,182 
(2003) (settlement of, among other issues, a practice whereby a transmission provider 
permitted its merchant function to request non-firm transmission to enable the merchant 
function to make off-system sales that by definition were not used to serve native load, so 
that the transmission did not qualify for the “native load” priority specified in section 
28.4 of the transmission provider’s OATT); Cleco Corporation, et al., 104 FERC                
¶ 61,125 (2003) (settlement between Enforcement staff and a transmission provider (and 
others in the corporate family) that provided a unique type of transmission service for its 
affiliate that was neither made available to non-affiliates nor included in its FERC tariff); 
Tucson Electric Power Company, 109 FERC ¶ 61,272 (2004) (operational audit in which 
staff found that, among other matters, a transmission provider permitted its wholesale 
merchant function to purchase hourly non-firm and monthly firm point-to-point 
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         Docket No. RM04-7-000   244 
 
believe that it is appropriate to establish a rebuttable presumption that if we find that 
a transmission provider should lose its market-based rate authority in a particular 
market, all affiliates of the transmission provider should also lose their market-based 
rate authority in the same market. 
426.  We are mindful, however, that the circumstances of a particular affiliate may 
not always justify the imposition of a remedy so severe as revocation of market-based 
rate authority in a particular market when its affiliated transmission provider loses its 
market-based rate authority in that market as a result of an OATT violation.  To 
ensure that a determination to revoke market-based rate authority in a particular 
market for a transmission provider and all of its affiliates that possess such authority 
is adequately based upon record evidence, we will allow an opportunity for each such 
affiliate to make a showing that it should retain its market-based rate authority or that 
                                                                                                                                                  
transmission service using an off-OASIS scheduling procedure while the transmission 
provider did not post on its OASIS the availability of capacity on these paths); South 
Carolina Electric & Gas Company, et al., 111 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2005) (settlement of 
Enforcement staff allegation that a transmission provider made available firm point-to-
point transmission service to its affiliated merchant function that did not submit 
transmission schedules with specific receipt points for the service as required by section 
13.8 of the transmission provider’s OATT); and MidAmerican Energy Company,        
112 FERC ¶ 61,346 (2005) (operational audit in which staff found, among other things, 
that a transmission provider permitted its wholesale merchant function to (a) use network 
transmission service to bring short-term energy purchases onto its system while it 
simultaneously made off-system sales, inconsistently with the preamble to Part III of the 
transmission provider’s OATT and section 28.6 of its OATT; and (b) confirm firm 
network transmission service requests without identifying a designated network resource 
or acquiring an associated network resource, in some instances using this service to 
deliver short-term energy purchases used to facilitate off-system sales, inconsistent with 
section 29.2 or section 30.6 of the transmission provider’s OATT). Docket No. RM04-7-000   245 
 
enforcement action against it should be less severe than revocation.  The 
determination whether an affiliate has overcome the rebuttable presumption depends 
on an analysis of specific facts in the record.  Relevant facts would include, for 
example, whether (1) the affiliate knew of, participated in, or was an accomplice to 
the OATT violation, (2) the affiliate assisted the transmission provider in exercising 
market power, or (3) the affiliate benefited from the violation. 
427.  Consistent with our approach to revocation of a transmission provider’s 
market-based rates, the Commission clarifies that a decision to revoke the market-
based rate authority of the transmission provider’s affiliates in the affected market 
will also be based on a finding that the transmission provider’s violation of its OATT 
has a nexus to the market-based rate authority of those affiliates. 
2.  Other Barriers to Entry 
Commission Proposal 
428.  The Commission proposed in the NOPR that, in order for a seller to 
demonstrate that it satisfies the Commission’s vertical market power concerns, it 
must demonstrate that neither it nor its affiliates can erect other barriers to entry (i.e., 
barriers other than transmission).  In this regard, the Commission proposed to 
continue to require a seller to provide a description of its affiliation, ownership or 
control of inputs to electric power production (e.g., fuel supplies within the relevant 
control area); ownership or control of gas storage or intrastate transportation or 
distribution of inputs to electric power production; and ownership or control of sites 
for new generation capacity development.  The Commission also proposed to require Docket No. RM04-7-000   246 
 
sellers to make an affirmative statement that they have not erected barriers to entry 
into the relevant market and that they cannot do so. 
429.  In addition, the Commission proposed to provide additional regulatory 
certainty by clarifying which inputs to electric power production the Commission will 
consider as other barriers to entry in its vertical market power review, and sought 
comments on this proposal.  Specifically, the Commission proposed that the analysis 
continue to include the consideration of ownership or control of sites for development 
of generation in the relevant market, fuel inputs such as coal facilities in the relevant 
market, and the transportation, storage or distribution of inputs to electric power 
production such as intrastate gas storage and distribution systems, and rail cars/barges 
for the transportation of coal. 
430.  The Commission also clarified that sellers need not address interstate 
transportation of natural gas supplies because such transportation is regulated by this 
Commission.
436  The Commission explained that its open access regulations 
adequately prevent sellers from withholding interstate pipeline capacity.  In addition, 
interstate pipeline capacity held by firm shippers that is not utilized or released is 
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available from the pipeline on an interruptible basis.  As to the commodity, the 
Commission noted that Congress has found the natural gas market competitive.
437 
431.  The Commission also sought comment on whether ownership or control of 
other inputs to electric power production should be considered as potential barriers to 
entry and, if so, what criteria the Commission should use to evaluate evidence that is 
presented.   
Comments 
432.  Several commenters state that the Commission’s other barriers to entry criteria 
are long-standing, well established and thus no expansion of current policy is 
necessary.
438  They submit that the requirement that the analysis include the 
consideration of ownership or control of sites for development of generation in the 
relevant market, fuel inputs such as coal supplies in the relevant market, and the 
transportation, storage or distribution of inputs to electric power production such as 
intrastate gas storage and distribution systems, and rail cars/barges for the 
transportation of coal, is broad and provides sufficient information for the 
Commission to assess the seller’s potential to erect barriers to entry.  They assert that 
this information, coupled with the proposal to require sellers to make an affirmative 
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statement that they have not erected barriers to entry into the relevant market and that 
they cannot do so, provides the Commission with appropriate information.
439  
433.  APPA/TAPS suggest that the proposed entry barriers affirmation should be 
signed and affirmed by a senior corporate official.
440  However, APPA/TAPS state 
that the Commission should not codify the specific entry barriers that it will consider 
given the ever-changing nature of electricity markets.
441  They submit that while 
illustrations of entry barriers can provide guidance to sellers and market participants, 
the Commission should not limit the kinds of entry barriers it will consider.  
434.  Sempra states that, to the extent the new analytic framework (the consolidation 
of the former transmission market power and other barriers to entry factors into the 
vertical market power analysis) would recognize existing precedent and not work to 
place additional burdens on market-based rate sellers, Sempra would support it.
442    
435.  Several sellers support continuation of the Commission’s policy that sellers 
need not address natural gas and its interstate transportation as part of their vertical 
market power analysis.
443  In contrast, a commenter states that the Commission 
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should not make a blanket exemption for sellers or their affiliates who own or control 
natural gas pipeline capacity.  Notwithstanding the Commission’s statement that 
natural gas interstate pipelines are regulated by the Commission and that the 
regulations adequately prevent sellers from withholding capacity, this commenter 
argues that the natural gas open access rules do not adequately mitigate vertical 
market power in all situations.  It encourages the Commission to require sellers with 
significant firm interstate pipeline capacity rights to demonstrate that they do not 
have vertical market power.
444 
436.  APPA/TAPS state that the Commission should clarify that it will consider 
control over interstate natural gas transportation if the issue is raised in a market-
based rate proceeding.
445  APPA/TAPS state that even if sellers do not have to 
address interstate gas transportation as part of the vertical market power test, 
intervenors should not be precluded from raising concerns and introducing evidence 
regarding a seller’s position in the interstate natural gas transportation market as a 
potential entry barrier and APPA/TAPS seek clarification in this regard.
446   
437.  Several commenters state that the markets for the other inputs to generation 
factor (e.g., fuel supply other than natural gas, transportation and storage) are 
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workably competitive and provide few opportunities for a seller to raise entry 
barriers.  They therefore suggest that the Commission create a rebuttable presumption 
that the markets for other factor inputs such as coal, oil and distillate commodity 
markets, the transportation and storage of these fuels, sites for new plants, etc., are 
workably competitive.  They urge that, absent a showing to the contrary, ownership 
or control of such assets need not be analyzed.
447  In this regard, Duke states that the 
Commission should allow sellers to make the representation that they cannot erect 
such barriers, while allowing other parties to introduce evidence challenging such an 
assertion.
448 
438.  PG&E states that, similar to the rules for interstate transportation of natural 
gas supplies (under which Commission open access regulations adequately prevent 
sellers from withholding interstate gas pipeline capacity), state regulation of access to 
gas storage, natural gas pipelines, or natural gas distribution should be a basis for 
finding that an entity with ownership or control of such assets cannot erect barriers to 
entry or otherwise hold or exercise vertical market power in the generation market.
449 
439.  SoCal Edison urges the Commission to clarify that, with regard to sites for 
building generation, mere ownership of real estate does not reasonably support an 
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inference of a barrier to entry, and that sellers are not required, in the first instance, to 
make any affirmative demonstration of the absence of potential that their real estate 
holdings might constitute a theoretical barrier to entry.  Rather, the Commission 
should clarify that it would pursue such inquiry only to the extent colorable issues are 
raised by way of protest or intervention.
450  Sempra states the Commission should 
modify the regulatory text in three respects.  First, the Commission should explicitly 
exclude from the definition of “inputs to electric power production” in proposed § 
35.36(a)(4) interstate transportation of natural gas supplies (both ownership/control of 
facilities as well as ownership/control of capacity) and the gas commodity itself.  
Second, the Commission should also exclude from the definition of “inputs to electric 
power production” intrastate natural gas facilities or distribution facilities, 
particularly where such facilities are operated under pervasive state regulations and in 
accordance with open access principles.  Third, the Commission should make clear in 
this provision and at § 35.27(e) of its proposed regulations (pertaining to a seller’s 
vertical market power analysis), that the only “inputs” that need to be addressed are 
those present in the seller’s relevant geographic market(s).
451 
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Commission Determination 
440.  As discussed above, the Commission will adopt the NOPR proposal to 
consider a seller’s ability to erect other barriers to entry as part of the vertical market 
power analysis, but we will modify the requirements when addressing other barriers 
to entry.  We also provide clarification below regarding the information that a seller 
must provide with respect to other barriers to entry (including which inputs to electric 
power production the Commission will consider as other barriers to entry) and we 
modify the proposed regulatory text in that regard. 
441.  In this rule, the Commission draws a distinction between two categories of 
inputs to electric power production: one consisting of natural gas supply, interstate 
natural gas transportation (which includes interstate natural gas storage), oil supply, 
and oil transportation, and another consisting of intrastate natural gas transportation, 
intrastate natural gas storage or distribution facilities; sites for generation capacity 
development; and sources of coal supplies and the transportation of coal supplies 
such as barges and rail cars.  
442.  With regard to the first category, based upon the comments received and 
further consideration, the Commission will not require a description or affirmative 
statement with regard to ownership or control of, or affiliation with an entity that 
owns or controls, natural gas and oil supply, including interstate natural gas 
transportation and oil transportation.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   253 
 
443.  In the case of natural gas, prices for wellhead sales were decontrolled by 
Congress.
452  Further, the Commission has granted other sellers blanket authority to 
make sales at market rates.  In the case of transportation of natural gas, pipelines 
operate pursuant to the open and non-discriminatory requirements of Part 284 of the 
Commission’s regulations.
453  These regulations mandate that all available pipeline 
capacity be posted on the pipelines’ website, and that available capacity cannot be 
withheld from a shipper willing to pay the maximum approved tariff rate.   
444.  Similarly, we note that oil pipelines are common carriers under the Interstate 
Commerce Act, specifically under section 1(4), and are required to provide 
transportation service "upon reasonable request therefore"
454 and that Congress has 
not chosen to regulate sales of oil.  
                                              
452 INGAA v. FERC, 285 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Natural Gas Decontrol Act of 
1989, H.R. Rep. No. 101-29, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1989).  
453 See, e.g., Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing 
Self-Implementing Transportation Under Part 284 of the Commission’s Regulations, 
Order No. 636, 57 FR 13267 (Apr. 16, 1992), FERC Stats. & Regs. Regulations 
Preambles January 1991-June 1996 ¶ 30,939 (Apr. 8, 1992); Regulation of Short-Term 
Natural Gas Transportation Services and Regulation of Interstate Natural Gas 
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July 1996 - December 2000 ¶ 31,091 (Feb. 9, 2000); order on reh'g, Order No. 637-A, 
FERC Stats. & Regs. Regulations Preambles July 1996 - December 200) ¶ 31,099     
(May 19, 2000); reh'g denied, Order No. 637-B, 92 FERC ¶ 61,062 (2000); aff’d in part 
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445.  In response to APPA/TAPS’ request for clarification, we note that as an initial 
matter, to the extent intervenors are concerned about a seller’s market power from 
ownership or control of interstate natural gas transportation, this would be actionable 
first in a complaint proceeding under section 5 of the Natural Gas Act before turning 
to market-based rate consequences. 
446.  With regard to the second category, in light of the comments received, and 
upon further consideration, the Commission adopts a rebuttable presumption that 
sellers cannot erect barriers to entry with regard to the ownership or control of, or 
affiliation with any entity that owns or controls, intrastate natural gas transportation, 
intrastate natural gas storage or distribution facilities; sites for generation capacity 
development; and sources of coal supplies and the transportation of coal supplies 
such as barges and rail cars.
455  To date, the Commission has not found such 
ownership, control or affiliation to be a potential barrier to entry warranting further 
analysis in the context of market-based rate proceedings.  However, unlike the first 
category of inputs, the Commission does not have sufficient evidence to remove these 
inputs from the analysis entirely.  Accordingly, we will rebuttably presume that 
ownership or control of, or affiliation with an entity that owns or controls, intrastate 
natural gas transportation, intrastate natural gas storage or distribution facilities; sites 
for generation capacity development; and sources of coal supplies and the 
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transportation of coal supplies such as barges and rail cars do not allow a seller to 
raise entry barriers, but will allow intervenors to demonstrate otherwise.  We note 
that this rebuttable presumption only applies if the seller describes and attests to these 
inputs to electric power production, as described herein. 
447.  With regard to this second category of inputs to electric power production, we 
will require a seller to provide a description of its ownership or control of, or 
affiliation with an entity that owns or controls, intrastate natural gas transportation, 
storage or distribution facilities; sites for generation capacity development; and 
sources of coal supplies and the transportation of coal supplies such as barges and rail 
cars.  The Commission will require sellers to provide this description and to make an 
affirmative statement, with some modifications to the affirmative statement from 
what was proposed in the NOPR.  Instead of requiring sellers to make an affirmative 
statement that they have not erected barriers to entry into the relevant market, we will 
require sellers to make an affirmative statement that they have not erected barriers to 
entry into the relevant market and will not erect barriers to entry into the relevant 
market.  We clarify that the obligation in this regard applies both to the seller and its 
affiliates, but is limited to the geographic market(s) in which the seller is located. 
448.  We therefore modify the proposed regulations to require a seller to provide a 
description of its ownership or control of, or affiliation with an entity that owns or 
controls, intrastate natural gas transportation, intrastate natural gas storage or 
distribution facilities; sites for generation capacity development; sources of coal 
supplies and the transportation of coal supplies such as barges and rail cars, to ensure Docket No. RM04-7-000   256 
 
that this information is included in the record of each market-based rate proceeding.  
In addition, a seller is required to make an affirmative statement that it has not erected 
barriers to entry into the relevant market and will not erect barriers to entry into the 
relevant market. 
449.  While some commenters raise concerns that codification of these possible 
barriers may inappropriately limit the analysis of a seller’s potential to erect other 
barriers to entry, we clarify that we are codifying what showing a seller must make in 
order to receive authority to make sales of electric power at market-based rates.  By 
so doing, we are not preventing intervenors from raising other barriers to entry 
concerns for consideration on a case-by-case basis.  This approach will allow unique 
or newly developed barriers to entry to be brought before the Commission. 
450.  We will not adopt APPA/TAPS’ proposal that the affirmation be signed and 
affirmed by a senior corporate officer.  Section 35.37(b) of the Commission’s 
regulations requires sellers to “provide accurate and factual information and not 
submit false or misleading information, or omit material information, in any 
communication with the Commission…”
456  The Commission has ample authority to 
enforce its regulations, and therefore does not believe that it is necessary in these 
circumstances to require the affirmative statement to be signed by a senior corporate 
official. 
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451.  The changes made to the evaluation of other barriers to entry, as described 
above, should not be more burdensome on market-based rate sellers than that which 
is currently in place.  For the most part, the Commission is maintaining its current 
policy, with some variation and additional guidance on what is required.  The policy 
adopted in this Final Rule should provide sellers with additional clarity regarding 
what needs to be addressed as a potential other barrier to entry and the way in which 
to address it.  
3.  Barriers Erected or Controlled by Other Than The Seller 
Comments 
452.  APPA/TAPS state that entry conditions and barriers, regardless of origin, need 
to be considered in both the horizontal and vertical market power tests.
457  
APPA/TAPS state that the Commission should not focus solely on entry barriers 
erected by the seller itself and that the Commission must be receptive to claims that 
entry barriers in the seller’s market provide or enhance market power, even if the 
seller itself did not erect the barriers.
458  Another commenter states that the 
Commission should maintain a separate evaluation on other barriers to entry that are 
not caused by a seller, thus requiring a seller to address barrier to entry issues to the 
relevant market, even if those barriers are not caused by a seller or its affiliates.  
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Commission Determination 
453.  The Commission finds that it is not reasonable to routinely require sellers to 
make a showing regarding potential barriers to entry that others might erect and that 
are beyond the seller’s control.  However, we will allow intervenors to present 
evidence in this regard, and by this means we will be able to assess the existence of 
barriers to entry beyond the seller’s control but which may affect the seller’s ability to 
exercise market power.  Should a potential barrier in the relevant market be raised by 
an intervenor, the Commission will address such claims on a case-by-case basis. 
4.  Planning and Expansion Efforts 
454.  In the NOPR, the Commission noted that several commenters had suggested 
that a transmission planning and expansion process can ameliorate vertical market 
power, and, accordingly, the Commission was seeking comment on the issues of 
transmission planning and expansion in the notice of proposed rulemaking in the 
OATT Reform Rulemaking.  The Commission sought comment in the NOPR on 
whether the planning and expansion efforts in the OATT Reform Rulemaking would 
address commenters’ concerns here. 
Comments 
455.  APPA/TAPS state that there will be a continuing need to address transmission 
market power issues, even after adoption of a revised pro forma OATT, because the Docket No. RM04-7-000   259 
 
improvements in transmission planning and expansion will not be immediately 
felt.
459  EPSA states that it advocates robust, independent and mandatory regional 
planning as a means to combat vertical market power and ensure competitive 
markets.
460 
456.  TDU Systems recommend that the Commission revoke a transmission 
provider’s market-based rate authority if it fails to build transmission to 
accommodate the needs of its transmission customers demonstrated through an open, 
joint planning process.
461  TDU Systems submit that willful failure to plan, maintain 
and expand the transmission system to meet transmission customers’ needs is an 
abuse of vertical market power and creates structural barriers to competition. 
457.  ELCON states that while it is encouraged by proposals in the OATT Reform 
Rulemaking, it recommends that transmission market power be the subject of a new 
rulemaking.
462  Similarly, EPSA asserts that a technical conference to develop the 
barriers to entry portion of the screens would help ensure an open, accessible, and 
robust competitive market.
463 
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Commission Determination 
458.  We find that our reforms to the pro forma OATT to require coordinated 
transmission planning on a local and regional level address the concerns raised by 
commenters.  While we recognize that the transmission planning reforms in Order 
No. 890 are still in the process of being implemented, failure to plan, maintain and 
expand the transmission system in accordance with the applicable, Commission-
approved OATT has always been, and will continue to be, an OATT violation.  Order 
No. 890 provides for revocation of an entity’s, and possibly that of its affiliates, 
market-based rate authority in response to an OATT violation upon a finding of a 
specific factual nexus between the violation and the entity’s market-based rate 
authority.
464  Should such a violation occur, the Commission will address it in that 
context.  The Commission does not find that the need exists to convene a technical 
conference in this regard.  The OATT Reform Rulemaking dealt extensively with this 
issue and the Commission finds that it has been adequately addressed in Order No. 
890. 
5.  Monopsony Power 
459.  In the NOPR, the Commission sought comment on whether the exercise of 
buyer’s market power by the transmission provider should be considered a potential 
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barrier to entry and, if so, what criteria the Commission should use to evaluate 
evidence that is presented. 
Comments 
460.  Allegheny states that the NOPR provided no explanation for why a 
transmission provider’s buyer’s market power should be relevant to the analysis.
465  
EEI argues that the Commission should not consider buyer’s market power as a 
barrier to entry because it is not relevant to the analysis.  According to EEI, the 
market-based rate analysis considers the ability of the applicant to exercise market 
power as a seller, not a buyer, which is consistent with the Commission’s authority 
under section 205 of the FPA, which regulates the sale of electricity.  EEI asserts that 
states generally have jurisdiction over the purchase of electricity by franchised 
utilities.
466 
461.  EPSA argues that if a utility holds a dominant purchasing position in the 
wholesale marketplace that allows it to exert excessive and discretionary buying 
power (of both supply and supply generation facilities), the exercise of market power 
will then lie with the buyer, not the seller.  This problem is exacerbated when such a 
purchasing utility also owns, controls or dispatches its own proprietary supply and the 
relevant transmission system.   
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462.  EPSA states that some would argue that the Commission cannot order 
economic dispatch or competitive solicitation because the FPA grants the 
Commission jurisdiction over sales, not purchases.  However, EPSA submits that the 
Commission would not be mandating purchases, but eliminating the exercise of 
market power which directly raises the prices for wholesale sales.  In so doing, the 
Commission would be using its tools under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA to 
ensure just and reasonable wholesale rates by allowing competitive alternatives to 
enter the market and protecting consumers from practices that will result in excessive 
rates and charges.  EPSA argues that the Commission must develop a transparent, 
methodical process for assessing this segment of the vertical market power analysis.  
EPSA submits that load serving entities that are transmission providers must, in 
addition to providing enhanced transmission services, facilitate accessible long-term 
markets through all-source competitive procurement processes, preferably via state 
created and supervised means, with independent third party oversight.  It asserts that 
the Commission must achieve and ensure these goals through a transparent, well-
developed process.  EPSA requests that the Commission convene a technical 
conference in order to fully develop that process and ensure that barriers to entry are 
properly mitigated.
467 
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Commission Determination 
463.  EPSA’s proposal not only raises jurisdictional issues, but EPSA has failed to 
provide specific instances in which the exercise of monopsony power has taken place 
and has provided no guidance as to how buyer market power should be measured 
(even assuming the Commission has jurisdiction to address it).  The Commission 
does not believe it is appropriate to attempt to address these difficult issues without 
specific evidence of monopsony power and a clear delineation of the state-federal 
jurisdiction issues that would arise in the context of a specific seller and specific set 
of circumstances.  For the same reason, we will not grant EPSA’s request to convene 
a technical conference to address such issues generically.  Until EPSA or others 
provide such information concerning a particular seller in either a market-based rate 
proceeding or a complaint, we defer judgment on the many difficult issues raised by 
EPSA. 
C.  Affiliate Abuse  
1.  General Affiliate Terms and Conditions 
a.  Codifying Affiliate Restrictions in Commission Regulations 
 Commission Proposal 
464.  In the NOPR the Commission proposed to discontinue referring to affiliate 
abuse as a separate “prong” of the market-based rate analysis and instead proposed to 
codify in the regulations at 18 CFR part 35, subpart H, an explicit requirement that 
any seller with market-based rate authority must comply with the affiliate power sales 
restrictions and other affiliate restrictions.  The Commission proposed to address Docket No. RM04-7-000   264 
 
affiliate abuse by requiring that the conditions set forth in the proposed regulations be 
satisfied on an ongoing basis as a condition of obtaining and retaining market-based 
rate authority.  The Commission indicated that a seller seeking to obtain or retain 
market-based rate authority will be obligated to provide a detailed description of its 
corporate structure so that the Commission can be assured that the Commission’s 
requirements are being applied correctly.  In particular, the Commission proposed 
that sellers with franchised service territories be required to make a showing 
regarding whether they serve captive customers and to identify all “non-regulated” 
power sales affiliates, such as affiliated marketers and generators.
468  
465.  The Commission further proposed that, as a condition of receiving market-
based rate authority, sellers must adopt the MBR tariff (included as Appendix A to 
the NOPR) which includes a provision requiring the seller to comply with, among 
other things, the affiliate restrictions in the regulations.  The Commission noted that 
failure to satisfy the conditions set forth in the affiliate restrictions will constitute a 
tariff violation.  The Commission sought comment on these proposals 
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Comments 
466.  As a general matter, commenters support the Commission’s proposal to codify 
the affiliate restrictions in the Commission’s regulations.
469  No comments were 
received opposing the proposal to codify affiliate restrictions in the Commission’s 
regulations. 
Commission Determination 
467.  The Commission will adopt the proposal in the NOPR to discontinue 
considering affiliate abuse as a separate “prong” of the market-based rate analysis and 
instead codify in the Commission’s regulations in § 35.39 an explicit requirement that 
any seller with market-based rate authority must comply with the affiliate restrictions.  
This will address affiliate abuse by requiring that the conditions set forth in the 
regulations be satisfied on an ongoing basis as a condition of obtaining and retaining 
market-based rate authority.  Included in the regulations will be a provision expressly 
prohibiting power sales between a franchised public utility with captive customers 
and any market-regulated power sales affiliates without first receiving Commission 
authorization for the transaction under section 205 of the FPA.  Also included in the 
regulations will be the requirements that have previously been known as the market-
based rate “code of conduct,” as those requirements have been revised in this Final 
Rule.   
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468.  Additionally, although we do not adopt the proposal to require that, as a 
condition of receiving market-based rate authority, sellers must adopt the MBR tariff 
(included as Appendix A to the NOPR), we do adopt a set of standard tariff 
provisions that we will require each seller to include in its market-based rate tariff, 
including a provision requiring the seller to comply with, among other things, the 
affiliate restrictions in the regulations.  We further adopt the proposal that failure to 
satisfy the conditions set forth in the affiliate restrictions will constitute a tariff 
violation.  
b.  Definition of “Captive Customers” 
Commission Proposal 
469.  The Commission stated in the NOPR that, among other things, in the 
Commission’s Final Rule on transactions subject to section 203 of the FPA, the 
Commission defined the term “captive customers” to mean “any wholesale or retail 
electric energy customers served under cost-based regulation.”
470  The Commission 
sought comment on whether the same definition should be used for purposes of this 
rule. 
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Comments 
470.  While a number of commenters support the Commission’s proposal to codify 
the affiliate abuse “prong” in the Commission’s regulations,
471 they comment that the 
proposed affiliate abuse restrictions do not do enough to protect retail customers from 
affiliate abuse.
472  NASUCA argues that affiliate abuse restrictions should be 
applicable to any affiliate with any retail customers, whether or not the retail affiliate 
is a “franchised” utility, whether or not it has a state-imposed “service obligation,” 
and whether or not its customers are characterized as “captive.”  NASUCA submits 
that the Commission should not rely on a state’s adoption of a retail access regime for 
any determination that a customer is not captive.  Further, although NASUCA 
comments that the Commission’s proposed definition for “captive customers” is an 
improvement from the text of the proposed regulation (which contains no definition 
of “captive customers”), NASUCA suggests it could also invite distinctions turning 
on the meaning of “cost-based regulation” that might cause future uncertainty in 
some circumstances and a corresponding loss of customer protection.
473   
471.  New Jersey Board argues that when customers lack realistic alternatives to 
purchasing power from their local utility, regardless of a legal right to competitive 
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power suppliers, such customers are still captive.  New Jersey Board states that most 
customers in retail choice states still rely on the provider-of-last-resort for electric 
service and, thus, are still captive customers.
474  New Jersey Board comments that, 
due to the relatively young retail choice and deregulation programs in many states, “it 
would be premature to declare electric retail choice to be vibrant enough to leave 
consumer protection from affiliate abuses completely to the marketplace.”
475  New 
Jersey Board states that, even where there are a few providers that comprise the 
market, such oligopolies often exhibit the same lack of competition and high prices as 
are seen in a monopoly market.  Thus, affiliate abuse would remain a concern where 
utilities would be granted market-based rate authority.
476 
472.  AARP similarly comments that the proposed definition of “captive customers” 
fails to capture the potential for adverse impacts on retail customers of “default” 
suppliers and thus, the coverage of the Commission’s affiliate restrictions should be 
expanded to prevent customers from bearing the costs of non-regulated marketing 
affiliates of the public utility they rely on for reliable service.
477  
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473.   ELCON suggests that “captive customers” should be defined as any end-users 
that do not have real competitive opportunities.
478  It recommends that the 
Commission adopt a case-specific approach to identifying captive customers to 
account for the failure of retail competition in many restructured states. 
474.  A number of other commenters argue that the proposed definition of “captive 
customers” is too broad
479 and would improperly include customers with competitive 
alternatives.  They state that the Commission should clarify that “captive customers” 
does  
 
not include customers in states with retail choice.
480  Duke recommends that the 
Commission define “captive customer” as “any electric energy customer that cannot 
choose an alternative energy supplier.”
481  Duke adds that initial commenters, such as 
ELCON, provide no support for their assertion that state retail access programs do not 
generate effective competition and that most provider-of-last-resort customers are 
actually captive.   
                                              
478 ELCON at 2, 7-8. 
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475.  Ameren comments that while there are sellers with market-based rate authority 
that have no captive wholesale customers for energy, but do have a cost-based rate 
schedule for reactive power supply, the fact that a seller has wholesale customers 
under a single cost-based rate for reactive power should not render the entity a seller 
with “captive customers” and therefore, subject to the affiliate restrictions.
482  It states 
that such a seller would have no ability to transfer benefits from its “captive 
customers” (customers taking reactive power services at cost-based rates) to subsidize 
its unregulated market-based rate sales, given the different products at issue and the 
restrictions of the cost-based rates for reactive power. 
476.  APPA/TAPS submit that the definition of “captive customers” should include 
wholesale transmission customers captive to the transmission provider’s system.
483  
APPA/TAPS state that affiliate abuse not only raises costs to wholesale customers, it 
can also harm competition such as through cross-subsidization that provides the seller 
with an unfair competitive advantage.  Therefore, APPA/TAPS state that wholesale 
transmission customers captive to the transmission provider’s system are particularly 
vulnerable to this kind of competitive harm and should be included in the definition 
of “captive customers” in the regulations.
484 
                                              
482 Ameren at 12. 
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477.  EEI responds to APPA/TAPS’ comment by stating that it is “completely 
unnecessary” to include transmission dependent utilities in the definition of captive 
customers since Order No. 888 already provides sufficient protections for 
transmission customers.  Additionally, EEI replies that transmission dependent 
utilities are like customers with retail choice who have chosen to stay under cost-
based rates while other transmission customers have broader options.  EEI responds 
that the Commission does not currently consider such customers captive and there is 
no reason to change this policy.
485 
Commission Determination 
478.  The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal to define “captive customers” as 
“any wholesale or retail electric energy customers served under cost-based 
regulation.”   
479.  The Commission clarifies in response to several comments that the definition 
of “captive customers” does not include those customers who have retail choice, i.e. 
the ability to select a retail supplier based on the rates, terms and conditions of service 
offered.  Retail customers who choose to be served under cost-based rates but have 
the ability, by virtue of state law, to choose one retail supplier over another, are not 
considered to be under "cost-based regulation" and therefore are not “captive.”   
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480.  As the Commission has explained, retail customers in retail choice states who 
choose to buy power from their local utility at cost-based rates as part of that utility’s 
provider-of-last-resort obligation are not considered captive customers because, 
although they may choose not to do so, they have the ability to take service from a 
different supplier whose rates are set by the marketplace.  In other words, they are not 
served under cost-based regulation, since that term indicates a regulatory regime in 
which retail choice is not available.
486  On the other hand, in a regulatory regime in 
which retail customers have no ability to choose a supplier, they are considered 
captive because they must purchase from the local utility pursuant to cost-based rates 
set by a state or local regulatory authority.
487  Therefore, with this clarification, the 
Commission will adopt the definition of “captive customers” proposed in the NOPR 
and clarifies, that, as the Commission did in Order No. 669-A, we will include the 
definition of captive customers in the regulations.  Regarding wholesale customers, 
sellers should continue to explain why, if they have wholesale customers, those 
customers are not captive.   
481.  We note that it is not the role of this Commission to evaluate the success or 
failure of a state’s retail choice program including whether sufficient choices are 
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available for customers inclined to choose a different supplier.  In this regard, the 
states are best equipped to make such a determination and, if necessary, modify or 
otherwise revise their retail access programs as they deem appropriate.  Further, to 
the extent a retail customer in a retail choice state elects to be served by its local 
utility under provider-of-last-resort obligations, the state or local rate setting 
authority, in determining just and reasonable cost-based retail rates, would in most 
circumstances be able to review the prudence of affiliate purchased power costs and 
disallow pass-through of costs incurred as a result of an affiliate undue preference.   
482.  We also decline to include transmission customers in the definition of “captive 
customers” for purposes of market-based rates.  We agree with EEI that the 
Commission's open access policies protect transmission customers from the exercise 
of vertical market power.  In this regard, we note that the Commission recently issued 
Order No. 890, which revised the pro forma OATT to ensure that it achieves its 
original purpose of remedying undue discrimination. Order No. 890 provided greater 
clarity regarding the requirements of the pro forma OATT and greater transparency in 
the rules applicable to the planning and use of the transmission system, in order to 
reduce opportunities for the exercise of undue discrimination, make undue 
discrimination easier to detect, and facilitate the Commission’s enforcement of the 
tariff.  
483.  In response to Ameren’s comments that a seller with wholesale customers 
under a single cost-based rate for reactive power should not be considered a seller 
with “captive customers” subject to the affiliate restrictions, we agree that such Docket No. RM04-7-000   274 
 
customers are not captive for purposes of market-based rates.  The concerns 
underlying the affiliate restrictions do not apply to sales of reactive power because 
those sales are typically either made to transmission providers so that the 
transmission provider can satisfy its obligation to provide reactive power or made by 
the transmission provider under its applicable OATT.    
c.  Definition of “Non-Regulated Power Sales Affiliate” 
Commission Proposal 
484.  Proposed § 35.36(a)(6) defined “non-regulated power sales affiliate” as “any 
non-traditional power seller affiliate, including a power marketer, exempt wholesale 
generator, qualifying facility or other power seller affiliate, whose power sales are not 
regulated on a cost basis under the FPA.” 
Comments 
485.  A number of commenters seek clarification and modification of the 
Commission’s proposed definition of “non-regulated power sales affiliate.”     
486.  Southern requests clarification that a franchised public utility does not become 
a non-regulated power sales affiliate simply because it may make some wholesale 
sales under market-based rate authority.    
487.  SoCal Edison argues that the Commission offers no explanation for including 
Qualifying Facilities (QFs) in the definition of “non-regulated power sales affiliate.”  
It states that the proposed definition of non-regulated power sales affiliate would 
subject QFs that may not have market-based rate authority to the code of conduct.  It 
states that the NOPR proposal would constitute a departure from traditional PURPA Docket No. RM04-7-000   275 
 
implementation and from the Commission’s recently revised regulations reaffirming 
that QF contracts created pursuant to a statutory regulatory authority’s 
implementation of PURPA are exempt from review under sections 205 and 206 of the 
FPA.
488  PG&E asserts that the Commission should clarify the meaning of “non-
regulated power sales affiliate” so that it does not encompass all affiliates such as 
parent companies or the natural gas LDC function of the regulated, franchised 
utility.
489 
488.  Xcel states that it is not clear whether the following result was intended, but 
the definition arguably could cover a “traditional” utility with a franchised retail 
service territory that had converted all of its wholesale sales from cost-based to 
market-based rates.  According to Xcel, not all utilities will be selling at cost-based 
rates at wholesale, even though they may still be doing so at retail in franchised 
service territories.
490  Xcel does not believe that it would be reasonable to exclude 
from the definition of “non-regulated power sales affiliate” a utility that serves retail 
customers under a franchised service territory.  Xcel also comments that the 
Commission should allow a waiver provision for utilities’ subsidiaries or affiliates to 
be treated under the Commission’s affiliate sales rules as affiliated utilities rather than 
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as “non-regulated power sales affiliates.”
491  Xcel believes that the proposed 
definition would generally serve to demarcate affiliates that should be treated as 
regulated from those that should be treated as non-regulated under the Commission’s 
affiliate rules but states that it is not desirable or beneficial to draw a completely 
bright line between the two.  Xcel states that some flexibility may be beneficial for 
both utilities and their customers and the Commission should not foreclose innovative 
structures by adopting hard and fast rules.
492   
489.  NASUCA also suggests revisions to this definition, out of concern that several 
of the terms used (non-regulated, non-traditional, regulated on a cost basis) are vague, 
inaccurate and unnecessary.
493  NASUCA suggests that the term be renamed “power 
sales affiliate with market-based rates” and defined as “any power seller affiliate 
utility, including a power marketer, exempt wholesale generator, qualifying facility or 
other power seller affiliate, with market-based rates authorized under these rules or 
Commission orders.”
494 
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Commission Determination  
490.  The Commission will modify the definition of “non-regulated power sales 
affiliate,” and change the term to “market-regulated power sales affiliate.”
495  In 
response to various commenters, we clarify that this definition is intended to apply 
only to non-franchised power sales affiliates (whose power sales are not regulated on 
a cost basis under the FPA, e.g., affiliates whose power sales are made at market-
based rates) of franchised public utilities.  Additionally, while we recognize that we 
have used the term “non-regulated” in the past, we believe that “market-regulated” is 
a more appropriate description for the entities we intend to capture in this definition.  
Accordingly, in this Final Rule, we revise the definition of “market-regulated power 
sales affiliate” to mean “any power seller affiliate other than a franchised public 
utility, including a power marketer, exempt wholesale generator, qualifying facility or 
other power seller affiliate, whose power sales are regulated in whole or in part at 
market-based rates.”  Because the revised definition includes only non-franchised 
public utilities, it does not apply to a franchised public utility that makes some sales 
at market-based rates.
496   
                                              
495 NOPR at Proposed Regulations at 18 CFR 35.36 (a)(6).  We adopt this 
regulation at 18 CFR 35.36 (a)(7). 
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engages in such sales must function independently of the utility’s transmission function.  
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491.  Xcel posits a somewhat different scenario under which it believes that a 
franchised public utility would fall within the definition of “non-regulated power 
sales affiliate,” namely, if such utility makes no wholesale sales that are regulated on 
a cost basis (making only wholesale sales at market-based rates) but serves retail 
customers under a franchised service territory.  With the revision to the definition of 
“market-regulated power sales affiliate” that we adopt here, such a utility would not 
fall within the definition of “market-regulated power sales affiliate” since it has a 
franchised service territory.   
492.  In addition, we note that the Commission has historically placed affiliate 
restrictions only on the relationship between a franchised public utility with captive 
customers and any affiliated market-regulated power sales affiliate.  Nevertheless, we 
believe that there may be circumstances in which it also would be appropriate to 
impose similar restrictions on the relationship of two affiliated franchised public 
utilities where one of the affiliates has captive customers and one does not have 
captive customers.  In such a case, there is a potential for the transfer of benefits from 
the captive customers of the first franchised utility to the benefit of the second 
franchised utility and ultimately to the joint stockholders of the two affiliated 
franchised public utilities.  Commenters in the instant proceeding did not address the 
potential for affiliate abuse in this situation (i.e., between a franchised public utility 
with captive customers and an affiliated franchised public utility without captive 
customers).  Accordingly, we do not generically impose the affiliate restrictions on Docket No. RM04-7-000   279 
 
such relationships but will evaluate whether to impose the affiliate restrictions in such 
situations on a case-by-case basis.   
493.  However, to avoid confusion between references to a “franchised public utility 
with captive customers” and a “franchised public utility without captive customers” 
we will revise the definition of “franchised public utility” in § 35.36(a) (5) to remove 
the reference to captive customers.  Accordingly, “franchised public utility” will be 
defined as “a public utility with a franchised service obligation under state law.”  
Further, we will revise other sections of the affiliate restrictions to specifically use the 
term “franchised public utility with captive customers” to clarify when the affiliate 
restrictions apply.  
494.  Additionally, not all qualifying facilities are necessarily included in the 
proposed definition of “market-regulated power sales affiliate.”  Only those 
qualifying facilities whose market-based rate sales fall under the Commission’s 
jurisdiction would fall within the definition of “market-regulated power sales 
affiliate.”  To the extent that some of a qualifying facility’s sales are regulated under 
the FPA, even if other sales are regulated by the states, such a qualifying facility 
would be considered a market-regulated power sales affiliate by virtue of its FPA 
jurisdictional sales.  
495.  Additionally, the Commission clarifies that the definition of “market-regulated 
power sales affiliate” does not encompass all affiliates such as parent companies or 
the natural gas LDC function of the regulated franchised utility; rather, it only 
includes non-franchised, power sales affiliates (sellers) that sell power in whole or in Docket No. RM04-7-000   280 
 
part at market based rates, and not an affiliated service company or others who are 
not authorized to make sales of power. 
d.  Other Definitions 
In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to adopt a restriction on affiliate 
sales of electric energy, whereby no wholesale sale of electric energy could 
be made between a public utility seller with a franchised service territory 
and a non-regulated power sales affiliate without first receiving 
Commission authorization under FPA section 205.  This restriction would 
be a condition of obtaining and retaining market-based rate authority, and a 
failure to satisfy that condition would be a violation of the seller’s market-
based rate tariff.
497  
 
Comments 
496.  Constellation proposes that the language in the proposed affiliate sales 
restriction provision be amended to use the defined term “franchised public utility” 
by replacing the phrase “public utility Seller with a franchised service territory” with 
“Seller that is a franchised public utility.”  Constellation submits that this change 
would make clear that the affiliate restrictions apply only if the seller is affiliated with 
a public utility that has captive customers, which it states appears to be the 
Commission’s intent.
498    
497.  FirstEnergy proposes that a definition of franchised service territory be added 
to the regulations to clarify that the affiliate sales restriction would only apply to 
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transactions involving public utilities with captive retail customers, and would not 
apply in areas in which there is retail choice.
499  
Commission Determination 
498.  The Commission’s intent was that the affiliate sales restriction in proposed            
§ 35.39(a) (now § 35.39(b)) would apply where a utility with a franchised service 
territory with captive customers proposes to make wholesale sales at market-based 
rates to a market-regulated power sales affiliate, or vice versa.  Accordingly, we will 
revise            § 35.39(a) (now § 35.39(b)) to replace “public utility Seller with a 
franchised service territory” with “franchised public utility with captive customers.”  
In light of this clarification, we do not believe it necessary to add a definition of 
franchised service territory to the regulations, as proposed by FirstEnergy.   
e.  Treating Merging Companies as Affiliates  
Commission Proposal 
499.  In the NOPR, the Commission noted that, for purposes of affiliate abuse, 
companies proposing to merge are considered affiliates under their market-based rate 
tariffs while their proposed merger is pending, and sought comments regarding at 
what point the Commission should consider two non-affiliates as merging partners.
500   
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Comments 
500.  PG&E comments that affiliate sales regulations should not apply to contracts 
that pre-date the announcement of a merger.  PG&E states that the Commission 
should allow merging companies sufficient time (e.g., 30 days) after the 
announcement of a merger before enforcing the affiliate sales regulations in order to 
give the merging companies time to acquire the necessary information and documents 
to prevent a company from being held responsible for activities of the merging 
company that it has no knowledge of or control over.
501 
Commission Determination 
501.  The Commission will continue to require that, for purposes of affiliate abuse, 
companies proposing to merge will be treated as affiliates under their market-based 
rate tariffs while their proposed merger is pending.
502  The Commission will adopt 
the proposal to use the date a merger is announced as the triggering event for 
considering two non-affiliates as merging partners.  In this regard, we reject PG&E's 
proposal that the Commission allow an additional 30 days after an announced merger 
to begin treating, for the purpose of affiliate abuse, merging partners as affiliates.  
                                              
501 PG&E at 14-21. 
502 Cinergy, Inc., 74 FERC ¶ 61,281 (1996); Consolidated Edison Energy, Inc.,    
83 FERC ¶ 61,236 at 62,034 (1998); Central and South West Services, Inc., 82 FERC     
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With the extensive discussions, negotiations and review that precede the formal 
announcement of plans to merge, there is sufficient time for companies to acquire the 
necessary information and documents related to the proposed merger, particularly 
given that utilities are on notice of our policy in this regard.   
502.  The Commission clarifies that the requirement that merging companies be 
treated as affiliates while the proposed merger is pending only applies prospectively 
from the date the merger is announced and does not apply to any contracts entered 
into that pre-date the announcement of the merger.
503  However, in the case of an 
umbrella agreement that pre-dates the announcement of the merger, any transactions 
under such umbrella agreement that are entered into on or after the date the merger is 
announced would be subject to the affiliate restrictions.  Further, if an announced 
merger does not go forward, the affiliate restrictions will cease to apply as of the date 
the announcement is made that the merger will not go forward. 
f.  Treating Energy/Asset Managers as Affiliates 
Commission Proposal 
503.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that unaffiliated entities that engage 
in energy/asset management of generation on behalf of a franchised public utility 
with captive customers be bound by the same affiliate restrictions as those imposed 
                                              
503 This is consistent with the standards of conduct, which require transmission 
providers to post information concerning potential merger partners as affiliates within 
seven days after the potential merger is announced.  18 CFR  358.4(b)(3)(v). Docket No. RM04-7-000   284 
 
on the franchised public utility and the non-regulated power sales affiliates.
504  The 
Commission recognized that there has been an increased range of activities engaged 
in by asset or energy managers.
505  The Commission noted that although asset 
managers can provide valuable services and benefit consumers and the marketplace, 
such relationships also could result in transactions harmful to captive customers.
506  
Accordingly, the Commission proposed that an entity managing generation for the 
franchised public utility should be subject to the same affiliate restrictions as the 
franchised public utility (e.g., restrictions on affiliate sales and information sharing).  
The Commission referenced a settlement in which Enforcement staff alleged that an 
affiliated power marketer acting as an asset manager for three generation-owning 
affiliates violated § 214 of the FPA.
507  As a result, if a company is managing 
generation assets for the franchised public utility, such entity would be subject to the 
same information sharing provision as the franchised public utility with regard to 
                                              
504 NOPR at P 117, 130, 131. 
505 Id. at P 124 citing Kevin Heslin, A few thoughts on the industry: Ideas from 
session at Globalcon, Energy User News, July 1, 2002, at 12 (Noting that prior to 
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applicable tariffs, evaluating the possible installation of energy conservation measures 
(ECMs), and considering whether to install on-site generation” but that “now, an energy 
manager has to be conversant with a far greater number of issues” such as complex legal 
issues and financial instruments like derivatives.) 
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507 NOPR at P 130. Docket No. RM04-7-000   285 
 
information shared with non-regulated affiliates, such as power marketers and power 
producers.
508  Similarly, asset managers of a non-regulated affiliate’s generation 
assets would be subject to the same affiliate restrictions as the market-regulated 
power sales affiliate, including the information sharing provision.
509 
Comments 
504.   Morgan Stanley comments that unaffiliated asset and energy managers should 
not be treated as affiliates of owners of the managed portfolios and that it would be 
overly inclusive for the Commission to adopt a presumption of control that would 
treat the energy manager as a franchised utility for purposes of the affiliate abuse 
rules.
510  Financial Companies argue that the Commission should not apply the 
affiliate abuse restrictions generically to all unaffiliated energy managers that provide 
management services to a franchised utility or its affiliates.  Rather, the Commission 
should evaluate applicability of the affiliate abuse restrictions on a case-by-case 
basis.
511   
505.  Allegheny claims that the Commission failed to consider the costs to 
customers, which are likely to be substantial through the loss of efficiencies by 
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treating asset managers as affiliates.
512  Allegheny claims that there will be higher 
costs because: (1) the affiliated asset manager will need to pass added costs on to the 
franchised utility; (2) if the affiliated asset manager cannot pass on costs, it may no 
longer provide the service and the utility may need to set up duplicative asset 
management capability, resulting in higher costs; or (3) the franchised utility will 
need to hire a third-party asset manager, presumably more expensive.
513  
Constellation makes a similar argument about the substantial costs and reduction of 
efficiencies by discouraging energy/asset management agreements.
514   
506.  EPSA states that it opposes the Commission’s proposal to treat asset managers 
as affiliates.  It submits that asset managers are not legally affiliates of the companies 
with which they have a contract.  If the basis for the proposal to treat asset managers 
as affiliates is for transparency purposes, EPSA says that all such contracts and 
transactions with asset managers are already reportable under the change in status 
final rule.
515 
507.  Alliance Power Marketing argues that by imposing affiliate abuse restrictions 
on entities acting on behalf of a regulated public utility or its non-regulated affiliates, 
the Commission seeks to alter the fundamental principle of responsibility and liability 
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of the regulated entity by making the third-party also directly accountable, thus 
blurring the lines of accountability.  Furthermore, a critical element in applying 
affiliate abuse restrictions to entities’ action on behalf of generation owners lies in 
having a stake in the outcome rather than just considering some direct or indirect 
control.  Alliance Power Marketing asserts that evaluating control over the outcome 
as the threshold for asset managers could sweep up many entities, such as 
RTOs/ISOs, governmental and cooperative entities, that could have jurisdictional and 
practical ramifications.
516  
508.  A number of other commenters oppose the Commission’s proposal to treat 
unaffiliated energy/asset managers as part of the franchised public utility.  They argue 
that the current code of conduct already provides the protections sought by such a 
proposal and the Commission fails to explain the need for such expanded 
regulation.
517  Furthermore, they submit that such proposal does not consider the 
additional costs to consumers through lost efficiencies.
518   
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509.  PG&E argues that the Commission proposal to consider “entities acting on 
behalf of and for the benefit of [the utility/affiliate]” as part of the utility/affiliate 
itself is unnecessary and overly broad.
519   
510.  Indianapolis P&L does not oppose the Commission’s proposal to treat asset 
managers as affiliates for the limited purposes of the code of conduct, standards of 
conduct or inter-affiliate transaction issues, but it states that the Commission should 
not treat unaffiliated asset managers as affiliates when determining how much 
generating capacity should be attributed to a generation asset owner.
520  
511.  Financial Companies and Morgan Stanley both state in their reply comments 
that the Commission should not impose affiliate restrictions on unaffiliated energy 
managers, as the Commission provides no basis for such requirement
521 and no 
evidence that energy managers can engage in cross-subsidization of unregulated 
affiliates.
522 
Commission Determination 
512.  From the various comments submitted it is apparent that our proposal has 
created confusion as to our intent with regard to the treatment of energy/asset 
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managers under the proposed affiliate restrictions.  Accordingly, we clarify and 
simplify our approach, as discussed below.  
513.  The Commission is concerned that there exists the potential for a franchised 
public utility with captive customers to interact with a market-regulated power sales 
affiliate in ways that transfer benefits to the affiliate and its stockholders to the 
detriment of the captive customers.  Therefore, the Commission has adopted certain 
affiliate restrictions to protect the captive customers and, in this Final Rule, is 
codifying those restrictions in our regulations.  To that end, we make clear that such 
utilities may not use anyone, including energy/asset managers, to circumvent the 
affiliate restrictions (e.g., independent functioning and information sharing 
prohibitions).  Accordingly, we adopt and codify in our regulations at §§ 35.39(c)(1) 
and 35.39(g) an explicit prohibition on using third-party entities to circumvent 
otherwise applicable affiliate restrictions.  
514.  We note that energy/asset managers provide a variety of services for 
franchised public utilities and market-regulated power sales affiliates, including, but 
not limited to, operating generation plants (sometimes under tolling agreements), 
acting as billing agents, bundling transmission and power for customers, and 
scheduling transactions.  However, regardless of the relationships and duties of an 
energy/asset manager to a franchised public utility or its non-regulated affiliate, the Docket No. RM04-7-000   290 
 
energy/asset manager may not act as a conduit to circumvent the affiliate 
restrictions.
523  
515.  This approach is consistent with past Commission orders that have identified 
the potential that affiliated exempt wholesale generators or qualifying facilities could 
serve as a conduit for providing below-cost services to an affiliated power marketer at 
the expense of captive customers of the public utility operating companies and 
imposed restrictions to prevent this.
524 
516.  Although several commenters assert that the costs of asset management will 
increase as a result of requiring asset managers to observe the affiliate restrictions, 
they did not provide any examples of why the costs would increase.  The 
Commission notes that under this Final Rule, all asset managers are not required to 
observe the affiliate restrictions, only those asset managers which control or market 
generation of the franchised public utility with captive customers or a market-
regulated power sales affiliate of a franchised public utility with captive customers.  
In those instances, the need to protect captive customers outweighs any generalized 
assertions of increased cost. 
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517.  We note that to the extent that a franchised public utility with captive 
customers and one or more of its non-regulated marketing affiliates obtains the 
services of the same energy/asset manager, such an arrangement would create 
opportunities to harm captive customers depending on how the energy/asset manager 
is structured.  For example, without internal separation between the energy/asset 
managers' regulated and non-regulated businesses, there would exist opportunities to 
harm captive customers.  
g.  Cooperatives 
Comments 
518.  Suez/Chevron asks the Commission to clarify that jurisdictional utilities 
organized as cooperatives are not exempt from the affiliate abuse rules and that all 
jurisdictional public utilities with captive customers, including utilities organized as 
cooperatives, must comply with the affiliate abuse rules.
525 
519.  El Paso E&P argues that it would appear that the proposed affiliate restrictions 
would apply to power sales at market-based rates made by G&T cooperatives to their 
state-regulated member distribution cooperatives.  It states that based on the 
definition of a “franchised public utility” as “a public utility with a franchised service 
obligation under state law and that has captive customers,” distribution cooperatives 
that are granted franchised service territories by state regulatory agencies would be 
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included in this definition.  El Paso E&P asserts that a G&T cooperative with 
authority to sell power at market-based rates would be defined as a non-regulated 
power seller and, accordingly, sales made by a G&T cooperative at market-based 
rates to its affiliated member distribution cooperatives would, under the proposed 
regulations, be required to comply with the requirements of the rule.
 526    
520.  However, El Paso E&P argues that the Commission has previously stated that 
affiliate abuse is not a concern for cooperatives owned by other cooperatives because 
the cooperatives’ ratepayers are its members.  El Paso E&P alleges that the 
Commission has never sufficiently explained the basis for its prior statements.  
According to El Paso E&P, the Commission’s prior statements are based on the 
findings in Hinson Power
527 that lack of concern with the potential for affiliate abuse 
is premised on the absence of captive customers that would be subject to the exercise 
of market power.  El Paso submits that the fact that ratepayers of the distribution 
cooperative are also members of such cooperatives should not alleviate the 
Commission’s concern about potential affiliate abuse issues.  El Paso E&P claims 
that industrial customers of distribution cooperatives with franchised service 
territories are captive to service from the generation and transmission and distribution 
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cooperatives that serve them and are in need of protection from the Commission to 
ensure that they are charged just and reasonable rates.
528 
521.  NRECA submits that El Paso misreads the proposed regulations by classifying 
distribution cooperatives as a “public utility Seller” under the proposed regulations 
and NRECA comments that it is not aware of any distribution cooperatives that 
would be classified as “public utility Sellers” thus triggering the restriction on 
affiliate sales without first receiving Commission approval.  NRECA states that 
nearly all distribution cooperatives are not regulated as public utilities under the FPA 
because they either have Rural Electrification Act (REA) financing or sell less than 4 
million MWh per year and thus do not qualify as a “public utility” under § 201(f) of 
the FPA.  Furthermore, NRECA comments that very few distribution cooperatives 
sell any electricity for resale.  Thus, they would not need to obtain market-based rate 
authority under section 205 even if they were not relieved of that obligation by 
section 201(f).
529  NRECA also comments that the Commission has explained the 
reasoning behind not requiring cooperatives to comply with the affiliate abuse 
requirements by stating that “in the case of a cooperative, the cooperative’s members 
                                              
528 El Paso E&P at 4-9. 
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are both the ratepayers and the shareholders, and thus there is no potential danger of 
shifting benefits from one to another.”
530 
522.  El Paso E&P responds that NRECA incorrectly interprets the scope of the 
proposed affiliate restriction and that NRECA ignores the definition of “franchised 
public utility” as “a public utility with a franchised service obligation under state law 
and that has captive customers.”  El Paso E&P submits that this definition clearly 
includes distribution cooperatives.  El Paso E&P further replies that the fact that 
distribution cooperatives are not “public utilities” regulated by the Commission is 
irrelevant because the Commission is not proposing to regulate sales by such 
distribution cooperatives.  Rather, it is proposing to regulate wholesale sales by the 
generation and transmission cooperatives to their member distribution cooperatives.  
Therefore, El Paso E&P argues, the Commission should clarify the regulations to 
ensure that generation and transmission cooperatives are covered under the affiliate 
restrictions.
531 
523.  El Paso E&P also responds that NRECA’s attempt to divorce a generation and 
transmission cooperative’s market-based rate sales to its distribution cooperative 
members from the distribution cooperative’s sales to captive customers ignores the 
cooperative structure.  It states that a generation and transmission cooperative is 
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comprised of its member distribution cooperatives and both the generation and 
transmission and distribution cooperatives act in concert in connection with sales to 
industrial customers.
532  El Paso E&P also submits that NRECA’s argument suggests 
that the Commission has no jurisdiction over sales to state-regulated franchised 
public utilities that are not cooperatives.
533  According to El Paso E&P, the captive 
customers of distribution cooperatives are in need of the same protection from the 
Commission notwithstanding that the distribution cooperatives are regulated by the 
states.
534   
524.  El Paso E&P also states that wholesale electric sales approved by the 
Commission must be passed through at the retail level.  Thus, El Paso E&P states that 
it is not sufficient to suggest that the Commission need not be concerned because the 
distribution cooperatives’ rates are subject to state regulation.
535  Finally, El Paso 
E&P responds that NRECA cannot seek the protection of this Commission when its 
members are purchasers of power, and then claim its members should be exempt 
from scrutiny when they are sellers to captive customers such as El Paso E&P.  It 
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asserts that captive customers of generation and transmission and their member 
distribution cooperatives are in need of protection.
536 
Commission Determination 
525.  FPA § 201(f) specifically exempts from the Commission’s regulation under 
Part II of the FPA, except as specifically provided, electric cooperatives that receive 
REA financing or sell less than 4 million megawatt hours of electricity per year.
537  
Thus, such electric cooperatives are not considered public utilities under the FPA and 
our market-based rate regulations do not apply to those electric cooperatives.  
Further, with respect to distribution-only cooperatives, they either do not meet the 
“public utility” definition because they do not own or operate facilities used for 
wholesale sales or transmission in interstate commerce or, if they do own or operate 
such facilities, they are exempted from Part II regulation by virtue of FPA § 201(f).  
In this regard, we note that NRECA states that it is unaware of any distribution 
cooperatives in the United States that would be “public utility Sellers” under the 
proposed regulations.
538  Such a cooperative would not be subject to the affiliate 
restrictions in the proposed regulations at § 35.39. 
                                              
536 Id. at 5. 
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526.  For electric cooperatives that are public utility sellers and not exempted from 
public utility regulation by FPA § 201(f), as discussed above, the Commission will 
continue to treat such electric cooperatives as not subject to the Commission’s 
affiliate abuse restrictions, based on a finding that transactions of an electric 
cooperative with its members do not present dangers of affiliate abuse through self-
dealing.  Even if an electric cooperative is not statutorily exempted from our 
regulation under Part II of the FPA, we conclude that a waiver of § 35.39 is 
appropriate.  As the Commission has previously explained, “affiliate abuse takes 
place when the affiliated public utility and the affiliated power marketer transact in 
ways that result in a transfer of benefits from the affiliated public utility (and its 
ratepayers) to the affiliated power marketer (and its shareholders).”
539  However, as 
the Commission has previously stated in many market-based rate orders over the 
years,
540 where a cooperative is involved, the cooperative’s members are both the 
ratepayers and the shareholders.  Any profits earned by the cooperative will enure to 
                                              
539 Heartland Energy Services, Inc., 68 FERC ¶ 61,223 at 62,062 (1994). 
540 Hinson Power Company, 72 FERC ¶ 61,190 (1995).  See also, e.g., People’s 
Electric Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,215 at 62,042 (1998) (application raised no issues of 
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also its owners); Old Dominion Electric Cooperative, 81 FERC ¶ 61,044 at 61,236 
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the benefit of the cooperative’s ratepayers.  Therefore, we have found that there is no 
potential danger of shifting benefits from the ratepayers to the shareholders.
541 
527.  Finally, we agree with NRECA’s argument that the issue that El Paso E&P 
discusses in its comments is not a concern that can be addressed through affiliate 
restrictions in market-based rates, but is rather more of a concern of discrimination in 
the allocation of benefits and burdens among retail ratepayers.  The Commission does 
not possess jurisdiction to review a distribution cooperative’s retail rates; that issue 
falls under state law.  Moreover, El Paso E&P’s argument that wholesale electric 
sales approved by the Commission must be passed through at the retail level is 
misplaced.   As the courts have previously held, state commissions are not precluded 
from reviewing the prudence of a company’s purchasing decisions, and may disallow 
pass-through of wholesale purchase costs unless the purchaser had no legal right to 
refuse to make a particular purchase.
542  
528.  Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the Commission will continue to 
follow its current precedent and find that electric cooperatives that are public utility 
                                              
541 Old Dominion Electric Cooperative, 81 FERC ¶ 61,044 at 61,236 (1997). 
542 Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Missouri Public Service Commission, 829 F. 
2d 1444 at 1451-52 (8
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sellers and not exempted from public utility regulation by FPA § 201(f) are not 
subject to the Commission’s affiliate abuse requirements.   
2.  Power Sales Restrictions 
Commission Proposal 
529.  In the NOPR the Commission proposed to continue the policy of reviewing 
power sales transactions between regulated and “non-regulated” affiliates under 
section 205 of the FPA.  This policy means, among other things, that a general grant 
of market-based rate authority does not apply to affiliate sales between a regulated 
and a non-regulated affiliate, absent express authorization by the Commission.  
530.  The Commission proposed to amend the regulations to include a provision 
expressly prohibiting power sales between a franchised public utility
543 and any of its 
non-regulated power sales affiliates without first receiving authorization for the 
transaction under section 205 of the FPA.   
531.  Additionally, although it did not propose to codify the requirement in the 
regulatory text, the Commission proposed that sellers seeking authorization to engage 
in affiliate transactions will continue to be obligated to provide evidence as to 
                                              
543 As proposed in the NOPR, the term “franchised public utility” was defined as 
“a public utility with a franchised service obligation under state law and that has captive 
customers.”  As set forth below, to avoid confusion between references to a franchised 
public utility with captive customers and one without, we revise the proposed regulations 
to delete the reference to customers in the definition and to specifically use the term 
“franchised public utility with captive customers” to clarify when the affiliate restrictions 
apply. Docket No. RM04-7-000   300 
 
whether there are captive customers that would trigger the application of the affiliate 
restrictions.  The Commission stated that if the Commission finds, based on the 
evidence provided by the seller, that the seller has no captive customers, the affiliate 
restrictions in the regulations would not apply.   
532.  The Commission proposed to continue its prior approach for determining what 
types of affiliate sales transactions are permissible and the criteria that should be used 
to make those decisions, including evaluation of the Allegheny and Edgar criteria.
544  
Although it did not propose to codify a safe harbor provision in the regulations, the 
Commission noted that when affiliates participate in a competitive solicitation 
process, application of the Allegheny criteria would constitute a safe harbor that 
affiliate abuse conditions are satisfied in a transaction between a franchised public 
utility and its affiliates.  The Commission emphasized, however, that using a 
                                              
544 Boston Edison Company Re: Edgar Electric Energy Co., 55 FERC ¶ 61,382 
(1991) (Edgar), describing three types of evidence that can be used to show that an 
affiliate power sales transaction is above suspicion ensuring that the market is not 
distorted and captive ratepayers are protected: (1) evidence of direct head-to-head 
competition between the affiliate and competing unaffiliated suppliers in a formal 
solicitation or informal negotiation process; (2) evidence of the prices non-affiliated 
buyers were willing to pay for similar services from the affiliate; or (3) benchmark 
evidence that shows the prices, terms, and conditions of sales made by non-affiliated 
sellers.  Allegheny Energy Supply Company, LLC, 108 FERC ¶ 61,082 (2004) 
(Allegheny), stating four guidelines that help the Commission determine if a competitive 
solicitation process satisfies the Edgar criteria: (1) it is transparent; (2) products are well 
defined; (3) bids are evaluated comparably with no advantage to affiliates; and (4) it is 
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competitive solicitation is not the only way to address concerns that an affiliate 
transaction does not pose undue preference concerns.
545 
533.  The Commission said it continues to believe that tying the price of an affiliate 
transaction to an established, relevant market price or index such as in an RTO or ISO 
is acceptable benchmark evidence and mitigates affiliate abuse concerns so long as 
that benchmark price or index reflects the market price where the affiliate transaction 
occurs.  The Commission proposed to allow affiliate transactions based on a non-
RTO price index only if the index fulfills the requirements of the November 19 Price 
Index Order
546 for eligibility for use in jurisdictional tariffs.  The Commission sought 
comment on whether evidence other than competitive solicitations, RTO price or 
non-RTO price indices, or benchmarks described in the NOPR should be accepted in 
an application for authority to engage in market-based affiliate power sales.  In 
addition, the Commission proposed to consider two merging partners as affiliates as 
of the date a merger is announced, and sought comments on this proposal (or whether 
to use the date the § 203 application is filed with the Commission, or another time).  
The Commission also proposed that unaffiliated entities that engage in energy/asset 
                                              
545 Although our focus and discussion in this rule is affiliate abuse with respect to 
affiliates that sell at market-based rates, affiliate concerns also arise with respect to 
affiliate sales at cost-based rates.  See, e.g., Duke Energy Corp. and Cinergy Corp.,      
113 FERC ¶ 61,297 at P 113-116 (2005), reh’g denied, 118 FERC ¶ 61,077 (2007). 
546 Order Regarding Future Monitoring of Voluntary Price Formation, Use of Price 
Indices In Jurisdictional Tariffs, and Closing Certain Tariff Dockets, 109 FERC ¶ 61,184 
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management of generation on behalf of a franchised public utility or non-regulated 
utility be bound to comply with the same affiliate restrictions as those imposed on the 
franchised public utility and the non-regulated power sales affiliate. 
534.  The Commission said it continues to believe that tying the price of an affiliate 
transaction to an established, relevant market price or index such as in an RTO or ISO 
is acceptable benchmark evidence and mitigates affiliate abuse concerns so long as 
that benchmark price or index reflects the market price where the affiliate transaction 
occurs.  The Commission proposed to allow affiliate transactions based on a non-
RTO price index only if the index fulfills the requirements of the November 19 Price 
Index Order
547 for eligibility for use in jurisdictional tariffs.  The Commission sought 
comment on whether evidence other than competitive solicitations, RTO price or 
non-RTO price indices, or benchmarks described in the NOPR should be accepted in 
an application for authority to engage in market-based affiliate power sales.  In 
addition, the Commission proposed to consider two merging partners as affiliates as 
of the date a merger is announced, and sought comments on this proposal (or whether 
to use the date the § 203 application is filed with the Commission, or another time).  
The Commission also proposed that unaffiliated entities that engage in energy/asset 
management of generation on behalf of a franchised public utility or non-regulated 
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utility be bound to comply with the same affiliate restrictions as those imposed on the 
franchised public utility and the non-regulated power sales affiliate. 
Comments 
535.  Industrial Customers urge the Commission to recognize that when an affiliate 
transaction has been subject to a state-approved process, separate section 205 
approvals for such transactions should not be required.  If, however, the Commission 
does maintain the section 205 approval, “the imprimatur of state commission 
approval should create a rebuttable presumption that the transaction is just and 
reasonable.”
548   NASUCA comments that the Commission should not assume the 
reasonableness of all affiliate sales under contracts with prices linked to spot markets 
or other auction results.
549   
536.  Other commenters urge the Commission to clarify that, while requests for 
proposals consistent with the Allegheny and Edgar standards and affiliate sales based 
on market index prices constitute a safe harbor for affiliate abuse, those should not be 
the only safe harbors.
550  The Commission should state it is willing to consider other 
information and evidence, including affiliate sales reviewed and authorized by a state 
regulatory agency, as safe harbors as well.
551 
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537.  New Jersey Board disagrees with comments that the Commission should 
consider state approval of affiliate sales as a safe harbor and responds that the 
Commission should assure that affiliate abuse does not take place and not ignore 
affiliate sales based on actions and oversight by state commissions.
552 
538.  State AGs and Advocates oppose the Commission’s proposal to find affiliate 
sales of wholesale power just and reasonable if such sales are made through an 
auction that reflects certain guidelines such as those set forth in Edgar and Allegheny.  
Instead, State AGs and Consumer Advocates state that the Commission should 
develop behavioral market power tests that apply to all market structures and that 
each auction should be assessed separately and evaluated on the merits of the 
proposal.
553 
539.  Industrial Customers oppose the Commission’s proposal to rely on an 
RTO/ISO benchmark price or index to mitigate affiliate abuse concerns and argues 
that tying an affiliate transaction to a price index should not allow utilities to escape 
scrutiny.
554 
Commission Determination 
540.  The Commission adopts the proposal to continue its approach for determining 
what types of affiliate transactions are permissible and the criteria used to make those 
                                              
552 New Jersey Board reply comments at 6. 
553 State AGs and Advocates reply comments at 12-13. 
554 Industrial Customers at 16-18. Docket No. RM04-7-000   305 
 
decisions.  Although we are not codifying a safe harbor in our regulations, when 
affiliates participate in a competitive solicitation process for power sales, we will 
consider proper application of the Allegheny guidelines to constitute a safe harbor 
that the affiliate abuse concerns are satisfied in a transaction between a franchised 
public utility with captive customers and its non-regulated power sales affiliate.  The 
Commission will consider proposed competitive solicitations on a case-by-case basis.  
We again emphasize that using a competitive solicitation by applying the Allegheny 
and Edgar guidelines is not the only way an affiliate transaction can address our 
concerns that the transaction does not pose undue preference concerns.  We will 
consider other approaches on a case-by-case basis.  Also, to the extent a seller is not 
bound by the affiliate restrictions because neither the seller nor the buyer has captive 
customers, we find that the Edgar principles do not apply and the seller does not need 
to make a filing with regard to a proposed competitive solicitation.
555    
541.  A number of commenters urge the Commission to find that a state-approved 
solicitation process creates a rebuttable presumption that an affiliate transaction 
satisfies the Commission’s affiliate abuse concerns.  The Commission will consider a 
state-approved process as evidence in its consideration as to whether our affiliate 
abuse concerns have been adequately addressed, but the Commission will not treat a 
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state-approved process as creating a rebuttable presumption that our affiliate abuse 
concerns have been addressed.  In this regard, the Commission has a responsibility 
under section 205 of the FPA to ensure that all jurisdictional rates charged are just 
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  While a state-approved 
solicitation process may provide evidence that the wholesale rates proposed as a 
result of that process are just and reasonable and do not involve any undue 
discrimination or preference, we do not believe it is appropriate to create a rebuttable 
presumption. 
542.  Further, the Commission will continue to allow an established, relevant market 
price or index such as in an RTO or ISO to be used as a benchmark for the 
reasonableness of the price of an affiliate transaction.  In this regard, we disagree with 
commenters that relying on such prices or indices allows utilities to escape 
Commission scrutiny.  Such an index is acceptable benchmark evidence and mitigates 
affiliate abuse concerns so long as that benchmark price or index reflects the market 
price where the affiliate transaction occurs (i.e., is a relevant index).
556  The 
Commission previously stated that the added protections in structured markets with 
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Elec. Co., 96 FERC ¶ 61,093 at 61,378 (2001); FirstEnergy Trading, 88 FERC ¶ 61,067 
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central commitment and dispatch and market monitoring and mitigation (such as 
RTOs/ISOs) generally result in a market where prices are transparent.
557 
543.  In addition, while the Commission has found in the past that certain non-RTO 
price indices are acceptable indicators of market prices, we continue to recognize that 
price indices at thinly traded points can be subject to manipulation and are otherwise 
not good measures of market prices as discussed in the Price Index Policy 
Statement
558 and November 19 Price Index Order.  Therefore, the Commission will 
allow affiliate transactions based on a non-RTO price index only if the index fulfills 
the requirements of the November 19 Price Index Order for eligibility for use in 
jurisdictional tariffs and reflects the market price where the affiliate transaction 
occurs (i.e., is a relevant index).
559 
3.  Market-Based Rate Affiliate Restrictions (formerly Code of Conduct) 
for Affiliate Transactions Involving Power Sales and Brokering, Non-
Power Goods and Services and Information Sharing 
Commission Proposal 
544.  The Commission stated in the NOPR that it continues to believe that a code of 
conduct is necessary to protect captive customers from the potential for affiliate 
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abuse.  In light of the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
560 
and the fact that holding company systems may have franchised public utility 
members with captive customers as well as numerous non-regulated power sales 
affiliates that engage in non-power goods and services transactions with each other, 
the Commission stated that it is important to have in place restrictions that preclude 
transferring captive customer benefits to stockholders through a company’s non-
regulated power sales business.  Therefore, the Commission stated its belief that it is 
appropriate to condition all market-based rate authorizations, including authorizations 
for sellers within holding companies, on the seller abiding by a code of conduct for 
sales of non-power goods and services and services between power sales affiliates.  In 
addition, the Commission stated that greater uniformity and consistency in the codes 
of conduct is appropriate and, therefore, proposed to adopt a uniform code of conduct 
to govern the relationship between franchised public utilities with captive customers 
and their “non-regulated” affiliates, i.e., affiliates whose power sales are not regulated 
on a cost basis under the FPA.  The Commission proposed to codify such affiliate 
restrictions in the regulations and to require that, as a condition of receiving market-
based rate authority, franchised public utility sellers with captive customers comply 
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with these restrictions.  The Commission proposed that the failure to satisfy the 
conditions set forth in the affiliate restrictions will constitute a tariff violation.   
545.  The Commission sought comments on this proposal and on whether the 
specific affiliate restrictions proposed in the NOPR are sufficient to protect captive 
customers.  In particular, the Commission sought comments on what changes, if any, 
should be adopted. 
a.  Uniform Code of Conduct/Affiliate Restrictions - Generally 
Comments 
546.  Some commenters support codifying the code of conduct affiliate restrictions 
in the regulations and comment that it will lead to consistent codes of conduct across 
all sellers, thus creating greater transparency, and will aid the Commission’s 
enforcement efforts.
561  ELCON argues that the ability of large utility holding 
companies with one foot in “competition” and one foot in “regulation” creates a 
myriad of potential problems.
562 Several state agencies and consumer commenters 
generally support the proposal to codify uniform code of conduct restrictions in the 
Commission’s regulations.
563  NASUCA comments that the separation of function 
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requirements should apply to any affiliate with retail customers, not just to affiliates 
who are franchised public utilities.
564  
547.  FP&L, however, does not believe it is unduly preferential to have different 
codes of conduct.
565  Indianapolis P&L argues that a single tariff/code of conduct 
does not make sense for diversified energy companies with geographically 
widespread operations.
566   
548.  FP&L states that the Commission should include in the regulatory text the 
statement that the affiliate restrictions are waived where a seller demonstrates that 
there are no captive customers.
567  EEI states that utilities already found not to have 
captive customers because of retail choice should be grandfathered and should not 
have to request waiver of the code of conduct again.
568  
Commission Determination  
549.  The Commission will adopt the proposed affiliate restrictions with certain 
modifications and clarifications.  These restrictions govern the separation of 
functions, the sharing of market information, sales of non-power goods or services, 
and power brokering.  The Commission will require that, as a condition of receiving 
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and retaining market-based rate authority, sellers comply with these affiliate 
restrictions unless otherwise permitted by Commission rule or order.  As discussed 
herein, these affiliate restrictions govern the relationship between franchised public 
utilities with captive customers and their “market-regulated” affiliates, i.e., affiliates 
whose power sales are regulated in whole or in part on a market-based rate basis.  
550.  Failure to satisfy the conditions set forth in the affiliate restrictions will 
constitute a violation of the market-based rate tariff.  As discussed in greater detail 
below, the Commission agrees with many of the commenters that the requirements 
and exceptions in the affiliate restrictions should follow those requirements and 
exceptions codified in the standards of conduct, where applicable.
569  The 
                                              
569 On November 17, 2006, the D.C. Circuit vacated the Order No. 2004 standards 
of conduct orders as they related to natural gas pipelines and remanded the orders to the 
Commission.  National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir.  
2006).  The court found that the rulemaking record did not support the Commission’s 
attempt to extend the standards of conduct beyond pipelines’ relationships with their 
marketing affiliates to also govern pipelines’ relationships with numerous non-marketing 
affiliates, such as producers, gatherers, and local distribution companies (which Order 
No. 2004 defined as “energy affiliates”).  In response to this decision, the Commission 
issued an interim rule on January 9, 2007 reinstating those provisions of Order No. 2004 
that were not specifically appealed to the D.C. Circuit.  Standards of Conduct for 
Transmission Providers, Order No. 690, 72 FR 2427 (Jan. 19, 2007); FERC Stats. & 
Regs. ¶ 31,237 (Jan. 9, 2007); order on reh’g, Standards of Conduct for Transmission 
Providers, Order No. 690-A, 72 FR 14235 (Mar. 27, 2007); FERC Stats. & Regs.             
¶ 31,243 (2007).  On January 18, 2007, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking proposing to make the changes in the Interim Rule permanent and seeking 
comment on whether the restrictions covering relationships between electric transmission 
providers and non-marketing affiliates that are engaged in energy transactions should be 
retained.  Standards of Conduct for Transmission Providers, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 72 FR 3958 (Jan. 29, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,611 (2007).  Docket No. RM04-7-000   312 
 
Commission believes that modeling these restrictions and the exceptions to those 
restrictions on the standards of conduct will lead to greater consistency and 
transparency and a greater understanding of permissible activities. 
551.  The Commission clarifies that any sellers that have previously demonstrated 
and been found not to have captive customers, and therefore have received a waiver 
of the market-based rate code of conduct requirement in whole or in part, will not be 
required to request another waiver of the associated affiliate restrictions.  However, 
those sellers are still under the obligation to report to the Commission any changes in 
status that may affect the basis on which the Commission relied in granting their 
waiver, consistent with the requirements of Order No. 652.
570  Additionally, those 
sellers also will be required to meet the requirements necessary to maintain their 
market-based rate authority when they file their regularly scheduled updated market 
power analyses.  As a result, they will be required to demonstrate that they continue 
to lack captive customers in order to support a continued waiver of the affiliate 
restrictions in the regulations.  Sellers will also need to explain why any wholesale 
customers are not captive, as explained above. 
552.  In response to FP&L and EEI, because we clarify in this Final Rule that, where 
a seller demonstrates and the Commission agrees that it has no captive customers, the 
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affiliate restrictions will not apply, the Commission does not believe it is necessary to 
include in the regulatory text a provision stating that the affiliate restrictions are 
waived where a seller demonstrates and the Commission agrees that it has no captive 
customers.   
b.  Exceptions to the Independent Functioning Requirement 
Commission Proposal Regarding Separation of Employees and 
Shared Employees 
553.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed regulatory language in § 35.39(b)(2) 
(now § 35.39(c)(2)) codifying the independent functioning requirement.  Specifically, 
the Commission stated, to the maximum extent practical, the employees of a non-
regulated power sales affiliate will operate separately from the employees of any 
affiliated franchised public utility. 
554.  The Commission did not propose to include any exceptions to the independent 
functioning requirements.  However, the Commission invited commenters to propose 
additions to, substitutions for or elimination of the proposed affiliate restrictions.
571  
Comments 
555.  A number of commenters request that the Commission modify the affiliate 
restrictions to adopt some of the requirements and exceptions consistent with those 
codified in Order No. 2004, such as allowing the sharing of senior officers and 
members of the board of directors, field and maintenance employees and support 
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employees.  According to EPSA, the affiliate restrictions should provide specifically 
for permissible sharing of officers (not just sharing of support personnel) between a 
franchised public utility and a non-regulated power sales affiliate.   EPSA notes that 
Order No. 2004 allows for shared officers as long as they do not direct, organize or 
execute day-to-day business transactions.
572 
556.  Duke comments that treatment of shared employees under the affiliate 
restrictions should follow the obligations adopted in the standards of conduct.  For 
example, Duke urges the Commission to allow the sharing of officers and 
directors.
573  Additionally, Avista states that the proposed affiliate restrictions should 
distinguish between operational and non-operational employees.
574    
557.  PG&E urges the Commission to clarify which employees cannot be shared.  
PG&E states that prohibiting employees involved in general operation of generation 
facilities, who lack control over generation availability, from being shared would be 
overly broad and unduly restrictive.
575  PPL similarly requests clarification of which 
employees would be deemed “shared employees” under the affiliate restrictions.
576  
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558.  NiSource requests that the Commission create an exception to allow the 
sharing between operational employees of the franchised public utility and its non-
regulated sales affiliates of any information necessary to maintain the safe and 
reliable operation of the bulk power system, similar to the exception in the standards 
of conduct at § 358.5(b)(8) of the Commission’s regulations.
577 
559.  EEI and FirstEnergy also request that the independent functioning requirement 
and information sharing restrictions in the proposed affiliate restrictions should have 
an exception for sharing employees and market information for emergency 
circumstances affecting system reliability.
578     
560.  On the other hand, Morgan Stanley urges the Commission not to adopt a 
blanket exception to the affiliate restrictions for emergency situations because the 
commenters’ proposal regarding what constitutes an “emergency” is vague and leaves 
too much discretion to the individual sellers.  Additionally, Morgan Stanley explains 
that communications with an affiliate during an emergency may not adequately 
address an emergency; sharing information with all sellers in the market would 
provide a better foundation to deal with any emergency.
579 
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Commission Determination 
561.  The Commission will revise the independent functioning requirement of the 
affiliate restrictions to include exceptions relating to permissibly shared senior 
officers and members of boards of directors, shared support personnel, and shared 
field and maintenance personnel.  With regard to permissibly shared individuals, the 
Commission will impose a “no-conduit rule” similar to that in the standards of 
conduct.
580  Under the no conduit rule, to be codified at § 35.39(g), a permissibly 
shared employee is prohibited from acting as a conduit for disclosing market 
information to employees, officers or directors that are not shared. 
562.  The Commission agrees that a franchised public utility with captive customers 
and its market-regulated power sales affiliates should be permitted to share senior 
officers and members of the board of directors to conduct corporate governance 
functions, and to take advantage of the efficiencies of corporate integration.
581  
Therefore, the Commission is adopting an exception at § 35.39(c)(2)(d) that permits a 
franchised public utility with captive customers and its market-regulated power sales 
affiliate to share senior officers and members of the board of directors.  Specifically, 
a franchised public utility with captive customers and its market-regulated power 
sales affiliate may share senior officers and members of boards of directors provided 
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that these individuals do not participate in directing, operating or executing 
generation or market functions.
582  In addition, to prevent permissibly shared senior 
officers or members of the board of directors from using their preferential access to 
market information to harm captive customers, consistent with the no-conduit rule 
codified at § 35.39(g), the permissibly shared senior officers and directors may not 
act as a conduit to provide market information to non-shared employees of the 
franchised public utility with captive customers or its market-regulated power sales 
affiliates.   
563.  The Commission also agrees that it is appropriate to codify an exception that 
permits the sharing of support employees between the franchised public utility with 
captive customers and its market-regulated power sales affiliates comparable to the 
standards of conduct exception, likewise subject to the no-conduit rule.
583   
564.  The Commission rejects Duke’s request that the Commission include a non-
exhaustive list of examples of permissible shared support employees within the body 
of  § 35.39.  However, we clarify that the types of permissibly shared support 
employees under the standards of conduct are the types of permissibly shared support 
employees that will be allowed under the affiliate restrictions in § 35.39(c)(2)(c).  
Such employees include those in legal, accounting, human resources, travel and 
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information technology.
584  Because permissibly shared employees may have access 
to market information, they are prohibited from acting as a conduit to provide market 
information to employees of the franchised public utility with captive customers and 
the market-regulated power sales affiliates that are not permitted to be shared. 
565.  The Commission also agrees to codify an exception to the independent 
functioning requirement to allow franchised public utilities with captive customers 
and their market-regulated power sales affiliates to share field and maintenance 
employees.  Field and maintenance employees perform purely manual, technical or 
mechanical duties that are supportive in nature and do not have planning or direct 
operational responsibilities.  Such employees would likely be part of shared work 
crews to do repair or maintenance work on facilities or equipment.  Examples of 
activities that may be performed by shared field and maintenance employees are 
reading meters, replacing parts in generators, restringing transmission lines, snow 
removal or maintaining roadways.  The key is that these employees do not also 
perform operational duties.
585  A field or maintenance employee cannot be shared if 
that employee also engages in marketing activities, makes decisions that would affect 
marketing activities, or controls generation.  We also consider the immediate 
supervisors of field and maintenance employees as permissibly shared employees so 
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long as they cannot control operations, e.g. restrict or shut down generation 
facilities.
586 
566.  The Commission agrees with commenters that allowing the sharing of field 
and maintenance employees between a franchised public utility with captive 
customers and its market-regulated power sales affiliates is unlikely to harm captive 
customers, provided that those shared employees do not act as a conduit for sharing 
market information with employees of the franchised public utility with captive 
customers or market-regulated power sales affiliates.  The permissibly shared field 
and maintenance employees are required to observe the no-conduit rule. 
567.  The Commission disagrees with NiSource that a broad exception to the 
independent functioning and information sharing requirement is needed for the 
reliable operation of the bulk power system.  Such an exception would be so broad 
that it would swallow the rule and create too many opportunities for shared 
employees to take actions to harm captive customers based upon their decision 
making authority and control over the bulk power system.  The Commission will 
consider requests for waiver of the affiliate restriction requirements to address the 
specific circumstances of the operation of a bulk power system and notes that, 
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subsequent to NiSource’s comments, the Commission granted a partial waiver of the 
code of conduct requirements for the situation described in NiSource’s comments.
587   
568.  While the Commission does not agree with NiSource’s proposal for a broad 
exception to the affiliate restrictions for everyday operations of the bulk power 
system, the Commission does agree with EEI and FirstEnergy that the affiliate 
restrictions should contain an exception related to emergency circumstances affecting 
system reliability.  As such, the Commission will adopt an exception to the 
independent functioning requirement and the information sharing restrictions for 
emergency circumstances affecting system reliability comparable to the exception in 
the standards of conduct.
588  The exception will apply to both the independent 
functioning requirements and the information sharing restrictions.  The Commission 
will modify proposed § 35.39(d) (to be codified at § 35.39(c)(2)(b)) to add a 
                                              
587 Northern Indiana Public Service Company and Whiting Clean Energy, Inc., 
116 FERC ¶ 61,248 (2006).  Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO) 
sought a waiver of the code of conduct so that it could perform its duties as a balancing 
authority.  Specifically, NIPSCO wanted the ability to have access to real-time 
information regarding the amount of energy being delivered to NIPSCO from its affiliate, 
Whiting Clean Energy, Inc. (Whiting)  The Commission granted a partial waiver limited 
to Whiting providing NIPSCO with the real-time information NIPSCO needed to carry 
out its responsibilities as a balancing authority in accordance with the requirements of the 
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), NERC approved regional 
reliability organization and  the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, 
Inc.  Id. at P 13.  The Commission also reminded NIPSCO that its employees were 
prohibited from being a conduit for improperly sharing Whiting’s generation information.  
Id. 
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provision that states that, notwithstanding any other restrictions in this section, in 
emergency circumstances affecting system reliability, a market-regulated power sales 
affiliate and the franchised public utility with captive customers may take the 
necessary steps to keep the bulk power system in operation.  The relaxation of the 
requirements during system emergencies is intended to ensure that the franchised 
public utility with captive customers and market-regulated power sales affiliate(s) can 
maintain reliability of the power grid.  However, the market-regulated power sales 
affiliate or the franchised public utility must report to the Commission and disclose to 
the public on its website each emergency that resulted in any deviation from the 
restrictions of § 35.39(c)(2)(b), within 24 hours of such deviation.  Reports to the 
Commission of emergency deviations under the affiliate restrictions in § 
35.39(c)(2)(b) will be made using the “EY” docket prefix. 
569.  The Commission and the public will be able to monitor the frequency of these 
emergency deviations through the reporting requirement.  Members of the public can 
seek redress from the Commission if they feel that the exception has been abused or 
used improperly. 
c.  Information Sharing Restrictions 
Commission Proposal 
570.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed regulatory language to codify the 
information sharing restrictions.  Specifically, the Commission proposed that the 
regulations provide that all market information sharing between a franchised public 
utility and a non-regulated power sales affiliate will be disclosed simultaneously to Docket No. RM04-7-000   322 
 
the public.  This includes, but is not limited to any communication concerning power 
or transmission business, present or future, positive or negative, concrete or 
potential.
589   
Comments 
571.  Ameren supports codification of the information sharing restrictions, but 
recommends that proposed § 35.39(c) be revised to allow permissibly shared senior 
officers and directors to receive market information so long as they do not act as a 
conduit to improperly share such information, akin to the standards of conduct.   
572.  Avista argues that the Commission should allow officers to be shared by 
affiliates, subject to the no-conduit rule.
590  EEI argues that for corporate governance 
and accountability purposes, there should be an exception to the information sharing 
prohibitions for shared senior officers, subject to the no conduit rule.
591  
573.    EPSA also asks the Commission to provide a specific time period for the 
length of time that posted information needs to remain on the website.
592    
574.  PPL comments that the Commission should clarify which situations would 
permit deviations from the code of conduct regarding information sharing.  
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Specifically, it suggests that the Commission adopt, for the affiliate restrictions, the 
standards of conduct exception that permits the sharing of information to comply with 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements.
593 
575.  A number of commenters argue that the Commission should not adopt the 
two-way information sharing prohibition in the uniform code of conduct because they 
disagree that a communication from the non-regulated power sales affiliate to the 
franchised public utility could potentially harm captive customers.
594   
576.  Duke notes that while the two-way restriction is consistent with the default 
code of conduct that the Commission has used since 1999, the Commission has 
approved many codes of conduct that contain one-way restrictions (i.e., codes that 
restrict a franchised public utility from sharing marketing information with its non-
regulated power sales affiliates, but do not place a similar restriction on a non-
regulated power marketer from sharing market information with its affiliated 
franchised utility.)  Duke says the Commission has failed to explain the elimination 
of previously-approved one-way restrictions.
595  It submits that the one-way code of 
conduct is sufficient to address affiliate abuse concerns and that the two-way code of 
                                              
593 PPL reply comments at 21-22 citing Interpretive Order Relating to the 
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conduct requirement will impose substantial costs on market-based rate sellers with 
no discernible benefits.
596 According to Duke, a number of market participants have 
made important organizational and commercial decisions based on current policies 
and precedents allowing one-way communications.  In the absence of any basis for 
reversing that policy, Duke submits that the Commission should reconsider its 
proposal to mandate two-way information sharing restrictions.   
577.  In addition, Duke argues that only two commenters, EPSA and ELCON, 
expressed even generalized support for a standardized code of conduct containing the 
two-way code restriction, but did not address the underlying policy issues of why or 
how a traditional utility’s regulated customers could be harmed if their unregulated 
affiliate were to share market information with the utility.
597 
578.  According to FP&L, the proposed two-way information sharing restriction 
does not provide any additional protection for captive customers.  Rather, such a 
restriction may place artificial and unnecessary barriers on a company’s ability to 
conduct business.
598  According to FP&L, the two-way restriction proposed in § 
35.39(c) (to be codified at § 35.39(d)) concerning the communication of all market 
information between a franchised public utility and its non-regulated power sales 
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affiliates is unnecessary if sales of capacity and energy between those entities are 
prohibited under the specific terms of the market-based rate tariff.  It submits that, if 
the Commission nevertheless concludes that a two-way restriction on 
communications should be adopted, then the final regulations should provide an 
exception if, in the market-based rate tariff, the non-regulated power sales affiliates 
have restricted sales to, and purchases from, their franchised public utility affiliate 
without having received advance Commission approval pursuant to a separate filing 
under section 205 of the FPA.
599   
579.  Similarly, EEI argues that the Commission has not explained how the two-way 
information sharing prohibition protects captive customers.
600 
Commission Determination 
580.    The Commission will revise the information sharing prohibitions to adopt 
certain exceptions. As discussed earlier with regard to the independent functioning 
requirement, we are creating exceptions to permit shared senior officers and members 
of a board of directors, as well as to permit shared field and maintenance employees.  
Permissibly shared employees may share all types of market information.  However, 
the information sharing provision, like all the affiliate restrictions, is subject to the 
“no-conduit” rule that we codify in the regulations.  The no-conduit rule allows 
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permissibly shared employees to receive market information so long as they are not 
conduits for sharing that information with employees that are not permissibly shared.  
In addition, as also discussed earlier in the independent functioning section, market 
information may be shared to address emergency circumstances affecting system 
reliability in order to keep the bulk power system in operation, provided that the 
subsequent reporting provisions are followed.     
581.  In response to PPL Companies’ concern as to communications relating to 
nuclear power plants, the Commission clarifies that the types of communications 
permitted under the standards of conduct for nuclear safety and regulatory 
requirements are also permitted under the affiliate restrictions.
601  Specifically, the 
Commission permitted transmission providers to communicate with affiliated and 
nonaffiliated nuclear power plants to enable the nuclear power plants to comply with 
the requirements of the NRC as described in the NRC’s February 1, 2006 Generic 
Letter 2006-002, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of 
Offsite Power.
602   
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and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power. February 1, 2006. 
OMB Control No.: 3150-0011.  Transmission providers may share with affiliates 
information to operate and maintain the transmission system and information required to 
maintain interconnected facilities.  However, transmission providers may not share 
transmission or marketing information that would give a transmission provider’s 
marketing or energy affiliates undue preference over a transmission provider’s non-
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582.  In response to EPSA’s request regarding the specific time period that posted 
material needs to remain on the website, the Commission concludes that it is 
appropriate to use the requirements set forth regarding OASIS postings in 18 CFR 
37.7(b).  Specifically, the material must be posted for 90 days and then be retained 
and made available upon request for download for five years from the date when first 
posted.  The archived material must be available in the same electronic form used as 
when it was originally posted. 
583.  The Commission will adopt the two-way information sharing restriction in 
proposed § 35.39(c) (now § 35.39(d)).  The purpose of the affiliate restrictions in § 
35.39 is to ensure that franchised public utility sellers with captive customers will not 
be able to engage in affiliate abuse to the detriment of those captive customers.  One 
way the Commission achieves this is by restricting the sharing of information 
between a franchised public utility with captive customers and a market-regulated 
power sales affiliate.  The Commission has long required a seller to address any 
potential affiliate abuse concerns before receiving Commission authorization to sell at 
market-based rates.  The Commission has previously held that “[t]here are many 
ways for the affiliated public utility and the affiliated power marketer to exchange 
information that would exacerbate affiliate abuse concerns.”
603  Therefore, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
affiliated customers in energy markets.  114 FERC ¶ 61,155 (2006). 
603 Heartland Energy Services, Inc., 68 FERC ¶ 61,223 (1994). Docket No. RM04-7-000   328 
 
Commission required that the sellers “ensure that market information is not shared 
among affiliates.”
604 
584.  The Commission later reaffirmed this in stating the general standards under 
which it reviews applications for market-based rate authority, including a 
demonstration by an affiliate that “there are adequate procedures in place to ensure 
that market information is not shared between it and the affiliate public utility.”
605   
585.  With regard to Duke's suggestion that we have failed to explain the elimination 
of the one-way restriction, we will provide the following example of our concern in 
this regard.    
586.  One example of how of improper sharing of information could harm captive 
customers is a circumstance where both a franchised public utility and its market-
regulated power sales affiliate are considering whether to bid into an RFP to provide 
power.  If the market-regulated power sales affiliate has absolute freedom to inform 
its franchised public utility affiliate that it intends to bid into the RFP, including but 
not limited to the price and quantity it intends to offer, the franchised public utility 
affiliate has the ability and incentive to use that information to benefit its 
stockholders at the expense of its captive customers (e.g., by either not bidding into 
the RFP or doing so at a price above that of its affiliate).  
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587.  While we recognize that some sellers may need to adjust their activities to 
comply with the two-way information restriction, we do not believe that such 
adjustments will impose significant costs upon those sellers.  Furthermore, as 
explained above, we believe that the two-way information sharing restriction will 
provide captive customers a more complete protection from affiliate abuse.  We find 
that any potential cost to sellers is outweighed by the increased protection a two-way 
information sharing restriction provides to captive customers.   
588.  Therefore, to ensure that all captive customers are protected from the potential 
for affiliate abuse, the Commission will adopt the proposed two-way information 
restriction in § 35.39(d).  Any sellers whose activities are currently governed by a 
code of conduct with a one-way information restriction will be deemed to have 
adopted a two-way information restriction as of the effective date of this Final Rule.     
589.  The Commission restates that the affiliate restrictions only apply when captive 
customers exist; therefore, if the Commission has found that there are no captive 
customers, then, consistent with § 35.39(b) through (g), the affiliate restrictions, 
including the prohibition on information sharing, will not apply.  
d.  Definition of “Market Information” 
Comments 
590.  Progress Energy urges the Commission to clarify the definition of the term 
“market information” which it argues is arbitrarily broad and may include public as Docket No. RM04-7-000   330 
 
well as non-public market information.
606  SoCal Edison states that the Commission 
should only prohibit the sharing of non-public market information among a utility and 
its market-regulated power sales affiliates, as outlined in the standards of conduct.
607  
EPSA also asserts that the Commission should clarify that the simultaneous posting 
requirement should apply to the communication of all non-public market information 
(not all market information).  It notes that Order No. 2004 specifically applies to non-
public transmission information, not all transmission information. 
Commission Determination 
591.  The Commission previously explained that “market information” includes 
information on sales or purchases that will not be made (as well as purchases and 
sales that will be made), as well as any information concerning a utility’s power or 
transmission business – broker-related or not, past, present or future, positive or 
negative, concrete or potential, significant or slight.
608  In an effort to provide 
additional clarity and regulatory certainty, we will provide further guidance and adopt 
and codify in                   § 35.36(a)(8) the following definition of market information: 
“market information means  non-public information related to the electric energy and 
power business including, but not limited to, information regarding sales, cost of 
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production, generator outages, generator heat rates, unconsummated transactions, or 
historical generator volumes.  Market information includes information from either 
affiliates or non-affiliates.”   
592.  The Commission clarifies that the definition does not prohibit the disclosure of 
publicly available information. We find that, because of its very nature of being 
publicly available to all entities, restrictions on sharing publicly available information 
are unnecessary.  In addition, the definition does not prohibit the sharing of 
transmission information.  The standards of conduct already prevent improper 
disclosures of non-public transmission information by a transmission provider to its 
marketing and energy affiliates, which would include both the franchised public 
utility with captive customers and the market-regulated power sales affiliate.
609  
593.  Further, as we have indicated, a principal purpose of the affiliate restrictions is 
to ensure that the interaction between a franchised public utility and its market-
regulated affiliate does not result in harm to the franchised public utility’s captive 
customers.  Therefore, we clarify that, as a general matter, the definition of “market 
information” includes information that, if shared between a franchised public utility 
and a market-regulated affiliate, may result in a detriment to the franchised public 
utility’s captive customers.  Therefore, market information includes, but is not limited 
to, information concerning sales and purchases that will not be made such as in 
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circumstances where parties have discussed a potential contract but no agreement has 
been reached.  In contrast, market information does not include information that 
would not result in an advantage to the recipient that could be used to the detriment of 
the franchised public utility’s captive customers.  For example, a franchised public 
utility with captive customers and its market-regulated power sales affiliate may 
share information related to the relocation of the franchised public utility’s 
headquarters, business opportunities outside the United States, general turbine safety 
information and internal procedures for general maintenance activities (other than 
scheduling).  We clarify that the definition of “market information” includes, but is 
not limited to, written, printed, verbal, audiovisual, or graphic information. 
594.  We are adding language to the information sharing restriction of § 35.39(d)(1) 
to make clear that disclosures of market information are prohibited, unless 
simultaneously disclosed to the public, if the information could be used to the 
detriment of captive customers.  For example, if a franchised public utility with 
captive customers conducts negotiations with an unaffiliated generator to acquire 
power, but does not reach an agreement, the franchised public utility with captive 
customers is prohibited from sharing with its market-regulated power sales affiliate 
any non-public information it acquired through the unsuccessful negotiations unless 
such information is simultaneously disclosed to the public.  Information relating to 
any other entities’ electric energy or power business is also subject to the sharing of 
market information restriction if such information could be used to the detriment of 
captive customers.  Also subject to the information sharing restriction is information Docket No. RM04-7-000   333 
 
regarding brokering activities, past sales and purchase activities, and the availability 
or price of inputs to generation such as natural gas supply if such information could 
be used to the detriment of captive customers.  For example, a franchised public 
utility with captive customers is restricted from disclosing to its market-regulated 
power sales affiliate any non-public information about a non-affiliated generator’s 
upcoming maintenance or outage schedules or information about the non-affiliated 
generator’s historical generation volumes, unless such information is simultaneously 
disclosed to the public.  In addition, neither the franchised public utility with captive 
customers nor its market-regulated power sales affiliate may tell the other that it 
intends to sell power to a third party, including but not limited to the price and 
quantity it intends to offer, unless such information is simultaneously disclosed to the 
public.  Similarly, a market-regulated power sales affiliate is likewise restricted from 
telling its franchised public utility affiliate with captive customers about any other 
business opportunity that it is considering or is undertaking, unless such information 
is simultaneously disclosed to the public. 
e.  Sales of Non-Power Goods or Services 
Commission Proposal 
595.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed regulatory language to codify the 
requirements governing sales of non-power goods or services.  The Commission 
proposed that sales of any non-power goods or services by a franchised public utility 
to a market-regulated power sales affiliates will be at the higher of cost or market 
price, and that sales of any non-power goods or services by a market-regulated power Docket No. RM04-7-000   334 
 
sales affiliate to an affiliated franchised public utility will not be at a price above 
market.  
Comments 
596.  PG&E argues that, while charging the high of cost or market price may be 
appropriate for sales of goods, it is “inoperable and inappropriate” for sales of 
services because market prices for sales of service by a third party may be hard to 
ascertain due to limited providers and that prices from a third party provider will not 
take into account efficiencies resulting from a utility and its affiliate sharing 
services.
610  PG&E further comments that charging the higher of cost or market, as 
proposed, may increase costs for both the utility and the affiliate by discouraging the 
efficient sharing of services.  Therefore, PG&E proposes that instead of charging the 
higher of cost or market price for non-power services, the Commission should allow a 
proxy for the market price such as the fully-loaded cost plus a reasonable profit, e.g., 
five percent.
611 
Commission Determination 
597.  The Commission will adopt the NOPR proposal to codify the requirement that 
sales of non-power goods and services by a franchised public utility with captive 
customers to a market-regulated power sales affiliate be at the higher of cost or 
market price, unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.  This requirement, 
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along with other requirements in the affiliate restrictions, protect a franchised public 
utility’s captive customers against inappropriate cross-subsidization of market-
regulated power sales affiliates by ensuring that the utility with captive customers 
does not recover too little for goods and services that the utility provides to a market-
regulated power sales affiliate.
612  We also adopt the NOPR proposal to codify the 
requirement that sales of any non-power goods or services by a market-regulated 
power sales affiliate to an affiliated franchised public utility with captive customers 
will not be at a price above market, unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.  
This requirement protects a utility’s captive customers against inappropriate cross-
subsidization of market-regulated power sales affiliates by ensuring that the utility 
with captive customers does not pay too much for goods and services that the utility 
receives from a market-regulated power sales affiliate.   
598.  We note that PG&E fails to provide the Commission with any specific 
examples of non-power services for which there is no corresponding third-party 
provider.  Therefore, we are not persuaded by PG&E that there is a need or a benefit 
to changing our precedent on this issue.  We will adopt the affiliate restrictions as 
proposed and require that sales of non-power goods or services by a franchised public 
utility with captive customers to a market-regulated power sales affiliate be at the 
higher of cost or market price.  Nevertheless, we will address on a case-by-case basis 
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arguments that charging the higher of cost or market for certain sales of non-power 
services may not be appropriate in a particular case. 
f.  Service Companies or Parent Companies Acting on Behalf of and 
for the Benefit of a Franchised Public Utility 
Commission Proposal 
599.  The Commission proposed in the NOPR to treat companies that are acting on 
behalf of and for the benefit of franchised public utilities with captive customers, for 
purposes of the affiliate provisions, as that franchised public utility.  Likewise, in the 
case of non-regulated affiliates, the proposed affiliate provisions treat companies that 
are acting on behalf of and for the benefit of non-regulated affiliates, for purposes of 
the affiliate provisions, as the non-regulated affiliates.
613 
Comments 
600.  EEI asks the Commission to clarify that the code of conduct (affiliate 
restrictions) provisions to be codified in the regulations do not preclude the use of 
service companies that manage assets for both regulated and unregulated affiliates.
614  
EEI submits that the language of proposed §§ 35.39(b) (now § 35.39(c)) uses 
“entities acting on behalf of and for the benefit of a franchised pubic utility (such as 
entities managing the electric generation assets of the franchised public utility)” 
whereas the NOPR text reads “entities acting on behalf of and for the benefit of a 
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franchised public utility (such as service companies and entities managing the 
generation assets of the franchised pubic utility).”  EEI argues that the treatment of 
service companies as part of the franchised public utility in the preamble to the 
NOPR is different from the language in the proposed regulation and makes the 
Commission’s intent unclear.  It submits that many companies use service companies 
to provide support activities to the franchised utility and non-regulated affiliates 
consistent with the no-conduit rule.  EEI asks the Commission to clarify that the 
standardization of the code of conduct is not intended to change this practice.  PG&E 
claims that under a plain reading of the proposed regulation, a parent company that 
acts on behalf of either the utility or the affiliate will be considered a part of the 
utility or affiliate, and communication with either entity will be restricted under 
proposed               § 35.39(c) (now § 35.39(d)).
615  It argues that the Commission 
should only consider a holding company or parent company as an affiliate subject to 
the information sharing prohibitions if it engages in energy transactions on its own 
behalf.
616   
601.  Southern states that it is unclear how the Commission intends to address and 
apply the requirements of separation of functions and information sharing in the 
                                              
615 PG&E at 16-17. 
616 PG&E at 17. Docket No. RM04-7-000   338 
 
context of public utility holding companies that have system pooling agreements.
617  
Southern recommends the Commission refine the definition of “non-regulated power 
sales affiliate” at least insofar as that term is used in the proposed separation of 
functions and information sharing provisions to exclude pooled system affiliates of 
traditional franchised utilities where affiliate interactions and sharing of benefits and 
burdens of pooled operations are addressed under an arrangement filed and approved 
under section 205.
618   
602.  EEI requests that the Commission clarify that, in circumstances where sales 
between affiliates have been made in connection with an approved system agreement, 
such agreements continue to govern.
619  Southern requests that the Final Rule clarify 
that affiliated operating companies may continue to operate on a pooled basis.
620  
Southern states that traditional centralized service company affiliates providing 
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system pooling support services under filed and approved system agreements should 
not be treated as non-regulated power sales affiliates.
621   
Commission Determination 
603.  The Commission clarifies that it did not intend to include service companies as  
“entities acting on behalf of and for the benefit of a franchised public utility” for 
purposes of the separation of functions provision in § 35.39(b) (now § 35.39(c)) to 
the extent that such service companies do not engage in generation or marketing 
activities.
622  Although service companies not engaged in generation or marketing 
activities are not included in the coverage of § 35.39(e), they may not act as a conduit 
for providing non-public market information between a franchised public utility and a 
market-regulated power sales affiliate.  However, unless otherwise permitted by 
Commission rule or order, service companies cannot be used to direct, organize or 
execute generation or marketing activities for both the franchised public utility and 
the market-regulated power sales affiliate(s).  In response to Southern’s and EEI’s 
request to clarify that affiliated operating companies may continue to operate as a 
pool or pursuant to an approved system agreement, nothing in this Final Rule 
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precludes pool operation pursuant to filed tariffs or agreements approved by the 
Commission and nothing in this rule changes filed system agreements approved by 
the Commission.  To the extent that individual companies enter into new pooling or 
system agreements, the Commission will continue to review those agreements on a 
case-by-case basis to ensure that, among other things, affiliate transactions meet the 
requirements of section 205 of the FPA and otherwise satisfy our affiliate abuse 
concerns.  
D. Mitigation 
604.  In the NOPR, the Commission sought comment on whether the default 
mitigation adopted in the April 14 Order is appropriate as currently structured.  The 
Commission’s current default mitigation rates are as follows: (1) sales of power of 
one week or less will be priced at the seller’s incremental cost plus a 10 percent 
adder; (2) sales of power of more than one week but less than one year (sometimes 
referred to as “mid-term sales”) will be priced at an embedded cost “up to” rate 
reflecting the costs of the unit or units expected to provide the service; and (3) new 
contracts for sales of power for one year or more will be priced at a rate not to exceed 
the embedded cost of service, and the contract will be filed with the Commission for 
review and approved prior to the commencement of service.
623 
                                              
623 April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61, 018 at P 151; see also NOPR at P 22, 137. Docket No. RM04-7-000   341 
 
605.  In the NOPR, the Commission sought comment on the following four issues 
that have arisen in implementing cost-based mitigation:  (i) the rate methodology for 
designing cost-based mitigation; (ii) discounting; (iii) protecting customers in 
mitigated markets; and (iv) sales by mitigated sellers that “sink” in unmitigated 
markets. 
1.  Cost-Based Rate Methodology 
a.  Sales of One Week or Less 
Commission Proposal 
606.  The Commission noted that two principal issues concerning rate methodology 
have arisen in implementing the April 14 Order.  The first relates to power sales of 
one week or less being made at incremental cost plus 10 percent.
624  The Commission 
noted that sellers have argued that this is a departure from the Commission’s 
historical acceptance of “up to” rates for short-term energy sales, including sales of 
one week or less, and sought comment on whether to continue to apply a default rate 
for such sales that is tied to incremental cost plus 10 percent.  The Commission 
sought comment as to: (i) whether there are problems associated with using “up to” 
rates for shorter-term sales and, if so, what are they; (ii) whether the current approach 
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provides utilities a disincentive to offer their power to wholesale customers in their 
local control area for short-term sales; and (iii) whether an “up to” rate adequately 
mitigates market power for such sales. 
Comments 
607.  While not opposing the default rate, APPA/TAPS state that as an alternative, 
sales of one week or less could occur under the traditional “split the savings” 
methodology.
625  APPA/TAPS submit that both of these methods are consistent with 
the Commission’s observation that “[a]bsent market power, a generator would 
typically run if it had excess power and could cover its incremental costs plus some 
return.”
626 
608.  While the Carolina Agencies claim that sales of one week or less should not 
carry a capacity charge, they concede that a reasonable contribution to the mitigated 
supplier’s fixed costs may be appropriate (e.g., by including a modest adder over the 
supplier’s incremental cost of energy).
627 
609.  NRECA and AARP ask the Commission to retain the incremental cost plus 10 
percent methodology for mitigating sales of one week or less.
628   NRECA expresses 
a concern that the Commission’s default cost-based rates (for all three products - 
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sales of one week or less; sales of more than one week but less than one year; and 
sales of one year or longer) may be subject to gaming by larger public utilities, 
especially because the sellers hold all of the critical data.  It asserts that if sellers have 
too much leeway in choosing which units they will use to calculate their incremental 
or embedded costs, the default cost-based rates will not provide an effective rate 
ceiling, and the purpose of the default mitigation will be undermined.  NRECA 
proposes that the Commission require sellers subject to default cost-based rates to 
submit both pre- and post-approval filings supporting the mitigated cost-based rates 
for short-and mid-term sales.  NRECA suggests that the seller justify its mitigated 
rates beforehand by demonstrating its incremental costs or embedded costs, as 
appropriate, and then file after-the-fact quarterly reports of the actual sales and the 
actual incremental or embedded costs incurred in making these sales.
629  NRECA 
suggests that this approach would subject mitigated cost-based rate sales to a cost-
based formula rate, and therefore to refund, upon Commission review of the quarterly 
compliance filing.
630 
610.  NASUCA urges the Commission to require that all mitigated rates, and any 
rate discounts, whether for more or less than one year in duration, must be filed and 
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made subject to public scrutiny and Commission review under section 205 of the 
FPA.
631  NASUCA is concerned that under the NOPR, only rates to be in effect for 
more than one year are required to be filed publicly in advance and subject to protest, 
intervention, prior Commission review and revision.  It argues, however, that section 
205 contains no exception from the filing requirement for sales of less than one 
year.
632  Given that all new rate schedules and contracts affecting rates must be 
publicly filed, NASUCA asks the Commission not to reduce section 205’s procedural 
safeguards for sales of less than one year at cost-based rates (i.e., by not requiring that 
they be subject to prior notice and review).
633  
611.  Some commenters oppose the incremental cost plus 10 percent default rate, 
with several alleging that it deviates from prior Commission precedent without 
sufficient justification and fails to adequately compensate sellers.
634  Some 
commenters also allege that such an approach will deter new entry and gives sellers 
the incentive to sell outside the mitigated market.   
612.  For example, Westar states that the Commission’s reasoning in the July 8 
Order which explained that the cost plus 10 percent default rate represents a 
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“conservative proxy for a reasonable margin available in a competitive market,”
635 
suffers from two fatal flaws.  First, the Commission failed to distinguish or even 
mention Terra Comfort wherein, Westar and Duke submit, the Commission found 
that 10 percent adders provide no contribution to fixed costs, and it rejected the 
argument that “utilities routinely forego these margins and sell at 110 percent of 
incremental cost.”
636  Second, according to Westar, in adopting this default rate the 
Commission relied heavily upon an order that applied the formula in an RTO under 
entirely different circumstances.
637    
613.  MidAmerican and Westar note that, in support of the default rate, in the April 
14 Order the Commission cited a PJM tariff provision pursuant to which generators 
dispatched out of economic merit have their bids mitigated to incremental costs plus 
10 percent to prevent them from exercising market power and, at the same time, 
providing revenues which include a margin.
638  MidAmerican and Westar contend 
that this is merely an example of a mitigation mechanism, not a rationale for a broad-
scale default mitigation scheme that ignores years of precedent.
639  They submit that 
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the PJM tariff mitigates bids for a select set of generators.  They state that, regardless 
of the level of their bids, those generators are still paid the market clearing price 
because only the offer is capped.  Further, because PJM’s methodology applied this 
offer cap only to a limited number of hours, MidAmerican and Westar state that 
sellers were also free to bid above the cap in the majority of the hours of the year.
640  
In contrast, MidAmerican and Westar claim that the incremental cost plus 10 percent 
default rate is an absolute cap on revenues that would apply to all sales of one week 
or less in length.
641 
614.  Although the July 8 Order explained that incremental cost plus 10 percent was 
a backstop, default rate, and that entities were free to propose alternative mitigation 
schemes, MidAmerican asserts that this ignores the fact that the Commission has 
routinely accepted alternative cost-based rates for sales of one week or less.  As such, 
MidAmerican maintains that there is no reason why “split the savings” rates, or rates 
reflecting a demand charge, could not be used as a default rate for mitigated sales of 
one week or less.
642 
615.  Several commenters also argue that the energy-only incremental cost plus 10 
percent methodology does not allow for proper recovery of capacity-based costs on 
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sales of one week or less thereby artificially depressing the prices of these short-term 
sales and possibly deterring new entry.
643  These commenters state that sellers should 
be allowed to recover a contribution to their fixed/capacity costs.   
616.  Some commenters contend that the default cost-based rates create an incentive 
to sell outside the mitigated market because they recover less than cost-based rates 
historically accepted that included a demand charge.  However, they assert that 
setting rates that require buyers to make a reasonable contribution to the seller’s fixed 
costs for the use of the capacity would create an incentive for the seller to make sales 
within its mitigated control area.
644  Duke and the Oregon Commission add that 
allowing recovery of capacity-based costs also ensures that wholesale customers bear 
their fair share of system costs.
645   
617.  Several commenters also claim that by artificially depressing short-term sales 
prices, the default rate transfers wealth from the supplier’s retail customers to 
wholesale customers.
646  Such retail customers, these commenters state, have paid the 
fully-allocated costs of the system and obtain revenue credits to their costs from the 
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supplier’s short-term sales.  Where short-term sales are made on a non-interruptible 
basis, and the incremental cost plus 10 percent rate prices them only at incremental 
running cost, Progress Energy contends that wholesale purchasers are receiving the 
benefits of capacity without cost.
647  Progress Energy and EEI submit that retail 
native load customers, as a result, lose the economic benefits that would otherwise 
accrue to them through revenue credits from short-term wholesale sales.
648  
Wholesale customers charged through an embedded cost-of-service are also harmed, 
Progress Energy adds, because they lose the economic benefits that would otherwise 
accrue to them through revenue credits from short-term wholesale sales.
649   
618.  Progress Energy and Duke instead favor an “up to” cost-based default rate for 
sales of one week or less.
650  For such sales, Progress Energy supports an “up to” rate 
design flexible enough to allow rates as low as the mitigated seller’s incremental 
costs and as high as 100 percent of the seller’s capacity and energy costs.  According 
to Progress Energy, a mitigated seller could choose to make sales as low as its 
incremental cost when either (1) the unmitigated market price of competing sellers 
dictates that price, or (2) the mitigated seller needs to sell its excess generation at that 
price to maintain a minimum generation control margin.  Given that there is a short-
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term market for capacity, Progress Energy asks that the default cost-based rates 
include a price structure that allows pricing of capacity-only sales.
651  
619.  Xcel suggests that the Commission should allow for an even higher emergency 
price in situations where purchasers need to make a purchase not simply to achieve 
economic benefits but where the purchaser is capacity deficient.  Xcel submits that in 
such instances, a purchaser plainly obtains a capacity benefit from the purchase of 
such power.  Historically, the Commission has allowed an emergency rate of $100 
per MWh for emergency service.  Given that gas prices have dramatically increased 
since that standard rate began to be utilized, Xcel claims that an emergency rate of the 
higher of cost plus 10 percent or $1,000 per MWh would be appropriate in the present 
environment.
652  
Commission Determination 
620.  The Commission will retain the incremental cost plus 10 percent methodology 
as the default mitigation for sales of one week or less, while continuing to allow 
sellers to propose alternative cost-based methods of mitigation tailored to their 
particular circumstances.  As discussed more fully below, we clarify that in retaining 
the incremental cost plus 10 percent methodology as the default mitigation for sales 
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of one week or less we do not otherwise limit a seller’s ability to propose different 
cost-based rates for sales of one week or less.
653 
621.  Although a number of commenters suggest that the Commission should adopt 
a different default cost-based ratemaking methodology for sales of one week or less, 
they have failed to persuade us that the existing default rate is inappropriate.  As the 
Commission has previously stated, an incremental cost rate that allows a fair recovery 
of the incremental cost of generating with a 10 percent adder to provide for a margin 
over incremental cost is reasonable.
654  Incremental costs plus 10 percent represents a 
conservative proxy for a reasonable rate available in a competitive market.
655  On this 
basis, we find incremental cost plus 10 percent to be an appropriate default rate.  
Moreover, we allow sellers the opportunity to design, support, and propose other 
cost-based rates that they believe are more appropriate for their particular 
circumstances. 
622.  Several commenters note that the Commission has permitted various cost-
based rate methodologies prior to the April 14 Order, including a split-the-savings 
formula.  These entities express concern that the use of the incremental cost plus 10 
percent methodology as the default mitigation rate for sales of one week or less 
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forecloses the possibility of other cost-based pricing methodologies.  However, this is 
not the case.  Rather than precluding alternative mitigation proposals, the April 14 
Order allows sellers to propose case-specific tailored mitigation, or adopt the default 
cost-based rate.  The April 14 Order described the default mitigation rate as “a 
backstop measure” intended to ensure a just and reasonable rate.
656  The Commission 
re-emphasized this in its July 8 Order explaining: “In the instant case, the 10 percent 
adder is to be used only as a backstop or default measure in the event that an 
applicant does not opt to propose its own mitigation.”
657   
623.  As such, the incremental cost plus 10 percent rate represents a default, cost-
based rate to protect customers from the potential exercise of market power and 
provide sellers regulatory rate certainty by establishing a “safe harbor.”  Any 
proposal for alternative cost-based rates will be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
624.  Further, with regard to including capacity charges in rates for one week or 
less, a seller may propose to recover such charges and the Commission will consider 
these charges based on the specific facts and circumstances presented. Rather than 
ignoring alternative forms of cost-based rates, as some commenters claim, the 
Commission’s policy offers sellers the opportunity to propose such alternatives.   
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625.  Use of the default rate as set forth in the April 14 and July 8 Orders also is not 
inconsistent with Terra Comfort, as some commenters claim.  As explained above, 
contrary to some commenters’ allegations, the Commission does not confine 
mitigated sellers to rates that forego a contribution to fixed/capacity costs.  In Terra 
Comfort, the Commission explained that “most utilities maintain on file for all 
services flexible demand charge ceilings designed to reflect a 100-percent 
contribution to the fixed costs of their facilities.”
658  The Commission then added that 
utilities are not obligated to “forego these margins and sell at 110 percent of 
incremental costs.”
659  In the April 14 Order, the Commission, consistent with its 
holding in Terra Comfort, explained that “as a backstop measure, we will also 
provide ‘default’ rates to ensure that wholesale rates do not go into effect, or remain 
in effect, without assurance that they are just and reasonable.”
660  Contrary to Duke’s 
assertion that this default rate suggests that sellers do not have economic justification 
(or need) to recover a share of their fixed/capacity costs in the prices charged for such 
transactions,
661 the Commission’s policy allows “applicants to propose case-specific 
mitigation tailored to their particular circumstances that eliminates the ability to 
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exercise market power, or adopt cost-based rates such as the default rates herein.”
662  
The Commission explained in the April 14 Order that “[p]roposals for alternative 
mitigation in these circumstances could include cost-based rates or other mitigation 
that the Commission may deem appropriate.”
663  Consistent with industry practice 
and Commission precedent, therefore, where mitigated sellers can properly justify 
such contributions, they may propose to recover contributions to fixed/capacity costs 
under the Commission’s mitigation policy.    
626.  Such alternative mitigation has been proposed and accepted.  For example, 
Progress Energy correctly notes that one of its subsidiaries proposed as mitigation - 
and the Commission approved - a cost-based “up-to” capacity charge and a cost-
based energy charge for the subsidiary’s power sales of less than one year, including 
sales of one week or less, in the mitigated control area.
664  Progress Energy is correct 
in observing that this decision was consistent with the Commission’s long-standing 
policy of permitting the pricing of short-term sales at cost-based “up-to” capacity 
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charges and cost-based energy charges.
665  Rather than artificially depressing the 
prices of short-term sales, exacting a wealth transfer, or limiting a seller’s ability to 
respond to market conditions, as Progress suggests, the default cost-based rate for 
sales of one week or less provides a backstop measure intended to protect customers 
by ensuring that, in the event a seller loses or relinquishes its market-based rate 
authority, there is a readily available cost-based rate under which such sellers may 
choose to transact , and the mitigated seller by establishing a refund floor that 
provides it with rate certainty. 
627.  As to some commenters’ suggestion that the incremental cost plus 10 percent 
methodology, and cost-based rates in general, adversely affect retail rates because 
they exact a wealth transfer from the supplier’s retail customers to wholesale 
customers, the July 8 Order rejected such claims on the ground that they were 
“unsupported and speculative.”
666  Not only do these claims remain unsupported but 
they suggest that the Commission should allow wholesale rates in excess of a just and 
reasonable rate.  This result would not be just and reasonable.  As the Commission 
stated in the July 8 Order, “our rate making policy is designed to provide for recovery 
of prudently incurred costs plus a reasonable return on investment.”
667  Moreover, the 
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Commission explained that “the opportunity for the applicants to propose alternative, 
tailored mitigation measures should allow adequate consideration of the effect on 
investment and customers.”
668 
628.  We will not adopt Progress Energy’s request that the default rate be modified 
to include a price structure allowing pricing of capacity-only sales.  Progress Energy 
fails to provide adequate justification to provide for such a rate in our default cost-
based rates.  For example, Progress Energy states that there is a short-term market for 
capacity-only sales but fails to explain how this market is a power sales market (for 
which our default cost-based rates apply) rather than an ancillary services market 
which is not contemplated in the default cost-based power sales rates.  Nevertheless, 
as noted above, a mitigated seller has the opportunity to propose and justify an 
alternative to the default rate. 
629.  Similarly, in response to NASUCA’s request that the Commission require all 
mitigated rates and discounts to be filed under section 205 of the FPA, we note that 
all mitigation proposals must be filed with the Commission for review.  These filings 
are noticed and interested parties are given an opportunity to intervene, comment, or 
protest the submittal.  With regard to discounts, as we explain in the discounting 
section of this Final Rule, discounts made to customers, like all other rates, are 
required to be reported in the seller’s EQRs.   
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630.  We also note that the Commission stated in the April 14 Order that where a 
seller proposes to adopt the default cost-based rates (or where it proposes other cost-
based rates), it must provide cost support for such rates.
669  The Commission will 
examine the proposed rates on a case-by-case basis.  With regard to sales of one week 
or less, where the seller fails to provide sufficient cost support, the Commission will 
direct the seller to submit a compliance filing to provide the formulas and 
methodology according to which it intends to calculate incremental costs.
670  We note 
here that, to the extent a seller proposes a cost-based rate formula, we will require the 
rate formula used be provided for Commission review and such formula included in 
the cost-based rate tariff including formulas used in calculating incremental cost.  
631.  The Commission also has set proposed default cost-based rates for hearing 
when appropriate.
671  We believe that this case-by-case review of proposed default 
cost-based rates adequately addresses NRECA’s and Suez/Chevron’s concerns.  
Moreover, to the extent that an entity contends that a mitigated seller is flowing 
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inappropriate costs through its formula rate, section 206 of the FPA provides a 
process for filing a complaint.    
b.  Sales of more than one week but less than one year  
Commission Proposal 
632.  In the NOPR, the Commission sought comment on issues related to the design 
of an "up to" cost-based rate.  The Commission noted in the NOPR that it has allowed 
significant flexibility in designing “up to” rates in the past, and invited comments on 
whether such flexibility is still warranted.  In particular, the Commission noted that 
there are often disputes over which units are “most likely to participate” or “could 
participate” in coordinated sales, and asked if it should continue to allow utilities 
flexibility in selecting the particular units that form the basis of the “up to” rate.  If 
not, the Commission asked which units should form the basis of an “up to” rate, and 
how such a rate should be calculated.  In addition, parties were invited to comment on 
whether a standard rate methodology should be prescribed that would allow a seller 
to avoid a hearing on this issue.  The Commission asked whether a methodology that 
is based on average costs (both variable and embedded) would allow a seller to avoid 
a hearing because it eliminates the seller’s discretion in designating particular units as 
“likely to participate.”  The Commission also inquired as to whether there are other 
approaches that would accomplish a similar objective. Docket No. RM04-7-000   358 
 
Comments 
i.  Selecting the particular units that form the basis of the “up to” 
rate 
633.  Regarding whether the Commission should continue to allow utilities 
flexibility in selecting the particular units that form the basis of the “up to” rate, EEI 
argues for flexibility because selection of generating units for these short-terms sales 
is made with the goal of minimizing the cost-of-service to the utility’s native load 
customers.
672  Several commenters note that the Commission has the ability to verify 
the validity of the seller’s analysis through an audit of the company’s records to 
monitor transactions made under the “up to” rates.
673 
634.  Pinnacle asks the Commission to establish a stacking methodology that 
determines default units most likely to run while allowing utilities to propose a 
different stack based on historical operational sales data.  Pinnacle also urges the 
Commission to clarify that the variable cost for the unit can be defined as the system 
incremental cost.
674 
635.  Other commenters raise concerns with respect to the discretion given to 
utilities to choose units used to calculate the ceiling.
675  They submit that taking only 
                                              
672 EEI at 30-31. 
673 MidAmerican at 12; Duke reply comments at 14; EEI reply comments at 20. 
674 Pinnacle at 11. 
675 See, e.g., NC Towns at 4-5; NRECA at 30-32 (utilities with a portfolio of 
generation units of various vintages and operating characteristics could manipulate the 
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
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a small snapshot of certain generating plants to develop cost-based rates will subject 
buyers to the discretion of sellers possessing market power. 
636.  APPA/TAPS, the Carolina Agencies and AARP oppose allowing mitigated 
sellers too much flexibility in designing mitigation methods on the grounds that such 
an approach would result in market-based rates disguised as cost-based mitigated 
rates.
676  For mid-term sales, APPA/TAPS and AARP urge the Commission to 
require a well-supported analysis of the units most likely to provide the service.
677  
637.  The Carolina Agencies ask the Commission to consider whether pricing 
service based on the costs of units “likely to participate” is sufficiently rigorous to 
meet the operative statutory standards.  They oppose the “units most likely to 
participate” method on the basis that the cost and dispatch assumptions used in the 
underlying analyses are subjective and difficult to verify.  The Carolina Agencies 
state that the identified “likely to participate” units often wind up being those units on 
the system with the highest fixed costs, regardless of whether the units are of a type 
that one might expect to be cycled or ramped for short-term sales.  If mitigated 
                                                                                                                                                  
rate ceiling and undermine mitigation). 
676 APPA/TAPS at 44-45; Carolina Agencies at 24-25; AARP at 8. 
677 APPA/TAPS at 46; AARP at 8.  Alternatively, both APPA/TAPS and the 
Carolina Agencies agree that the Commission’s proposal to use an average embedded 
cost basis for mid-term sales would be acceptable and would avoid the need to make 
determinations about units most likely to run. APPA/TAPS at 4, 44-47; Carolina 
Agencies at 24. Docket No. RM04-7-000   360 
 
utilities are allowed to continue using this method, the Carolina Agencies urge the 
Commission to develop a set of generic guidelines that will yield more rigorous, less 
subjective analyses.
678 
ii.  Standard default rate methodology to allow a seller to avoid a 
hearing 
638.  With regard to whether a standard methodology should be prescribed that 
would allow a seller to avoid a hearing on rate methodology (e.g., a methodology that 
is based on average costs (both variable and embedded)), many commenters urge the 
Commission to continue to allow flexibility rather than imposing a standard 
methodology based on average costs.
679   
639.  Westar argues that the use of a standard methodology based on average costs 
would constitute a radical departure from long-settled Commission policy.  Westar 
states that in Opinion No. 203, the Commission found that cost-based pricing cannot 
keep pace with fluctuating markets,
680 and that imposing average cost pricing would 
                                              
678 Carolina Agencies at 24. 
679 See, e.g., Westar at 14; MidAmerican at 11; PPL reply comments at 17-18; 
Southern at 66-67; Duke at 10; Progress Energy at 10-12; Xcel at 10; EEI at 30-31.  
680 Similarly, Southern states that the use of an “up to” rate design protects 
customers against unreasonably high prices (the purpose of mitigation in the first place), 
while giving mitigated sellers the ability to respond to pricing and market dynamics. 
Southern at 66; see also EEI reply comments at 19-20; Xcel at 10. Docket No. RM04-7-000   361 
 
only exacerbate the market inefficiencies that result under cost-based rate making by 
eliminating pricing flexibility and lowering ceiling rates.
681 
640.  Westar adds that public utilities have the statutory right under section 205 to 
propose and file their rates, and that the Commission lacks the power to impose rates 
upon public utilities.
682  Westar therefore opposes standardizing cost-based rates in 
any manner that would curb a mitigated seller’s section 205 discretion to select a 
pricing methodology.
683  Westar contends that the Commission’s section 206 
authority to require rate changes is limited to instances where the Commission finds 
that the utility’s presumptively just and reasonable existing rate is unjust and 
unreasonable, and that the Commission’s proposed alternative is just and 
reasonable.
684  According to Westar, the NOPR offers no support for a finding that 
the wide variety of previously approved cost-based rate methodologies are no longer 
just and reasonable, and must be replaced with a standardized rate method.
685 
                                              
681 Westar at 14, 23. 
682 Id. at 17-18, 23-24 (citing Atlantic City Electric Company v. FERC, 295 F.3d 
1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
683 See Westar at 14, n.26 (claiming that an average cost methodology would 
eliminate the seller’s discretion in designating particular units as “likely to participate” in 
cost-based sales and conflicts with utilities’ fundamental rights under section 205 of the 
FPA, and long-standing precedent under the “units most likely” methodology.) 
684 Id. at 18 (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company v. FERC, 860 F.2d 446, 456 
(D.C. Cir. 1988)); see also id. at 23-24.  See also MidAmerican reply comments at 22. 
685 Westar at 24. Docket No. RM04-7-000   362 
 
641.  Duke and PPL support “up to” rates
686 based on the embedded costs of the 
units most likely to provide the service.
687  According to Duke, the average costs of 
all units in a utility’s installed generating capacity base could be quite different than 
the costs of the specific units most likely to participate in the short-term wholesale 
market.
688  As such, Duke claims that a system-average cost approach could force the 
mitigated seller to charge non-native load customers less than the cost actually 
incurred for generating power whenever incremental costs are greater than average 
costs, thereby creating a disincentive for the mitigated seller to market wholesale 
power in a control area where it does not have market-based rate authority.
689    
642.  Progress Energy states that it opposes a standardized methodology because it 
will not send appropriate price signals to customers or appropriately compensate the 
                                              
686 Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner also support the use of an “up to” rate because it 
offers flexibility in conducting transactions.  However, they suggest a methodology that 
reflects the incremental cost of new entry to encourage new investment and allow sellers 
a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their investment.  According to Drs. 
Broehm and Fox-Penner, the weakness of setting a price cap based on embedded cost 
stems from disputes that arise over which units are selected as the basis for the price cap.  
Because the cost of new entry methodology would allow the price cap to be formulaic 
and generic based on the estimate of the annualized total cost of building a new 
combustion turbine peaking facility, they suggest that this approach would minimize 
discretion in determining the foundation of a cost-based rate. Drs. Broehm and Fox-
Penner at 16. 
687 Duke at 10; Duke reply comments at 13-14; PPL reply comments at 17-18.  
688 Duke at 10; see also MidAmerican at 9-11; PPL reply comments at 17-18; 
Southern at 66-67. 
689 Duke at 10; Duke reply comments at 14. Docket No. RM04-7-000   363 
 
seller for costs where the seller’s generating units or the customer’s usage deviates 
materially from the standardized methodology.  Rather than adopting a “units most 
likely” approach, Progress Energy prefers a methodology that identifies units based 
on load conditions that are more closely associated with typical market clearing 
opportunities, between the average of monthly minimum loads and the average of 
monthly peak loads.  Such an approach, Progress Energy argues, better represents 
conditions where sales occur.
690 
643.  While supporting flexibility in the design of up-to rates,
691 Ameren urges the 
Commission to prescribe a standard methodology that sellers could opt to use to 
avoid prolonged and costly factual disputes.  Ameren asserts that a formula rate based 
on information from FERC Form No. 1, where available, and incorporating the AEP 
Methodology
692 could easily form the basis of such a standard methodology.
693 
                                              
690 Progress Energy at 11-12. 
691 Ameren maintains that allowing mitigated sellers to sell at cost-based “up to” 
rates from which the seller may discount adequately mitigates the seller’s market power 
while still allowing that entity to participate in competitive markets.  Ameren states that 
“up to” rates thus can benefit customers by resulting in a more robust market.  Ameren at 
15. 
692 American Electric Power Company, 88 FERC ¶ 61,141 at 61,453-54 (1999). 
Under this methodology, Ameren explains that a seller must develop a cost-based annual 
rate, which then is divided by 52 to derive a weekly rate, which then is divided by 5 to 
derive a daily peak rate, which then is divided by 16 to derive an hourly peak rate.  
Ameren at 15. 
693 Ameren at 16. Docket No. RM04-7-000   364 
 
644.  Because of concerns with regard to the discretion given to sellers to choose 
units used to calculate the cost-based rate, the NC Towns assert that a standard, 
system-average ratemaking methodology would provide a certainty beneficial to both 
utilities and wholesale customers, as well as help reduce protracted negotiations and 
litigation surrounding parties’ concepts of a cost-based rate.
694 
645.  For mid-term sales that carry a capacity charge, the Carolina Agencies contend 
that charge should be based on the utility’s fully allocated system-wide cost of 
capacity.  The Carolina Agencies state that energy associated with the purchased 
capacity also should be priced on a system average basis, in order to adhere to the 
principle that capacity and energy charges be developed on a consistent basis.
695  For 
these mid-term sales, the Carolina Agencies also support giving Load Serving 
Entities (LSEs) located within the mitigated utility’s control area an option between: 
(1) locking-in their price for capacity and/or energy in advance of delivery, at the 
mitigated utility’s forecasted cost of energy and its cost-based tariff rate for capacity; 
or (2) having their charges determined through a formula rate that would charge 
purchasers an annually-updated price reflecting the utility’s actual system-wide 
average costs.
696 
                                              
694 NC Towns at 4-5. 
695 Carolina Agencies at 11; see also APPA/TAPS at 46-47, n.50 (citing Florida 
Power & Light Co., 66 FERC ¶ 61,227 at 61,532 (1994)). 
696 Carolina Agencies at 11. Docket No. RM04-7-000   365 
 
646.  The Carolina Agencies add that any change in the Commission’s pricing 
policy that would yield more reasonable cost-based rates must be coupled with a 
“must-offer” requirement.  Lower cost-based rates without a concurrent “must–offer” 
requirement, they argue, will only provide the mitigated utility with an even greater 
incentive to sell all its available power beyond the mitigated region, thereby 
exacerbating the problems of depleted supply and profiteering by remaining 
suppliers.
697  
647.  For mid-term sales, NRECA asks the Commission to enforce a matching or 
consistency principle.  Here, NRECA advocates using the same generating units “as 
the basis for the fixed and variable costs in determining the default embedded-cost 
rate.  In no case should a seller be allowed to mix high-fixed-cost units with high-
variable-cost units to artificially inflate the embedded-cost rate.  If a seller can show 
that a portfolio of generating units is likely to be used to provide service, then the 
seller might be permitted to use a weighted average of the fixed and variable costs of 
the portfolio.”
698 
Commission Determination 
648.  Under the Commission’s current policy, the default mitigation rate for mid-
term sales (sales of more than one week but less than one year) is priced at an 
                                              
697 Carolina Agencies at 25. 
698 NRECA at 32. Docket No. RM04-7-000   366 
 
embedded cost “up to” rate reflecting the costs of the unit(s) expected to provide the 
service.  The Commission will retain this approach as the default mitigation for mid-
term sales.  As is the case with sales for one week or less, sellers may choose to adopt 
the default cost-based rate or propose alternative cost-based rates.  
Selecting the particular units that form the basis of the “up to” 
rate 
649.  When a seller adopts the default cost-based mid-term rate or otherwise 
proposes a cost-based rate designed on the unit or units expected to run, the 
Commission will continue to allow the seller flexibility in selecting the particular 
units that form the basis of the “up to” rate.  Entities that included various proposals 
for “up to” cost-based rate methodologies in their comments may propose those or 
other methodologies as alternatives to the default cost-based rates, and the 
Commission will consider any such proposal on a case-by-case basis.  Any seller 
proposing an alternative mitigation methodology, including a cost-based 
methodology with demand or capacity charges, carries the burden of justifying its 
proposal. 
650.  We agree with commenters that the Commission has the ability to verify the 
validity of the seller’s analysis and will continue to do so in our review of proposed 
cost-based rates.  We will continue to conduct our own analysis of whether a 
proposed cost-based rate is just and reasonable and, if warranted, will set such a 
proposed rate for evidentiary hearing where there are issues of material fact.      Docket No. RM04-7-000   367 
 
651.  In response to the concerns raised by some commenters regarding the 
discretion given to sellers in the design of “up-to” rates, as noted above, the 
Commission considers all evidence when reviewing a cost-based rate proposal and, if 
a company has not justified selection of certain generating units, we will not accept 
the proposed rate.  Under the FPA, we have the authority to accept, reject, or modify 
a proposed rate based on an analysis of the specific facts and circumstances. 
652.  Further, we find that the approach we adopt in this regard allowing sellers 
flexibility in designing “up to” rates for purposes of mitigation, subject to 
Commission review and approval, is consistent with the Commission’s historical 
approach to the pricing of cost-based rates.  Because the Commission will have the 
opportunity to review a seller’s proposed “up to” rates, we find that allowing 
mitigated sellers flexibility in choosing which units are used to calculate the proposed 
cost-based rate will not result in market-based rates being disguised as cost-based 
mitigated rates. 
653.  In response to Pinnacle's suggestion that the Commission make available a 
stacking methodology to be used to determine which units are most likely to run, we 
will do so for informational purposes and will make the methodology available on the 
FERC Internet site.  We also note, however, that sellers may propose to use their own 
stacking methodology. 
654.  With regard to the Carolina Agencies’ question of whether pricing service 
based on the costs of units “likely to participate” is sufficiently rigorous to meet the 
operative statutory standards, we find that it is.  Historically, the Commission has Docket No. RM04-7-000   368 
 
allowed such an approach and the Carolina Agencies have failed to convince us that, 
whether or not the underlying analysis is difficult to verify, the approach does not 
result in just and reasonable rates.  In addition, with regard to Carolina Agencies’ 
position with regard to a “must-offer” provision, we discuss proposals for a “must-
offer” provision below in the section on protecting mitigated markets. 
Standard default rate methodology to allow a seller to avoid a 
hearing 
655.  Regarding a standard default rate methodology that would allow a seller to 
avoid a hearing on rate methodology (e.g., a methodology that is based on average 
costs (both variable and embedded)), we note that the Commission has approved 
various rate methodologies in the past.  Rather than adopting a specific default rate 
methodology in this Final Rule, we affirm that, to the extent the Commission has 
previously accepted a particular rate methodology, that methodology is presumed to 
be just and reasonable until the Commission makes a contrary finding.
699   
656.  The Commission will continue to allow sellers flexibility in designing “up to” 
cost-based rate proposals as alternatives to the default methodology.  Entities that 
                                              
699 In response to Westar, as discussed herein, Commission precedent supports 
flexibility in designing cost-based rates and we are not proposing to standardize cost-
based rates here.  Upon loss or surrender of market-based rate authority a seller has a 
number of options on how to make wholesale power sales.  It can revert to a cost-based 
rate tariff on file with the Commission, file a new proposed cost-based rate tariff, or 
propose other mitigation.  While we provide a default cost-based rate methodology, we 
also allow a seller to submit its own cost-based mitigation.  On this basis, a seller’s filing 
rights under section 205 of the FPA are not eroded and we are not finding methodologies 
different from the default methodology necessarily to be unjust and unreasonable. Docket No. RM04-7-000   369 
 
included various proposals for “up to” cost-based rate methodologies in their 
comments may propose those or other methodologies as alternatives to the default 
cost-based rates, and the Commission will consider any such proposal on a case-by-
case basis.
700  Any seller proposing an alternative mitigation methodology carries the 
burden of justifying its proposal. 
657.  We acknowledge that a standard default rate methodology may provide, as 
several commenters suggest, some level of certainty and avoid prolonged factual 
disputes.  However, we are persuaded by the concerns expressed by others that 
designing a standard default rate methodology based, for example, on average costs 
may not account for the actual costs of the units making the sales, and thus may not 
allow the seller to recover its costs.   
c.  Sales of one year or greater 
Comments 
658.  While the NOPR did not propose changes to the default pricing for long-term 
sales (sales of one year or more), several entities filed comments on that issue.  
APPA/TAPS and AARP reiterate their support for pricing such sales on an embedded 
cost basis.
701  They submit that the Commission should not depart from its default 
cost-based mitigation policy with regard to long-term sales.  The NC Towns also 
                                              
700 In response to Pinnacle’s request for clarification that the variable cost for the 
unit can be defined as the system incremental cost, a mitigated seller can make that 
argument in support of an alternative cost-based mitigation methodology.  
701 APPA/TAPS at 47; AARP at 8. Docket No. RM04-7-000   370 
 
favor using system average costs in a rate base, rate of return model for determining 
long term cost-based rates.
702  Similarly, the Carolina Agencies assert that long-term 
sales to embedded LSEs should be priced at the mitigated utility’s fully allocated 
average embedded cost of capacity and system average energy costs.  As with short-
term sales, the Carolina Agencies urge the Commission to allow the embedded LSEs 
the choice between: (1) locking-in their price at the mitigated utility’s embedded cost 
rates; or (2) agreeing to have their charges determined through an annually updated 
formula rate that reflects the utility’s actual system-wide average costs.
703 
Commission Determination 
659.  We will retain our existing policy for sales of one year or more (long-term) 
sales.   Specifically, we will continue to require mitigated sellers to price long-term 
sales on an embedded cost of service basis and to file each such contract with the 
Commission for review and approval prior to the commencement of service.
704  We 
discuss below the Carolina Agencies’ request for a “must offer” requirement.   
d.  Alternative methods of mitigation 
Commission Proposal 
660.  In the NOPR, the Commission noted that sellers that are found to have market 
power (i.e., after the Commission has ruled on a DPT analysis), or that accept a 
                                              
702 NC Towns at 4. 
703 Carolina Agencies at 12-13. 
704 April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 151, 155. Docket No. RM04-7-000   371 
 
presumption of market power, can either accept the Commission’s default cost-based 
mitigation measures or propose alternative methods of mitigation.  With regard to 
alternative methods of mitigation, the Commission asked in the NOPR whether it 
should allow as a means of mitigating market power the use of agreements that are 
not tied to the cost of any particular seller but rather to a group of sellers.  The 
Commission asked whether the use of such agreements as a mitigation measure 
would satisfy the just and reasonable standard of the FPA. 
Comments 
661.  Many commenters favor allowing alternative mitigation methods tied to the 
costs of a group of sellers, in particular the Western Systems Power Pool Agreement 
(WSPP Agreement),
705 or transparent competitive market prices in regional markets.  
Xcel asserts that the FPA does not require a mitigated rate to reflect a utility’s own 
cost-of-service.
706   
662.  E.ON U.S. supports mitigation that sets prices at competitive market levels.  It 
claims that cost-based rate mitigation eliminates the potential for new competition in 
a mitigated area.  In this regard, E.ON U.S. argues that profits are available only 
when market prices are below the mitigated utility’s cost-based rates, which reduces 
the incentive for investment in new generation as long as buyers can obtain below 
                                              
705 Westar at 26-27; Pinnacle at 10; Ameren at 16-17; PG&E at 22; MidAmerican 
at 12; Xcel at 8; PPL reply comments at 18; and PNM/Tucson reply comments at 2-3. 
706 Xcel reply comments at 7. Docket No. RM04-7-000   372 
 
market-price energy from generation facilities of the mitigated utility’s ratepayers.
707  
E.ON U.S. adds that mitigation reflective of competitive prices results in mitigated 
sellers that are indifferent as to the buyer’s location and competitive price signals to 
which buyers can respond accordingly.
708 
Use of the WSPP Agreement Rate to Mitigate Market Power 
663.   Several entities suggest that the rates under the WSPP Agreement may be an 
appropriate alternative mitigation method.
709  Westar asserts that the purpose of the 
cost-based rate schedules under the WSPP Agreement is to mitigate perceived market 
power,
710 and notes that the Commission has also accepted use of the WSPP 
                                              
707 E.ON U.S. reply comments at 3; see also EPSA at 13. 
708 E.ON U.S. reply comments at 3. 
709 See, e.g., Westar at 26 (“The Commission developed and approved the rates 
under Schedules A and C of the WSPP Agreement as ‘rates that are within the zone of 
reasonableness and that are just and reasonable under the [Federal Power Act]’” (citing 
Western Systems Power Pool, 55 FERC ¶ 61,099, at 61,321 (WSPP), order on reh’g, 
Western Systems Power Pool, 55 FERC ¶ 61,495 (1990), aff’d in relevant part and 
remanded in part sub nom. Environmental Action and Consumer Federation of America 
v. FERC,    996 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1992), order on remand, 66 FERC ¶ 61,201 (1994)); 
Pinnacle at 10; PG&E at 22. 
710 Westar at 26 (citing Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 38 FERC ¶ 61,242 
(1987) (accepting WSPP Agreement on experimental basis); Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company, 50 FERC ¶ 61,339 (1990) (reducing the ceiling price on economy energy and 
capacity service under Schedules A, B and C from $245/MWh to $124/MWh); WSPP; 
Western Systems Power Pool, 83 FERC ¶ 61,099 (1998) (order accepting amendments); 
Western Systems Power Pool, 85 FERC ¶ 61,363 (1998) (Letter Order accepting revised 
WSPP Agreement); Western Systems Power Pool, Inc., 95 FERC ¶ 61,483 (2001) (order 
accepting amendments)). Docket No. RM04-7-000   373 
 
Agreement to mitigate market power in various contexts.
711  Westar contends that 
parties to the WSPP Agreement may sell under the cost-based rate schedules of the 
WSPP Agreement regardless of whether they have a separate tariff and authorization 
from the Commission.
712  Thus, Westar claims that the NOPR’s implicit question 
whether additional authorization is needed to make mitigated sales is misplaced since 
the WSPP Agreement, as an accepted tariff/rate schedule, establishes the lawful filed 
rate.   
664.  Pinnacle notes that the WSPP Agreement’s price caps were established based 
on a system-wide average cost and serve to put entities without market-based rate 
authority on a similar footing.  In Pinnacle's view, such agreements enhance liquidity 
in the regional markets and facilitate transactions due to the commonality of terms 
and conditions.
713   
665.  PG&E adds that the WSPP Agreement is the most commonly used 
standardized power sales contract in the electric industry.  PG&E states that the 
WSPP membership continuously updates the WSPP Agreement to ensure that it 
                                              
711 Id. (citing, among other cases, Western Resources, Inc., 94 FERC ¶ 61,050, at 
61,247 (2001) (accepting WSPP Agreement to mitigate potential affiliate preference 
concerns between prospective merger partners)).  
712 Id. at 27 (citing NorthPoint Energy Solutions, Inc., 107 FERC ¶ 61,181 (2004) 
(rejecting wholesale cost-based rate tariff as unnecessary in light of seller’s intent to 
make sales under the WSPP Agreement)). 
713 Pinnacle at 10. Docket No. RM04-7-000   374 
 
represents up-to-date terms for power sales contracts and notes that the process of 
updating its terms involves a diversified, experienced group of market participants 
focused on developing an appropriate rate for short-term sales.  PG&E concludes that 
the terms of the WSPP tariff should be an accepted alternative rate to the default rate 
determined by the Commission.
714   
666.  In contrast, APPA/TAPS and AARP oppose alternative mitigation methods 
tied to the costs of a group of sellers because there is no assurance that the group rate 
would reflect the costs of the seller subject to mitigation.
715  Further, APPA/TAPS 
have concerns that selecting the appropriate group and obtaining the necessary cost 
information could be extremely difficult and controversial.
716 
Commission Determination 
667.  We will address on a case-by-case basis whether the use of an agreement that 
is not tied to the cost of any particular seller but rather to a group of sellers is an 
appropriate mitigation measure.  
668.  With regard to the WSPP Agreement, as discussed below, we conclude that 
use of the WSPP Agreement may be unjust, unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or 
preferential for certain sellers.  Therefore, in an order being issued concurrently with 
this Final Rule, the Commission is instituting a proceeding under section 206 of the 
                                              
714 PG&E at 22. 
715 APPA/TAPS at 47; AARP at 8. 
716 APPA/TAPS at 41. Docket No. RM04-7-000   375 
 
FPA to investigate whether, for sellers found to have market power or presumed to 
have market power in a particular market, the WSPP Agreement rate for coordination 
energy sales is just and reasonable in such market.   
669.  The WSPP Agreement was initially accepted by the Commission on a non-
experimental basis in 1991,
717 providing for flexible pricing for coordination sales 
and transmission services.  Currently, there are over 300 members of the WSPP 
Agreement located from coast to coast in the United States and Canada, including 
private, public and governmental entities, financial institutions and aggregators, and 
wholesale and retail customers.  The WSPP Agreement as it exists today permits 
sellers of electric energy to charge either an uncapped market-based rate (for public 
utility sellers, they must have obtained separate market-based rate authorization from 
the Commission to do this), or an “up to” cost-based ceiling rate.  For sellers without 
market-based rate authority, the cost-based ceiling rate under the WSPP Agreement 
consists of an individual seller’s forecasted incremental cost plus an “up-to” demand 
charge based on the costs of a sub-set (eighteen sellers) of the original WSPP 
Agreement members, not necessarily the costs of any one seller.  The up-to demand 
charge is based on the average fixed costs of the generating facilities of that sub-set 
of WSPP Agreement members; it was designed to reflect the costs of a hypothetical 
                                              
717 WSPP, 55 FERC ¶ 61,099 (1991).  Prior to 1991, the WSPP Agreement was 
used for three years on an experimental basis.  See Western Sys. Power Pool, 50 FERC    
¶ 61,339 (1990) (extending the initial two-year period for an additional year). Docket No. RM04-7-000   376 
 
average utility member in 1989.  The only limitations are:  (1) that the trades by 
Commission-regulated public utilities must be short-term (lasting one year or less), 
and (2) that they be priced at or below the ceilings for sellers without market-based 
rate authority. 
670.  In a number of recent orders, the Commission accepted the use of the WSPP 
Agreement as a mitigation measure subject to the outcome of the instant proceeding 
and any determinations that the Commission makes regarding mitigation in this 
proceeding.  In those cases, we explained that the WSPP Agreement contains a 
Commission-approved cost-based rate schedule that has been found to be just and 
reasonable.  Further, we noted that parties to the WSPP Agreement have “the option 
of transacting under the WSPP Agreement and thus can make sales under the WSPP 
Agreement without any further authorization from the Commission.”
718   
671.  Though the Commission has allowed sellers to charge flexible cost-based 
ceiling rates that are not necessarily based on a particular seller’s own costs (such as 
the WSPP Agreement ceiling rate), we are concerned that the evolution and use of the 
WSPP Agreement ceiling rate and the evolution of competitive markets have resulted 
in circumstances in which the WSPP rate may no longer be just and reasonable for 
                                              
718 Westar Energy, Inc., 116 FERC ¶ 61,219 at P 33 (2006); The Empire Dist. 
Elec. Co., 116 FERC ¶ 61,150 at P 12 (2006); Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 117 FERC      
¶ 61,180 at P 49 (2006).  However, we note that a review of EQR data indicates that of 65 
sellers reporting contracts under the WSPP Agreement, 56 sellers reported sales under 
that agreement in 2006.  Fifty-five of these sellers reported sales that were identified as 
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sellers that are found to have market power or are presumed to have market power in 
a particular market, i.e., sellers under the WSPP Agreement that do not have market-
based rate authority or that lose or relinquish market-based rate authority. 
672.  We recognize that the ceiling rate under the WSPP Agreement has been found 
to be a just and reasonable cost-based rate by this Commission as well as by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
719 and that it has been in use for over 15 years 
by sellers irrespective of whether they have market power.  Nevertheless, the WSPP 
Agreement ceiling rate contains extensive pricing flexibility and relies in part on 
market forces to set the rate at or below the demand charge cap, and we believe he 
WSPP Agreement rate needs to be revisited in light of its widespread use and changes 
in electric markets since 1991.  When originally approved by the Commission in 
1991, there were 40 members under the WSPP Agreement; now there are over 300 
members.  Additionally, the WSPP Agreement is now used by entities not only in the 
Western Interconnection, but throughout the continental United States.  Further, the 
demand charge component of the WSPP Agreement ceiling rate is based on the costs 
of only 18 of the original WSPP members in 1991 (utilizing 1989 data) and does not 
reflect the costs of the members that joined the agreement since 1991. 
673.  For these reasons, concurrently with issuance of this Final Rule, we are 
instituting in Docket No. EL07-69-000 a proceeding under section 206 of the FPA to 
                                              
719 Environmental Action and Consumer Federation of America v. FERC,         
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investigate whether the WSPP Agreement ceiling rate is just and reasonable for a 
public utility seller in a market in which such seller has been found to have market 
power or is presumed to have market power.  All interested entities will have an 
opportunity to address this issue through a paper hearing.   
674.   As noted above, the Commission has accepted, subject to the outcome of this 
rulemaking proceeding, the use of the WSPP Agreement ceiling rate as mitigation by 
a number of sellers.  These sellers may continue to use the WSPP Agreement ceiling 
rate as mitigation, subject to refund (and the refund effective date established in 
Docket No. EL07-69-000) and subject to the outcome of the section 206 proceeding.    
Market-Based Proposals for Mitigation 
Comments 
675.  Commenters are generally concerned that where the Commission’s current 
mitigation approach focuses on a seller’s own cost of service, it imposes cost-based 
rates on a mitigated utility in the home control area regardless of whether the prices 
of alternative sources of supply in the mitigated market exceed the mitigated seller’s 
cost-based rates.
720  Rather than relying on cost-based price caps that may bear no 
relationship to market conditions, several commenters support allowing mitigation 
methods based on transparent competitive market prices in regional markets.
721  
                                              
720 See, e.g., Xcel at 7-9. 
721 Duke at 3, 13-14; Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner at 16-17; MidAmerican at 12-
13; E.ON U.S. at 10-12; Southern at 65, n. 104, 66; Ameren at 14; Xcel at 8-9; 
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Commenters suggest various market indicia that the Commission could use as price 
proxies in market-based mitigation alternatives.
722   
676.  Because different markets may be uncompetitive for different reasons, and the 
same mitigation measure is not necessarily equivalent in all situations, several 
commenters urge the Commission to consider more tailored, market-based rate 
approaches to mitigation on a case-by-case basis.
723  MidAmerican suggests that any 
specific index chosen could be reflected in the tariff of mitigated sellers (for sales up 
to one year) or in agreements filed with the Commission (for sales of one year or 
longer).
724 
                                                                                                                                                  
PNM/Tucson at 12,14; EEI at 26-29; Dr. Pace at 23; PPL reply comments at 17-18; and 
Oregon Commission reply comments at 2-3. 
722 For example, Duke (prices from an adjoining LMP market that are transparent 
and contemporaneously available); MidAmerican (reference prices for the region or from 
neighboring LMP markets, published index prices reported by public subscription 
services, or prices capped at levels reported in the Commission’s Electric Quarterly 
Report for sales in neighboring markets); Xcel (proximate price indexes where available, 
the WSPP Agreement, a utility’s own sales in areas where it does not possess market 
power, competitive solicitations with a sufficient amount of bidders or opportunity cost 
pricing); EEI (published index prices at liquid regional trading hubs or LMP nodal prices 
for adjacent Day 2 RTOs); the Oregon Commission (price at a frequently traded energy 
hub or an LMP determined by an adjoining RTO would be appropriate price indexes).  If 
an appropriate and valid price index is not available, the Oregon Commission would 
require the seller to make mitigated sales at cost-based rates.   
723 MidAmerican at 14; NYISO at 8; Duke at 13-14; Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner 
at 15. 
724 MidAmerican reply comments at 5. Docket No. RM04-7-000   380 
 
677.  Duke explains that market-based rate mitigation alternatives could be applied 
to mitigated sellers whose control area markets are adjacent to a Commission-
approved market.  If the proxy prices are established in markets that the Commission 
has found to be functionally competitive, Duke contends that the price will by 
definition be just and reasonable.  Duke submits that the Commission approved 
similar mitigation for sales by the LG&E Parties sinking in the Big Rivers control 
area capped at the Midwest ISO’s LMP at the Big Rivers control area interface.
725     
678.  E.ON U.S. argues that allowing index-based price caps as a mitigation option 
is just and reasonable because such sales are either subject to the market monitoring 
provisions of an RTO, or in the case of price indices, are structured according to the 
Commission’s instructions with regard to market price reporting.  They add that 
index-based price caps are efficient because:  (a) they can be used to address pricing 
requirements for varying time commitments; (b) they meet the Commission’s criteria 
for accurate and timely reporting; and (c) they do not require the administrative 
overhead and complexity associated with calculating and reporting cost-based 
rates.
726 
679.  MidAmerican and the Oregon Commission submit that using an appropriate 
price index as a proxy could ensure that prices are derived from competitive 
                                              
725 Duke at 14 (citing LG&E Energy Marketing Inc., 113 FERC ¶ 61,229 at P 30 
(2005)). 
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conditions and do not reflect the market power of the mitigated seller (or, for that 
matter, of any seller).
727  Duke, MidAmerican, and the Oregon Commission reason 
that allowing a published price index would effectively make the mitigated seller a 
price taker rather than a price setter.
728  E.ON U.S., PNM/Tucson, and Indianapolis 
P&L also suggest that requiring cost-based mitigation may result in sellers giving up 
their market-based rate authority in mitigated areas due to the significant time and 
expense of developing a cost-of-service filing.
729  Where sellers opt to give up 
market-based rate authority, these commenters conclude that buyers will be harmed 
by a reduction in the number of competitive options available to them in mitigated 
markets. 
680.  MidAmerican claims that using price indices would (a) eliminate the incentive 
for round-trip transactions; (b) alleviate the need to determine whether the need for 
mitigation should be based on the point of delivery, the sink location, or some other 
determinant; and (c) reduce contention over how to calculate cost-based rates.
730  EEI 
and the Oregon Commission conclude that allowing mitigated rates to be based on 
competitive market prices would: (1) maintain supply choices for captive customers 
                                              
727 MidAmerican at 13; Oregon Commission reply comments at 2; see also PPL 
reply comments at 17-18. 
728 Duke at 14; MidAmerican at 13-14; Oregon Commission reply comments at 2. 
729 Indianapolis P&L at 11; E.ON U.S. at 11; PNM/Tucson at 13. 
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by encouraging mitigated suppliers to participate actively in the mitigated markets; 
(2) avoid the unintended consequences of cost-based rate mitigation (e.g., incentive to 
sell outside the mitigated region); (3) help to ensure that buyers continue to receive 
accurate price signals and not inappropriately lean on cost-based rates in times of 
peak demand; and (4) be consistent with the Commission’s goal of encouraging 
competitive market solutions.
731   
681.  APPA/TAPS reject this reasoning, arguing that a dominant supplier has other 
incentives not to sell to captive customers beyond just the availability of a higher 
price elsewhere, including the desire to disadvantage competing suppliers within its 
control area.  Therefore, even if a market price index is used as a mitigation 
alternative, APPA/TAPS submit that a “must offer” obligation remains necessary.
732   
682.  According to some commenters, capping mitigated prices at the levels of 
relevant price indices would also reduce the market distortions that exist under dual 
price systems.
733  E.ON U.S., Xcel, PNM/Tucson, Duke, EEI, MidAmerican and the 
Oregon Commission generally contend that allowing market-based rate mitigation 
methods would reduce the incentive, arising from price disparities in dual-price 
systems (a regime where a seller has market-based rate authority in some markets but 
                                              
731 EEI reply comments at 12; Oregon Commission reply comments at 3. 
732 APPA/TAPS reply comments at 15. 
733 PNM/Tuscon at 13-14; MidAmerican at 14; EEI at 26; see also, CAISO at 6. Docket No. RM04-7-000   383 
 
is limited to cost-based sales in other market(s)), for mitigated sellers to seek market-
based rate sales beyond the mitigated market.
734  This, in turn, would obviate the 
need for a “must offer” requirement or mitigation of sales outside the mitigated 
region.  Somewhat similarly, EEI warns that if the Commission implements a “must 
offer” obligation, suppliers may not apply for market-based rate authorization in 
markets where they are likely to fail any of the market power screens.
735  
683.  Some commenters add that the Commission surrenders nothing in terms of 
consumer protection by allowing market-based price caps as a mitigation option.  In 
their view, permitting such mitigation will likely increase the willingness of sellers to 
engage in market transactions in mitigated areas and result in buyers paying no more 
than what is already recognized as a just and reasonable competitive market price.
736 
684.  MidAmerican, E.ON U.S., PNM/Tucson, and Indianapolis P&L all note that 
the Commission (1) has found that inter-affiliate sales are permissible at RTO price 
indices, and (2) proposes in the NOPR (at P 113-14) to extend this policy to market 
indices satisfying the November 19 Price Index Order.
737  These commenters argue 
that if sales at a meaningful market index are per se just and reasonable for affiliate 
                                              
734 E.ON U.S. at 10-11; Xcel at 8-9; PNM/Tucson at 13; Duke at 9; EEI at 28; 
MidAmerican at 14; Oregon Commission reply comments at 3. 
735 EEI reply comments at 18. 
736 Duke at 14; APPA/TAPS at 64; MidAmerican at 13. 
737 MidAmerican at 13; E.ON U.S. at 11; PNM/Tucson at 12; Indianapolis P&L at 
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transactions, there is no reason why such sales are not per se just and reasonable for 
non-affiliate transactions.
738  PNM/Tucson add that even in regions without 
organized RTO/ISO markets, sellers with market-based rate authority have 
established highly liquid trading hubs (e.g., Four Corners or Palo Verde) that also 
produce market prices that are readily available, transparent, can serve as an 
appropriate proxy, and satisfy the Commission’s index pricing standards.
739 
685.  Another commenter supports the adoption of more market-oriented approaches 
to mitigation.  For daily and hourly transactions, this commenter asks the 
Commission to be receptive to rates tied to an acceptable price index at a liquid 
trading point.  For long term transactions, rather than focusing on average embedded 
costs, which this commenter claims are likely to be a poor proxy for market rates, the 
Commission should consider capacity and associated energy rates that provide a 
competitive rate of return on new generation units built in the region.  Where 
transmission constraints bind only occasionally and the seller does not have market 
power absent such constraints, this commenter reasons that it is rational to only apply 
mitigated rates to sales made at the time such constraints are binding.  Similarly, 
where indicative screens or the DPT analysis point to the existence of a market power 
                                              
738 E.ON U.S. at 11; Indianapolis P&L at 11; MidAmerican reply comments at 5. 
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problem in a well-defined seasonal or peak period, this commenter favors confining 
rate mitigation to sales made in the relevant market during that period.
740 
686.  APPA/TAPS acknowledge that cost-based rates do not achieve competitive 
wholesale markets.
741  Ideally, wholesale customers should have a meaningful choice 
of suppliers whose costs are disciplined by competitive forces and remedies focused 
on fostering structurally competitive markets will help to ensure that future 
consumers have choices.  Until such structural remedies are fully implemented, 
APPA/TAPS maintain that mitigated sellers should sell at cost-based rates.
742   
687.  APPA/TAPS and Morgan Stanley do not categorically oppose the use of price 
indices as a mitigation alternative that could be justified with substantial evidence, 
but urge caution and ask the Commission not to assume that the index relied upon is a 
just and reasonable, and comparable, proxy for the mitigated market.
743  Morgan 
Stanley explains that given the price variation among transmission nodes, it is not 
possible to generically find that any one index-based price would be an adequate 
proxy for another node(s).  APPA/TAPS explain that a thinly traded market, or one 
separated by transmission constraints, could create volatility or arbitrage possibilities 
                                              
740 Dr. Pace at 23-24. 
741 APPA/TAPS at 48. 
742 Id. at 48-49. 
743 APPA/TAPS reply comments at 13; Morgan Stanley reply comments at 2, 8-
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that would leave captive customers worse-off than a cost-based mitigated rate.  They 
add that appropriate price proxies may not be available for all products, and that 
RTO-administered real-time or day-ahead markets would not generally provide 
acceptable proxies for price mitigation in markets for weekly, monthly or annual 
sales.  APPA/TAPS also note that the Southeast has no real liquid trading hubs.
744  
While urging the Commission to continue requiring cost-based mitigation, Morgan 
Stanley does not oppose allowing mitigated sellers to justify an index-based 
mitigation approach as appropriate for their specific circumstances.  According to 
Morgan Stanley, such an approach may prove justifiable where a viable, liquid index 
exists within or adjacent to the territory in which a finding of market power exists.
745   
688.  NRECA likewise is concerned that there is no assurance that (1) the external 
market price would be a competitive price; (2) external markets are a reasonable 
proxy for non-existent competitive market prices in the mitigated market; and (3) 
there are sufficient monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure these first two 
conditions are continually being met.
746  Unless these three concerns are addressed, 
NRECA asserts that the Commission may not lawfully rely on an external market 
price as a proxy in a mitigated market, particularly where the FPA is clear that the 
                                              
744 APPA/TAPS reply comments at 14-15. 
745 Morgan Stanley reply comments at 9-10. 
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Commission may not approve market-based rates absent “empirical proof” that 
“existing competition would ensure that the actual price is just and reasonable.”
747  
Moreover, where “Congress could not have assumed that ‘just and reasonable’ rates 
could conclusively be determined by reference to market price,”
748 NRECA argues 
that the Commission may not rely exclusively on market prices but rather must have a 
regulatory “escape hatch” or “safeguard” mechanism
749 if actual competitive 
pressures alone cannot keep rates just and reasonable.  NRECA, similar to 
APPA/TAPS, is concerned that proxy indices are irrelevant oftentimes because they 
are too far removed from the mitigated market to be adequately representative.  While 
NRECA admits that such indices may be adequate in some instances, it takes the 
position that, at most, the Commission could entertain proxy index proposals from 
mitigated sellers on a case-by-case basis.
750   
689.  The Carolina Agencies are similarly concerned that market-based indices 
based on LMPs from adjacent markets in many hours will reflect transmission 
congestion that may not be representative of congestion patterns in the mitigated 
market, and therefore must not be deemed a just and reasonable proxy for an entirely 
                                              
747 Id. at 32 (quoting Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 
1510 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
748 Id. (quoting FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 399 (1974)). 
749 Id. (quoting Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 370-71 
(D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
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different market.  Moreover, LSEs in RTOs with Day 2 markets have some ability to 
limit their exposure to LMP spikes through the use of hedging tools (i.e. Auction 
Revenue Rights and Financial Transmission Rights).  However, the Carolina 
Agencies argue, LSEs in mitigated markets would face these LMP gyrations from 
adjacent markets as proxy prices without any hedging protections.  These agencies 
further claim that there are no other sources of non-LMP price information in their 
region that are reliable enough to serve as proxy prices.
751  In the Carolina Agencies’ 
view, because price information from non-LMP markets is mostly illiquid, non-
transparent and easily manipulated due to the low volume of transactions, such 
reference prices are unlikely to be an accurate and reasonable proxy for competitive 
prices in the mitigated control area.  They state that, as the Commission has reported, 
“some electric power markets are almost entirely opaque both to regulators and to 
price takers.  In these markets (such as electricity in the Southeast), so little 
information is available that price indices either do not develop or have little value in 
price discovery.”
752  The Carolina Agencies also wonder how a meaningful proxy 
could be determined for a market price in a control area where a dominant supplier 
has market power.
753 
                                              
751 Carolina Agencies reply comments at 2-3, 10, 14-18.   
752 Id. at 18, n. 11 (citing Federal Energy Regulatory Commission – Office of 
Market Oversight and Investigations, 2004 State of the Market Report (June 2005)). 
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690.  The Carolina Agencies and NASUCA oppose providing mitigated utilities 
with the option of filing cost-based rates or choosing the market rates of a 
neighboring control area.
754  NASUCA adds that commenters articulate no legal 
theory by which mitigated sellers should be allowed any market rate or how the 
Commission has power to grant any waiver of the rate filing and review requirements 
of section 205 of the FPA.
755  Rather than allowing mitigated rates to be determined 
by market prices in adjacent market areas, NASUCA urges the Commission to deny 
any form of market rates to mitigated utilities and require such suppliers to comply 
with section 205 of the FPA by filing their rates subject to the traditional review to 
ensure just and reasonable rates.
756   
691.  If the presence of transmission constraints in a dominant transmission 
provider’s control area allow it to charge supra-competitive market-based rates there, 
APPA/TAPS submit that the Commission must require these constraints to be 
addressed.
757  These commenters ask the Commission to impose mitigating 
conditions on market-based rate authority to increase access to existing transmission 
facilities as well as to expand their transmission access through rolled-in upgrades.  
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756 Id. 
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For example, APPA/TAPS,
758 and the Carolina Agencies
759 suggest that the 
Commission could condition the market-based rate authority of a mitigated seller on 
the demonstrated willingness of vertically-integrated transmission owners to jointly 
plan and construct new generation projects with market participants, and/or to 
participate with them in collaborative, open regional transmission planning processes.   
692.  Xcel responds that, aside from such a requirement being impractical, the 
Commission has no legal authority to impose a condition requiring joint planning of 
new facilities nor jurisdiction over the construction of new facilities.
760  Xcel states 
that the FPA does not provide the Commission with certificate jurisdiction over 
generation facilities or otherwise, nor does the Commission have the authority to 
order utilities to enter into such a contract.
761 
Commission Determination 
693.  The Commission continues to believe that proposed alternative methods of 
mitigation should be cost-based.  However, as discussed below, while we will not 
allow the use of alternative “market-based” mitigation on a generic basis, we will 
                                              
758 Id. at 40-41, 49, 50-51. 
759 Carolina Agencies at 12, n.10. 
760 Xcel reply comments at 9-10. 
761 Id. at 10.  Duke likewise opposes any proposal granting an automatic 
entitlement to participate in new generation planned by the mitigated utility, arguing that 
the commercial terms of any joint ownership arrangements must be negotiated by the 
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permit sellers to submit alternative non-cost-based mitigation proposals for  
Commission consideration on a case-by-case basis.   
694.  A variety of suggestions have been made such as basing mitigated prices on: 
prices from an adjoining LMP market that are transparent and contemporaneously 
available; published index prices; prices capped at levels reported in the Electric 
Quarterly Reports for sales in neighboring markets; a utility’s own sales in areas 
where it does not possess market power; and competitive solicitations with a 
sufficient amount of bidders or opportunity cost pricing.  However, while some 
commenters suggest that market-based rate mitigation may cure several of the cost-
based mitigation regime’s alleged ailments, they fail to convincingly address a 
fundamental concern with such mitigation.  That is, why a market-based price from 
one market would be a relevant and appropriate proxy price to mitigate market power 
found in a different market.   
695.  Specifically, we reject Duke’s argument that we should allow market-based 
rate mitigation alternatives to be used by mitigated sellers whose control area markets 
are adjacent to a Commission-approved market because if the proxy prices are 
established in markets that the Commission has found to be functionally competitive, 
the price will by definition be just and reasonable.  Although Duke is correct that a 
price in a market may be presumed to be just and reasonable in the market in which it 
has been approved, Duke’s claim fails because that price has not been shown to be Docket No. RM04-7-000   392 
 
just and reasonable for other markets with differing competitive circumstances.
762    
Duke’s argument also fails to recognize that the Commission does not certify markets 
as competitive; rather, we make determinations on whether individual sellers in a 
market have market power.  In addition, contrary to Duke’s view, the Commission’s 
acceptance of proposed mitigation in the Big Rivers control area does not support 
Duke’s proposal in this regard.  In LG&E Energy Marketing Inc.,
763 the Commission 
accepted a proposal that capped - at the Midwest ISO’s LMP price at the Big Rivers 
control area interface - all market-based sales by LG&E sinking in the Big Rivers 
control area not sold pursuant to contractual agreements already in existence.  
However, Duke fails to point out that, when LG&E proposed to mitigate its sales into 
the Big Rivers control area, LG&E was a member of the Midwest ISO and, 
accordingly, capping LG&E’s sales price at the Midwest ISO LMP at the Big Rivers 
interface was appropriate.   
696.  Commenters raise many reasons why allowing the use of an index could be 
beneficial such as:  using an appropriate price index as a proxy could ensure that 
prices are derived from competitive conditions and do not reflect the market power of 
the mitigated seller; allowing a published price index would effectively make the 
                                              
762 E.ON U.S.’ proposal that the use of index-based price caps subject to the 
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equally fails to address whether the index-based price is relevant to the market in which 
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mitigated seller a price taker rather than a price setter; use of an index price would 
eliminate the incentive for round-trip transactions and alleviate the need to determine 
whether the need for mitigation should be based on the point of delivery, the sink 
location, or some other determinant; would maintain supply choices for captive 
customers by encouraging mitigated suppliers to participate actively in the mitigated 
markets; would help to ensure that buyers continue to receive accurate price signals 
and not inappropriately lean on cost-based rates in times of peak demand; and, would 
be consistent with the Commission’s goal of encouraging competitive market 
solutions.   
697.  However, we agree with Morgan Stanley and others that, given price 
variations among transmission nodes, we should not generically find that one index-
based price is necessarily an adequate proxy for another node.  Commenters urging 
the Commission to consider such alternatives on a case-by-case basis acknowledge 
that different markets may be uncompetitive for different reasons.
764  While 
commenters speak of “relevant price indexes,” their comments contain little more 
than undeveloped proposals and limited discussion as to how such an index would be 
chosen, and why it would be an appropriate proxy for the mitigated market.  For 
example, commenters fail to explain how a proxy price based on existing competition 
from one market with distinct traits such as transmission congestion ensures a just 
                                              
764 MidAmerican at 14; NYISO at 8; Duke at 13-14; Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner 
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and reasonable price in another market that has its own unique traits and 
circumstances.  Deriving prices from competitive conditions, making a mitigated 
seller a price taker rather than a price setter, and reducing market distortions are all 
goals commenters claim market-based mitigation can help achieve.  Nonetheless, the 
use of an external market price to establish the just and reasonable price in the 
mitigated market has not yet been shown to be appropriate.   
698.  While we will not allow the use of “market-based” mitigation on a generic 
basis, we nevertheless will permit sellers to submit non-cost-based mitigation 
proposals, such as the use of an index or an LMP proxy, for Commission 
consideration on a case-by-case basis based on their particular circumstances.  Sellers 
choosing to propose such alternative mitigation will carry the burden of showing why 
and how the proposed index-based price is relevant, appropriate and a just and 
reasonable price for the mitigated market.While several commenters also seek to have 
the Commission make market-based rate authorization of mitigated sellers contingent 
upon their pledging to jointly plan and construct future generation projects with 
market participants, or pursue other structural conditions, they have not justified 
imposing such a burden.  For those sellers that are affected with a market power 
concern, we discuss elsewhere in this Final Rule the means by which we will require 
adequate mitigation.  Moreover, we believe that we have adequately addressed these 
concerns related to planning in our recent Order No. 890, where we require all 
jurisdictional transmission owners to engage in transmission planning with other Docket No. RM04-7-000   395 
 
market participants.  Therefore, we find no reason to mandate a mitigated seller’s 
participation in such arrangements. 
2. Discounting 
Commission Proposal 
699.  In the NOPR, the Commission explained that a supplier authorized to sell 
under an “up to” cost-based rate has an incentive to discount its sales price when the 
market price in the supplier’s local area is lower than the cost-based ceiling rate.  
During these periods, a rational seller will discount its sales to maximize revenue.  In 
the past, the Commission has encouraged discounting as an efficient practice that can 
maximize revenues to reduce the revenue requirements borne by requirements 
customers. 
700.  Here, the primary issue is whether a seller can “selectively” discount, i.e., 
offer different prices to different purchasers of the same product during the same time 
period.  The Commission invited comment on whether selective discounting should 
be allowed for sellers that are found to have market power or have accepted a 
presumption of market power and are offering power under cost-based rates.  If so, 
the Commission sought comment on what mechanisms (reporting or otherwise), if 
any, are necessary to protect against undue discrimination.  By contrast, were it to 
forbid selective discounting, the Commission asked for comment on whether it 
should require the utility to post discounts to ensure that they are available to all 
similarly-situated customers.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   396 
 
Comments 
701.  Some commenters favor selective discounting because it provides an 
opportunity to meet competition where necessary to retain and attract business.  They 
add that the contracting flexibility afforded by selective discounting allows sellers to 
modify rates and tailor sales based on customer-specific factors such as load 
characteristics and credit ratings.  They argue that such flexibility maximizes liquidity 
and available capacity and energy.
765   
702.  MidAmerican and Indianapolis P&L both state that § 206 of the FPA already 
prohibits undue discrimination and provides well-established procedures for entities 
that have been subjected to undue discrimination.
766  Westar notes that the 
Commission’s long-standing policy is to allow selective discounting and asserts that 
discounting to customers who have competitive alternatives is not unduly 
discriminatory.
 767       
703.  PG&E maintains that it is just and reasonable for a seller to offer a discount 
below its cost-based mitigated rate if the seller will gain other (non-market power) 
                                              
765 See, e.g., Indianapolis P&L at 10; MidAmerican at 15-16; Duke at 10-11; EEI 
at 34; PG&E at 23; Progress Energy at 12. 
766 MidAmerican at 15; Indianapolis P&L at 10. 
767 Westar at 26 (citing Town of Norwood v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1306, 1312 & n.17 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (rate disparity may be justified by, inter alia, differences in the 
customers’ level of risk aversion and bargaining power)); see Policy for Selective 
Discounting by Natural Gas Pipelines, 111 FERC ¶ 61,309, reh’g denied, 113 FERC ¶ 
61,173 (2005) (affirming Commission’s 16-year policy to allow selective discounting by 
interstate natural gas pipelines when necessary to meet competition). Docket No. RM04-7-000   397 
 
advantages such as repeat customers or lower transaction costs.  PG&E also suggests 
that principles of efficiency and competition support providing selective discounts to 
entities with larger needs.
768   
704.  Duke contends that sales arising from selective discounting spread fixed costs 
over more units of service, thereby reducing the “up to” rate.
769  Moreover, without 
the ability to selectively discount, Duke submits that utilities will not have the 
opportunity to compete for many wholesale transactions in the mitigated control 
area.
770   
705.  Southern asserts that if selective discounting were eliminated, then the 
resulting loss of a low-cost source of supply would harm the customers.  In 
Southern’s view, captive customers also lose because of foregone opportunities to 
optimize capacity nominally dedicated to native load service.
771  EEI adds that where 
a mitigated seller is already precluded from making market-based rate sales within 
mitigated areas, selective discounting does not give rise to conditions that support the 
potential exercise of market power.
772   
                                              
768 PG&E at 23. 
769 Duke at 11. 
770 Id. 
771 Southern at 67. 
772 EEI at 31; see also PG&E at 23. Docket No. RM04-7-000   398 
 
706.  Other commenters generally oppose allowing mitigated sellers to selectively 
discount sales.  For example, TDU Systems claim that selective discounting is 
unnecessary because a seller subject to cost-based mitigation in its home control area 
would not face competition by definition.  They also contend that selective 
discounting would allow mitigated sellers to engage in price discrimination in a non-
competitive market, thereby permitting the seller to exercise market power by 
economically or physically withholding capacity to increase the posited market price.  
Thus, in the TDU Systems’ view, a rule allowing selective discounting would 
effectively grant market-based rate authority in a non-competitive market, in 
contravention of the requirements of the FPA.
773   
707.  While NC Towns generally encourage discounts to cost-based rates, they 
oppose selective discounting because they do not believe that the size of a load 
should be a factor when determining whether to give a buyer a discount.
774 
708.  APPA/TAPS question why a dominant seller would offer discounts to captive 
customers with no other viable supply options.  They add that there is no evidence 
that local, competing generation exists or that there is available transmission capacity 
that could support significant imports.  In order to avoid discrimination, APPA/TAPS 
advocate requiring a mitigated supplier to offer captive customers any discounts that 
                                              
773 TDU Systems at 19-21. 
774 NC Towns at 5. Docket No. RM04-7-000   399 
 
it offers to other purchasers.
775  Factors such as a customer’s capacity factor, credit 
rating or fuel costs may justify adjustments to seller-specific cost-based rates, but 
such factors, argue APPA/TAPS, should be reflected in the seller’s cost-based rates 
rather than through selective discounting.
776  
709.  If selective discounting is permitted, TDU Systems and NRECA urge the 
Commission to require sellers to file reports of the discounts offered, and encourage 
the Commission to vigorously enforce its market manipulation and affiliate 
transactions rules.
777     
710.  Suez/Chevron urges the Commission to require selective discounts to be 
contemporaneously offered to similarly-situated buyers, and separately identified in 
the mitigated seller’s EQR.
778  To minimize the potential for market power abuse 
when a mitigated seller selectively discounts to an affiliate,
779 Suez/Chevron supports 
                                              
775 APPA/TAPS reply comments at 15-16; APPA/TAPS at 44-48. 
776 APPA/TAPS reply comments at 16. 
777 TDU Systems at 24; NRECA at 32. 
778 NC Towns and Morgan Stanley state that any discount the seller wishes to offer 
should be required to be posted with sufficient time for other interested parties to take 
advantage of the offer.   NC Towns at 5-6; Morgan Stanley at 7. 
779 Suez/Chevron states that sellers should be required to post any affiliate 
discounts on their OASIS.   Suez/Chevron at 13.
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requiring a presumption that nonaffiliated buyers are similarly-situated, and therefore 
entitled to the same discount as a mitigated seller offers to its affiliate.
780  
711.  PG&E, in contrast, opposes requiring the seller to make discounts available to 
all similarly-situated entities.  According to PG&E, it would be difficult to determine 
which entities are in fact similarly-situated because the seller would have to consider 
multiple factors, such as quantity of load, timing, flexibility, credit rating, and 
purchases history.
781 
712.  Ameren disagrees with a posting requirement, arguing that the Commission’s 
requirements for separate filings and advance approval of affiliate power sales 
provide the appropriate oversight and mechanisms necessary to police discounting 
concerns regarding selective discounts favoring affiliates.  Ameren concludes that a 
requirement to post discounts is unduly burdensome given that the only discounts of 
concern are in the affiliate sales, which are subject to separate filing requirements.
782  
PG&E, in turn, notes that the affiliate restrictions also provide protection against the 
use of selective discounts to benefit affiliates.
783 
                                              
780 Suez/Chevron at 12-13. 
781 PG&E at 24. 
782 Ameren at 17-18. 
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Commission Determination 
713.  We will continue our practice of allowing discounting from the default cost-
based mitigated rates for short- and mid-term sales and will permit selective 
discounting by mitigated sellers provided that the sellers do not use such discounting 
to unduly discriminate or give undue preference.  We believe that selective 
discounting that does not constitute undue discrimination can improve liquidity, 
available capacity and energy, and customer supply options.  In other words, non-
discriminatory discounting can provide benefits to the market.   
714.  APPA/TAPS question why a dominant seller would offer discounts to captive 
customers with no other viable supply options, and the TDU Systems comment that 
selective discounting is unnecessary because a mitigated seller by definition would 
not face competition in its home control area.  However, in times when there are 
viable alternatives, a seller under an “up to” cost-based rate has an incentive to 
discount its sales price when the market price in the seller’s mitigated market is lower 
than the cost-based ceiling rate.  Allowing a mitigated seller to non-discriminatorily 
discount the rate when there are viable alternatives in the market benefits customers 
by providing more supply options in such instances.      
715.  Discounting also can maximize revenue by optimizing capacity nominally 
dedicated to native load service, allowing the supplier to spread fixed costs over more 
units of service.  Maximizing revenue in this manner can help reduce the “up to” rate, 
and therefore the revenue requirements borne by captive customers.  The 
Commission has previously determined that requiring a mitigated entity to limit sales Docket No. RM04-7-000   402 
 
to its ceiling rates “is at odds with the longstanding policy of allowing ‘up to’ cost-
based rates.”
784    
716.  The FPA requires that all rates charged by public utilities for the sale for resale 
of electric energy be “just and reasonable.”
785    If a seller’s cost-based rate has been 
found to be just and reasonable by the Commission, it follows that discounted rates 
below such a cost-based rate are also just and reasonable.
786  However, a seller may 
not lawfully discount to gain, or profit from, market power advantages.  We 
emphasize that section 205 of the FPA prohibits public utilities, in any power sale 
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, from granting any undue preference or 
advantage to any person
787 and also prohibits undue discrimination.
788   
717.  With regard to comments that the Commission establish a reporting 
mechanism, under the Commission’s existing reporting requirements entities making 
power sales must submit EQRs containing: a summary of the contractual terms and 
conditions in every effective service agreement for all jurisdictional services, 
                                              
784 Duke Power, 113 FERC ¶ 61,192 at P 17 (2005). 
785 16 U.S.C. 824d(a). 
786 Public Service Company of Oklahoma, 54 FERC ¶ 61,021, at 61,032 and fn. 8 
(1991) (“If PSO’s rates set at full cost are reasonable in the presence of market power, it 
follows that PSO’s rates reflecting less than a 100- percent contribution to fixed costs are 
also reasonable in the presence of market power.”). 
787 16 U.S.C. 824d(b). 
788 16 U.S.C. 824e(a). Docket No. RM04-7-000   403 
 
including market-based and cost-based power sales and transmission services; and, 
transaction information for effective short-term (less than one year) and long-term 
(one year or greater) power sales during the most recent calendar quarter.
789  Through 
this reporting requirement, the Commission monitors the rates charged by mitigated 
sellers.   
718.  Several commenters also seek to have the Commission require selective 
discounts to be posted and contemporaneously offered to similarly-situated buyers.  
Some seek a presumption that nonaffiliated buyers are similarly situated whenever a 
mitigated seller offers an affiliate a discount.  The Commission will not require 
mitigated sellers to contemporaneously post in a public forum all discounts provided 
for cost-based sales (i.e., where the sale is made at a price below the maximum up-to 
cost-based rate approved by the Commission in that tariff or rate schedule).  
Proponents of a posting requirement have not justified nor demonstrated how the 
Commission’s EQR requirement fails to provide an adequate means by which to 
monitor such discounts.  In addition, many sales are made below the cost-based cap, 
and the commenters’ proposals would place an undue burden on sellers that would be 
required to contemporaneously post rates that the Commission has already deemed to 
be just and reasonable.  Accordingly, the Commission will not require the 
                                              
789 Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, Order No. 2001, 67 FR 31043 
(May 8, 2002), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,127 (2002).  Required data sets for contractual 
and transaction information are described in Attachments B and C of Order No. 2001.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   404 
 
contemporaneous posting of discounted cost-based rates.  Finally, commenters have 
provided no basis to conclude that nonaffiliated buyers are similarly situated 
whenever a mitigated seller offers an affiliate a discount, and we will not adopt the 
proposed presumption in this regard.  Thus, sellers may selectively discount only if 
they do so in a manner that is not unduly discriminatory or preferential.   
719.  Further, we agree with MidAmerican that identifying discriminatory selective 
discounting requires fact-specific evaluations.  Because individual proceedings are 
the best instrument available to the Commission for such efforts, allegations of undue 
discrimination arising from selective discounting are best addressed on a case-by-case 
basis. 
3.  Protecting Mitigated Markets 
a.  Must Offer  
Commission Proposal 
720.  Under the Commission’s current mitigation policy, a seller that loses market-
based rate authority in its home control area is limited to charging cost-based rates in 
that control area; however, there is no requirement that the seller offer its available 
power to customers in that home control area.  Instead, the seller is free to market all 
of its available power to purchasers outside that control area if it chooses to do so.  If, 
for example, market prices outside the mitigated seller’s control area exceed the cost-
based caps within the mitigated control area, then the seller will, other things being 
equal, have an incentive to sell outside.  As noted in the NOPR, wholesale customers 
have argued that default cost-based mitigation of this kind is of little value if a seller Docket No. RM04-7-000   405 
 
can market its excess capacity at market-based rates in other control areas.  In the 
NOPR, the Commission sought comment on whether its current policy is appropriate, 
and if not, what further restrictions are needed.  The Commission asked whether it 
should adopt a form of “must offer” requirement in mitigated markets to ensure that 
available capacity (i.e., above that needed to serve firm and native load customers) is 
not withheld.  If so, the Commission asked if such a “must offer” requirement should 
be limited to sales of a certain period to help ensure that wholesale customers use that 
power to serve their own needs, rather than simply remarketing that power outside the 
control area and profiting
790  If it were to adopt such a “must offer” requirement, the 
Commission asked what rules there should be to define the "available" capacity that 
must be offered , in order to avoid case-by-case disputes over this issue.   
Comments 
721.  Wholesale customers generally support a “must offer” requirement,” stating 
that it is needed to ensure that power is available for purchase in the mitigated market 
and to protect them from incurring higher costs to serve load.
791  They argue that the 
                                              
790 In this regard, the Commission asked if there should be an annual open season 
under which the mitigated seller offers its available capacity to local customers for the 
following year at the cost-based ceiling rate and, if customers do not commit to purchase 
that capacity, then the seller would be free to sell the remaining capacity at market-based 
rates where it has authority to do so.   
791 See, e.g., APPA/TAPS at 40-42 (also urging the Commission to apply any 
“must offer” requirement to captive customers in the seller’s transmission service area); 
Carolina Agencies at 10-13; NRECA at 35; Montana Counsel at 19; TDU Systems at 19; 
NC Towns at 6-8 (asking the Commission to require mitigated utilities to serve wholesale 
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
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existence of a dual price system (a regime where a seller has market-based rate 
authority in some markets but is limited to cost-based sales in other market(s)) creates 
an incentive for a mitigated seller to sell its power outside of the mitigated market 
whenever market prices in the outside market are above the mitigated seller’s cost-
based price.  They are concerned particularly with the situation where a wholesale 
customer faces few or no alternatives in the mitigated market due to transmission 
constraints. 
722.  APPA/TAPS, the Carolina Agencies and NRECA claim that the Commission 
has both the authority and obligation to remedy undue discrimination in wholesale 
sales, which are clearly set forth in sections 205 and 206 of the FPA.
792  They 
specifically argue that a “must offer” condition is within the Commission’s authority 
as a remedy for the unjust and unreasonable rates and undue discrimination (refusal 
to sell in the mitigated control area) that are a consequence of the mitigated seller’s 
accumulation of market power.
793  Several commenters reason that, similar to 
                                                                                                                                                  
customers in the mitigated control area at long-term  system average cost-based rates in 
order to maintain reliability).  See also MidAmerican reply comments at 9-12 (arguing 
that the APPA/TAPS and Carolina Agencies proposals suffer from significant policy 
flaws).   
792 APPA/TAPS and Carolina Agencies supplemental comments at 4, 9-18 (citing, 
among others, 16 U.S.C. 824d(a), 824d(b), 824e(a); Associated Gas Distributors v. 
FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
793 NRECA reply comments at 41 (citing New York v. FERC, 535 U.S.1, 27 
(2002); Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 683-88 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002)); Carolina Agencies at 
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
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imposing reporting requirements and other conditions on a grant of market-based rate 
authority, where a seller no longer has market-based rate authority in its home control 
area, the Commission may impose a “must offer” condition on the continuation of 
market-based rate authorization outside a mitigated seller’s control area.
794  
APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies argue that the Commission already imposed 
a must-offer obligation on the continued availability of market-based rate authority 
for sellers in the California markets.
795   
723.  APPA/TAPS also assert that while Order No. 888 rejected a generic obligation 
that would have required sellers to continue wholesale sales past the expiration of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
4-5; Carolina Agencies reply comments at 2.  See also  Montana Counsel at 19 (citing 
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378 (1959) and United Gas 
Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223 (1965), two cases in which the 
Montana Counsel claim that the Supreme Court, in recognition of the market power of 
natural gas producers and the public interest provisions of the NGA, “virtually ordered” 
the Commission to exercise its jurisdiction to condition producer natural gas certificates 
and rate orders to limit gas prices); APPA/TAPS and Carolina Agencies supplemental 
comments at 2, 18-30; NRECA supplemental comments at 6-7. 
794APPA/TAPS at 37-38; APPA/TAPS reply comments at 8; Montana Counsel at 
21-22; Carolina Agencies at 4-5; Carolina Agencies reply comments at 3-4. 
795 APPA/TAPS and Carolina Agencies supplemental comments at 27 (citing San 
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Servs. Into Mkts. Operated by 
the Cal. Ind. Sys. Operator and the Cal. Power Exch., 93 FERC ¶ 61,294, at 62,010-11 
(2000) (extended-refund-period condition), order on rehearing and clarification, 97 FERC 
61,275, at 62,243-44 (2001), order on rehearing and clarification, 99 FERC ¶ 61,160 
(2002), on rehearing and clarification, 105 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2003), petitions for rev. 
granted in part sub nom. Bonneville Power Auth. v. FERC, 422 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2005) 
and Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 462 F.3d 1027, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing must-offer condition)). Docket No. RM04-7-000   408 
 
contract(s) in question in that proceeding, Order No. 888 explained that the 
Commission can impose an obligation to continue service on a case-by-case basis.
796   
724.  APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies argue that a dominant public utility’s 
physical withholding of generation in the mitigated market in order to make market-
based sales elsewhere results in undue discrimination that the Commission has an 
obligation to remedy.  They assert that because wholesale customers in the mitigated 
market are harmed through decreased supply, increased market concentration, and 
increased prices, these customers are exposed to the type of injury against which the 
FPA was designed to protect.
797  The Carolina Agencies also maintain that, whether 
or not exporting behavior can be considered economically efficient, such behavior 
results in undue discrimination between (i) the mitigated utility’s native load and (ii) 
LSEs located within the mitigated utility’s home control area.
798  This outcome, the 
Carolina Agencies continue, violates the FPA’s mandate that rates be just, reasonable 
                                              
796 APPA/TAPS at 39 (citing Order No. 888 - “we continue to believe that the 
extent to which a customer could demonstrate a reasonable expectation of continued 
service at the existing contract rate (or at a cost-based rate, if that was the customer’s 
expectation) is best addressed on a case-by-case basis”); see also Order No. 888, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, at 31,805 & n.652 (1996) (explaining that although the 
Commission determined “not to impose a regulatory obligation on wholesale 
requirements suppliers to continue to serve their existing requirements customers,” “any 
party claiming to be aggrieved by a utility’s alleged abuse of generation market power 
under a wholesale requirements contract can file a complaint with the Commission under 
Section 206”); see also Montana Counsel at 22.   
797 APPA/TAPS and Carolina Agencies supplemental comments at 19. 
798 Carolina Agencies at 6. Docket No. RM04-7-000   409 
 
and not unduly discriminatory regardless of whether the mitigated utility’s decision to 
export power is a conscious “withholding” for anticompetitive ends.
799  APPA/TAPS 
and Carolina Agencies add that vertically-integrated utilities with substantial 
generation in their home control areas frequently have the ability and incentive to 
discriminate against their wholesale customers, who compete against them on both 
the wholesale and retail level.
800   
725.  APPA/TAPS and Carolina Agencies maintain that undue discrimination 
occurs if a dominant public utility unjustifiably disadvantages a class of market 
participants.  They cite case law that the D.C. Circuit found “upholds the power of the 
Commission to subject approval of a set of voluntary transactions to a condition that 
providers open up the class of permissible users.”
801  Absent relevant circumstances 
that render two sets of customers differently situated, they assert that it is unduly 
discriminatory for a public utility to sell wholesale power to one set of customers (at 
market-based rates) while denying service to another set (to whom sales, if made, 
                                              
799 Id. at 9. 
800 APPA/TAPS and Carolina Agencies supplemental comments at 16 (citing FPC 
v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 278 (1976) to further argue that the Commission can and 
must take account of competition at retail when determining whether such discrimination 
exists.) 
801 Id. at 13 (citing Central Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156, 1172 
(D.C. Cir. 1979); and quoting Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 999 
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).  APPA/TAPS and Carolina Agencies claim that in this case, a must 
offer requirement would expand the class of buyers of the mitigated seller’s wholesale 
services to include customers from the mitigated utility’s home control area. Docket No. RM04-7-000   410 
 
would need to be priced at cost-based rates).  They contend there is no justification 
for disparate treatment in such a case and, therefore, the Commission is obligated 
under sections 205 and 206 to remedy such undue discrimination by either denying or 
conditioning the grant of market-based rate authority outside of the mitigated home 
control area.  A “must offer” condition, they claim, would satisfy this obligation by 
preventing undue discrimination.
802   
726.  APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies further allege that, while it may not 
be unduly discriminatory for a utility to elect to sell to the wholesale customer who 
will pay the highest price, it is unduly discriminatory if the price differential is based 
upon mitigation required as a result of the seller’s market power.
803  Where sellers 
claim a right to seek the highest prices, APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies 
counter that this profit maximization impulse can neither justify the exercise of 
market power nor insulate it from correction.
804   
727.  According to APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies, it is also unduly 
discriminatory for a mitigated seller to make market-based rate sales outside its home 
control area when constraints on that entity’s own transmission system prevent 
embedded customers from similarly accessing those markets as buyers.  They argue 
                                              
802 Id. at 15-16. 
803 Id. at 30. 
804 Id. at 31. Docket No. RM04-7-000   411 
 
that refusal to sell wholesale power supplies to embedded LSE customers at fully-
compensatory cost-based rates effectively compounds the de facto denial of access by 
exacerbating both the discrimination and the resulting harm.
805  According to 
APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies, the claim that mitigated sellers are merely 
engaging in economically efficient behavior ignores the market power that the sellers 
possess.
806  They state that when captive customers have few or no supply 
alternatives in the mitigated market and are constrained from accessing opportunities 
in the broader market (even with open access tariffs), and the dominant supplier sells 
its excess capacity beyond the mitigated market, the resulting reduction in output in 
the mitigated market is not addressed simply by prohibiting the mitigated seller from 
selling at unmitigated prices in the mitigated region.
807  They conclude that it would 
be unjust and unreasonable to permit or facilitate such withholding by allowing 
unconditioned sales at market-based rates outside a mitigated supplier’s home control 
area; this would reserve the benefits of competitive markets exclusively to dominant 
public utility sellers.
808 
728.  A number of commenters claim that a “must offer” requirement is necessary 
due to their lack of viable options in mitigated control areas.  For example, 
                                              
805 Id. at 30-31. 
806 APPA/TAPS at 6-7; Carolina Agencies reply comments at 6. 
807 APPA/TAPS reply comments at 6-7. 
808 APPA/TAPS supplemental comments at 30-31. Docket No. RM04-7-000   412 
 
Fayetteville submits that it finds itself without transmission access to make short-term 
energy purchases to displace its higher cost generation.
809  Fayetteville contends that 
Progress Energy’s dominant position, as well as Fayetteville’s inability to access 
alternative suppliers due to the inadequacy of Progress Energy’s transmission system, 
gives Progress Energy unmitigated market power.
810    
729.  The Carolina Agencies add that, while economic efficiency is a worthy goal in 
structurally sound markets where participants have ready and equal access to 
meaningful choices, the idea of economic efficiency cannot justify a mitigated 
supplier’s behavior in a control area where its market power arises from import 
limitations or other factors that deprive captive LSEs of viable options.  Nor can, they 
claim, the goal of economic efficiency trump the Commission’s clear duty to protect 
customers by ensuring that rates are just, reasonable, and not unduly 
discriminatory.
811    
730.  The Carolina Agencies dispute the claim that there is no need for a “must 
offer” requirement given the Commission’s authority to penalize market 
manipulation.  They question whether refusal to sell in the mitigated market would be 
                                              
809 Fayetteville reply comments at 5.  
810 Id. at 6.  See also Montana Counsel at 15-23 (where market power is found, 
sellers should be required to offer power to meet the requirements of dependent 
customers at cost). 
811 Carolina Agencies reply comments at 9. Docket No. RM04-7-000   413 
 
actionable under the anti-manipulation rules if there is no obligation to offer power to 
embedded LSEs.
812 
731.  NRECA and others ask the Commission to reject the claim that a “must offer” 
requirement would impede a mitigated seller’s ability to fulfill its retail crediting 
obligations.
813  NRECA responds that retail customers can sometimes benefit from 
cost-based rates; if competition reduces the market price to a seller’s marginal cost, 
no contribution to fixed costs would be recovered.  Commenters note that not all 
utilities are subject to rules requiring the sharing of profits from off-system sales.
 814  
NRECA argues that a utility’s authority to make off-system sales at market-based 
rates is a privilege granted by the Commission; if the Commission restricts or 
conditions that privilege, any obligation the public utility has under state law or 
regulation to sell excess energy or capacity is pre-empted by the requirements of 
federal regulation.
815  The Carolina Agencies and NRECA add that a “must offer” 
                                              
812 Carolina Agencies reply comments at 10-11. 
813 See, e.g., NRECA reply comments at 37-39; Carolina Agencies at 17 (citing 
April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 140, 154, where they claim that the Commission 
rejected arguments that cost-based mitigation rates adversely affect retail rates, because 
such rates provide for the recovery of the mitigated utility’s longer-term costs, and 
because the adverse impact claims were “unsupported and speculative.”); Fayetteville 
reply comments at 7, 9-10. 
814 NRECA reply comments at 38; Carolina Agencies at 8. 
815 NRECA reply comments at 38-39 (citing Entergy La., Inc., v. La. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 
U. S. 354 (1988); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U. S. 953 (1986)); see 
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requirement would serve the intended purpose of the Commission’s mitigation 
policy, which is to protect wholesale customers from the exercise of actual and 
potential market power, not to preserve a utility’s ability to reduce retail rates nor its 
ability to engage in a certain volume of off-system power sales.
816 
732.  NRECA, APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies all set forth proposals in 
their comments for implementing a “must offer” requirement.
817  NRECA suggests 
requiring a mitigated seller to hold an annual open season to offer long-term service 
(one year or more), as well as requiring a mitigated seller to offer shorter-term 
capacity and energy.
818  While not favoring an annual open season, APPA/TAPS and 
the Carolina Agencies each propose “must-offer” parameters to govern short- and 
long-term sales.
819  For both short- and long-term sales, the Carolina Agencies would 
offer captive customers an option between (1) locking-in their price at the mitigated 
utility’s embedded cost rates or (2) agreeing to have their charges determined through 
                                                                                                                                                  
also Carolina Agencies reply comments at 7-8 (where a utility is satisfying a 
countervailing regulatory mandate (such as a “must offer” obligation, it cannot be held to 
be violating the cost minimization duty)). 
816 Carolina Agencies at 17; Carolina Agencies reply comments at 7-8; NRECA 
reply comments at 35. 
817 NRECA at 35; APPA/TAPS at 40-42; Carolina Agencies at 10-13. 
818 NRECA at 35-36. 
819 APPA/TAPS at 40-42; Carolina Agencies at 10-13. Docket No. RM04-7-000   415 
 
an annually updated formula rate that reflects the mitigated utility’s actual system-
wide average costs.
820  The APPA/TAPS proposal also includes an obligation to offer 
captive customers participation on proposed generation projects.
821  Both 
APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies would limit any “must-offer” to loads 
actually located in the mitigated control area. 
733.  NRECA also proposes two alternatives to a “must offer” requirement.  First, 
NRECA suggests that the Commission give captive wholesale customers a right of 
first refusal to purchase at a market price energy or capacity that the mitigated seller 
proposes to sell outside the mitigated market.
822  The weakness of this approach, 
NRECA acknowledges, is that it would allow the mitigated seller to charge wholesale 
customers a supra-competitive price in the mitigated market given that the market-
based rate outside the control area would be higher than the cost-based rate in the 
seller’s control area.
 823 
                                              
820 Carolina Agencies at 12-13. 
821 APPA/TAPS at 41. 
822 NRECA reply comments at 36-37. 
823 NRECA at 36-37.  MidAmerican disagrees, arguing that market-based prices 
are not by definition always higher than cost-based prices in the mitigated region.  
Rather, the Commission has encouraged open access transmission and market 
competition because economically efficient market-based rates can be lower than cost-
based rates.  At the same time, where a price index at a trading hub may be lower than the 
seller’s incremental cost, MidAmerican argues that a seller should never be required to 
sell at rates below its incremental cost.  MidAmerican reply comments at 21. Docket No. RM04-7-000   416 
 
734.   NRECA also suggests as an alternative an enforceable commitment to provide 
sufficient additional transmission import capacity to mitigate the generation market 
power.  It states that such a commitment could be implemented by re-dispatching 
resources, relinquishing transmission reservations, or physically upgrading the 
transmission grid.  This would allow additional suppliers to make sales in the 
mitigated region, thereby mitigating the seller’s generation market power.  NRECA 
contends that this approach would directly address the larger issue of the need to 
eliminate transmission bottlenecks and load pockets that give rise to generation 
market power.
824   
735.  The Carolina Agencies also propose that mitigated utilities be required to 
investigate and report on transmission expansion or other actions that could remove 
structural impediments causing market power.  The Carolina Agencies claim that 
such a requirement is consistent with the Commission’s affirmative duty to remedy 
undue discrimination, an area in which the Commission has broad authority to craft 
remedies.
825 
736.  Other commenters argue against imposition of a “must offer” requirement, 
stating that it would encourage inefficiencies, undermine competition, discourage 
investment, and perpetuate market power.  They also assert that such a requirement 
                                              
824 NRECA at 37. 
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goes beyond any cost-of-service requirement that the Commission has ever 
adopted.
826  They question the need for a “must offer” requirement, claiming that 
existing Commission statutory authority, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms 
already sufficiently guard against the market power abuse and market manipulation 
concerns that “must offer” proponents claim such a provision is needed to prevent.
827   
737.  EEI and Progress Energy claim that when the Commission establishes a cost-
based rate in a mitigated market, it ensures that the rate meets the just and reasonable 
and not unduly discriminatory requirements of sections 205 and 206 of the FPA, and 
thus there is no further Commission action that is required to mitigate the indicated 
market power.
828 
738.  Several commenters that argue against imposition of a “must offer” 
requirement state that wholesale customers have not presented sufficient evidence to 
justify the generic imposition of such a requirement.  They state that there have been 
no specific instances cited where a wholesale customer in a mitigated market was 
unable to obtain service, much less evidence that such instances are commonplace.   
                                              
826 See, e.g., Xcel at 5; Progress Energy reply comments at 5.  APPA/TAPS and 
NRECA respond that as long as the rate is cost-compensatory, and therefore just and 
reasonable, it provides an adequate return and the mitigated supplier is not disadvantaged 
by making such sale.  APPA/TAPS reply comments at 9; NRECA reply comments at 31, 
35, 38. 
827 See, e.g., EEI at 36; Progress Energy at 17. 
828 EEI at 37; Progress Energy at 13. Docket No. RM04-7-000   418 
 
739.  Duke/Progress Energy argue that the Commission must make a finding that 
rates or practices are unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory as a predicate to 
taking action, and that in the case of a generic rulemaking, “the Commission ‘cannot 
rely solely on “unsupported or abstract allegations.”’”
829  They cite National Fuel Gas 
Supply Corp. v. FERC,
830 where the D.C. Circuit, describing Tenneco Gas v. 
FERC,
831 stated “[t]he court [in Tenneco] ‘upheld Order 497 in relevant part because 
FERC presented an adequate justification – by advancing both (i) a plausible 
theoretical threat of anti-competitive information-sharing between pipelines and their 
marketing affiliates and (ii) vast record evidence of abuse.’”
832  They note that the 
D.C. Circuit contrasted Tenneco with Order No. 2004 (at issue in National Fuel), 
where “‘FERC has cited no complaints and provided zero evidence of actual abuse 
between pipelines and their non-marketing affiliates.’”  They assert that the D.C. 
Circuit concluded that “‘[p]rofessing that an order ameliorates a real industry 
problem but then citing no evidence demonstrating that there is in fact an industry 
problem is not reasoned decisionmaking.’”
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829 Duke/Progress Energy supplemental coments at 21 (quoting Transmission 
Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (TAPS)). 
830 468 F.3d 831, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (National Fuel). 
831 969 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Tenneco). 
832 Duke/Progress Energy supplemental comments at 22 (quoting National Fuel, 
468 F.3d at 840). 
833 National Fuel, 468 F.3d at 843-44. Docket No. RM04-7-000   419 
 
740.  According to Duke/Progress Energy, the commenters favoring a “must offer” 
requirement “have presented no evidence whatsoever to support the conclusion that 
any systemic discrimination is occurring or that any party is suffering any actual 
harm under the discrimination theory they have posited.”
834  Duke/Progress Energy 
offer several examples where they have sold power to LSEs within their control areas 
after the Commission imposed cost-based mitigation for those sales as evidence that 
there is no basis for expecting mitigated utilities to abandon long-standing customers 
and “decades of intersystem coordination and mutual assistance, whereby utilities 
take whatever measures are possible . . . to help their neighbors maintain 
reliability.”
835 
741.  A number of commenters assert that the Commission’s statutory authority to 
require wholesale sales under §§ 202(b) and 202(c) of the FPA is limited and cannot 
justify the imposition of a “must offer” requirement in this context.
836  Southern 
explains that the Commission has forced power sales by a jurisdictional public utility 
to wholesale customers under § 202(b) of the FPA only if such customers have 
                                              
834 Duke/Progress Energy supplemental comments at 23 (citing TAPS, 225 F.3d at 
688, (emphasis in original)); see also Xcel reply comments at 6-7 (parties havenot 
provided any supporting rationale that would justify a “must offer” requirement over 
other potential purchasers); EEI supplemental comments at 3 (commenters have failed to 
demonstrate that there is discrimination warranting generic action). 
835 Duke/Progress Energy supplemental comments at 17 and n.7. 
836 See, e.g., Pinnacle at 8; EEI at 35-36; Progress Energy reply comments at 5, 
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proven they lack service alternatives.  Southern states that it would be unreasonable 
to impose a generic obligation to serve at wholesale by means of a “must offer” 
requirement, absent particularized findings based on a properly developed record that 
wholesale customers lack reasonable alternatives.
837      
742.  EEI agrees that the Commission’s § 202(b) authority is clearly aimed at 
individual transactions where a wholesale customer cannot access supply, with ample 
due process safeguards to ensure that a requirement to sell is truly warranted and will 
not harm the seller.
838  EEI states that the Commission cannot turn such a provision 
into a blanket regulatory requirement without violating the intent of Congress and 
inappropriately bypassing these safeguards, nor is such a blanket requirement 
warranted.
839 
743.  Several commenters question the legal support for a “must offer” requirement, 
arguing that the FPA does not contain an express obligation to serve wholesale 
customers,
840 and that neither section 205 nor section 206 of the FPA authorize the 
                                              
837 Southern at 60. 
838 EEI reply comments at 16. 
839 EEI at 35-36 (citing El Paso Electric Co. v. FERC, 201 FERC F.3d 667 (5
th Cir. 
2000)). 
840 MidAmerican at 18-19; EEI at 33; Southern at 59; Westar at 17; Duke at 12; 
E.ON U.S. reply comments at 1-2; Progress at 13. Docket No. RM04-7-000   421 
 
Commission to mandate or prohibit sales, as long as they are made at just, reasonable, 
and non-discriminatory rates approved by the Commission.
841   
744.   Many commenters also contest claims that sales outside the mitigated control 
area at market-based rates constitute withholding or undue discrimination.  Westar 
and others suggest that offering generation for sale outside of the mitigated control 
area at the prevailing market price to serve demand does not constitute withholding.  
They state that withholding generally refers to either physical withholding (not 
offering to sell) or economic withholding (offering to sell only at inflated prices), 
which in either case is intended to raise prices.
842  Duke/Progress Energy claim that 
“the Commission has confirmed that it is ‘legitimate economically rational’ behavior 
for a market participant to export power in order to sell at higher prices outside a 
control area rather than to sell at lower capped prices within a control area.”
843  
Westar similarly argues that, absent evidence of manipulation or fraud, a “’seller of a 
commodity is acting quite rationally and legally to withhold his supply from the 
market if he believes that in the future the commodity will command a higher price – 
assuming, of course, the seller is under no legal duty to sell.’”
844  Westar and E.ON 
                                              
841 EEI at 35; Progress Energy at 13-14; E.ON U.S. reply comments at 1-2; Duke 
reply comments at 5-6. 
842 EEI reply at 2; Duke/Progress Energy at 15. 
843 Duke/Progress Energy at supplemental comments 16 (quoting San Diego Gas 
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U.S. reason that the Commission’s market behavior rules already address economic 
withholding concerns.
845 
745.  MidAmerican adds that in the limited instances where a wholesale customer 
cannot obtain service, and where an obligation to serve exists, the Commission can 
address the issue in fact-specific proceedings of individual sellers.
846  Duke suggests 
that the “must offer” proponents have failed to demonstrate why “self-supply,” 
including new construction and supply from external resources, is not a viable option 
in at least some instances.
847  Duke states, for example, that the Carolina Agencies 
submit that LSEs will have few if any practical supply options if a mitigated supplier 
is not subject to a must offer requirement.  However in Duke’s view, the Carolina 
Agencies fail to demonstrate why “self-supply,” including construction of local 
                                                                                                                                                  
844 See Westar at 11, n.23 (quoting United States v. Reliant Energy Services Co., 
420 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2006)); see also EEI at 36. 
845 Westar at 12; E.ON U.S. reply comments at 7.  In adopting those rules, Westar 
submits that the Commission specifically rejected arguments that “withholding for an 
anti-competitive purpose can only be remedied by way of a generic “must offer” 
obligation,” stating that “[i]n fact, where a seller intentionally withholds capacity for the 
purpose of manipulating market prices, market conditions, or markets rules for electric 
energy or electricity products, it has done so without a legitimate business purpose in 
violation of Market Behavior Rule 2.”  Westar at 12 (quoting Investigation of Terms and 
Conditions of Public Utility Market-Based Rate Authorizations, 107 FERC ¶ 61,175 at P 
27 (2004) (emphasis added)). 
846 MidAmerican at 19. 
847 Duke reply comments at 10.  APPA/TAPS responds that the Commission has 
recognized that not all LSEs can build their own generation.  APPA/TAPS reply 
comments at 9 (citing April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 155). Docket No. RM04-7-000   423 
 
generation by their members, is not a viable option in at least some instances.  Nor do 
they demonstrate lack of ability to secure supply from resources external to the 
control area.  Duke submits that even where construction of new generation may not 
be cost-effective, “self-supply” includes purchasing as well as self-build.  Duke 
argues that lack of an economic self-build option at a given time does not relieve an 
LSE of its obligation to acquire generation resources through alternate means such as 
long-term purchases.
848 
746.  Several commenters similarly challenge the claim that choosing to make sales 
outside the mitigated control area at market-based rates is discriminatory.  EEI notes 
that not all rate distinctions are prohibited by section 205(b) of the FPA.  It states that 
only undue discrimination between customers of the same class that is not justified by 
cost of service differences, operating conditions, or other considerations is 
forbidden.
849  In this proceeding, Duke/Progress Energy claim that wholesale 
customers are seeking a superior product to that offered to other customers outside 
the mitigated control area:  “a Commission-enforced right to a free and unilateral call 
                                              
848 Duke reply comments at 10.  
849 EEI reply comments at 13-14 (citations, including Wisconsin Michigan Power 
Co., 31 FPC 1445 (1964); CED Rock Springs LLC, 116 FERC ¶ 61,163 at P 39 (2006) 
(In examining potential undue discrimination, the Commission properly focuses on 
whether “there are any similarly situated projects that have been treated differently.”); see 
also Badger Power Marketing Authority, 116 FERC ¶ 61,200 at P 10 (2006) (approving a 
rate that is essentially the same as the rate charged another similarly-situated customer)). Docket No. RM04-7-000   424 
 
option to buy any available energy generated by [m]itigated [u]tility assets at cost-
based prices, exercisable during peak periods when market prices are high.”
850  
747.  EEI adds that the courts also recognize that the just and reasonable standard 
allows – and can even require – rate differences to reflect different locations and 
classes of customers.
851  EEI and Progress Energy therefore contend that, once the 
Commission has determined whether a seller may sell at market-based rates or must 
use mitigated rates in various markets, the seller must be allowed to sell electricity at 
the just and reasonable rates approved for the different markets.
852 
748.  MidAmerican claims that customer concerns that a mitigated seller will unduly 
discriminate between the seller’s native load and wholesale customers in the 
mitigated region are baseless because the Commission’s jurisdiction does not extend 
to a comparison of retail and wholesale rates.  MidAmerican states that while a seller 
typically has an obligation to serve retail customers in a franchised service area, that 
obligation does not extend to wholesale customers.  Therefore, MidAmerican states 
                                              
850 Duke/Progress Energy supplemental comments at 9. 
851 EEI reply comments at 14-15 (citing Town of Norwood, Massachusetts v. 
FERC, 202 F.3d 392 at 402 (1
st Cir. 2000) (“[D]ifferential treatment does not necessarily 
amount to undue preference where the difference in treatment can be explained by some 
factor deemed acceptable by the regulators (and the courts).”); City of Vernon, California 
v. FERC, 983 F.2d 1089 at 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
852 Id. at 15; Progress Energy at 13. Docket No. RM04-7-000   425 
 
there is no issue of undue discrimination between retail and wholesale rates that 
either requires or allows a “must offer” requirement.
853 
749.  Xcel and others submit that wholesale customers are seeking a preference or 
entitlement through a “must offer” requirement and are in fact calling for 
discrimination by asserting a preference to power available for sale by a mitigated 
seller over all other purchasers, even those who value it more highly,
854 and have 
provided no evidence to justify such a preference or entitlement over other potential 
purchasers.
855  Duke/Progress Energy state that customer claims that “they are 
victims of market power and therefore need some specially tailored remedy” is 
erroneous, and that “[b]y imposing cost-based rates . . . within their control area, the 
Commission has fully mitigated any market power concerns.”
856   Xcel and others 
also note that the LSEs have no reciprocal obligation to purchase power if a “must 
offer” requirement were imposed upon mitigated sellers.
857 
                                              
853 MidAmerican reply comments at 7; see also, Duke reply comments at 6.  
Compare APPA/TAPS reply comments at 3 (“The Commission is not called upon to 
decide a struggle between wholesale and retail ratepayers, but to set a just and reasonable 
wholesale rate, which a Commission-approved cost-based rate surely is.”). 
854 Xcel reply at 6-7 ; EEI supplemental comments at 4-5.   
855 Xcel reply comments at 6-7; Progress Energy reply comments at 2, 4, 7-11; 
Duke reply comments at 7, n.10. 
856 Duke/Progress Energy supplemental comments at 13 (citing Duke Power, 113 
FERC ¶ 61,192 at P 22). 
857 Xcel reply comments at 7; Progress Energy reply comments at 6; MidAmerican 
reply comments at 9. Docket No. RM04-7-000   426 
 
750.  According to Duke and others, when a mitigated supplier sells excess 
generation at market-based rates outside of the mitigated control area, it is exhibiting 
economic behavior.
858  Such behavior encourages trading within and across regions, 
making markets more competitive.  Similarly, Westar contends that a “must offer” 
requirement prevents markets from allocating scarce resources to customers who 
value them the most, hindering optimal resource allocation.
859  Westar states that this 
is inefficient because “the highest cost generation may not be displaced by the seller’s 
lower cost energy.”
860 
751.  EEI, Progress Energy, and others also claim that a “must offer” requirement 
would effectively take economic benefits away from the mitigated utility’s retail 
native load and transfer them to wholesale customers in the mitigated control area.
861  
Some of these commenters claim that a “must offer” requirement may result in a 
windfall for the wholesale customer originally seeking protection from the seller’s 
market power at the expense of the mitigated utility and its native load customers.
862  
                                              
858 Duke at 11; Xcel at 6; Southern at 56-57; EEI reply comments at 11.   
859 Westar at 13 (citing Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 38 FERC ¶ 61,242 at 
61,790 (1987)). 
860 Id. (quoting Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 38 FERC at 61,790, n.19). 
861 See, e.g., EEI at 33; Progress Energy at 14, 16; Entergy at 2; Westar at 16; see 
also Dr. Pace at 24-25. 
862 PPL reply comments at 14; Duke reply comments at 2, 7-8; Progress Energy at 
16; E.ON U.S. at 13-14; Duke at 12-13; MidAmerican at 27. Docket No. RM04-7-000   427 
 
PNM/Tucson adds that sales made by a utility pursuant to a “must offer” requirement 
could affect reliability by making capacity unavailable to meet state-established 
reserve margins.
863 
752.  Xcel and Duke point out that a “must offer” requirement at cost-based rates 
may result in a lost opportunity cost to the seller.
864  A number of commenters assert 
that mitigation is intended to assure that selling utilities do not benefit from the 
exercise of market power; it is not to guarantee preferential treatment for particular 
customers to obtain below-market generation through an obligation to serve.
865 
753.  Some commenters further contend that a “must offer” requirement would 
create significant wealth transfers from mitigated sellers as a result of arbitrage 
opportunities.  For example, wholesale customers would accept the mitigated offer 
any time the “must offer” price was below the market price, either in or outside of the 
mitigated region.
866  E.ON U.S. is concerned that a “must offer” requirement giving a 
buyer the option to buy power at mitigated prices will inevitably result in external 
third parties negotiating with such a buyer to obtain longer-term access to the 
mitigated power.
867 
                                              
863 PNM/Tucson at 18. 
864 Xcel at 8; Duke reply comments at 3, n.4. 
865 Xcel at 5; EEI reply comments at 10, 12; Progress Energy at 14.  
866 Progress Energy at 16; Westar at 16. 
867 E.ON U.S. at 13. Docket No. RM04-7-000   428 
 
754.  In addition, EEI and others argue that a “must offer” requirement would 
reduce competition and stifle development by providing a disincentive for sellers to 
develop new generation resources.
868  New entrants would be deterred from building 
generation due to the disparity between cost-based and market-based rates;
869 other 
sellers in the mitigated region effectively would be mitigated because they would not 
be selected by buyers unless their price is below the mitigated price of the “must 
offer” requirement.
870  At the same time, EEI asserts that the mitigated seller would 
perpetuate its market power by increasing its capacity in the mitigated control area.
871 
755.  Progress Energy and MidAmerican add that a “must offer” requirement would 
impede a mitigated seller’s ability to fulfill its retail crediting obligations and to 
provide adequate and reliable service to its native load retail customers, which bear, 
through their retail rates, the fixed costs of the generation to serve them.
872 
                                              
868 EEI at 37; Progress Energy at 16; MidAmerican at 22.  APPA/TAPS responds 
that it is in fact the mitigated seller’s constrained transmission system that keeps LSEs 
captive and prevents new entry that could reduce the seller’s market power.  APPA/TAPS 
reply comments at 9. 
869 EEI reply comments at 10. 
870 MidAmerican reply comments at 8. 
871 EEI reply comments at 10. 
872 See, e.g., Progress Energy at 14-15; E.ON U.S. at 12-13; PNM Tucson at 18; 
MidAmerican at 21. Docket No. RM04-7-000   429 
 
756.  Southern, Duke and others further suggest that a “must offer” requirement 
could undermine the required planning and operations processes of utility systems 
purchasing the “must offer” output.
873  They argue that a “must offer” requirement 
could bias shorter-term operating decisions where, for example, an LSE has the 
opportunity to purchase peak supply in real time at less than market prices, thereby 
avoiding incurring any fixed costs on a day-ahead basis to ensure peak supply 
availability.
874  They contend that this would eliminate incentives for the LSEs to 
plan to meet their resource needs and shift planning obligations at the expense of a 
mitigated utility’s native load customers.
875 
757.  Another commenter is also wary of a “must offer” requirement, reasoning that 
such a requirement is normally designed to mitigate physical withholding.  This 
commenter states that it may work well in an organized power market where an 
independent operator ensures that the power is used to serve the local needs caused 
by reliability or local resource deficiency.  However, without an independent 
                                              
873 Southern at 61; Progress Energy at 16; Duke reply comments at 9-10; EEI reply 
comments at 10-11. 
874 Southern at 63. 
875 Duke reply comments at 8-11.  APPA/TAPS counters that where a “must offer” 
requirement would not, by its own terms, obligate a seller to build, an LSE that relied 
exclusively on “must offer” sales would be taking risks that capacity to support those 
sales might no longer be available.  APPA/TAPS reply comments at 9. Docket No. RM04-7-000   430 
 
operator, a “must offer” requirement may be more difficult to administer.
876  In 
advocating for separate market policies and tests for short- and long-term markets, 
this commenter prefers a price cap for short-term products rather than a “must offer” 
requirement, asserting that a price cap for short-term products is preferable to a “must 
offer” approach because it is more economically efficient, fair, and easier to 
administer.
877  For long-term products, this commenter takes the position that, “[i]n 
situations where a lack of long-term transmission and/or a lack of long-term supply 
alternatives exist, it is difficult to think of an alternative to full cost-of-service 
rates.”
878  They add that these cost-based rates should offer both fair prices and 
adequate investment returns to suppliers in the destination market with rate-of-return 
levels that fully enable incumbent suppliers to make appropriate investments to meet 
such cost-based obligations.
879   
758.  Entergy raises a concern that in the NOPR the Commission erred by failing to 
define what constitutes available capacity.  It asserts that there is difficulty in 
                                              
876  Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner at 16-17. 
877 Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner supplemental comments at 3.  Drs. Broehm and 
Fox-Penner advocate other approaches, such as use of a proxy price when transmission 
constraints are not binding and use of default cost-based rates when they are binding. 
878 Id.
879 Id.Docket No. RM04-7-000   431 
 
calculating available capacity because of uncertainty regarding: (1) loads; (2) 
qualifying facility puts; (3) unit performance; and (4) fuel arrangements and prices.
880 
Commission Determination 
759.  After careful consideration of the arguments raised by commenters, we will 
not impose an across-the-board “must offer” requirement for mitigated sellers.  While 
wholesale customer commenters have raised concerns relating to their ability to 
access needed power, we conclude that there is insufficient record evidence to 
support instituting a generic “must offer” requirement. 
760.  As discussed above, some commenters argue that undue discrimination occurs 
if a mitigated seller refuses to sell power to customers in the mitigated balancing 
authority  area and instead sells that power at market-based rates to customers outside 
the mitigated balancing authority area.  Some commenters also contend that it is 
unduly discriminatory for a mitigated seller to make market-based rate sales to 
competitive markets outside the mitigated balancing authority area when constraints 
on that seller’s own transmission system prevent embedded customers from similarly 
accessing those markets as buyers.  However, these commenters have not provided 
any evidence of specific instances in which the harms they identify have, or are, 
occurring.  Without such evidence, we decline to impose a generic remedy such as a 
“must offer” requirement.  
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761.  In National Fuel, the D.C. Circuit vacated a final rule of the Commission, 
Order No. 2004, as applicable to natural gas pipelines because of the expansion of the 
standards of conduct to include a new definition of energy affiliates.  The court 
explained that the Commission relied on both theoretical grounds and on record 
evidence to justify this expansion.  The court concluded that the Commission’s record 
evidence did not withstand scrutiny and, thus, concluded the expansion was arbitrary 
and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
881  While the court 
left open the possibility of the Commission relying solely on a theoretical threat of 
abuse, it cautioned that if the Commission chooses to take that approach, “it will need 
to explain how the potential danger . . . unsupported by a record of abuse, justifies 
such costly prophylactic rules.”
882  In addition, the court said the Commission would 
need to explain why individual complaint procedures were insufficient to ensure 
against abuse.
883   
762.  We find here that, although wholesale customer commenters have raised 
theoretical concerns that they will be unable to access power absent a “must offer” 
requirement, they have not provided any concrete examples of harm nor explained 
how the potential harm justifies the generic remedy they seek.  Given the lack of 
                                              
881 National Fuel, 468 F.3d at 844. 
882 Id.
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evidence in the record that wholesale customers in mitigated markets will be unable 
to obtain power supplies at reasonable rates, we conclude that there is insufficient 
basis for instituting a generic “must offer” requirement.  Indeed, the record includes 
evidence of utilities continuing to make cost-based sales after loss or surrender of 
market-based rate authority.
884 
763.  In addition, consistent with the guidance provided in National Fuel, 
commenters advocating a generic “must offer” have not demonstrated that existing 
procedures and remedies under the FPA are inadequate to deal with specific cases 
that may arise.  To the contrary, we find that there are potential remedies available on 
a case-by-case basis to a wholesale customer alleging undue discrimination or other 
unlawful behavior on the part of a mitigated seller.   For example, a wholesale 
customer can file a complaint pursuant to section 206 of the FPA.  It also can bring an 
action under section 202(b) of the FPA.
885  In addition, it can bring an action pursuant 
to the statutory prohibition in section 222 of the FPA against market manipulation.   
764.  While we do not impose a generic “must offer” requirement in this Final Rule, 
we do not rule out the possibility that we might find the imposition of a “must offer” 
                                              
884 See Duke  reply comments at 7 and n.10; Progress Energy reply comments at 
9-11; Duke/Progress Energy supplemental comments at 17 and n.7. 
885 See, e.g, City of Las Cruces, New Mexico v. El Paso Electric Co., 87 FERC 
¶ 61,220 (1999) (“In our view, section 202(b) allows the Commission to direct a public 
utility to take three separate actions:  (1) establish a physical connection of its 
transmission facilities with the facilities of one or more eligible persons; (2) sell energy to 
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requirement, or some other condition on the seller’s market-based rate authority, to be 
an appropriate remedy in a particular case depending on the facts and circumstances, 
as we have done in the past.
886  We note that the Commission has previously imposed 
a “must offer” requirement as a condition of market-based rate authority for sellers in 
the California markets.
887  There, the record demonstrated a problem in a limited 
geographic area that warranted a “must offer” remedy to prevent unjust and 
unreasonable rates from being charged during certain times and under certain 
conditions.  If a wholesale customer were to present specific evidence documenting 
that a transmission provider either denied the customer’s request for transmission 
service, in violation of the OATT, or was unreasonably delaying responding to a 
request for transmission service, in violation of the OATT, we might find the 
imposition of a “must offer” requirement on a transmission provider to be an 
appropriate remedy.
888  As the Commission recently explained in Order No. 890, 
transmission providers must process requests for transmission service “as soon as 
                                              
886 If an intervenor believes a “must-offer” requirement is the only way to mitigate 
market power, it may present evidence to that effect in a particular proceeding. 
887 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 95 FERC ¶ 61,418 at 62,557 (2001) (“After 
carefully considering the record, the Commission reaffirmed its general finding that, as a 
result of the seriously flawed electric market structure and rules for wholesale sales of 
electric energy in California, unjust and unreasonable rates were charged and could 
continue to be charged during certain times and under certain conditions, unless certain 
targeted remedies were implemented.”)   
888 We are not prejudging here that such facts warrant imposition of a “must offer” 
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reasonably practicable after receipt” of such requests
889 and must post performance 
metrics that are intended “to enhance the transparency of the study process and shed 
light on whether transmission providers are processing request studies in a non-
discriminatory manner.”
890  Order No. 890 explained that “the revised pro forma 
OATT will greatly enhance our oversight and enforcement capabilities by increasing 
the transparency of many critical functions under the pro forma OATT, such as ATC 
calculation and transmission planning.”
891 Here too, we reiterate that the Commission 
“intends to use its enforcement powers with respect to the OATT in a fair and even-
handed manner, pursuant to the principles set forth in the Policy Statement on 
Enforcement.”
892 
765.  In addition to our conclusion that there is not sufficient record evidence to 
support the imposition of a generic “must offer” requirement, we are also concerned 
that adoption of a “must offer” requirement would present a number of difficult 
implementation and logistical problems.
893  
                                              
889 Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at P 1296 (2007) (Order No. 890). 
890 Id. at P 1308. 
891 Id. at P 1721. 
892 Id. at P 1714. 
893 Because we have decided not to impose a generic “must offer” requirement in 
this Final Rule, we do not address the merits of the particular must-offer proposals made 
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766.  For example, given the difficulties associated with calculations of available 
transfer capability,
894 we foresee similar disputes over the calculation of available 
generation capacity were we to impose a generic “must offer” obligation.  For 
instance, how far in advance should such calculations occur – one hour, one day, one 
month, or some other time frame?  Would such calculations be derived on a generator 
specific basis or on a system basis (and how is transmission factored in)?  Would the 
Commission or the industry need to develop a standard method of calculating 
available generation capacity?  How would available generation capacity be allocated 
to potential purchasers?   
767.  We also are concerned that adopting a “must offer” requirement could harm 
other markets.  For example, if a mitigated seller is required to offer its available 
power first to customers in the mitigated market, such a requirement may effectively 
preclude the mitigated seller from participating in adjoining markets particularly at 
times when additional supply is most needed (i.e., when prices in the adjoining 
market are high).  Such a policy may serve to assist one set of customers at the 
expense of other customers that see their supply options reduced. 
                                                                                                                                                  
by commenters.   
894 OATT Reform NOPR at PP 37-41 (outlining problems that result from 
inconsistent available transfer capacity calculation, including missed opportunities for 
transactions, frequent errors, and undue discrimination). Docket No. RM04-7-000   437 
 
768.  Parties have asserted that imposing a must offer requirement may discourage 
long-term planning, while others have disagreed with those arguments.  Given that 
we do not impose any must offer obligation in this rule, we need not and do not 
address these arguments.  If the Commission considers imposing a “must offer” 
requirement in an individual case, affected parties can raise these arguments at that 
time.   
769.  Though APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies are correct that the 
Commission has previously imposed a “must offer” requirement as a condition of 
market-based rate authority for sellers in the California markets, as discussed above, 
that holding supports our approach here.  There, the record demonstrated a problem 
in a limited geographic area that warranted a “must offer” remedy to prevent unjust 
and unreasonable rates from being charged during certain times and under certain 
conditions.  By contrast, here APPA/TAPS and the Carolina Agencies urge us to 
impose a generic remedy on all mitigated sellers in all markets without a showing that 
there is a concrete problem justifying imposition of a “must offer” requirement in all 
markets.   
770.  Given that we have not adopted a “must offer” requirement in this Final Rule, 
we need not, and do not, address arguments asserting that we lack legal authority to 
do so.  If the Commission should adopt any such requirement in an individual case, 
affected parties can raise any related legal arguments at that time and nothing in this 
rule precludes them from doing so. Docket No. RM04-7-000   438 
 
771.  For many of the same reasons that we decline to impose a “must offer” 
requirement, we also decline to adopt the “right of first refusal” requirement proposed 
by NRECA.  Under this approach, a wholesale customer in the mitigated market 
would be given a right of refusal to purchase, at the market price, power that the 
mitigated seller proposes to sell outside the mitigated market.  For the reasons 
provided above, there is insufficient record evidence to support imposition of such an 
across-the-board requirement.   
772.  A “right of first refusal” also would carry significant administrative burdens.  
Such an approach would invite disputes about what constitutes a legitimate offer by a 
third party to purchase power which establishes the basis for the offered rate.  There 
also may be disputes if more than one wholesale customer wants to purchase the 
power in question.  We are also concerned about the long-term viability of a rate 
setting that is based on mitigated sellers repeatedly negotiating tentative power sale 
arrangements with would-be buyers in first-tier markets only to have those offers 
withdrawn so the sale could be made to another buyer.  Under such a regime, buyers 
from outside the mitigated market may be disinclined to invest resources to negotiate 
tentative contracts knowing that there is a significant chance that another buyer from 
within the mitigated market will usurp their position and instead get the sale. 
773.  There are also administrative concerns with how the Commission or third 
parties could be certain what the actual price and conditions of service would be for 
the sale in the first-tier market unless the contract was actually executed.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   439 
 
774.  In response to NRECA’s suggestion that an enforceable commitment to 
provide sufficient additional transmission import capacity to mitigate generation 
market power be considered as an alternative, the Commission notes that, consistent 
with the April 14 Order, a seller that fails one of the generation market power screens 
is allowed to propose alternative mitigation that the Commission may deem 
appropriate.
895  As a result, a mitigated seller could propose, as alternative mitigation, 
to provide additional transmission capacity by, for example, committing to relinquish 
transmission reservations or to physically upgrade the transmission grid.
 896  The 
Commission would consider such proposals on a case-by-case basis.  Moreover, a 
primary purpose of Order No. 890 is to “increase the ability of customers to access 
new generating resources and promote efficient utilization of transmission by 
requiring an open, transparent, and coordinated transmission planning process.”
897  
775.  In particular, we believe recent actions we took in Order No. 890 address the 
Carolina Agencies’ proposal that mitigated utilities be required to investigate and 
report on transmission expansion or other actions that could remove structural 
impediments exacerbating market power.  In Order No. 890, the Commission adopted 
                                              
895 April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 61,018 at P 147, 148 n.142. 
896 See, e.g., Westar Energy, Inc., 115 FERC ¶ 61,228, order on reh’g, 117 FERC 
¶ 61,011 (2006), order on further reh’g, 118 FERC ¶ 61,237 (2007) (concerning such 
mitigation proposed in the context of a disposition of jurisdictional facilities). 
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a number of reforms designed to mitigate transmission market power, including a 
requirement that all transmission providers develop a coordinated, open and 
transparent transmission planning process that would, among other things, enable 
customers to request studies evaluating potential upgrades or other investments that 
could reduce congestion or integrate new resources and loads.
898  The requests for 
these economic planning studies and the responses will be posted on the transmission 
provider’s OASIS site, subject to confidentiality requirements.
899  We believe these 
steps may assist in reducing structural impediments that contribute to market power. 
b.  First-Tier Markets 
Commission Proposal 
776.  In the NOPR, the Commission sought comment on whether it is appropriate to 
continue to allow sellers that are subject to mitigation in their home control area to 
sell power at market-based rates outside their control area.  The Commission asked if 
this represents undue discrimination or otherwise constitutes "withholding" in the 
home control area that is inconsistent with the FPA's mandate that rates be just, 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory, or, instead, if this reflects economically 
efficient behavior and encourages necessary trading within and across regions, 
particularly in peak periods when marginal prices rise above average embedded costs. 
                                              
898 Id. at P 544. 
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777.  The Commission also asked if it should find that any seller that has lost 
market-based rate authority in its home control area should be precluded from selling 
power at market-based rates in adjacent (first tier) control areas. 
Comments 
 
778.  A number of commenters state that there is no basis for prohibiting a mitigated 
seller from selling excess power at market-based rates in adjacent control areas, as the 
Commission will have determined that the seller does not have the ability to exercise 
market power in any of those adjacent control areas.
900  Some commenters also claim 
that prohibiting these sales would limit market activity and constrain the benefits of 
competitive pricing by excluding sellers from markets in which they do not possess 
market power.
901   
779.  PNM/Tucson contends that prohibiting sales of available capacity at market-
based rates in adjacent control areas where the seller does not possess market power 
would be a disproportionate response that would render the Commission’s market-by-
market analysis meaningless.
902  Moreover, PNM/Tucson and MidAmerican warn 
that independent power producers have no incentive to invest in new resources in 
                                              
900 Ameren at 18-19; see also Duke at 12 (citing Florida Power Corp., 113 FERC ¶ 
61,131 at P 24 (2005)); Southern at 56; PNM/Tucson at 19-20 ; Xcel at 5-6; EEI at 33; 
and PPL reply comments at 15-16. 
901 MidAmerican at 22-23; PPL at 24-25; EEI at 28. 
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markets where prices are effectively constrained to the level of another entity’s 
embedded costs.
903 
780.  Southern asks the Commission not to impose mitigation that will create flaws 
in markets that may have periods of genuine temporary scarcity but where the seller 
does not possess market power.
904  Southern states that prohibiting a mitigated seller 
from responding to price signals in neighboring markets will adversely affect 
efficient resource development and contradicts the Commission’s desire to promote 
competitive markets and resource adequacy.
905  Further, foreclosing markets 
otherwise accessible to resources nominally dedicated to native load service may 
impair the optimization of those resources by impairing a full response to price 
signals.  This, Southern adds, would harm native load customers because the 
mitigated utility would be unable to optimize surplus resources, as mandated through 
state retail credit obligations, thereby depriving retail customers of the benefits of 
system optimization.
906 
781.  Another commenter agrees that a mitigated seller should be allowed to sell 
available capacity at market-based rates in markets where that seller does not possess 
                                              
903 MidAmerican at 22, PNM/Tucson at 17. 
904 Southern at 64-65.  
905 Id. at 57. 
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market power, provided that this does not raise prices in the mitigated region.
907  This 
commenter asserts that such sales facilitate regional trading and market efficiency in 
developing competitive markets.
908  Another commenter contends that unless “costs” 
are defined in a way that effectively allows competitive market rates to be charged, 
revoking a seller’s market-based rate authority in markets where the seller does not 
possess market power would reduce the mitigated seller’s incentive to supply 
available power to the market, deprive the mitigated seller and its customers of 
legitimate economic rent, subsidize those buyers with access to the mitigated rates, 
and create a rationing problem among buyers with access to the mitigated-rate 
power.
909 
782.  MidAmerican states that, if the Commission were to eliminate a seller’s 
market-based rate authority in all regions, the mitigated prices should only apply 
prospectively.  MidAmerican reasons that existing transactions negotiated in the 
                                              
907 Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner at 16.  The NYISO also supports market-based 
rate sales in competitive markets where the mitigated seller does not possess market 
power.  According to the NYISO, with regard to the NYISO, PJM Interconnection, LLC 
and ISO-New England, the Commission can ensure that sellers respond to market price 
signals by designing market power mitigation in a manner that will permit even mitigated 
sellers to receive the applicable market clearing price.  For example, any cost-based rate 
mitigation imposed could limit the maximum bids that the seller may submit without 
limiting the revenues that the mitigated seller may receive.  NYISO at 10. 
908 Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner at 16.  See also PPL at 24; MidAmerican at 17; 
E.ON U.S. at 12-13; EEI at 28; Duke at 11. 
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absence of market power should not be altered, since these previously-negotiated 
transactions would have no impact on a seller’s willingness to make future sales to 
customers in the home control area.
910 
783.  Other commenters oppose allowing mitigated sellers to sell at market-based 
rates outside the home control area on the basis that it encourages and provides 
incentives for the seller to engage in physical or economic withholding of its 
generation output in the home control area.  These commenters indicate that their 
concerns in this regard would be addressed if mitigation is combined with a 
requirement that the mitigated seller make power available to customers within the 
mitigated control area.  APPA/TAPS state that, absent a “must offer” requirement, it 
is not clear that prohibiting mitigated sellers from making market-based sales outside 
their home control areas would necessarily prompt the mitigated seller to sell power 
in its home control area.
911   
784.  However, APPA/TAPS ask the Commission not to rule out across-the-board 
revocation of market-based rate authority as it may be necessary to motivate 
mitigated sellers to undertake the kind of structural measures needed to mitigate 
market power on a long-term basis.  If the Commission adopts a policy to revoke or 
condition market-based rate authority beyond the home control area, APPA/TAPS 
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state that the policy should not be limited to just the first-tier control area.   Rather, 
the revocation or conditions should apply to any market where the seller can use 
generation located in or originally delivered to its control area to sell outside that 
mitigated area.
912 
785.  The Carolina Agencies state that a generic prohibition on market-based rate 
sales outside the mitigated market appears likely to inhibit regional trade to a greater 
extent than is necessary to protect the interests of embedded LSEs.
913  Both the 
Carolina Agencies and NC Towns state that there is no clear need to prohibit 
mitigated sellers from making market-based sales outside their home control areas if 
a “must offer” requirement is adopted.
914  According to the Carolina Agencies, a 
mitigated seller should be free to engage in market-based rate sales in other control 
areas as long as that utility has provided embedded LSEs a reasonable opportunity to 
purchase capacity and/or energy.  
786.  As to any claim that it would be unduly discriminatory for the Commission to 
deny or condition the market-based rate authority of a utility that passes the screens in 
markets beyond its mitigated home control area, APPA/TAPS and the Carolina 
Agencies submit that mitigated sellers are not similarly-situated to the other utilities 
                                              
912 APPA/TAPS at 43-44. 
913 Carolina Agencies at 19. 
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selling at market-based rates in those other competitive markets.  They assert that 
other sellers’ market-based rate sales do not implicate those sellers’ ability to 
withhold supply from disfavored wholesale customers in a mitigated control area.  
Moreover, they argue that it elevates the importance of the screens above the FPA to 
argue that granting unconditioned market-based rate authority to one seller who 
passes the screens obligates the Commission to grant unconditioned authority to all 
who pass the screens.  In their view, the Commission would be failing its duty under 
the FPA if it permitted physical withholding by a dominant utility, as such actions 
would be unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory.
915  
787.  ELCON advocates suspending any mitigated seller’s market-based rates in all 
markets it can access.  Short of this long-term fix, ELCON asserts that other 
proposals such as “must offer” requirements will be prone to fail because of likely 
unintended consequences.
916 
788.  Morgan Stanley favors requiring mitigated sellers to post the mitigated price 
and other material terms on a publicly-available website for all sales to be made from 
the units that are part of the portfolio covered by the Commission’s market power 
                                              
915 APPA/TAPS and Carolina Agencies supplemental comments at 36-37.  
NRECA adds that “the FPA does not bar – as unduly discriminatory – Commission 
imposition of remedies in a non-discriminatory fashion, including banning sales outside 
the mitigated market: the statute protects buyers, not sellers, from undue discrimination.”  
NRECA reply comments at 41; see also Carolina Agencies at 16 (citing the OATT 
Reform NOPR at P 210 and n.203). 
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finding, regardless of where the actual sale sinks.
917  Morgan Stanley asserts that 
effective mitigation can only occur if it is imposed on all sales from a mitigated 
supplier’s generation portfolio and urges the Commission not to focus on who the 
purchaser is or where the power sinks.
918  If a mitigated seller chooses to offer its 
excess power only outside the mitigated region and simply refuses to sell inside its 
home market, Morgan Stanley is concerned that the market in the “home” territory 
would be even less competitive than if the seller were allowed to sell there on an 
unmitigated basis. 
919 
789.  CAISO states that, where a competitive supply of imports into a mitigated 
control area does not exist, market power mitigation mechanisms or other incentive 
schemes will be necessary to ensure that the local supplier makes all of its capacity 
available to supply energy and ancillary services to the home control area.
920  CAISO 
asks the Commission to provide greater clarity on the extent to which the antifraud 
and anti-manipulation rules adopted in Order No. 670 prohibit economic and physical 
                                              
917 Morgan Stanley at 7; Morgan Stanley reply comments at 6. 
918 Morgan Stanley reply comments at 6.  The Oregon Commission responds that 
such broad mitigation would not benefit wholesale customers in the mitigated region and 
would harm the supplier’s native retail load by transferring wealth to marketers like 
Morgan Stanley.  Oregon Commission reply comments at 4; see also MidAmerican reply 
comments at 13-14 (arguing that Morgan Stanley’s proposal would be an arbitrary and 
capricious redistribution of income and allow windfall arbitrage profits). 
919 Morgan Stanley at 6. 
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withholding of resources.  In particular, CAISO asks the Commission to provide 
greater clarity on the deceptive conduct criteria it would use to determine whether a 
particular case of physical or economic withholding would be a violation of the new 
Part 47 regulations.  CAISO explains that greater clarity in this area will help ISO and 
RTO market monitors in developing effective RTO/ISO market power mitigation 
rules tailored for the types of physical and economic withholding that are not 
addressed under Part 47 regulations. 
Commission Determination 
790.  After careful consideration of the arguments raised by commenters, we will 
retain our current policy and limit mitigation to the market in which the seller has 
been found to possess, or chosen not to rebut the presumption of, market power.  We 
will not place limitations on a mitigated seller’s ability to sell at market-based rates in 
balancing authority areas in which the seller has not been found to have market 
power.   
791.  The Commission authorizes sales of electric energy at market-based rates if 
the seller and its affiliates do not have, or have adequately mitigated, horizontal and 
vertical market power in generation and transmission, and cannot erect other barriers 
to entry.  As the Commission has explained, “The consideration of market power is 
important in determining if customers have genuine alternatives to buying the seller's Docket No. RM04-7-000   449 
 
product.”
921  Commenters favoring revocation of a mitigated seller’s market-based 
rate authority in markets where there has been no finding of market power, as well as 
those supporting broadening mitigation to first-tier markets, have not provided a 
sufficient legal basis for such a policy.  Where the record demonstrates that a seller 
does not have market power in a market, or has adequately mitigated any market 
power, the Commission has authorized such a seller to transact under market-based 
rates.
922 As the April 14 Order explained, “Market-based rates will not be revoked 
and cost-based rates will not be imposed until there has been a Commission order 
making a definitive finding that the applicant has market power ….”
923 
792.  We recognize that wholesale customer commenters are generally concerned 
that allowing mitigated sellers to sell outside their mitigated markets at market-based 
rates could encourage such sellers not to offer generation for sale within the mitigated 
market.  However, we agree with the Carolina Agencies that a generic prohibition 
against such sales could inhibit regional trade to a greater extent than necessary to 
protect captive LSEs.  We note that even some wholesale customer commenters 
acknowledge that it is not clear that prohibiting mitigated sellers from making 
market-based sales beyond their mitigated region would prompt the mitigated seller 
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to sell power in the mitigated market.  For these reasons, we limit mitigation to the 
areas in which the seller has market power. 
793.  For the reasons stated above, we disagree with Morgan Stanley’s assertion that 
effective mitigation can only occur if it is imposed on all sales from a mitigated 
seller’s generation portfolio.  In addition, though we appreciate CAISO’s request for 
greater clarity on the criteria the Commission will use to determine whether economic 
and physical withholding has occurred, such a determination must be made on a case-
by-case basis. 
c.  Sales that Sink in Unmitigated Markets 
Commission Proposal  
794.  In the NOPR, the Commission stated that some companies have proposed 
limiting mitigation to sales that “sink in” the mitigated market, that is, so that 
mitigation would only apply to end users in the mitigated market.  However, in 
MidAmerican Energy Company,
924 the Commission stated that limiting mitigation to 
sales that “sink in” the mitigated market would improperly limit mitigation to certain 
sales, namely, only to sales to buyers that serve end-use customers in the mitigated 
market.  The Commission reasoned that limiting mitigation in this manner would 
improperly allow market-based rate sales within the mitigated market to entities that 
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do not serve end-use customers in the mitigated market.
925   The Commission stated 
that such a limitation would not mitigate the seller’s ability to attempt to exercise 
market power over sales in the mitigated market and is inconsistent with the 
Commission’s direction in the April 14 and July 8 Orders.   On rehearing of the April 
14 Order, it was argued that access to power sold under mitigated prices should be 
restricted to buyers serving end-use customers within the relevant geographic market 
in which the seller has been found to have market power.  In particular, arguments 
were made that a seller should not be required to make sales at mitigated prices to 
power marketers or brokers without end-use customers in the relevant market.  In the 
July 8 Order, the Commission rejected the suggestion that mitigated sellers be 
restricted to selling power only to buyers serving end-use customers,
 and has since 
rejected tariff language that proposes to do so.   
795.  In the NOPR, the Commission sought comment on whether it should modify 
or revise its current policy.  The Commission sought comment on whether and, if so, 
how it should allow market-based rate sales by a mitigated seller within a mitigated 
market if those sales do not “sink” in that control area.   
Comments 
796.  While some commenters generally seek to allow a mitigated seller to make 
sales at market-based rates if those sales do not “sink” in the mitigated market, other 
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commenters support the current policy of requiring all of a mitigated supplier’s sales 
in the mitigated market to be cost-based.  The State AGs and Advocates go even 
further and encourage the Commission to apply its mitigation policy to all wholesale 
sales that sink in the mitigated market, regardless of the seller, arguing that the impact 
of market power on price is market-wide in scope.
926 
797.  APPA/TAPS support the current policy of requiring cost-based rate mitigation 
for all sales in the mitigated market regardless of whether the sales ultimately sink in 
an unmitigated market.  APPA/TAPS argue that allowing market-based rate sales in a 
mitigated market would yield unlawful rates because the mitigated seller would be 
making market-based rate sales in a market where it has, or is presumed to have, 
market power.
927  
798.  The NYISO agrees that mitigation should not be limited to sales that “sink in” 
the mitigated market, at least in clearing price auctions such as those administered by 
the NYISO.  The clearing prices are established by the interaction of all eligible 
buyers and sellers, and the NYISO reasons that there would be no practical basis, nor 
                                              
926 State AGs and Advocates at 43-44. 
927 APPA/TAPS at 47-48.  To limit marketers’ arbitrage opportunities, 
APPA/TAPS suggest limiting any “must offer” obligation to sales that sink in the seller’s 
control area.  The seller could make additional sales in its control area at the cost-based 
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economic justification, for carving out marketers or brokers who may export their 
purchases.
928 
799.  The Carolina Agencies express concern that limiting mitigation to sales that 
sink in a mitigated market would reduce supply options for LSEs embedded in that 
mitigated market.  They contend that unrestricted exports from a mitigated market 
increase the prices charged by other sellers due to scarcity.  Even when a sale sinks 
outside the mitigated market, the Carolina Agencies claim that round-trip gaming will 
continue, and they question the Commission’s ability to effectively detect and stop 
such gaming by attempting to trace megawatts via NERC tag data or other means.  
However, the Carolina Agencies submit that with a properly structured “must offer” 
requirement in place, there is no reason to bar market-based rate sales based on the 
location of the point of sale or even the identified sink.
929  
800.  Other commenters support allowing sales of power within a mitigated market 
that nonetheless sink in unmitigated markets (i.e., markets where the seller does not 
possess market power) to be made at market-based rates.
930  As discussed below, they 
                                              
928 NYISO at 8-10.  The NYISO suggests that the Commission can avoid concerns 
regarding exports to neighboring markets by applying any cost-based mitigation it 
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revenues that the mitigated seller may receive.  Id.
929 Carolina Agencies at 20. 
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offer various proposals on what factors should determine whether a sale should be 
priced at market-based rates.   
801.  Several commenters state that the relevant inquiry should be whether the 
power serves load (sinks) in a control area where generation market power is an 
issue. MidAmerican and the Oregon Commission submit that there is no reason to 
mitigate sales over which the seller is unable to exercise market power.
931  Rather, 
MidAmerican asks the Commission to refocus on whether a seller could exercise 
market power, not on the physical location where a change in ownership of energy 
occurs.  MidAmerican argues that if a mitigated seller cannot exercise market power 
over sales made directly in an outside competitive market, such seller cannot exercise 
market power over sales made in its home control area that are for export to that 
outside competitive market.
932  Rather than protecting the ultimate buyers, these 
commenters submit that mitigating such sales would transfer wealth from the 
mitigated seller to subsequent entities that can charge market prices in later 
transactions.
933 
802.  MidAmerican and the Oregon Commission claim that if the Commission 
requires mitigated sellers to mitigate all their sales in the mitigated market such an 
                                              
931 MidAmerican at 26; Oregon Commission reply comments at 5; see also Westar 
at 20. 
932 MidAmerican at 25-26; see also Dr. Pace at 18-20. 
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outcome would encourage gaming, such as round-trip or ricochet transactions.
934  
MidAmerican maintains that such gaming can be eliminated when mitigation applies 
only to sales sinking within the mitigated control area.
935  
803.  Duke, E.ON U.S., Westar, Mid-American, Ameren, and Xcel all assert that the 
availability of supply alternatives to wholesale purchasers should be a determining 
factor when deciding whether to permit market-based rates for sales that sink in 
unmitigated markets.
936  E.ON U.S. points out that the Commission in the April 14 
Order noted that the foundation of the market power analysis under the Delivered 
Price Test is the “destination market.”  As such, E.ON U.S. asserts that a relevant 
factor in determining whether to permit a sale at market-based rates should be the 
level of choice in supply available to the purchaser, not where the product 
originates.
937   
804.  Westar contends that when the buyer is purchasing to serve load in control 
areas where the seller lacks market power, the buyer presumably has access to other 
competitive alternatives and has voluntarily entered into the agreement.  Therefore, 
                                              
934MidAmerican at 26-27; Oregon Commission reply comments at 6. 
935 MidAmerican at 27. 
936 Duke at 13; E.ON U.S. at 6; Westar at 20; MidAmerican at 25; Ameren at 19-
20;  and Xcel at 13. 
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the Commission should not second guess the buyer’s decision.
938  Westar adds that 
prohibiting all sales in the mitigated control area elevates form over substance 
because parties can simply alter the implementing details of their transaction to 
accomplish the same result.
939 
805.  Westar argues that the Commission’s stated concern in MidAmerican with a 
seller’s “ability to attempt to exercise market power over sales in its control area” is 
misplaced; the Commission’s traditional market power analysis is only concerned 
with the “incentive” and “ability” to exercise market power, not with “attempts” to do 
so.
940  As such, it is “ability” and not “attempts” to exercise market power that is a 
key determinant of whether an actual market power problem exists. 
806.  Westar further claims that the Commission is not bound by precedent to 
prohibit all market-based rate sales in a mitigated control area, pointing out that the 
Commission has accepted four proposals after the July 8 Order that limit mitigation 
                                              
938 Westar at 20. 
939 Id. at 21. 
940 Id. at 21 (citing MidAmerican Energy Company, 114 FERC ¶ 61,280 (2006), 
reh’g pending; Exelon Corp., 112 FERC ¶ 61,011, at P 134 (“As we have said in 
numerous contexts, we are concerned about a merger’s effect on the merged firm’s ability 
and incentive to harm competition.”), order on reh’g, 113 FERC ¶ 61,299 (2005); 
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company, 105 FERC ¶ 61,297, at P 35 (2003) (“Both the 
ability and incentive to raise prices by restricting access are necessary for a vertical 
market power problem to exist.”); NiSource Inc., 92 FERC ¶ 61,068, at 61,239 (2000) 
(“Because the merged company must have both the ability and incentive to adversely 
affect electricity prices or output, and the merged company will lack the former, no 
further findings are necessary.”)). Docket No. RM04-7-000   457 
 
to sales that sink in the mitigated control areas.
941  Moreover, Westar claims that the 
July 8 Order appears to address the question of who may buy power from a mitigated 
seller, not where mitigated sales can occur.  This leads Westar to conclude that the 
Commission did not originally intend to preclude mitigated sellers from making 
market-based sales to buyers over which the seller lacks generation market power, 
regardless of where the sales occur.  Westar urges the Commission to return to this 
principle.
942 
807.  Xcel urges the Commission to focus on the parties’ intent and whether 
alternative supply options are available to the purchaser at the time of contracting, 
rather than focusing on where energy purchased in the transaction actually sinks in 
real time.  At the time of the transaction, if the purchaser can confirm:  (i) it intends to 
use the power outside of the mitigated control area, and (ii) there are existing 
transmission arrangements to actually use the power elsewhere, Xcel maintains that it 
should not matter what the purchaser subsequently does with the power in real 
                                              
941 Id. at 22 (citing American Electric Power Service Corp., Docket Nos. ER96-
2495-026, et al. (Jan. 13, 2006) (letter order accepting uncontested settlement applying 
mitigation to sales that sink in the mitigated control area); AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 
112 FERC ¶ 61,320 (2005) (dismissing rehearing requests as moot because of utility’s 
commitment to mitigate sales “that sink within AEP-SPP”); South Carolina Electric and 
Gas Company, 114 FERC ¶ 61,143 (2006) (order accepting utility’s commitment to 
mitigate sales that “sink” in its home control area, subject to a compliance filing); LG&E 
Energy Marketing, Inc., 113 FERC ¶ 61,229 (2005) (ordering the utility to apply the 
proposed mitigation to sales that sink in the mitigated control area)). 
942 Westar at 22-23. Docket No. RM04-7-000   458 
 
time.
943  Xcel and MidAmerican also favor adopting market-index or proxy based 
mitigation as a way to reduce the concern about where sales actually sink when trying 
to ensure proper mitigation.
944     
808.  EEI, PPL, PNM/Tucson, and Pinnacle take the position that the Commission 
should consider point of delivery when deciding whether to permit market-based rate 
sales.
945  EEI asks the Commission to allow mitigated sellers to make market-based 
rate sales if the delivery point in the contract or sale confirmation is outside the 
mitigated market, or if the buyer has transmission service to take the power outside 
the mitigated market.  In other words, buyers who choose delivery points inside the 
mitigated market and do not move the power out will pay mitigated rates, but buyers 
who choose delivery points inside the mitigated market but move the power outside 
the mitigated market will pay market-based rates.
946   
809.  EEI asserts that its proposal is consistent with the Commission policy that the 
mitigation must focus on the geographic market that is mitigated, not the type of 
customer purchasing the power.  EEI concludes that the proposal will minimize the 
                                              
943 Xcel at 13.  While MidAmerican does not object to Xcel’s proposal, it submits 
that its own proposal regarding use of market-based indices would provide additional 
assurance that a seller would not manipulate prices by arranging round-trip transactions 
into a mitigated control area.  MidAmerican reply comments at 19-20.   
944 Xcel at 11-138, ; MidAmerican reply comments at 4. 
945 EEI at 38; PPL at 25 (supporting EEI’s comments); Pinnacle at 9; PNM/Tucson 
at 14-15. 
946 EEI at 38. Docket No. RM04-7-000   459 
 
impacts on competitive transactions as well as avoid a remedy that will have a 
negative impact on the liquidity of the competitive market.
947   
810.  PNM/Tucson agree that the Commission should use the point of delivery as a 
determining factor.  They contend that transmission tags alone - which they explain 
are a reliability tool to ensure systems balance from a transmission perspective - are 
inadequate to monitor market transactions or ensure that sales sink outside a 
mitigated control area.
948 
811.  PNM/Tucson, Pinnacle, E.ON U.S., MidAmerican and PPL all generally argue 
that sales at or beyond the transmission interface of a mitigated control area should 
not be mitigated if the seller lacks market power in the adjacent control area.
949  
MidAmerican asserts that the Commission’s market power analyses demonstrate that 
the seller has no market power over sales at the border (sales requiring no additional 
transmission to exit the mitigated region).
950  PNM/Tucson, Pinnacle and E.ON U.S. 
maintain that prohibiting market-based rate sales at these transmission interfaces 
                                              
947 EEI at 41. 
948 PNM/Tucson at 14-15. 
949 PNM/Tucson at 16; Pinnacle at 8-9; E.ON U.S. at 5-8; MidAmerican at 29-30; 
PPL reply comments at 16.  
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would prevent cross border sales at these unique locations and reduce market 
liquidity in markets where the seller does not possess market power.
951   
812.  E.ON U.S. and MidAmerican urge the Commission to view interface/border 
transactions as fundamentally different from sales in, or sinking in, a control area.  
These commenters reason that, at transmission interfaces, a buyer has competitive 
choices from sellers in both control areas that abut the interface, as well as from any 
seller that can transmit power to that interface from any control area.  As a result, 
buyers taking title to power at a transmission interface for delivery outside the 
mitigated control area have competitive choices that do not require transacting with 
the supplier found to have market power within the mitigated control area(s).
952  
Moreover, E.ON U.S. claims that mitigating transactions at control area interfaces 
could reduce a utility’s profits from off-system sales, thereby affecting retail 
ratepayers by reducing offsets that affect the costs of their retail rates.
953     
813.  PNM/Tucson, Pinnacle, E.ON U.S., and MidAmerican note that the 
Commission indicated in LG&E that sales at the border need not be mitigated along 
with sales “wholly in” a control area.
954  PNM/Tucson and MidAmerican urge the 
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951 PNM/Tucson at 16; Pinnacle at 8-9; E.ON U.S. at 8. 
952 E.ON U.S. at 6; MidAmerican reply comments at 22-23. 
953 E.ON U.S. at 8. 
954 PNM/Tucson at 16; Pinnacle at 8-9; E.ON U.S. at 8; MidAmerican reply Docket No. RM04-7-000   461 
 
Commission to codify in the Final Rule LG&E’s holding that sales at the 
transmission interface of a mitigated control area are not “in” the control area, and 
therefore need not be mitigated.
955  E.ON U.S. similarly asks the Commission to 
define sales “in” a control area as those where title to power transfers at a physical 
location wholly within such control area, and should not include sales where title 
transfers at a transmission interface.
956 
814.  Xcel, in comparison, argues that any buyer purchasing power at a generator 
bus or elsewhere in a mitigated control area for purposes of moving that power out of 
the mitigated market should be treated no differently than a buyer who takes delivery 
of purchased power outside of the mitigated region.  According to Xcel, mitigation to 
discipline market power is unnecessary in either of these cases and the location of the 
delivery point does not matter.
957 
815.  Both Dalton Utilities and the Carolina Agencies state that it would be wrong to 
assume that every contract involving a mitigated supplier is unjust and unreasonable 
and must be abrogated to protect consumers.
958  Dalton Utilities urge the Commission 
                                                                                                                                                  
comments at 23. 
955  PNM/Tucson at 16; MidAmerican reply comments at 23. 
956 E.ON U.S. at 5. 
957 Xcel at 12. 
958 Dalton Utilities reply comments at 4-9; Carolina Agencies at 22-23. Docket No. RM04-7-000   462 
 
to clearly state in the final rule that it does not generically abrogate existing long-term 
market-based rate wholesale requirements and transmission contracts, nor is it 
requiring such abrogation in subsequent proceedings that revoke the market-based 
rate authority of a public utility found to possess market power.
959  Dalton Utilities 
asks the Commission to grandfather existing long-term market-based wholesale 
contracts in the final rule.
960 
816.  The Carolina Agencies add that the effect on existing contracts of a decision to 
retain the current mitigation policy of prohibiting sales at market-based rates in a 
mitigated market should be determined on a case-by-case basis.  These entities reason 
that simply because market power may exist (or a presumption that it exists has not 
been rebutted) does not in every instance mean that the seller actually abused its 
market position to extract unreasonable terms from its purchaser.  The circumstances 
of each contract must be examined to determine whether its terms reflect the exercise 
of market power.  The Carolina Agencies and Dalton Utilities conclude that generic 
abrogation or reformation of existing agreements is neither warranted nor consistent 
                                              
959 Dalton Utilities reply comments at 6, 9. 
960 Id. at 6-7.  Duke notes its support for the Commission’s current policy of not 
reforming or abrogating contracts that were negotiated prior to the time of any finding of 
market power.  Duke reply comments at 8, n.12. Docket No. RM04-7-000   463 
 
with the Commission’s manner of resolving other claims of broad-based 
discrimination.
961 
Commission Determination 
817.  In order to protect customers from market power concerns, we will continue to 
apply mitigation to all sales in the balancing authority area in which a seller is found, 
or presumed, to have market power.  However, as discussed below we will allow 
mitigated sellers to make market-based rate sales at the metered boundary
962 between 
a mitigated balancing authority area and a balancing authority area in which the seller 
has market-based rate authority under certain circumstances. 
818.  Commenters advocating allowing market-based rate sales in a mitigated 
market provided the power is intended for an unmitigated market (e.g., applying 
mitigation only to sales that sink in the mitigated market) have failed to adequately 
explain how customers in the mitigated market would be protected from the potential 
exercise of market power.  In addition, commenters have failed to adequately address 
how the Commission could effectively monitor such sales to ensure that improper 
sales were not being made.  Indeed, several commenters have noted the complex 
                                              
961 Carolina Agencies at 23; Dalton Utilities reply comments at 7-9. 
962 North American Electric Reliability Corporation.  Glossary of Terms Used in 
Reliability Standards at 2 (2007), available at 
ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/standards/rs/Glossary_02May07.pdf. Docket No. RM04-7-000   464 
 
administrative problems that would be associated with trying to monitor compliance 
with such a policy.
963 
819.  Allowing market-based rate sales by a seller that has been found to have 
market power, or has so conceded, in the very market in which market power is a 
concern is inconsistent with the Commission’s responsibility under the FPA to ensure 
that rates are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.  While we generally 
agree that it is desirable to allow market-based rate sales into markets where the seller 
has not been found to have market power, we do not agree that it is reasonable to 
allow a mitigated seller to make market-based rate sales anywhere within a mitigated 
market.  It is unrealistic to believe that sales made anywhere in a balancing authority 
area can be traced to ensure that no improper sales are taking place.  Such an 
approach would also place customers and competitors at an unreasonable 
disadvantage because the mitigated seller has dominance in the very market in which 
it is making market-based rate sales.   
820.  However, we do recognize that sales made at the metered boundary  for export 
do lend themselves to being monitored for compliance, and the nature of these types 
of sales do not unduly disadvantage customers or competitors.  Prohibiting market-
based rate sales at these metered boundaries of the balancing authority area could 
prevent or adversely impact cross border sales at these unique locations and reduce 
                                              
963 For example, PNM/Tucson note that transmission tags alone are inadequate to 
monitor market transactions.  PNM/Tucson at 14-15. Docket No. RM04-7-000   465 
 
market liquidity in markets where the seller does not possess market power.  Buyers 
taking title to power at a metered boundary for delivery to serve load in a balancing 
authority area where the seller has market-based rate authority have competitive 
choices and therefore are not required to transact with the seller found to have market 
power within the mitigated balancing authority area(s).   
821.  Accordingly, we will allow such sales to be made at market-based rates.  
Mitigated sellers making such sales must maintain for a period of five-years from the 
date of the sale all data and information related to the sale that demonstrates that the 
sale was made at the metered boundary between the mitigated balancing authority 
area and a balancing authority area in which the seller has market-based rate 
authority, that the sale is not intended to serve load in the seller’s mitigated market, 
and that no affiliate of the mitigated seller will sell the same power back into the 
mitigated seller’s mitigated market.  
822.  Such an approach properly balances commenters’ concerns that when a buyer 
purchases power to serve load in markets where the mitigated seller lacks market 
power the buyer has access to competitive alternatives with the Commission’s 
obligation under the FPA to ensure that rates are just and reasonable.  Further, we 
find that our approach in this regard does not place an unreasonable burden on the 
customer, mitigated seller, or competitors.  We also emphasize that the mitigation we 
adopt herein is prospective only.  In response to Dalton’s concern, we clarify that Docket No. RM04-7-000   466 
 
such mitigation does not modify, abrogate, or otherwise affect existing contractual 
agreements.
964   
823.  Further, we disagree with the Carolina Agencies’ contention that short of a 
“must-offer” provision unrestricted exports from a mitigated market increase the 
prices charged by other suppliers due to scarcity.  Carolina Agencies’ argument 
would only apply when the market prices in the first-tier markets are higher than the 
seller’s cost-based rate in the mitigated market.  This situation is not necessarily 
always the case and, therefore, the Carolina Agencies’ concern may be based on an 
unrealistic assumption.  
824.  We disagree with MidAmerican and the Oregon Commission’s claim that if 
the Commission requires mitigated sellers to mitigate all their sales in the mitigated 
market this would encourage gaming, such as round-trip or ricochet transactions.  
While the Commission issued an order rescinding Market Behavior Rules 2 and 6,
965 
Order No. 670 finalized regulations prohibiting energy market manipulation pursuant 
to the Commission’s new Energy Policy Act of 2005 authority.  The Commission 
emphasized in Order No. 670 that “the specific prohibitions of Market Behavior Rule 
                                              
964 See South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., 114 FERC ¶ 61,143 at P 18 (2006) 
(accepting mitigation on a prospective basis; existing long-term agreements remain in 
effect until terminated pursuant to their terms); see also April 14 Order, 107 FERC ¶ 
61,018 at P 154; July 8 Order, 108 FERC ¶ 61,026 at P 145. 
965 Investigation of Terms and Conditions of Public Utility Market-Based Rate 
Authorizations, 114 FERC ¶ 61,165 (2006). Docket No. RM04-7-000   467 
 
2 (wash trades, transactions predicated on submitting false information, transactions 
creating and relieving artificial congestion, and collusion for the purpose of market 
manipulation), … are examples of prohibited manipulation, all of which are 
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances, and are therefore prohibited 
activities under this Final Rule, subject to punitive and remedial action.”
966  Such 
fraud and manipulative conduct therefore remains prohibited and subject to the 
Commission’s anti-manipulation and civil penalty authority.  
d.  Proposed Tariff Language 
Comments 
825.  Several commenters have proposed specific tariff language in the event the 
Commission allows market-based rate sales in the mitigated market or at the border.  
For example, PNM/Tucson would require a sale to “have a contractual point of 
delivery at or beyond the transmission interface of the mitigated control area 
(assuming that the point of delivery is not in another control area where the seller is 
also mitigated).”
967  They would also require the seller’s market-based rate tariff to 
explicitly prohibit efforts to collude with a third party to sell to customers in the 
mitigated control area at market-based rates.
968   
                                              
966 Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, Order No. 670, 114 ¶  FERC 
61,047 at P 59 (2006). 
967 PNM/Tucson at 15. 
968 Id.  Docket No. RM04-7-000   468 
 
826.  PNM/Tucson point out that their proposal contains a significant concession.  
Under their proposed language, a sale by a mitigated seller at the generation bus in 
the mitigated control area must be made at mitigated rates.  They believe this 
concession is fair if the Commission insists that market-based rate sales for mitigated 
sellers are based on contractual points of delivery at or beyond the transmission 
interface of the mitigated control area.  In these companies’ view, such an approach 
would provide needed certainty through a bright line rule and limit factual disputes 
and investigations.
969   
827.  MidAmerican and Ameren also support using tariff or agreement language to 
ensure power sinks outside of the mitigated market.
970  MidAmerican favors using 
tariff safeguards and confirmation/oversight procedures to mitigate a seller’s ability 
to exercise generation market power, prevent gaming, and protect wholesale 
customers in the mitigated region.  MidAmerican submits that it has developed and 
filed market-based rate tariff provisions and verification and oversight procedures 
that can ensure that export transactions sink outside the mitigated seller’s control 
area.
971  MidAmerican argues that its approach correctly focuses on whether the 
                                              
969 Id. at 16-17; MidAmerican submits that its proposal would also provide the 
“bright-line” regulatory certainty sought by PNM/Tucson.  MidAmerican reply 
comments at 16-18. 
970 MidAmerican at 28; Ameren at 19-20. 
971 Under MidAmerican’s proposed tariff revisions:  (i) counterparties would be 
required to affirmatively confirm that the energy sold within MidAmerican’s control area 
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mitigated seller could exercise market power over transactions that affect entities that 
purchase on behalf of, or for re-sale to, loads within the market subject to mitigation, 
rather than the geographical location where customers may take responsibility for 
transmitting the power to a final destination.  Moreover, MidAmerican claims that its 
proposal would allow the market to work efficiently in areas where the mitigated 
seller’s ability to exercise market power is not an issue.  MidAmerican supports a 
Commission technical conference to further explore this concept with interested 
parties.
972 
828.  Several commenters further propose that mitigated sellers be required to add 
language to their market-based rate tariffs or to specific market-based rate contracts 
to restrict re-sales from sinking in the mitigated control area.
973  FP&L argues that 
                                                                                                                                                  
will not stay inside that control area; (ii) MidAmerican energy schedulers will review 
NERC tags associated with in-control area sales on a daily basis to ensure transactions 
indeed sink outside the mitigated control area; (iii) if a review of the NERC tags shows 
that a transaction will sink inside the mitigated control area, the sale will be renegotiated 
at cost-based rates; and (iv) if required by the Commission, MidAmerican would submit 
the NERC tag data to the appropriate market monitor.  MidAmerican at 28-29.   
972 MidAmerican at 28-29. 
973 FP&L at 6 (proposing the following tariff language: “Purchasers are hereby on 
notice that the sink for any energy or capacity sale under this Tariff shall not be in the 
Seller’s control area.”); E.ON U.S. at 10 (proposing “a simple tariff commitment by 
sellers that power sold at a point of delivery within their mitigated control area will, to 
the best of their knowledge, sink elsewhere.”); Ameren at 20 (proposing that agreements 
governing market-based rate sales in mitigated markets explicitly state that the subject 
power will sink outside the mitigated region, and that the seller be required to report such 
sales in its EQR). Docket No. RM04-7-000   470 
 
requiring such language would reinforce the idea that re-sales into mitigated control 
areas are violations of a Commission-approved tariff that also, depending on the 
facts, might violate the Commission’s market manipulation regulations.
974   
829.  Another commenter agrees that restrictive language in the market-based rate 
tariff could prevent re-sales into the mitigated control area by helping to ensure that 
any power purchased at market-based rates within a mitigated control area is 
exclusively for export to serve loads beyond the mitigated market.  Where the 
Commission is concerned that gaming could lead to the exercise of market power 
over wholesale customers in the home control area, this commenter suggests that the 
Commission reemphasize that efforts to loop power through an adjacent market area 
in order to raise prices to wholesale customers in mitigated areas above competitive 
levels is a violation of market-based rate tariffs.  Further, this commenter submits that 
the Commission may require buyers to confirm that power purchased at market-based 
rates in a mitigated control area is for export, use NERC tag data and transmission 
scheduling information to verify when purchased power is being exported from the 
home control area, and require oversight by independent market monitors.
975 
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Commission Determination 
830.  Consistent with our decision above, mitigated sellers choosing to make 
market-based rate sales at the metered boundary between a mitigated balancing 
authority area and a balancing authority area in which the seller has market-based rate 
authority will be required to commit and maintain sufficient documentation to 
demonstrate
976 that: (1) legal title of the power sold transfers at the metered boundary 
between a mitigated balancing authority area and one in which the mitigated entity 
has market-based rate authorization; and (2) any power sold is not intended to serve 
load in the seller’s mitigated market and (3) no affiliate of the mitigated seller will 
sell the same power back into the mitigated seller’s mitigated market.  To accomplish 
these requirements, mitigated sellers seeking to make market-based rate sales at the 
metered boundary between their mitigated balancing authority area and a balancing 
authority area in which the sellers have market-based rate authority must adopt the 
following tariff provision: 
Sales of energy and capacity are permissible under this tariff in all balancing 
authority areas where the Seller has been granted market-based rate authority.  
Sales of energy and capacity under this tariff are also permissible at the metered 
boundary between the Seller’s mitigated balancing authority area and a balancing 
authority area where the Seller has been granted market-based rate authority 
provided: (i) legal title of the power sold transfers at the metered boundary of the 
balancing authority area where the seller has market-based rate authority; (ii) any 
                                              
976 Reliance solely on NERC tag data as documentation for such sales will likely 
be deemed insufficient as such an approach has not yet been shown to be either workable 
or effective. 
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power sold hereunder is not intended to serve load in the seller’s mitigated market; 
and (iii) no affiliate of the mitigated seller will sell the same power back into the 
mitigated seller’s mitigated market. Seller must retain, for a period of five years 
from the date of the sale, all data and information related to the sale that 
demonstrates compliance with items (i), (ii) and (iii) above. 
  
831.  This approach affords necessary protection from market power abuse for 
customers in the mitigated markets.  Such language reminds all sellers that gaming 
resulting in re-sales of any sort by an affiliate of the mitigated seller into their 
mitigated balancing authority area(s) (i.e., by looping power through adjacent 
markets) are violations of a Commission-approved tariff that may also, depending on 
the facts, violate the Commission’s market manipulation regulations.  Such violations 
may result in penalties being imposed under the market manipulation regulations 
and/or the revocation of a mitigated seller’s market-based authority in all markets.    
E.  Implementation Process 
Commission Proposal 
832.  In the NOPR, the Commission put forth several proposals to streamline the 
administration of the market-based rate program while maintaining a high degree of 
oversight.  The Commission proposed to modify the practice of requiring an updated 
market power analysis to be submitted within three years of any order granting a 
seller market-based rate authority and every three years thereafter by, instead, putting 
in place a structured, systematic review based on a coherent and consistent set of 
data.  First, the Commission proposed to establish two categories of sellers with Docket No. RM04-7-000   473 
 
market-based rate authorization.  Sellers in the first category, Category 1,
977 would 
not be required to file a regularly scheduled updated market power analysis.  The 
Commission proposed instead to monitor any market power concerns for Category 1 
sellers through the change in status reporting requirement and through ongoing 
monitoring by the Commission’s Office of Enforcement.  In this regard, the 
Commission noted that failure to timely file a change in status report would constitute 
a violation of the Commission’s regulations and the seller’s market-based rate tariff.  
833.  Sellers in Category 2, consisting of all sellers that do not qualify for Category 
1, would be required to file regularly scheduled updated market power analyses in 
addition to change in status reports.  The Commission proposed to codify this 
requirement in its regulations.  Failure to timely file an updated market power 
analysis would constitute a violation of the Commission’s regulations and the seller’s 
market-based rate tariff.  
834.  Second, to ensure greater consistency in the data used to evaluate Category 2 
sellers, the Commission proposed that the required updated market power analyses be 
filed for each seller’s relevant geographic market(s) on a schedule allowing 
                                              
977 Category 1 sellers would include power marketers and power producers that 
own or control 500 MW or less of generating capacity in aggregate and that are not 
affiliated with a public utility with a franchised service territory.  Category 1 sellers also 
must not own or control transmission facilities other than limited equipment necessary to 
connect individual generating facilities to the transmission grid (or must have been 
granted waiver of the requirements of Order No. 888 because the facilities are limited and 
discrete and do not constitute an integrated grid), and they must not present other vertical 
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examination of the individual seller at the same time that the Commission examines 
other sellers in the relevant markets and contiguous markets within a region from 
which power could be imported.  The Commission appended a proposed schedule for 
the regional review process, rotating by geographic region with three regions being 
reviewed per year.  For corporate families that own or control generation in multiple 
control areas and different regions, the Commission proposed that the corporate 
family would be required to file an update for each region in which members of the 
corporate family sell power during the time period specified for that region. 
835.  Finally, the Commission proposed to require that all updated market power 
analyses and all new applications for market-based rate authority include an appendix 
listing all generation assets owned or controlled by the corporate family by control 
area, listing the in-service date and nameplate and/or seasonal ratings by unit, and all 
electric transmission and natural gas intrastate pipelines and/or gas storage facilities 
owned or controlled by the corporate family and their location.  
1.  Category 1 and 2 Sellers 
Comments 
a.  Establishment of Category 1 and 2 Sellers 
836.  A variety of commenters fully support the Commission’s proposed 
categorization of sellers into two categories and the boundaries of those categories.  
ELCON comments that the Commission’s limited resources should be focused on the Docket No. RM04-7-000   475 
 
dominant players and not treat every seller as a potential threat.  NRECA commends 
the Commission for its attempt to streamline the process.
978  APPA/TAPS support the 
proposed categories but suggest that the Commission clarify that it retains the ability 
to determine that a Category 1 seller must still adhere to the triennial update 
requirements if, for example, it is dominant in a particular load pocket.  Explaining 
that its generation and power marketing activities are only incidental to its mining 
operations, and that its market share will likely decline over time, Newmont states 
that filing an updated market analysis every three years would be an unnecessary 
burden to prepare and a waste of the Commission’s time to review.  Newmont finds 
the 500 MW cutoff a clear, bright line that would be easy to administer.  If the 
Commission determines it necessary to adjust the threshold, however, Newmont 
suggests retaining the 500 MW cutoff with a further requirement that no more than 
250-300 MW be located in any one control area.  Alternatively, there could be some 
sliding scale delineation between Categories 1 and 2 based on the size of a control 
area, in terms of load, unaffiliated capacity, or both. 
837.  Financial Companies and Morgan Stanley request that the Commission release 
a list of all sellers in each category and the region in which the Commission believes 
each seller belongs to help ensure that sellers have notice of their status and related 
                                              
978 See also EPSA reply comments at 3, 13-14. Docket No. RM04-7-000   476 
 
filing obligations.  These parties also suggest that the Commission hold a technical 
conference on commenters’ proposals about how to organize the categories. 
838.  FirstEnergy opposes the concept of exempting Category 1 sellers from 
triennial reporting while continuing the requirement for Category 2 sellers.  
FirstEnergy states that there is no reason for the Commission to require any public 
utility authorized to sell at market-based rates to file an updated market power 
analysis.  According to FirstEnergy, the showing made in the initial market-based rate 
proceeding and the change in status rules are adequate, and relieving Category 1 
sellers from filing without abolishing the requirement entirely would be unduly 
discriminatory. 
839.  On the other hand, the California Commission believes that all sellers should 
have to continue filing updated market power analyses; it states that the assumption 
that Category 1 sellers do not need the same level of scrutiny as larger sellers is 
erroneous, and argues that the NOPR provides no legitimate justification for creating 
a disparity between Category 1 and 2 sellers.  The California Commission continues 
by stating that reliance solely on market monitoring would not necessarily be 
effective in California.  It notes that in markets utilizing LMP, there is a great 
potential for sellers to exert “local” market power, especially in load pockets.  In such 
load pocket areas, it contends that there is no guarantee that a small seller could not 
have market power.  Further, it states that a Category 1 seller could suddenly gain 
market power due to another seller’s withdrawal from the market and asserts that 
“given the number of markets and the Commission’s limited resources, it would seem Docket No. RM04-7-000   477 
 
an enormous task of monitoring without requiring regular updated market power 
analyses from all market participants.”
979   
840.  Similarly, NASUCA states that there is no basis in the record to assume that 
Category 1 sellers would lack market power at all times and offers examples of when 
Category 1 sellers could pose a problem.
980  NASUCA also warns that there is no 
apparent limit on the total amount of exempt generation that could be owned by 
entities other than those affiliated with a franchised utility.  Specifically, NASUCA 
argues that: 
[U]nder the [Category 1] definition and [change of status] notice obligations, a 
“Category 1” seller could qualify for exemption from triennial market power 
reviews even if its holding company affiliates – other power marketing and 
generation entities that also have “Category 1” status – collectively have a share of 
generation far larger than 500 MW, and even if the seller has a retail affiliate 
without a franchised service territory.  Examples might include a group of 
“Category 1” peaker plant owners in a constrained area, each owned by a separate 
entity affiliated with the same holding company; owners of a fleet of small hydro 
facilities, each a separate entity within a holding company structure; or an 
assemblage of generation control [sic] by numerous power marketing subsidiaries, 
each of which controls less than 500 MW of generation.[
981]     
                                              
979 California Commission at 4. 
980 For example, NASUCA asserts that there appears to be a possibility that a 
seller with a fleet of newer power plants that were initially exempted from review would 
be totally exempt from subsequent review based on the size of the power plants.  These 
sellers might at times have market power with respect to ancillary services.  NASUCA 
further submits that changed circumstances, such as declining reserve margins, might 
create opportunities for seemingly small sellers to exercise market power. 
981 NASUCA at 12.  See also NASUCA reply comments at 9-11 (stating that 
neither the 500 MW exemption, nor the expansion to a 1000 MW exemption, nor the 
elimination of a horizontal market power test, should be adopted). Docket No. RM04-7-000   478 
 
 
841.  Thus, NASUCA argues that the regulations should be modified or clarified to 
prevent this scenario.  If the Commission proceeds with its proposal, NASUCA states 
that the Commission should consider a much lower threshold, such as 75 MW.  
842.  State AGs and Advocates state that exempting entities, no matter how small, 
would conflict with the concept that all sellers contribute in varying degrees to the 
existence of market power in a market.
982 
843.  NASUCA and the California Commission argue that none of the proponents of 
an exempt category of sellers have shown how the exemption meets the 
Commission’s legal requirements.
983  NASUCA expresses concern that the blanket 
exemption for Category 1 sellers from filing updated market power reviews is 
inconsistent with the justification the Commission has previously made to the courts 
in support of market-based rates, namely, that the Commission makes a discrete 
finding or determination as to each seller’s market power, and periodically reviews it.  
The California Commission similarly disputes that the exemption meets the 
underlying principle found in Lockyer.  It states that the Ninth Circuit in that case 
noted that the Commission’s authority to grant market-based rates is rooted in the 
integral nature of the reporting requirements.  The California Commission asserts that 
                                              
982 State AGs and Advocates reply comments at 14. 
983 NASUCA reply comments at 9-11, California Commission reply comments at 
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the proposed requirement for Category 1 sellers to make a filing only upon a change 
in status is inconsistent with the rationale laid out in Lockyer.  It further contends that 
delegation of ongoing monitoring to the Commission’s Office of Enforcement is 
vague and contrary to the underlying principle found in Lockyer.  According to the 
California Commission, the assumptions underlying the proposed Category 1 
exemption (that since Category 1 sellers are smaller in size they do not need to be 
subject to the same requirements and scrutiny as larger sellers of energy, and that 
“’Category 2 sellers are the larger sellers with more of a presence in the market and 
are more likely to fail one or more of the indicative screens or pass by a smaller 
margin than Category 1 sellers’”) are insufficient to justify a departure from the 
Lockyer rationale.
984  
844.  PPM refutes the California Commission’s arguments.  First, PPM asserts that 
the California Commission is wrong in its generalization that a seller that controls 
less than 500 MW in a market that utilizes LMP could exert local market power.  
PPM argues that the existence of an LMP market does not increase the potential for a 
small generator or marketer to possess market power; LMP is intended to reduce the 
ability of a party to exercise local market power.
985  Second, PPM states that the 
California Commission is wrong when it asserts that Lockyer requires the 
                                              
984 California Commission reply comments at 3-4 (quoting NOPR at P 153). 
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Commission to require all sellers to file updated market power analyses.  According 
to PPM, in Lockyer, the Court found that if the Commission is going to grant parties 
the authority to charge market-based rates, the Commission must continue to monitor 
and ensure that the rates charged are just and reasonable.  PPM submits that creating 
a categorical exemption to reduce the burden on smaller generators and marketers 
does not mean that the Commission is eliminating its ability to effectively monitor 
the wholesale electric market.  It states that the Commission retains the tools 
necessary to ensure that all rates are just and reasonable:  all entities with market-
based rate authority must submit electric quarterly reports to the Commission 
regarding their transactions; all parties have the right to ask the Commission for relief 
under section 206 of the FPA if they believe that rates are improper or unjust; the 
Commission may take up an independent review of any markets which are displaying 
abnormal characteristics; and finally, the Commission may require certain parties to 
file updated market power analyses if the seller is found to have market power even if 
the seller meets the threshold for Category 1 exemption. 
b.  Threshold for Category 1 Sellers and Other Proposed Modifications 
845.  While the majority of commenters support the concept of exempting smaller, 
Category 1 sellers from filing updated market power analyses, many seek 
clarification or modification of the proposal.  A number of commenters propose a 
threshold other than ownership or control of 500 MW or less in aggregate.  Suggested Docket No. RM04-7-000   481 
 
thresholds include:  500 MW or less of uncommitted capacity (therefore including 
only that which is available for sale into markets during peak periods);
986 500 MW 
within a particular control area;
987 500 MW within a geographic market;
988 500 MW 
within a particular region;
989 up to 1000 MW;
990 less than 1 percent of the installed 
capacity in a regional market or 1000 MW in that regional market (whichever is 
higher);
991 or some other formula.
992  Several commenters urge the Commission to 
consider the size of a particular control area or geographic region or market and 
                                              
986 See Ormet at 9. 
987 See, e.g., PPM at 3-4; AWEA at 3-4. 
988 See Constellation at 8-9 (noting that this would be consistent with the 
Commission’s indicative screen analysis and regional approach to updated market power 
analyses). 
989 EPSA at 36-37; AWEA at 3-4; Suez/Chevron at 5-10. 
990 See Morgan Stanley at 10-13; Financial Companies at 13-14; Financial 
Companies reply comments at 7-8.  See also Mirant at 12 (recommending 1000 MW per 
geographic market if the Commission hopes to have a minimal impact on sellers’ 
compliance costs caused by eliminating the 18 CFR 35.27(a) exemption). 
991 EPSA at 36-37. 
992 Constellation at 9-11 (supports changing threshold from 500 MW to the greater 
of 500 MW or 2 percent of the total generation capacity in the relevant geographic 
market; where the geographic market is an RTO or ISO, change threshold to the greater 
of 1,000 MW or 2 percent of the total generation capacity in that market); Ameren at 21 
(supports exempting a company that owns or controls more than 500 MW but owns or 
controls less than 20 percent of the total uncommitted capacity in the relevant geographic 
market and also is not affiliated with an entity that owns transmission facilities in that 
market). Docket No. RM04-7-000   482 
 
whether the geographic market is served by an RTO/ISO,
993 and to take into account 
the difference between thermal generating capacity and intermittent or non-
dispatchable generation for their ability to impact the competitiveness of a market.
994 
846.  PPM argues that without certain modifications to the Commission’s definition 
of a Category 1 seller, which PPM believes is too narrowly defined, many generators 
and marketers may needlessly have to submit an updated market power analysis.  
According to PPM, the Commission should not eliminate the exemption for new 
generation (pursuant to 18 CFR 35.27(a)) without expanding the group of generators 
and marketers eligible for Category 1 status.
995  Several commenters also urge the 
Commission to allow fact-specific requests for exemption from filing requirements 
for those sellers who otherwise would qualify as Category 2 sellers
996 or other 
particular exemptions.
997 
                                              
993 Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner at 13; Constellation at 9; PPM at 3-4. 
994 AWEA at 3-4 (asserting that companies owning or controlling thermal 
generating capacity have a greater opportunity for impacting the competitiveness of a 
market than those that own or control non-dispatchable generation, such as wind power 
facilities, that rarely achieve production at nameplate capacity levels); PPM at 4 (same); 
Financial Companies reply comments at 8-9. 
995 PPM at 3-5. 
996 See Morgan Stanley; Financial Companies.  
997 See, e.g., Ormet at 7-11 (exemption for self use/supply, i.e., capacity used to 
self supply a corporate affiliate and presumptively unavailable for sale into markets); 
TXU at 4-5 (case-by-case determination of whether a seller’s affiliation with an entity 
that owns or controls Commission-jurisdictional transmission presents the possibility of 
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847.  In addition, Constellation proposes specific modifications to the proposal.  
First, Constellation requests that the Commission change the affiliation standard in 
the definition of Category 1 sellers to be consistent with other definitions set forth in 
the NOPR.  Because the proposed language would exclude from the definition of 
Category 1 sellers any affiliate of a public utility with a franchised service territory 
regardless of whether it has captive customers, Constellation suggests using the 
defined term “franchised public utility”
998 instead of “public utility with a franchised 
service territory.”  Constellation states that the exclusion should only apply to 
affiliates of public utilities with captive customers.  Second, Constellation argues that 
a company should be considered to be a Category 1 seller so long as it is not affiliated 
with a “franchised public utility” in the same geographic region.  It explains that, with 
this change, a company would qualify as a Category 1 seller in California despite the 
fact that it is affiliated with a franchised public utility in New England because any 
concerns about affiliate abuse would exist only in the New England market and not in 
California.
999  Third, Constellation suggests that, if operational control over 
transmission facilities has been transferred to an RTO/ISO, then a seller’s affiliation 
                                              
998 Proposed 18 CFR 35.36(a)(5) defines a franchised public utility as “a public 
utility with a franchised service obligation under state law and that has captive 
customers.” 
999 Similarly, Constellation contends that, if a seller and its affiliates own more 
than 500 MW of generation capacity in only one region and less in others, then the seller 
should be required to file updated market power analyses in only the region(s) where its 
affiliated generation exceeds the threshold.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   484 
 
with the owner of such transmission facilities should not exclude the seller from 
qualifying as a Category 1 seller.  Further, Constellation seeks clarification that the 
exclusions for owners of transmission facilities that are simply interconnection 
facilities, are under operational control of an RTO/ISO, or are subject to waiver of 
Order No. 888 and 889, will also apply to affiliates of those transmission owners.  
Commission Determination  
Adoption of Category 1/Category 2 
848.  We adopt the NOPR proposal to create a category of sellers that are exempt 
from the requirement to automatically submit updated market power analyses, with 
certain modifications.  As discussed further below, this finding is fully consistent 
with our statutory obligation to ensure just and reasonable rates and with court 
decisions construing that obligation.  Moreover, it will streamline the administration 
of the market-based rate program by focusing the Commission’s resources on sellers 
that have a significant presence in the market.  It also is supported by the majority of 
commenters in this proceeding.   
849.  The Commission agrees with Financial Companies and Morgan Stanley that 
sellers should have notice of their status and related filing obligations.  However, we 
believe the criteria we adopt herein are sufficiently clear so that the vast majority of 
sellers can easily determine in which category they fall.  Accordingly, the 
Commission will not initially compile and release a list of sellers in each category.  
Rather, we will require all sellers that believe they fall into Category 1 to make a 
filing with the Commission at the time that updated market power analyses for the Docket No. RM04-7-000   485 
 
seller’s relevant market would otherwise be due (based on the regional schedule for 
updated market power analyses adopted in this Final Rule).  That filing should 
explain why the seller meets the Category 1 criteria
1000 and should include a list of all 
generation assets (including nameplate or seasonal capacity amounts) owned or 
controlled by the seller and its affiliates grouped by balancing authority area.
1001  The 
Commission will notice these filings and provide an opportunity for comment.  The 
Commission will then act on the seller’s filing, either acknowledging that the seller 
falls within Category 1 or, if it finds that the seller does not qualify as a Category 1 
seller, directing the seller to file an updated market power analysis.  Subsequently, all 
Category 1 sellers will not be required to file regularly scheduled updated market 
power analyses.   
850.  With regard to sellers that fall into Category 2, these sellers will be required to 
file an updated market power analysis based on the schedule in Appendix D.  In our 
                                              
1000 These criteria, as modified in this Final Rule, include wholesale power 
marketers and wholesale power producers that own or control 500 MW or less of 
generation in aggregate per region; that do not own, operate or control transmission 
facilities other than limited equipment necessary to connect individual generating 
facilities to the transmission grid (or have been granted waiver of the requirements of 
Order No. 888); that are not affiliated with anyone that owns, operates or controls 
transmission facilities in the same region as the seller’s generation assets; that are not 
affiliated with a franchised public utility in the same region as the seller’s generation 
assets; and that do not raise other vertical market power issues.    
1001 In the section titled “Regional Review and Schedule” we discuss further how 
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orders acting on the updated market power analyses, the Commission will make a 
finding that the seller is a Category 2 seller, as appropriate. 
851.  In addition, with regard to new applications for market-based rate authority, 
we also will make a finding regarding the category in which the seller falls.  
However, all sellers submitting initial applications for market-based rate authority 
must submit the indicative screens, or accept a presumption of market power in 
generation, and must submit a vertical market power analysis. 
852.  We reject FirstEnergy’s argument that there should be no requirement for any 
seller to file an updated market power analysis.  Competitiveness of markets is 
continuing to change and, therefore, we are reluctant to rely only on initial market 
power analyses, change in status filings, and section 206 complaints in all cases.  The 
burden on Category 2 sellers is small compared to their market presence and 
activities, and is outweighed by the fact that submission of periodic updated market 
power analyses enhances Commission oversight and public confidence in the 
regulatory process.  Thus, we will require the submittal of regularly scheduled 
updated market power analyses by those sellers that have more of a presence in the 
market and are more likely to either fail one or more of the indicative screens or pass 
by a smaller margin than those that will qualify as Category 1 sellers, or that may 
present circumstances that could pose vertical market power issues, i.e., Category 2 
sellers.  Through regularly scheduled updated market power analyses for Category 2 
sellers, the Commission is better able to evaluate the ongoing reasonableness of those 
sellers’ charges and to provide for an ongoing assessment of their ability to exercise Docket No. RM04-7-000   487 
 
market power.  In the absence of regularly scheduled updated market power analyses 
from the Category 2 sellers, it would be more difficult for the Commission to fulfill 
its statutory duty to ensure that market-based rates are just and reasonable and that 
market-based rate sellers continue to lack the potential to exercise market power so 
that market forces are indeed determining the price.   
853.  Because Category 1 and 2 sellers occupy different postures in terms of their 
presence in the market, it is not unduly discriminatory to eliminate the requirement to 
file a regularly scheduled updated market power analysis for Category 1 sellers but 
not Category 2 sellers.  Category 1 sellers have been carefully defined by the 
Commission to have attributes that are not likely to present market power concerns:  
ownership or control of relatively small amounts of generation capacity; no affiliation 
with an entity with a franchised service territory in the same region as the seller’s 
generation facility; little or no ownership or control of transmission facilities and no 
affiliation with an entity that owns or controls transmission in the same region as the 
seller’s generation facility; and no indication of an ability to exercise vertical market 
power.  Further, based on a review of past Commission orders, we are aware of no 
entity that would have qualified as a Category 1 seller under this Final Rule but 
would nevertheless have failed our indicative screens necessitating a more thorough 
analysis.  Thus, the Commission has provided a reasoned basis to distinguish 
Category 1 sellers from Category 2 sellers.  Moreover, the EQR reporting 
requirements and change in status filings required for Category 2 market-based rate 
sellers will also apply to Category 1 sellers.  This will ensure adequate oversight of Docket No. RM04-7-000   488 
 
Category 1 sellers, even without regularly scheduled updated market power analyses.  
Further, we will continue to reserve the right to require an updated market power 
analysis from any market-based rate seller at any time, including for those sellers that 
fall within Category 1. 
854.  In this regard, we agree with PPM that the Commission retains the tools 
necessary to ensure that all rates are just and reasonable, including initial market 
power evaluations, and ongoing monitoring by the Commission.  For example, as 
noted above, all sellers with market-based rates must file electronically with the 
Commission an EQR of transactions no later than 30 days after the end of the 
reporting quarter and must comply with the change in status reporting requirement.  
We note that the reporting requirement relied upon by the court in Lockyer is the 
transaction-specific data found in EQRs, which we continue to require of all sellers, 
and not updated market power analyses.  Thus, exempting Category 1 sellers from 
routinely filing updated market power analyses does not run counter to Lockyer.  
855.  With respect to EQR filings, the Commission enhanced and updated the post-
transaction filing requirements from what they were during the period at issue in the 
Lockyer case, now requiring electronic reporting of, among other things:
1002 (1) a 
                                              
1002 Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, Order No. 2001, 67 FR 31043 
(May 8, 2002), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,127 (2002).  Required data sets for contractual 
and transaction information are described in Attachments B and C of Order No. 2001.  
The EQR must be submitted to the Commission using the EQR Submission System 
Software, which may be downloaded from the Commission’s website at 
http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/eqr.asp.  The exact dates for these reports are prescribed 
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
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summary of the contractual terms and conditions in every effective service agreement 
for market-based power sales; and (2) transaction information for effective short-term 
(less than one year) and long-term (one year or greater) market-based power sales 
during the most recent calendar quarter.  We also note that the Commission has 
revoked the market-based rate authority of sellers that have failed to comply with the 
EQR filing requirements.
1003   Further, the Commission has utilized EQR data in 
determinations relating to market power.  For example, the Commission relied in part 
on EQR data in reaching its determination that an “alternative” market power analysis 
submitted by Duke Power was unpersuasive.
1004 
856.  With respect to notices of change in status, in a related rulemaking proceeding 
in early 2005, the Commission clarified and standardized market-based rate sellers’ 
reporting requirement for any change in status that departs from the characteristics 
the Commission relied on in initially authorizing sales at market-based rates.
 1005  In 
Order No. 652, the Commission required that, as a condition of obtaining and 
                                                                                                                                                  
in 18 CFR 35.10b.  Failure to file an EQR (without an appropriate request for extension), 
or failure to report an agreement in an EQR, may result in forfeiture of market-based rate 
authority, requiring filing of a new application for market-based rate authority if the seller 
wishes to resume making sales at market-based rates.   
1003 See Electric Quarterly Reports, 115 FERC ¶ 61,073 (2006); Electric Quarterly 
Reports, 114 FERC ¶ 61,171 (2006); Electric Quarterly Reports, 69 FR 57679 (Sept. 27, 
2004); Electric Quarterly Reports, 105 FERC ¶ 61,219 (2003). 
1004 Duke Power, a Division of Duke Energy Corporation,111 FERC ¶ 61,506 at P 
48, 55 (2005). 
1005 Order No. 652 at P 47. Docket No. RM04-7-000   490 
 
retaining market-based rate authority, sellers must file notices of such changes no 
later than 30 days after the change in status occurs.
1006  These requirements are 
codified in our regulations, and failure of a market-based rate seller to timely file a 
change in status report constitutes a tariff violation.  If such a violation occurs, the 
Commission has the tools available to impose remedies, as necessary and appropriate, 
from the date on which the tariff violation occurred.  Such remedies could include 
disgorgement of profits, civil penalties or other remedies the Commission finds 
appropriate based on the specific facts and circumstances.  
857.  We note that any new market-based rate seller must conduct a horizontal 
market power analysis for our review.  Furthermore, we reiterate that the Commission 
retains the ability to require an updated market power analysis from any seller, 
Category 1 or 2, at any time.   
858.  We also reject those arguments made by the California Commission, 
NASUCA, and State AGs and Advocates that all sellers should continue to be 
required to file regularly scheduled updated market power analyses.  For the reasons 
stated above, assertions that the Commission will be unable to monitor market-based 
rate sellers without requiring all sellers to file regularly scheduled updated market 
power analyses are unfounded.     
                                              
1006 As discussed below in the Change in Status section, the Commission is 
modifying its regulations to provide that, in the case of power sales contracts with future 
delivery, such contracts are reportable 30 days after the physical delivery has begun. Docket No. RM04-7-000   491 
 
859.  In response to the comments of NASUCA and Constellation, we make the 
following clarifications.  We clarify that, subject to other conditions discussed below, 
Category 1 sellers include power marketers and power producers with 500 MW or 
less of generation capacity owned or controlled by the seller and its affiliates in 
aggregate per region.  Our use of the term “region” is intended to be as delineated in 
the Regional Review and Schedule attached as Appendix D.  
860.  We further clarify that a seller that owns, operates or controls, or is affiliated 
with an entity that owns, operates or controls, transmission facilities in the same 
region as the seller’s generation assets does not qualify as a Category 1 seller in that 
region.  This standard applies regardless of whether the total generation capacity 
owned or controlled by the seller and its affiliates is below 500 MW in the region.   
861.  Regarding Constellation’s point that a company should be considered 
Category 1 so long as it is not affiliated with a franchised public utility in the same 
region (and meets the other requirements for Category 1), we concur.  Hence, a seller 
that is affiliated with a franchised public utility that is not in the same region in which 
the seller owns or controls generation assets may qualify as a Category 1 seller for 
that region if it meets the other Category 1 criteria.  Likewise, a seller that does not 
own, operate or control, and is not affiliated with an entity that owns, operates or 
controls, transmission in the same region in which the seller owns or controls 
generation assets may qualify as a Category 1 seller for that region.   
862.  We do not adopt Constellation’s proposal that we carve out an exemption for 
sellers affiliated with a franchised public utility without captive customers nor do we Docket No. RM04-7-000   492 
 
adopt the proposal to exempt those that are affiliated with transmission owners that 
have given operational control of their transmission facilities to RTOs/ISOs.
1007  
Constellation has failed to adequately demonstrate that sellers affiliated with a 
franchised public utility without captive customers and those that are affiliated with 
transmission owners that have given operational control of their transmission 
facilities to RTOs/ISOs necessarily lack market power in generation.   
863.  In addition, we will revise the definition of Category 1 sellers in the 
regulations to include those that own, operate or control only transmission facilities 
that are “limited equipment necessary to connect individual generating facilities to 
the transmission grid.”  While the NOPR included this language in the preamble, 
conforming language was inadvertently excluded from the definition of Category 1 
sellers in § 35.36(a)(2) of the proposed regulations. 
Threshold for Category 1  
864.  After considering all of the comments regarding the proposed cutoff between 
Categories 1 and 2, we believe that 500 MW or less of generating capacity per region 
is an appropriate threshold.  We will use this value as a cutoff because, during our 15 
years of experience administering the market-based rate program, there have only 
rarely been allegations that sellers with capacity of 500 MW or less had market 
power, and when those claims have been raised the Commission’s review has either 
                                              
1007 We do, however, replace the term “public utility with a franchised service 
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found no evidence of market power or found that the market power identified was 
adequately mitigated by Commission-enforced market power mitigation rules.
1008  
While some commenters urge the Commission to adopt either a higher or lower 
threshold, the Commission believes that a 500 MW threshold is both a reasonable 
balance as well as conservative enough to ensure that those unlikely to possess 
market power will be granted market-based rate authority.  Moreover, as Newmont 
asserts, 500 MW is a clear, bright line that will be easy to administer. 
865.  In addition and in response to commenter requests, we clarify that the 500 
MW threshold is determined by adding all the generation capacity owned or 
controlled by the seller and its affiliates within the same region (as delineated in the 
Regional Review and Schedule attached as Appendix D).  In keeping with our 
conservative approach with regard to which entities qualify for Category 1, we find 
that aggregate capacity in a given region best meets our goal of ensuring that we do 
not create regulatory barriers to small sellers seeking to compete in the market while 
maintaining an ample degree of monitoring and oversight that such sellers do not 
obtain market power.  In this regard, we also clarify that although we will use 
aggregate capacity owned or controlled in a region to determine which sellers are 
required to file regularly scheduled updated market power analyses, we will continue 
                                              
1008 Moreover, as noted above, the Commission’s indicative screens are set at 
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to evaluate the balancing authority area in which the seller is located when 
performing our indicative screens, absent evidence to the contrary.
1009 
866.  While we recognize the appeal of a test that takes into account the size of each 
geographic market, such as using a percentage of all capacity (as opposed to a stated 
MW) cutoff and the use of uncommitted capacity rather than installed capacity, these 
methodologies are inconsistent with a straightforward, conservative means of 
screening sellers and consequently would lead to regulatory uncertainty.  As markets 
and market participants can fluctuate, a determination of the number of MWs 
constituting a particular percentage of capacity in a regional market would have to be 
constantly recalculated and the assumptions underlying a determination could lead to 
potential challenges.  Such an approach would run counter to our intention to provide 
certainty to market participants and to streamline the administration of the program. 
867.  The Commission rejects as unnecessary suggestions by AWEA and PPM that 
we take into account the differences among generation, including that classified as 
intermittent or non-dispatchable, when calculating the generation capacity of a seller.  
We believe that many sellers with wind and other non-thermal capacity will fall 
below the 500 MW threshold; those that do not may take advantage of simplifying 
                                              
1009 As we have stated above, where a generator is interconnecting to a non-
affiliate owned or controlled transmission system, there is only one relevant market (i.e., 
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assumptions and other means to minimize the burden of filing an updated market 
power analysis.    
868.  With respect to several commenters’ desire for fact-specific exemptions for 
sellers who otherwise may qualify for Category 2, we note that the Commission will 
determine on a case-by-case basis the category status of each seller with market-
based rate authorization.  In our attempt to keep the Category 1 criteria as simple and 
straightforward as possible, we may have swept under Category 2 particular sellers 
whose circumstances make it unlikely that they could ever exercise market power.  
As a result, we will entertain and evaluate individual requests for exemption from 
Category 2 and make a finding on the category status of each company.  However, if 
a seller wishes to request exemption from Category 2, it must make a filing seeking 
such an exemption no later than 120 days before its next updated market power 
analysis is due.  We also will consider any arguments from intervenors that a 
particular seller that contends that it qualifies for Category 1 status based on our 
definition should nevertheless be treated as a Category 2 seller and thus be required to 
continue filing updated market power analyses. 
2.  Regional Review and Schedule 
Commission Proposal 
869.  To ensure greater consistency in the data used to evaluate Category 2 sellers, 
the Commission proposed to require ongoing updated market power analyses to be 
filed for each seller’s relevant geographic market on a pre-determined schedule.  
Such a process would allow examination of the individual seller at the same time that Docket No. RM04-7-000   496 
 
the Commission examines other sellers in the relevant market and contiguous markets 
within a region from which power could be imported.  The Commission appended to 
the NOPR a proposed schedule for the regional review process, rotating by 
geographic region with three regions being reviewed per year.  For corporate families 
that own or control generation in multiple control areas and different regions, the 
Commission proposed that the corporate family would be required to file an update 
for each region in which members of the corporate family sell power during the time 
period specified for that region. 
Comments 
870.  Several commenters, including ELCON, APPA/TAPS, NRECA, 
Suez/Chevron, and Newmont, support the Commission’s proposal.  ELCON states 
that the requirement that a seller file its updated market power analysis at the same 
time the Commission examines other sellers in the relevant market and region is an 
excellent idea because it provides a better picture to the Commission during its 
review.  APPA/TAPS state that the regional approach will lead to data consistency 
and availability, and will allow the Commission to fulfill its obligations more 
completely.  Newmont believes that the Commission’s proposal appropriately 
balances the need to effectively monitor and mitigate market power while avoiding 
unnecessary and unproductive regulatory requirements.
1010     
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871.  Alternatively some commenters oppose the proposal entirely, or suggest 
modifications.  Reliant states that the regional review and schedule would 
significantly increase the administrative burdens of compliance rather than streamline 
them.  According to Reliant, companies that engage in business in multiple regions of 
the United States would have to file several times over the three year schedule instead 
of once as is required currently.
1011  Morgan Stanley and Financial Companies state 
that the Commission should require Category 2 sellers to file only once every three 
years, either with the region where they have a franchised service territory or the 
region in which they own the greatest amount of generation.  EEI and EPSA maintain 
that a regional review will pose a great burden on utilities operating in multiple 
markets and will lead to confusion over contradictory information.
1012 
872.  State AGs and Advocates warn that the regional approach will result in a too 
infrequent analysis of each area.  They and others state that, with the combined 
approach, each specific region will only be looked at completely every three years, 
which is less oversight than the Commission has currently.
1013 
                                              
1011 Similarly, Allegheny, Mirant, FP&L, EEI, FirstEnergy, MidAmerican, TXU, 
Morgan Stanley, Financial Companies, and EPSA argue that large corporate families 
could find themselves in a perpetual triennial review that would place a substantial 
regulatory burden and expense on them.   
1012 EEI reply comments at 27-29, EPSA reply comments at 11-14. 
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873.  FirstEnergy notes that the Commission has encouraged PJM and Midwest ISO 
to eliminate “seams” between their respective regions and comments that the 
proposal to schedule submittal of updated market power analyses for sellers in these 
two regions at different times is inconsistent with the reasons underlying adoption of 
common filing dates.  Mirant states that the limited number of consultants that 
perform market power analyses use separate, proprietary databases and warns that the 
market data submitted on a regional basis will remain inconsistent.  Further, Mirant 
asserts that there may be antitrust issues if a group of competing sellers jointly hires 
one consultant.   
874.   NRECA replies that any increase in the burden on sellers does not outweigh 
the substantial benefits of greater data consistency and a complete picture of each 
region under review.
1014  APPA/TAPS assert that the Commission should not 
sacrifice improvements to its program for the interests of a few companies and that 
any increased cost to companies associated with regional reviews is outweighed by 
the companies’ profits from market-based rate sales.  They dismiss concerns 
regarding a scarcity of consultants, noting that the market should respond to an 
increase in demand for consulting services, and that “competition will force 
efficiency gains to be passed along to consultants’ clients.”
1015  Further, with respect 
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to a group of sellers jointly hiring a consultant to produce a market analysis, they 
comment that antitrust counsel should be able to ensure joint representation does not 
result in improper information sharing.
1016   
875.  PNM/Tucson state that the updated market power analyses in a given region 
should be deliberately staggered so that utilities are able to build upon data sets 
already submitted in prior proceedings, instead of each having to construct its own, 
which would result in varying, competing data sets.   
876.  Mirant and FP&L add that with all the entities filing concurrently it will be 
difficult for some, such as non-transmission owning entities, to acquire the necessary 
data (i.e., simultaneous import limit data).  NRECA, Mirant and Powerex ask the 
Commission to have transmission-owning utilities file their updated market power 
analyses (or information necessary for others to perform preliminary screens) at a 
minimum 90 days prior to the regional due date; MidAmerican requests that the 
Commission require each transmission provider to post to its OASIS a simultaneous 
import study 60 days before the filing deadline that could be used by first-tier entities 
to develop their market power analyses.  Similarly, Suez/Chevron suggests requiring 
RTOs and/or control area operators in each region to file certain information in 
advance of the filing deadline so that sellers can rely on uniform baseline data.
1017  
                                              
1016 Id. at 19-21. 
1017 The data Suez/Chevron refer to include the information indicated in proposed 
Appendix C, Pivotal Supplier Analysis at Rows E through J, O, P and Q and also 
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
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EEI critiques the proposals for sharing of data prior to submission of triennial 
reviews, stating that this would increase the complexity of an already cumbersome 
process.
1018  
877.  APPA/TAPS state that data sharing by companies should be enhanced by 
regional reviews, not impaired, and that more robust data and opportunities to 
reconcile conflicting submissions with a regional review will lead to a better analysis 
by the Commission.
1019 
878.  MidAmerican asserts that the Commission should allow more time between 
the end of the qualification period and the filing of market power analyses.  It states 
that these analyses require Form 1 data that is not available until several months after 
the end of the calendar year and that control area loads as filed in Form 714 are 
frequently not available until the third quarter following the end of the calendar year, 
usually July.  Additionally, it states that generation and load data from Forms EIA-
860 and EIA-861, respectively, are likewise not available until late in the following 
year.  Accordingly, it suggests that market analyses should not be due until mid-
                                                                                                                                                  
proposed Appendix C, Wholesale Market Share Analysis at Rows F through Q, and the 
accompanying workpapers.  
1018 EEI reply comments at 27-29. 
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October following the end of the qualification period, allowing roughly 90 days 
between the availability of Form 714 and the deadline for filing.
1020 
879.  Many commenters also argue that the Commission should extend the time 
until the first regional reviews are due.  Suggested beginning filing dates include:  the 
first filing period for a region that is no earlier than a company’s next required 
updated analysis;
1021 the first filing period that occurs no earlier than two years from 
the latest filed updated analysis;
1022 the first filing period that is no earlier than one 
year from the latest filed updated analysis;
1023 or 180 days after the Final Rule is 
published in the Federal Register.
1024  Duke suggests that, rather than extending the 
first filing times, the Commission clarify that those entities due to file their next 
updates before the scheduled regional reviews are due can forgo making any interim 
filings.  
880.  APPA/TAPS ask the Commission to extend the period for commenting on the 
updated market power analyses from the current 21-day comment period to 60 days, 
at a minimum.  They state that because numerous sellers will file the updated market 
power analyses contemporaneously, intervenors should be given sufficient time to 
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make meaningful use of the expanded body of information and to prepare multiple 
pleadings dealing with various sellers in the region.  They add that the additional time 
should improve the quality of the analyses that the Commission receives from 
intervenors. 
881.  Finally, regarding the Commission’s proposal to require all updates (and all 
new applications) to include an appendix listing all generation assets owned or 
controlled by the corporate family, in-service dates and capacity ratings by unit, Duke 
agrees with the proposal that the appendix should also reflect all electric transmission 
and natural gas intrastate pipelines and/or gas storage facilities owned or controlled 
by the corporate family.  It states that having such a standardized listing will be 
helpful both to the Commission and to other market participants.
1025  Duke cautions, 
however, that including the location of transmission and gas pipeline facilities in the 
appendix could conflict with CEII requirements, and requests clarification that sellers 
will have discretion with locational descriptions.  
Commission Determination 
882.  The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal to conduct a regional review of 
updated market power analyses, with certain modifications.  We agree with 
commenters such as APPA/TAPS that the regional approach will lead to data 
consistency and availability.  In this regard, both the Commission and market 
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participants will benefit from greater data consistency that will result from regional 
examination of updated market power analyses and a methodical study of all sellers 
in the same region.  This will give the Commission a more complete view of market 
forces in each region and the opportunity to reconcile conflicting submissions, 
enhancing our ability to ensure that sellers’ rates remain just and reasonable.   
883.  Although some commenters express concern that a regional review approach 
will increase administrative burdens, particularly for sellers operating in multiple 
regions, we believe that the Commission’s proposal properly and fairly balances the 
need to effectively monitor and mitigate market power in wholesale markets with the 
desire to minimize any administrative burden associated with the filing and review of 
updated market power analyses.  While we recognize that some sellers may have to 
file updates more frequently than they do currently, we have carefully balanced the 
interests of all involved, and we believe that regional reviews of updated market 
analyses is both needed and desirable and will enhance the Commission's ability to 
continue to ensure that sellers either lack market power or have adequately mitigated 
such market power.  
884.  We note that sellers currently must prepare a market power analysis for all of 
their generation assets nationwide.  Some sellers with assets in multiple regions have 
chosen to submit their individual updated market power analyses when each is due 
(every three years) rather than combining them into a single updated market power 
analysis.  Others file one updated market power analysis for the entire corporate 
family, with individual analyses of the different markets in which their assets are Docket No. RM04-7-000   504 
 
located.  Either way, the same analyses must be filed under the status quo and the 
approach adopted in this Final Rule.  The timing may differ, but the increased burden 
is minimal.
1026 
885.  Nevertheless, considering the comments received and upon further review of 
the Commission’s proposal, we believe that some of the proposed regions should be 
consolidated.  Therefore, we will reduce the number of regions from the proposed 
nine to six.  In Appendix D we identify the six regions (Northeast, Southeast, Central, 
Southwest Power Pool, Southwest, and Northwest), and will require Category 2 
sellers that own or control generation assets in each region to file an updated market 
power analysis for that region every three years based on a rotating schedule shown 
in the Appendix.
1027  We believe that, with fewer and larger regions, some sellers will 
likely be present in fewer regions and administrative burdens for those sellers 
accordingly will be reduced.  In addition, the decrease in the number of regions will 
also extend the time period between filings.  In the NOPR, the Commission stated 
that three regions would be reviewed per year, with four months between each set of 
                                              
1026 In this regard, we note that preparation of multiple market power analyses is 
likely less burdensome and less expensive than what would otherwise be required under 
cost-based regulation which can result in extended administrative litigation to determine 
the just and reasonable rate. 
1027 Concerning power marketers that may not own or control generation assets in 
any region, we will require the submission of a filing explaining why the seller meets the 
Category 1 criteria, as discussed above.  Power marketers must submit such a filing with 
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filings.  Here we adopt review of two regions per year, with the filing periods six 
months apart. 
886.  Regarding FirstEnergy’s argument that PJM and Midwest ISO should be 
placed in the same region, we continue to encourage PJM and the Midwest ISO to 
address "seams" issues.  However, we find that placing them in different regions for 
the purpose of determining when an updated market power analysis is submitted 
should in no way affect or discourage efforts to address seams between these two 
regions.  Other considerations (such as balancing RTO/ISO and non-RTO/ISO 
filings, and scheduling approximately the same number of filings each year) outweigh 
FirstEnergy's concerns.   
887.  The Commission rejects the arguments by some commenters that the regional 
approach will result in too infrequent an analysis of each area.  As a practical matter, 
currently sellers are required to file an updated market power analysis every three 
years.  In the intervening years between updated market power analyses, most utilities 
either enjoy the 18 CFR 35.27(a) exemption from filing a generation market power 
analysis or rely on the previously filed updated market power analysis.  The regional 
approach will provide the Commission with a snapshot of sellers across a larger area 
and will provide a more accurate view of simultaneous import capability into the 
relevant geographic markets under review.  Accordingly, contrary to claims that the 
regional approach will result in less Commission oversight, the regional approach 
will enhance the Commission’s ability to analyze market power using better data with 
less opportunity for conflicting claims of ownership or control of generation assets.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   506 
 
888.  Regarding concerns about the scarcity of consulting firms, we note that our 
proposal will not necessarily increase the number of market power analyses to be 
performed (indeed, by exempting all Category 1 sellers from submitting updated 
market power analyses, the number may be decreased).  We agree with APPA/TAPS 
that any shortage of consultants performing market power analyses should be 
temporary as firms adjust to a new schedule reflecting the regional review timetable 
and take precautions to prevent improper information sharing.  
889.  We agree with commenters that transmission-owning entities should file their 
updated market power analyses in advance of others in each region.  Thus, the 
Commission will modify the schedule proposed in the NOPR to better allow sellers to 
rely on the transmission-owning utilities’ information, and we will adopt a staggered 
filing approach for each region which will require different types of entities to file at 
different times.  The transmission-owning utilities, which have the information 
necessary to perform SIL studies, will be required to file their updated market power 
analyses first.  Six months later, all others in that region will be required to file their 
updated market power analyses.
1028   
890.  Staggering the time periods within which transmission-owning and non-
transmission-owning utilities will be required to submit their updated market power 
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analyses will provide an opportunity for those non-transmission owning sellers that 
need simultaneous transmission import limits to perform the screens to rely on the 
SIL studies performed by the transmission-owning utilities rather than rely on a 
"proxy" for the import limits. 
891.  Our experience is that sellers located in RTOs/ISOs typically do not need to 
rely on a SIL study in performing the screens, and transmission-owning utilities in 
RTOs/ISOs typically do not prepare or submit such studies.  Accordingly, staggered 
filings for sellers in RTOs/ISOs may not be necessary for purposes of data 
availability.  Nevertheless, we will retain the staggered filing deadlines for all regions 
for consistency and to avoid any confusion in this regard.  If a particular seller that is 
located in an RTO/ISO finds that it needs import data in order to complete its market 
power analysis, we expect the RTO/ISO to assist such sellers if requested.  
892.  In response to MidAmerican’s suggestion that the Commission allow adequate 
time between the date that all data is available and the date that a region’s analyses 
are due, we will schedule the updates to be filed in December (12 months after the 
study year), and June (18 months after the study year).  We note that studies due in 
December and June may be filed anytime during the applicable month.  Such a 
schedule will allow adequate time for the data to be available (at least 6 weeks after 
EIA Forms 860 and 861 become public) and the analyses to be completed.  
893.  In response to commenters’ requests that the Commission extend the time until 
the first analyses are due, we will commence the schedule in December 2007.  The 
Commission believes this will provide adequate notice and time to prepare the Docket No. RM04-7-000   508 
 
analyses.  In addition, we clarify that sellers that otherwise would have been required 
to file an updated market power analysis before the effective date of this rule should 
submit their updated market power analyses in accordance with past orders directing 
them to do so.  Starting with the effective date of this rule, sellers should submit their 
updated market power analyses in accordance with the schedule set forth in Appendix 
D.  
894.  We also agree with the suggestion of APPA/TAPS to extend the period for 
intervenors to comment on the updates.  We agree that extending the comment period 
will allow intervenors a better opportunity to review and comment on filings, 
especially considering the large number of filings that will be submitted at one time.  
For that reason, the Commission will establish a 60-day comment period for updated 
market power analyses.  Further, we adopt the NOPR proposal to require that with 
each new application and updated market power analysis, the seller must list in an 
appendix, among other things, all affiliates that have market-based rate authority and 
identify any generation assets owned or controlled by the seller and any such affiliate.  
In addition, we extend this obligation to relevant change in status notifications.
1029  
We believe that requiring the submission of such data will provide the Commission 
with more accurate and up-to-date information about each corporate family and will 
address some of our concerns regarding confusion that has occurred with respect to 
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corporate families and, in particular, what sellers are authorized to transact at market-
based rates in each corporate family.   
895.  Accordingly, the appendix must list all generation assets owned (clearly 
identifying which affiliate owns which asset) or controlled (clearly identifying which 
affiliate controls which asset) by the corporate family by balancing authority area, 
and by geographic region, and provide the in-service date and nameplate and/or 
seasonal ratings by unit.  As a general rule, any generation assets included in a 
seller’s or a seller’s affiliate’s market study should be listed in the asset appendix.  
We find that the in-service date and nameplate and/or seasonal ratings help identify 
and provide the Commission and market participants with critical market 
information.  In addition, the appendix must reflect all electric transmission and 
natural gas intrastate pipelines and/or gas storage facilities owned or controlled by the 
corporate family and the location of such facilities.  
896.  In response to Duke, we clarify that CEII data is more detailed than “simply 
[giving] the general location of the critical infrastructure.”
1030  As the location of the 
facilities listed in the appendix need only include the balancing authority area and 
geographic region (see sample appendix attached as Appendix B) in which they are 
located, we do not anticipate that any CEII will be disclosed. 
                                              
1030 18 CFR 388.113(c)(1)(iv). Docket No. RM04-7-000   510 
 
F.  MBR Tariff 
Commission Proposal 
897.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to adopt a market-based rate tariff of 
general applicability (MBR tariff), applicable to all sellers authorized to sell electric 
energy, capacity or ancillary services at wholesale at market-based rates, as a 
condition of market-based rate authority.  The MBR tariff, as proposed, would 
require each seller to comply with the applicable provisions of the market-based rate 
regulations to be codified at 18 CFR Part 35, Subpart H.  The Commission proposed 
that each seller would be required to list on the MBR tariff the docket numbers and 
case citations, where applicable, of any proceedings where the seller received 
authorization to make sales of energy between affiliates or where its market-based 
rate authority was otherwise restricted or limited.   
898.  The Commission explained that not all of the provisions of the proposed 
regulations may be applicable to all sellers.  For example, a seller may not wish to 
offer ancillary services under the tariff.  The Commission sought comments regarding 
whether a placeholder should be reserved in the MBR tariff for the seller to indicate 
those parts of the regulations that are not applicable to it. 
899.  The Commission stated that this streamlining effort is not intended to reduce 
the flexibility of sellers and customers in negotiating the terms of individual 
transactions.  The Commission noted that sellers would continue to negotiate the 
terms and conditions of sales entered into under their MBR tariff, and the terms and 
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in the quarterly EQRs.  The Commission stated that if sellers wish to offer or require 
certain “generic” terms and conditions that in the past were contained in their market-
based rate tariff, they may place customers on notice of such requirements by 
including such information on a company website and include any related provisions 
in individual transaction agreements.  The Commission explained its desire that the 
MBR tariff reflect, in a consistent manner, only those matters that are required to be 
on file.
1031   
900.  Further, rather than each entity having its own MBR tariff, which can result in 
dozens of tariffs for each corporate family with potentially conflicting provisions, the 
Commission proposed that each corporate family have only one tariff, with all 
affiliates with market-based rate authority separately identified in the tariff.
1032  The 
Commission stated that this would reduce the administrative burden and confusion 
that occurs when there are multiple, and potentially conflicting, tariffs in a single 
corporate family, and would allow the Commission and customers to know what 
sellers are in each corporate family.  
1.  Tariff of General Applicability 
Comments 
901.  Several commenters do not support the adoption of a tariff of general 
applicability.  Allegheny argues that “the Commission is without legal authority to 
                                              
1031 NOPR at P 163. 
1032 Id. at P 164. Docket No. RM04-7-000   512 
 
impose a one-size-fits-all market-based rate tariff.”
1033  It argues that the Commission 
has made no finding of undue discrimination and is not proposing to act under FPA § 
206, and asserts that administrative efficiency is an insufficient justification to impose 
a standardized tariff on market-based rate sellers.  Similarly, FirstEnergy asserts that 
requiring a uniform MBR tariff would impose undue administrative burdens on 
sellers, as each would have to make a compliance filing modifying its currently 
effective tariff and would also have to expand its compliance program to confirm that 
its tariff was in conformance with the uniform tariff. 
902.  Xcel states that the Commission has not made clear its basis for and expected 
benefit from a pro forma tariff.  Xcel suggests that, if it is adopted, then the 
Commission should describe any limitations on a seller’s market-based rate authority, 
in addition to identifying any docket numbers where they were imposed.
1034  
903.  Similarly, Avista Corporation believes that all of the terms and conditions of a 
tariff should be included in one easily accessible place.  Requiring that certain terms 
and conditions be posted on a company website, rather than the tariff, is bound to 
cause unnecessary confusion as to which terms and conditions apply, and will 
increase the burden on both the utilities to notify, and customers to remain apprised, 
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of when those terms and conditions change.
1035  Additionally, FirstEnergy states that 
a process by which a seller places customers on notice of such terms and conditions 
beyond the minimum by including such information on a company website, and 
including related provisions in individual transaction agreements, would be 
cumbersome at best, and would deprive sellers and customers of the benefit of having 
the “generic” terms and conditions in one document.
1036 
904.  Commenters who responded to the question of whether a placeholder should 
be reserved in the tariff to indicate parts of the regulations that are not applicable to 
the seller, support the idea of a placeholder.
1037 
905.  Mirant notes that the sample MBR tariff attached to the NOPR did not provide 
for specific RTO/ISO ancillary service products and states that it is unclear how the 
Commission would identify which seller under the corporate tariff is permitted to sell 
the specific ancillary services traded in each region.  Mirant asks whether the 
Commission would require each seller of ancillary services to maintain an ancillary 
services tariff on file with the Commission.  Mirant further notes that some sellers not 
located in an RTO/ISO have been granted authorization to sell ancillary services at 
market-based rates if they post those services on their websites and suggests that the 
                                              
1035 Avista at 10-12 
1036 First Energy at 27-31. 
1037 Avista at 10; MidAmerican at 33 (suggesting that the placeholder could be 
included as an attachment to each seller’s tariff in order to preserve the generic nature of 
the tariff itself); Progress Energy at 19. Docket No. RM04-7-000   514 
 
requirement that sellers maintain such a website would have to be cross-referenced in 
the corporate tariff. 
906.  EEI states that companies with operations in multiple markets may need to 
tailor their market-based rate tariffs to reflect the particular circumstances of each 
market.  This will be true for RTO and ISO markets as well as non-RTO markets.  In 
each of these cases, participants in the markets typically must agree to abide by 
specific market terms and conditions that may need to be reflected in the tariff.  
Therefore, EEI encourages the Commission to allow each company to file multiple 
tariffs, as may be necessary to reflect these market differences.
1038 
907.  Regarding the timing of tariff implementation, MidAmerican comments that 
the Commission should apply the new tariff prospectively only to future transactions, 
and urges that existing tariffs should be unaffected until existing transactions expire.  
MidAmerican observes that if existing tariffs containing terms and conditions are 
replaced by the proposed generic tariff, then neither the new tariff nor the existing 
service agreements will reflect the terms and conditions of ongoing transactions.  
908.  ELCON supports the proposed MBR tariff, believing that it will be more 
customer-friendly.  APPA/TAPS agree, stating that a pro forma tariff will help by 
addressing variations in MBR tariffs that increase transaction costs by creating 
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potential confusion about applicable terms and conditions.
1039  A number of 
commenters find some merit in the concept of the MBR tariff, but request 
clarifications or revisions.
1040  Some of these entities comment that companies with 
operations in multiple markets may need to tailor their tariffs to reflect the particular 
circumstances of each market, and state that participants in organized markets 
typically must agree to abide by specific terms that may need to be reflected in their 
tariffs. 
909.  Indianapolis P&L asserts that any restrictions on market-based rate authority 
should be in a tariff, rather than in Commission orders.  It believes that “converting 
concepts (e.g., all sales in a control area will be mitigated) into precise contract-
worthy terms and conditions can be very difficult” and argues that the best way to 
prevent misunderstandings between parties is to have “precise, transparent and, 
publicly-available language in a tariff explaining the precise conditions on an entity’s 
market-based rate authority.”
1041  Indianapolis P&L further warns that “having 
restrictions on an entity’s market-based rate authorization contained in a tariff only 
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through cross-reference to a Commission order may run afoul of the FPA requirement 
that rates be ‘on file’ with the Commission.”
1042 
910.  Constellation seeks clarification that a seller that has received waiver from the 
code of conduct need not report in its MBR tariff that the affiliate restrictions in 
proposed § 35.39 do not apply to it.  Alternatively, Constellation suggests that the 
Commission allow sellers to list the appropriate docket numbers in which the 
Commission has granted waivers of the code of conduct or provide a place to indicate 
that the provisions are not applicable.  Constellation notes that many market-based 
rate sellers have included provisions in their tariffs regarding reassignment of 
transmission capacity and sale of firm transmission rights, congestion contracts, or 
fixed transmission rights (as a group, “FTRs”), and requests that the Commission 
either provide for inclusion of such provisions in the MBR tariff or state affirmatively 
that they will not be required. 
Commission Determination 
911.  In the NOPR, the Commission explained that it was acting pursuant to sections 
205 and 206 of the FPA in proposing to amend its regulations to govern market-based 
rate authorizations for wholesale sales of electric energy, capacity and ancillary 
services by public utilities, “including modifying all existing market-based rate 
authorizations and tariffs so they will be expressly conditioned on or revised to reflect 
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certain new requirements proposed herein.”
1043  Section 205 of the FPA requires that 
all rates for sales subject to our jurisdiction, and all rules and regulations pertaining to 
such rates, be just and reasonable.  Section 206 of the FPA provides that, when the 
Commission finds that a rate or a rule, regulation or practice affecting a rate, is unjust 
or unreasonable, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, rule or 
regulation and order it so. 
912.  Based on careful consideration of the comments received, the Commission 
agrees that complete uniformity of market-based rate tariffs is not necessary.  
However, pursuant to our authority under sections 205 and 206, we conclude that the 
lack of consistent tariff form and content has hampered our ability to manage the 
market-based rate program in an efficient manner and has introduced uncertainty for 
potential customers.  We find that continuing to allow basic inconsistencies in the 
market-based rate tariffs on file with the Commission is unjust and unreasonable.  
Nevertheless, we find that we can achieve our goal without imposing a uniform tariff 
requirement on all sellers by, instead, requiring that all sellers revise their market-
based rate tariffs to contain certain standard provisions, as discussed below.   
913.  We believe the approach we adopt here addresses the concerns of commenters 
that the Commission not impose a one-size-fits-all approach while, at the same time, 
presenting a uniform set of required provisions that will provide adequate certainty 
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and will be more customer friendly.  In addition, we believe that allowing sellers to 
include seller specific terms and conditions in their market-based rate tariffs will offer 
a greater degree of transparency and serve customers by providing for the opportunity 
to have all terms and conditions identified and in one place.  As Progress Energy 
asserts, “[g]reater consistency of tariffs within the industry . . . will not only reduce 
customer confusion, it also will reduce the administrative burden of those responsible 
for the implementation and administration of the tariff.”
1044 
914.  Accordingly, in this Final Rule, we adopt two standard “required” provisions 
that each seller must include in its market-based rate tariff:  a provision requiring 
compliance with the Commission’s regulations and a provision identifying any 
limitations and exemptions regarding the seller’s market-based rate authority. 
915.  In particular, with regard to compliance with the Commission’s regulations, 
we will require each seller to include the following provision in its market-based rate 
tariff: 
Seller shall comply with the provisions of 18 CFR Part 35, Subpart H, as 
applicable, and with any conditions the Commission imposes in its orders 
concerning seller’s market-based rate authority, including orders in which 
the Commission authorizes seller to engage in affiliate sales under this 
tariff or otherwise restricts or limits the seller’s market-based rate authority.  
Failure to comply with the applicable provisions of 18 CFR Part 35, 
Subpart H, and with any orders of the Commission concerning seller’s 
market-based rate authority, will constitute a violation of this tariff. 
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916.  We also will require that the seller include a provision identifying all 
limitations on its market-based rate authority (including markets where the seller does 
not have market-based rate authority) and any exemptions from, or waivers of, or 
blanket  authorizations under the Commission’s regulations that the seller has been 
granted (such as exemption from affiliate sales restrictions; waiver of the accounting 
regulations; blanket authority under Part 34 for the issuances of securities and 
liabilities, etc.), including cites to the relevant Commission orders. 
917.  In addition to the required tariff provisions, we also will adopt a set of 
standard  provisions (which we reference herein as “applicable provisions”) that must 
be included in a seller’s market-based rate tariff to the extent that they are applicable 
based on the services provided by the seller.  For example, if the seller’s sales under 
its market-based rate tariff are subject to mitigation, it must include the standard 
provision governing mitigated sales.  Similarly, if the seller makes sales of certain 
ancillary services in certain RTOs/ISOs, or if it makes sales of ancillary services as a 
third-party provider, it must include the standard ancillary services provisions, as 
applicable. 
918.  Attached hereto as Appendix C is a listing of the standard required provisions 
and the standard applicable provisions.  The Commission will post these provisions 
on its web site and will update them as appropriate. 
919.  In addition, as discussed more fully below, we will permit sellers to list in their 
market-based rate tariffs additional seller-specific terms and conditions that go 
beyond the standard provisions set forth in Appendix C. Docket No. RM04-7-000   520 
 
920.  As Constellation observes, the uniform MBR tariff proposed in the NOPR did 
not provide for sellers to offer reassignment of transmission capacity or FTRs.  As 
revised in this Final Rule, Appendix C does not contain a standard provision for the 
reassignment of transmission capacity.  The Commission believes that, although these 
items have historically been offered in the context of sales of electric energy and 
capacity, they are transmission-related rather than generation services.  Accordingly, 
the Commission has made provision for reassignment of transmission capacity in the 
revised OATT, as discussed in Order No. 890.
1045  Thus, we state affirmatively here 
that provisions concerning the reassignment or sale of transmission capacity or FTRs 
are not required to be included in a seller’s market-based rate tariff, nor is it 
appropriate to include transmission-related services in the seller’s market-based rate 
tariff.  Sellers seeking to reassign transmission capacity should adhere to the 
provisions of Order No. 890
1046 and should revise their market-based rate tariffs to 
remove provisions governing these services at the time they otherwise revise their 
tariffs to conform them to the standard provisions discussed herein.   
921.  Regarding FTRs and, incidentally, virtual trading,
1047 we note that 
Commission-approved market rules for RTOs/ISOs address resales of FTRs and 
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1046 Id. at P 816. 
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that do not go to physical delivery.  For example, virtual bidding allows entities that do 
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virtual trading to ensure that no market power is exercised in such trades.  In addition, 
sellers engaging in these activities sign a participation agreement with RTOs/ISOs 
which require them to abide by those market rules.  Hence, the approval of the market 
rules in conjunction with approval of the generic participation agreement by the 
Commission constitutes authorization for public utilities to engage in the resale of 
FTRs and virtual transactions, and no separate authorization is required under the 
FPA.  The Commission’s monitoring of the effectiveness of the market rules and 
oversight of participants engaging in FTR resales and virtual trading in the RTO/ISO 
markets provide sufficient protections against the exercise of market power.  
Nevertheless, if the Commission concludes in the future that a separate section 205 
authorization would better enable us to ensure that FTR resales or virtual trading do 
                                                                                                                                                  
not serve load to make purchases in the day-ahead market.  Such purchases are 
subsequently sold in the real-time spot market.  Likewise, entities without physical 
generating assets can make power sales in the day-ahead market that are subsequently 
purchased in the real-time market.  By making virtual energy sales or purchases in the 
day-ahead market and settling these positions in the real-time, any market participant can 
arbitrage price differences between the two markets.  For example, a participant can 
make virtual purchases in the day-ahead if the prices are lower than it expects in the real-
time market, and then sell the purchased energy back into the real-time market.  The 
result of this transaction would be to raise the day-ahead price slightly due to additional 
demand and, thus, improve the convergence of the day-ahead and real-time energy prices 
due to additional supply in the real-time.  Virtual trading is not limited to entities without 
assets.  For example, generators or loads that prefer to transact at the real-time price may 
use virtual trading to accomplish this without having to under-schedule load or withhold 
generation from the day-ahead market by submitting matching virtual trades. Docket No. RM04-7-000   522 
 
not result in unjust and unreasonable wholesale rates, the Commission may change 
the filing requirements for engaging in these activities.
1048   
922.  To the extent that individual companies within a corporate family need or 
desire a tariff separate from their affiliates, the Commission will allow this, as 
discussed below.  Although EEI asserts that participants in organized markets may 
need to meet the requirements of various organized markets, EEI offers no specific 
examples in this regard.  Nevertheless, we believe that our action to replace the 
uniform MBR tariff proposed in the NOPR with standard provisions that we will 
require to be included in a seller’s market-based rate tariff and the allowance of seller 
specific terms and conditions in the market-based rate tariff should meet the needs of 
all sellers with market-based rate authority.   
923.  We will require all market-based rate sellers to make section 206 compliance 
filings to modify their existing tariffs to include the standard required provisions set 
forth in Appendix C as well as any of the standard applicable provisions.  These 
compliance filings are to be made by each seller the next time the seller proposes a 
tariff change, makes a change in status filing, or submits an updated market power 
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Independent System Operator, Inc., 89 FERC ¶ 61,153 at 61,435-36 (1999) (requiring, 
among other things, that all public utility resellers of FTRs file a rate schedule for 
authorization to make resales) we note that that analysis rested on Order No. 888’s filing 
requirements for resales of transmission capacity.  As Order No. 890 has modified the 
filing requirements with respect to reassignments of transmission capacity (in addition to 
the reasons cited above) we find it appropriate not to require a separate rate schedule for 
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analysis (or a demonstration that Category 1 status is appropriate) in accordance with 
the schedule in Appendix D.   
924.  One of the required standard provisions (the compliance with Commission 
regulations provision) states that failure to comply with the applicable provisions of 
the regulations adopted in this Final Rule or with any Commission orders concerning 
a seller’s market-based rate authority will constitute a violation of the seller’s tariff.  
As provided in this Final Rule, the regulations at 18 CFR Part 35, Subpart H will 
become effective 60 days after publication of this Final Rule in the Federal Register.  
Accordingly, this provision will be considered part of each seller’s market-based rate 
tariff effective as of the effective date of this Final Rule.  As noted above, all sellers 
will be required to amend their market-based rate tariffs to include the required 
standard provisions, as well as the required applicable provisions, either at the time 
that they file any other amendment to their current tariffs, when they report a change 
in status, or when they file their updated market power analysis, whichever occurs 
first.  However, regardless of the date on which sellers make their compliance filing, 
the provision providing that failure to abide by the regulations will constitute a tariff 
violation will be considered part of each seller’s current market-based rate tariff as of 
60 days after the date of publication of this Final Rule in the Federal Register.    
2.  Placement of Terms and Conditions 
Comments 
925.  In the NOPR, the Commission observed that the purpose of a MBR tariff of 
general applicability is not to direct the terms and conditions of particular sales but to Docket No. RM04-7-000   524 
 
ensure that the tariff on file reflects in a consistent manner only those matters that are 
required to be on file, namely, the identity of the seller(s), the docket number(s) of the 
market-based rate authorization, the seller’s requirement to follow the conditions of 
market-based rate authorization contained in the proposed regulations, and that the 
rates, terms and conditions of any particular sale will be negotiated between the seller 
and individual purchasers.  The Commission stated that sellers could offer other 
“generic” terms and conditions as information on a company website.   
926.  In response, several commenters state that requiring companies to move 
generic terms and conditions to a company website, or to replicate them in individual 
agreements or rely on Commission orders, would be confusing and/or overly 
cumbersome.
1049  Avista and FirstEnergy believe that all of the terms and conditions 
of a tariff should be in one easily accessible place; otherwise, sellers and customers 
would be deprived of the benefit of having them in one document.  According to 
FirstEnergy, this “would be contrary to the goal of establishing a ‘customer-friendly 
tariff’ as contemplated in the NOPR.”
1050  Further, FirstEnergy states that the fact that 
the Commission may not review individualized commercial terms included in tariffs 
does not make it unjust and unreasonable for sellers to include such terms in their 
tariffs; thus, there is no basis for the Commission to exercise its authority under FPA 
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§ 206 to require changes to existing market-based rate tariffs.  However, Progress 
Energy agrees with the Commission that commercial terms and conditions for sales 
under the MBR tariff should not be filed for Commission review. 
Commission Determination 
927.  As discussed above, we find consistency of standard market-based rate tariff 
provisions to be essential, and we modify the proposal in the NOPR by adopting a set 
of standard tariff provisions that we will require each seller to include in its market-
based rate tariff, but we do not adopt the NOPR proposal that all sellers adopt the 
uniform MBR tariff of general applicability set forth in the NOPR.  After careful 
consideration of the comments, we also will not adopt the NOPR proposal that sellers 
offer other generic terms and conditions as information on a company website.  We 
agree with commenters as to the benefits to sellers and customers of having all terms 
and conditions relevant to a seller’s market-based rate power sales available in one 
document.  Thus, we will permit sellers to list in their market-based rate tariffs 
additional terms and conditions that go beyond the standard provisions required in 
Appendix C (with the exception of transmission-related services, as discussed above), 
as modified in this Final Rule.  As has been our practice in many instances, we will 
not evaluate the justness and reasonableness of such additional provisions, but will 
allow them to be included in the market-based rate tariff that is on file with the 
Commission.  Our reasoning is that such additional provisions are presumptively just 
and reasonable.  A seller granted market-based rate authority has been found not to 
have, or to have adequately mitigated, market power; thus, if a customer is not Docket No. RM04-7-000   526 
 
satisfied with the terms and conditions offered by a seller, the customer can choose to 
purchase from a different supplier. 
3.  Single Corporate Tariff 
Comments 
928.  ELCON supports the NOPR proposal that each corporate family have one 
tariff on file, stating that it will lead to better transparency regarding what each seller 
in a corporate family owns or controls.  APPA/TAPS agree, commenting that a single 
corporate tariff addresses recurring problems with determining exactly who is 
affiliated with whom.
1051  Sempra agrees in general that the single tariff structure 
should eliminate confusion that results when entities within the same corporate 
family have tariffs with terms that differ. 
929.  However, a number of commenters raise potential implementation issues and 
believe that having all entities in a corporate family selling under the same tariff 
should be optional and not mandatory.
1052  Several of these commenters state that the 
                                              
1051 EEI disagrees, contending that, since companies already disclose affiliations in 
their individual market-based rate filings and are separately subject to the Commission’s 
affiliate transactions rules, any confusion about affiliations does not justify a single tariff 
requirement.  EEI reply comments at 30-31. 
1052 See, e.g., EPSA at 41; Duke at 45-48; MidAmerican at 33-35; FirstEnergy at 
27-31; Constellation at 27-29; Progress Energy at 19-23; EEI at 49.  Cogentrix  also 
expresses reservations about requiring a single corporate tariff.  See Cogentrix/Goldman 
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Commission has not demonstrated the need for a single corporate tariff and believe 
that the added burden of implementation would outweigh any benefits.
1053 
930.  Some of the problems with the single corporate tariff proposal identified by 
commenters include the following: 
·  the proposal does not make sense for diversified energy companies with a variety 
of non-utility generator or power marketer affiliates because it would require increased 
regulatory and legal coordination among affiliates; 
·  the burden of replacing multiple market-based rate tariffs with one umbrella tariff 
would be significant, requiring amendment and re-execution of many documents with 
many trading counterparties, as well as extensive changes to the existing quarterly 
reporting process; 
·  a single tariff listing all affiliates could create confusion regarding which affiliates 
may be bound by certain executed service agreements, or which terms and conditions 
apply to certain affiliates;  
·  confusion would result when trying to create a single tariff per corporate family 
when sellers can have multiple corporate families; listing the same seller on the MBR 
tariffs of multiple corporate groups would not improve transparency; and 
·  given that some sellers’ upstream ownership can include multiple investors, 
passive investors, and limited partners, the proposal could impose a filing requirement on 
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entities that have only a passive role and may not otherwise be engaged in the energy 
business. 
931.  Several commenters assert that, while they support the objective of 
simplifying tariff administration, the Commission has not considered the 
administrative and commercial ramifications of mandating one tariff per family.  For 
instance, Duke cites the possibility that any seller under the corporate tariff could be 
sued for an affiliate’s alleged breach, and the complications of Company A selling 
Subsidiary X to Company B and the status of X’s sales under Company A’s tariff.  
Mirant questions how the sale of a subsidiary’s MBR tariff to a non-affiliate would be 
handled, given that the tariffs are assets that can be bought and sold.  In a related 
comment, Ameren asks for which company or companies would the tariff be a 
jurisdictional facility for purposes of FPA § 203.  EPSA and Sempra request 
clarification regarding how an enforcement action would be affected by the presence 
of other members of a corporate family on the same tariff, and Ameren seeks 
clarification on the effect of a revocation of market-based rate authority of only some 
companies in a corporate family.  MidAmerican suggests that, since different 
affiliates within a corporate family may have authority to offer different services, a 
service schedule to the tariff should specify the products that each affiliate is 
authorized to offer and any restrictions or limitations on a seller’s market-based rate 
authorization.  Morgan Stanley notes that, in many cases, the “parent” is not a 
jurisdictional entity or is a holding company, and recommends requiring each 
corporate family to designate a lead company that will submit its filing and those of Docket No. RM04-7-000   529 
 
its affiliates, rather than specifically appointing the “parent corporation” as the filing 
entity.  Duke urges the Commission to consider what legal means would be required 
to ensure that the tariff is legally a separate and severable tariff for each member of a 
family.   
932.  Further, commenters state that there are transitional issues that the 
Commission should consider, such as whether existing tariffs will be superseded or 
cancelled and all existing service agreements migrated to the joint tariff; which 
corporate entity would be required to file and maintain the MBR tariff; and the extent 
to which affiliates may have to file separate quarterly reports due to the fact that the 
responsible employees are not shared (e.g., regulated versus unregulated merchant 
employees).   
933.  In reply comments, EPSA reiterates its opposition to a mandatory single 
corporate tariff, urging the Commission to abandon the proposal because it “poses 
major practical obstacles for corporate parents that own vastly differing 
affiliates.”
1054  EPSA contends that the Commission’s premise for adopting the 
proposal, i.e., entities within a corporate family can have conflicting tariff provisions, 
is mooted by the adoption of a standardized tariff.  In addition, EPSA echoes 
implementation concerns raised by other parties, in particular:  (1) the situation where 
a seller is a member of two corporate families; and (2) increased regulatory burden 
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from frequent tariff amendments each time ownership changes and corporate 
affiliations are terminated or created. 
934.  Indianapolis P&L argues that affiliates should be permitted to maintain 
separate market-based rate tariffs for many of the reasons already cited.  In addition, 
it contends that consolidation will increase the burden on many entities by requiring 
increased regulatory and legal coordination between affiliates.  Whereas many 
utilities presently separate their utility and non-utility operations in part to comply 
with Commission regulations, Indianapolis P&L asserts that mandating a single tariff 
per corporate family would necessarily require utility and non-utility affiliates to 
operate in closer coordination.  FirstEnergy agrees, stating that “[t]he Commission 
should not expect franchised public utilities with captive customers to market power 
totally independently of their affiliates where they are all required to sell power to 
wholesale purchasers under the same tariff.”
1055 
935.  Finally, some commenters state that the Commission’s concerns can be 
satisfied through means other than a single tariff per corporate family.  Duke 
recommends allowing affiliated utilities to operate with separate but uniform tariffs 
while posting on their corporate websites a centralized list of each of the affiliates’ 
market-based rate tariffs.  Similarly, Progress Energy suggests requiring sellers to use 
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the standardized tariff but having them include a section identifying all affiliates with 
market-based rate authority and any restrictions on that authority. 
Commission Determination 
936.  We will modify the NOPR proposal and allow sellers to elect whether to 
transact under a single market-based rate tariff for an entire corporate family or under 
separate tariffs.  The benefits that the Commission hoped to realize by requiring all 
corporate families to consolidate their operations under one tariff will be achievable 
by other means, namely, by having each individual seller revise its existing market-
based rate tariff to include the standard tariff provisions we require in this Final Rule 
and by maintaining up-to-date information on sellers’ affiliates through the 
submission of asset appendices.
1056   
937.  For the benefit of those sellers that choose a single corporate tariff, we clarify 
that each seller should continue to report its own transactions using the docket 
number under which it initially received market-based rate authority. 
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G.  Legal Authority 
1.  Whether Market-Based Rates Can Satisfy the Just and Reasonable 
Standard Under the FPA 
Comments 
938.  A number of commenters challenge the Commission’s authority to adopt a 
market-based rate regime.
1057  State AGs and Advocates contend that the courts have 
never actually reviewed the Commission’s market-based rate program and found that 
it satisfies the FPA.  They contend that the Commission in the NOPR cited dictum in 
Louisiana Energy and Power Authority v. FERC,
1058 noting that the petitioner in that 
case did not challenge the Commission’s general policy of permitting market-based 
rates in the absence of market power.  They further argue that the D.C. Circuit in  
Elizabethtown Gas Company v. FERC,
1059 relied on dictum in a prior gas case to the 
effect that, where markets are competitive, it is “rational” to assume that a seller will 
make “only a normal return on its investment.”  State AGs and Advocates then 
criticize the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, arguing that “this sort of judicial economic 
theorizing does not constitute either the substantial evidence required to support 
orders of this Commission under the [FPA], or the ‘empirical proof’ required by the 
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courts when an agency attempts to substitute competition for statutorily required 
regulation.”
1060 
939.  NASUCA similarly questions the Commission’s reliance on Elizabethtown 
Gas as the legal foundation for its market-based rate regime.  NASUCA suggests that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in MCI v. AT&T,
1061 casts considerable doubt on the 
vitality of Elizabethtown Gas and cases that follow its apparent endorsement of 
market-based rates that did not consider the statutory filing issues found crucial in 
MCI.  NASUCA also notes that, in another case the Commission relied on, Mobil Oil 
Exploration v. United Distribution Co.
1062, the Supreme Court cited to FPC v. 
Texaco, where it held that just and reasonable rates cannot be determined solely by 
reference to market prices.
1063 
940.  Some commenters argue that a finding that competitive markets exist is a 
prerequisite to relying upon market-based rate authority to satisfy the mandates of the 
FPA.
1064  Industrial Customers contend that the Commission may rely on market-
based rate authority to produce just and reasonable rates if it finds that a competitive 
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market exists and the seller lacks or has adequately mitigated market power.  They 
submit that the duty to determine that a competitive market exists is separate and 
independent of the determination that a seller lacks, or has adequately mitigated, 
market power.   
State AGs and Advocates contend that the market-based rate program offers no way to 
monitor whether existing competition results in just and reasonable rates, nor a way to 
check rates if it does not.
1065   
941.  In reply, PNM/Tucson argues that the Commission need not entertain attacks 
on the existence of competitive power markets and the legality of market-based rates 
under the FPA, as they constitute collateral attacks on recent Commission decisions 
and the Lockyer opinion, and because a theoretical debate on the subject is beyond 
the scope of this rulemaking proceeding.  PNM/Tucson asserts that those cases found 
that market-based rates are permissible by law and urges the Commission to reject 
any attacks on market-based rates generally.
1066   
942.  Financial Companies respond to State AGs and Advocates’ assertion that the 
Commission should suspend or revoke all market-based rates and return to cost-of-
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(finding reliance on existing competition, with no monitoring or mitigation, 
unacceptable). 
1066 PNM/Tucson reply comments at 3-4 (citing Lockyer and the underlying 
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Exchange Corp., 99 FERC ¶ 61,247, order on reh’g, 100 FERC ¶ 61,295 (2002)). Docket No. RM04-7-000   535 
 
service ratemaking by commenting that the complaining parties mischaracterize the 
state of the wholesale market.  Financial Companies enumerate the “myriad of 
approval, reporting and other obligations”
1067 that constitute the Commission’s 
oversight and point out that ISOs and RTOs provide another layer of market 
monitoring and mitigation.  They state that it is preferable to shape market power 
remedies addressing specific circumstances than to revoke market-based rate tariffs 
for all sellers.  
Commission Determination 
943.  The Commission rejects arguments that it has no authority to adopt market-
based rates or that the market-based rate program it is adopting in this rule does not 
comply with the FPA.  The Supreme Court has held that “[f]ar from binding the 
Commission, the FPA’s just and reasonable requirement accords it broad ratemaking 
authority. . . .  The Court has repeatedly held that the just and reasonable standard 
does not compel the Commission to use any single pricing formula in general. . . 
.”
1068  It is settled law that market-based rates can satisfy the just and reasonable 
standard of the FPA, as most recently reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Lockyer and 
                                              
1067 Financial Companies reply comments at 10. 
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(1991) (Mobil Oil Exploration), citing FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 
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Snohomish,
1069 and the court in Lockyer expressly denied a “facial challenge to the 
market-based [rate] tariffs,” as discussed below.  
944.  In the Lockyer court’s analysis of the Commission’s market-based rate 
authority, the Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s determination in Mobil Oil 
Exploration.  It also noted that the use of market-based rate tariffs was first approved 
(by the courts) as to sellers of natural gas in Elizabethtown Gas, then as to wholesale 
sellers of electricity in LEPA.   
945.  Commenters have also argued that the proposed rule impermissibly relies 
solely on the market to determine just and reasonable rates, as was the case in 
Texaco.  We reject these arguments as well.   
946.  In Texaco, the Supreme Court found that the Natural Gas Act (NGA) permits 
the indirect regulation of small-producer rates.
1070  The Supreme Court explained that 
"[t]he Act directs that all producer rates be just and reasonable but it does not specify 
the means by which that regulatory prescription is to be attained.  That every rate of 
every natural gas company must be just and reasonable does not require that the cost 
of each company be ascertained and its rates fixed with respect to its own costs."
1071  
                                              
1069 Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington v. FERC, 471 
F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2006) (Snohomish). 
1070 Cases under the NGA and the FPA are typically read in pari materia.  See, e.g., 
FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Company, 350 U.S. 348, 353 (1956); Arkansas-Louisiana 
Gas Company v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 578 n.7 (1981). 
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The Supreme Court noted that it had sustained rate regulation based on setting area 
rates that were based on composite cost considerations, citing its decision in FPC v. 
Hope Natural Gas Co.
1072  The Supreme Court further explained, with respect to the 
prior area rate cases, "we recognized that encouraging the exploration for and 
development of new sources of natural gas was one of the aims of the Act and one of 
the functions of the Commission.  The performance of this role obviously involved 
the rate structure and implied a broad discretion for the Commission."
1073  Quoting 
Permian Basin, the Supreme Court added that "[i]t follows that ratemaking agencies 
are not bound to the service of any single regulatory formula; they are permitted, 
unless their statutory authority otherwise plainly indicates, 'to make the pragmatic 
adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances.’" 
1074   
947.  The Texaco Court further stated that "the prevailing price in the marketplace 
cannot be the final measure of 'just and reasonable' rates mandated by the Act."
1075  
But, "[t]his does not mean that the market price of gas would never, in an individual 
                                              
1072 320 U.S. at 602 ("Under the statutory standard of 'just and reasonable' it is the 
result reached not the method employed which is controlling."). 
1073 Id. at 388. 
1074 Id. at 389, citing Permian, 390 U.S. at 776-777.  
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case, coincide with just and reasonable rates or not be a relevant consideration in the 
setting of area rates."
1076 
948.  In Elizabethtown Gas, a decision relying on Texaco, the D.C. Circuit 
addressed a Commission order approving a restructuring settlement under which 
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation (Transco) would no longer sell gas 
bundled with transportation, but would sell gas at the wellhead or pipeline receipt 
point, to be transported as the buyer sees fit.  The sales would be market-based 
(negotiated) and the rates for transportation on Transco's system would be cost-of-
service based.  In approving the settlement, the Commission had “determined that 
Transco's markets are sufficiently competitive to preclude the pipeline from 
exercising significant market power in its merchant function and to assure that gas 
prices are 'just and reasonable' within the meaning of the NGA section 4."
1077  The 
Commission also "authorized Transco in advance 'to establish and to change' 
individually negotiated rates free of customer challenge under section 4 of the NGA; 
the 'only further regulatory action' possible under the settlement is the Commission's 
review of Transco's prices under section 5 of the Act, upon the Commission's own 
motion or upon the complaint of a customer that is not a party to the settlement." 
1078 
                                              
1076 Id. at 399. 
1077 10 F.3d at 869. 
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949.  In Elizabethtown Gas, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's approval of 
market-based pricing, holding that “nothing in FPC v. Texaco precludes the FERC 
from relying upon market-based pricing.”
1079  The D.C. Circuit explained that in 
Texaco, the Commission had failed to even mention the "just and reasonable" 
standard and appeared to apply only the "standard of the marketplace" in reviewing 
the reasonableness of the rate (which the Supreme Court had found to be 
unacceptable).  Thus, the D.C. Circuit explained with approval, "the FERC has made 
it clear that it will exercise its section 5 authority (upon its own motion or upon that 
of a complainant) to assure that a market (i.e., negotiated) rate is just and 
reasonable."
1080 
950.  The D.C. Circuit noted that the Commission had specifically found that 
Transco's markets are sufficiently competitive to preclude it from exercising 
significant market power.  It further noted that the Commission had explained that 
Transco would be providing comparable transportation for all gas supplies and that 
"adequate divertible gas supplies exist" to assure that Transco would have to sell at 
competitive prices.  Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Transco would not be able 
to raise its price above the competitive level without losing substantial business.  
"Such market discipline provides strong reason to believe that Transco will be able to 
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charge only a price that is ‘just and reasonable' within the meaning of section 4 of the 
NGA."
1081 
951.  Likewise in LEPA, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Commission's approval of an 
application by Central Louisiana Electric Company (CLECO) to sell electric energy 
at market-based rates.  The D.C. Circuit found reasonable the Commission's 
conclusion that there are no market power considerations that should bar CLECO's 
application to sell at market-based rates.  It also found reasonable the Commission's 
conclusion that even if CLECO had participated in oligopolistic behavior in the past, 
the Commission's new open access transmission rules had transformed the 
competitive environment.  The D.C. Circuit noted that "competitors outside the 
current, alleged oligopoly will now be able to transmit power into CLECO's territory 
on nondiscriminatory terms." 
1082  Thus, according to the D.C. Circuit, the 
Commission reasonably predicted that it was "unlikely that 'energy suppliers will 
decline to participate in the emerging competitive markets."' 
1083  Finally, the D.C. 
Circuit viewed favorably the Commission's provision of a safeguard in the event that 
its predictions are wrong: 
FERC notes that should the Commission's sanguine  
predictions about market conduct turn out to be incorrect,  
                                              
1081 Id. at 871. 
1082 141 F.3d at 370. 
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LEPA can file a new complaint for any abuses of market  
power that do occur. While this escape hatch might be  
insufficient if LEPA had shown a substantial likelihood that  
FERC's predictions would prove incorrect, it provides an  
appropriate safeguard against the uncertainties of FERC's  
prognostications where there has been no such showing.[
1084] 
 
952.  In the market-based rate program adopted in this rule and through other 
Commission actions, unlike the situation in Texaco, the Commission is not relying 
solely on the market, without adequate regulatory oversight, to set rates.  Rather, it 
has adopted filing requirements (EQRs and change in status filings for all market-
based rate sellers, regularly scheduled updated market power analyses for all 
Category 2 market-based rate sellers,
 1085), new market manipulation rules, and a 
significantly enhanced market oversight and enforcement division to help oversee 
potential market manipulation.  In addition, for sellers in RTO/ISO organized 
                                              
1084 Id. at 370-71 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
1085 In this Final Rule, the Commission creates two categories of sellers.  Category 
1 sellers (wholesale power marketers and wholesale power producers that own or control 
500 MW or less of generation in aggregate per region; that do not own, operate or control 
transmission facilities other than limited equipment necessary to connect individual 
generation facilities to the transmission grid (or have been granted waiver of the 
requirements of Order No. 888); that are not affiliated with anyone that owns, operates or 
controls transmission facilities in the same region as the seller’s generation assets; that 
are not affiliated with a franchised public utility in the same region as the seller’s 
generation assets; and that do not raise other vertical market power issues) would not be 
required to file a regularly scheduled updated market power analysis, but would be 
subject to the change in status requirement.  Category 2 sellers consist of all sellers that 
do not qualify as Category 1 sellers. Docket No. RM04-7-000   542 
 
markets, Commission-approved tariffs contain specific market rules designed to 
prevent or mitigate exercises of market power. 
953.  In Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit cited with approval the Commission’s dual 
requirement of an ex ante finding of the absence of market power and sufficient post-
approval reporting requirements and found that the Commission did not rely on 
market forces alone in approving market-based rate tariffs.  The Ninth Circuit held 
that this dual requirement was “the crucial difference” between the Commission’s 
regulatory scheme and the FCC’s regulatory scheme, remanded in MCI, which had 
relied on market forces alone in approving market-based rate tariffs.
1086  The Ninth 
Circuit thus held that “California’s facial challenge to market-based tariffs fails” and 
“agree[d] with FERC that both the Congressionally enacted statutory scheme, and the 
pertinent case law, indicate that market-based tariffs do not per se violate the 
FPA.”
1087  The Ninth Circuit determined that initial grant of market-based rate 
authority, together with ongoing oversight and timely reconsideration of market-
based rate authorization under section 206 of the FPA, enables the Commission to 
meet its statutory duty to ensure that all rates are just and reasonable.
1088  While the 
                                              
1086 Id. at 1013. 
1087 Id. at 1013 & n.5; id. at 1014 (“The structure of the tariff complied with the 
FPA, so long as it was coupled with enforceable post-approval reporting that would 
enable FERC to determine whether the rates were ‘just and reasonable’ and whether 
market forces were truly determining the price.”).  
1088 See Snohomish, 471 F.3d at 1080 (in which the Ninth Circuit discusses its 
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court in Lockyer found that the Commission’s market-based rate reporting 
requirements were not followed in that particular case, it did not find those reporting 
requirements invalid and, in fact, upheld the Commission’s market program as 
complying with the FPA.  The market-based rate requirements and oversight adopted 
in this rule are more rigorous than those reviewed by the Lockyer court.  
954.  Accordingly, the Commission rejects the position of commenters arguing that 
the Commission lacks authority to continue to permit market-based rates for 
wholesale sales of electricity.  The courts have sustained the Commission’s finding 
that market-based rates are one method of setting just and reasonable rates under the 
FPA.  As supplemented by this Final Rule, the Commission finds that the market-
based rate program complies with the statutory and judicial standards for acceptable 
market-based rates.  We will retain our policy of granting market-based rate authority 
to sellers without market power under the terms and conditions set forth in this Final 
Rule and the Commission’s regulations.   
955.  Further, we will retain our approach to determining whether a seller should 
receive authorization to charge market-based rates, as modified by the Final Rule, by 
analyzing seller-specific market power.  The Commission has a long-established 
                                                                                                                                                  
decision in Lockyer).  In Snohomish, the Ninth Circuit explained, “As in Lockyer, we do 
not dispute that FERC may adopt a regulatory regime that differs from the historical cost-
based regime of the energy market, or that market-based rate authorization may be a 
tenable choice if sufficient safeguards are taken to provide for sufficient oversight.”  Id. 
at 1086. Docket No. RM04-7-000   544 
 
approach when a seller applies for market-based rate authority of focusing on whether 
the seller lacks market power.
1089  This approach, combined with our filing 
requirements (EQRs, change of status filings, and regularly scheduled updated market 
power analyses for Category 2 sellers) and ongoing monitoring through our 
enforcement office and complaints filed pursuant to FPA section 206, allows us to 
ensure that market-based rates remain just and reasonable.  Moreover, for sellers in 
RTO/ISO organized markets, the Commission has in place market rules to help 
mitigate the exercise of market power, price caps where appropriate, and RTO/ISO 
market monitors to help oversee market behavior and conditions.  As explained in our 
earlier discussion, we believe that the market-based rate program fully complies with 
judicial precedent. 
Consistency of Market-based Rate Program with FPA Filing Requirements  
Comments 
956.  State AGs and Advocates contend that the Commission’s market-based rate 
program fails to comply with the FPA in several ways:  (1) it ignores the FPA 
                                              
1089 See, e.g., Heartland Energy Services, Inc., 68 FERC ¶ 61,223, at 62,060-61 
(1994); Louisville Gas and Electric Co., 62 FERC ¶ 61,016, at 61,143 n.16 (1993) (and 
the cases cited therein); Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 FERC ¶ 61,210, at 61,776 & 
n.11 (1989); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Turlock), 42 FERC ¶ 61,406, at 62,194-98, 
order on reh’g, 43 FERC ¶ 61,403 (1988); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Modesto), 44 
FERC ¶ 61,010, at 61,048-49, order on reh’g, 45 FERC ¶ 61,061 (1988).  See also, e.g., 
LEPA, 141 F.3d at 365; Consumers Energy Co., 367 F.3d 915 at 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(upholding Commission orders granting market-based rate authority, noting that the 
Commission’s longstanding approach is to assess whether applicants for market-based 
rate authority do not have, or have adequately mitigated, market power). Docket No. RM04-7-000   545 
 
mandate that all rates and contracts, as well as all changes in rates and contracts, must 
be filed in advance and made open to the public for prior review, and instead allows a 
seller to simply report rates after-the-fact or, in some cases, not at all; (2) it eliminates 
the statutory mandate that all rate increases must be noticed by filing 60 days in 
advance so that they can be reviewed and, if warranted, suspended for up to five 
months, set for hearing with the burden of proof on the seller, and made subject to 
refund pending the outcome of the hearing; (3) it provides no objective or 
independent standard for determining whether “competitive” market-based rates are 
in fact “just and reasonable;”
1090 (4) it provides no standard for determining whether 
market rates are unduly preferential or discriminatory; and (5) it provides no way for 
consumers in most cases to know what the “just and reasonable” rate will be in 
advance.
 1091 They also contend that the legal presumptions that follow from the 
Commission’s market power screens would unduly shift the burden of demonstrating 
the existence of market power to intervenors and away from the Commission.  They 
argue that, until an appropriate methodology for predicting and checking market 
power is in place, the Commission must suspend its market-based rate regime and 
return to cost-of-service rates for all wholesale sales of electric power. 
                                              
1090 State AGs and Advocates express doubt that the rate of return for power sold 
from a highly depreciated coal plant in an auction process at a market price equal to the 
marginal cost of a new, gas-fired plant could be within a zone of reasonableness.  State 
AGs and Advocates at 25-26. 
1091 Id. at 19-20. Docket No. RM04-7-000   546 
 
957.  NASUCA objects that the proposed rules would prohibit utilities from filing 
new wholesale energy contracts,
1092 an apparent reference to the Commission’s 
policy, since the issuance of Order No. 2001,
1093 that long-term affiliate sales 
contracts under a seller’s market-based rate tariff are not to be filed.
1094  According to 
NASUCA, by not requiring sellers to file long-term market-based rate sales contracts, 
the Commission effectively precludes the public and others from objecting before the 
rates take effect.  Additionally, NASUCA states that there is no statutory basis for a 
Commission rule directing sellers not to file their rates when the statute says exactly 
the opposite.
1095  AARP similarly comments that the Commission’s policy of 
monitoring long-term market-based sales through quarterly reports is too little 
oversight too late to ensure that such rates are just and reasonable.  AARP argues that 
the Commission should reconsider its policy on affiliate transactions and asserts that 
all affiliate contracts should be filed and reviewed under section 205 to comply with 
the express requirements under the FPA.
1096 
                                              
1092 NASUCA at 32-33. 
1093 Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, Order No. 2001, 67 FR 31043 
(May 8, 2002), FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles 2001-2005  ¶ 31,127 (2002).  See 
18 CFR 35.10b. 
1094 NASUCA at 27-29. 
1095 Id. at 28. 
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958.    NASUCA also argues that the proposed rule allows sellers with cost-based 
rates to declare their own rates without filing them, subject to Commission review 
when the sales are for less than one year.  It contends that the burden of proof, under 
Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. v. FERC
1097 and Texaco,
1098 is on the 
Commission to demonstrate empirical proof that consumers are provided the 
“complete, effective and permanent bond of protection from excessive rates” that the 
statute anticipates.
1099 
Commission Determination 
959.  We reject State AGs and Advocates’ arguments that the Commission’s 
market-based rate program fails to comply with the FPA.   Contrary to State AGs and 
Advocates’ contention that the Commission’s market-based rate program “ignores the 
FPA mandate that all rates and contracts, as well as all changes in rates and contracts, 
must be filed in advance and made open to the public for prior review” and instead 
“allows sellers to simply ‘report’ rates after-the-fact, or in some cases, not at all,”
1100 
as the courts have found, the Commission’s market-based rate program does not 
                                              
1097 734 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Williams Pipe Line 
Company v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc., 469 U.S. 1034 (1984) (Farmers 
Union). 
1098 417 U.S. 380 (1974). 
1099 NASUCA cites Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of State of N.Y., 360 
U.S. 378, 388 (1959). 
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violate the FPA’s filing requirements.  The FPA requires that every public utility file 
with the Commission “schedules showing all rates and charges for any transmission 
or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,”
1101 but it explicitly leaves the 
timing and form of those filings to the Commission’s discretion.  Public utilities must 
file “schedules showing all rates and charges” under “such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe,” and “within such time and in such form as the 
Commission may designate.”
1102 
960.  We note that the courts have recognized the Commission’s discretion in 
establishing its procedures to carry out its statutory functions.  For example, the Ninth 
Circuit, in denying a California Commission request to order the Commission to 
adopt different market-based rate tariff reporting requirements, observed: 
Congress specified that filings be made “within such time and with such 
form” and under “such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe.”  16 U.S.C. § 824d(c).  Thus, so long as FERC has approved a 
tariff within the scope of its FPA authority, it has broad discretion to 
establish effective reporting requirements for administration of the 
tariff.[
1103] 
                                              
1101 16 U.S.C. 824d(c). 
1102 Id. 
1103 Lockyer, 383 F.3d at 1013.  See also Wabash Valley Power Association v. 
FERC, 268 F.3d 1105, 1115 (citing with approval the Commission’s authority to fix just 
and reasonable rates under section 206 as a condition of its market-based rate 
authorization); Environmental Action v. FERC, 996 F.2d 401, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(in which the D.C. Circuit recognized “the Commission’s determination to streamline its 
regulatory process to keep pace with advances in information technology.  Ratemaking is 
a time-consuming process.”).  Docket No. RM04-7-000   549 
 
961.  The market-based rate tariff, with its appurtenant conditions and requirement 
for filing transaction-specific data in EQRs, is the filed rate.  As the Commission has 
held, if every service agreement under a previously-granted market-based rate 
authorization had to be filed for prior approval, then the original market-based rate 
authorization would be a pointless exercise.
1104 
962.  We also disagree with State AGs and Advocates’ argument that the market-
based rate program eliminates the statutory mandate that all rate increases be noticed 
by filing 60 days in advance and, if warranted, suspended for up to five months, set 
for hearing with the burden of proof on the seller, and made subject to refund pending 
the outcome of the hearing.  The Commission has developed a thorough process to 
evaluate the sellers that it authorizes to enter into transactions at market-based rates.  
Under the market-based rate program, the rate change is initiated when a seller 
applies for authorization of market-based rate pricing.  All applications are publicly 
noticed, entitling parties to challenge a seller’s claims.  At that time, there is an 
opportunity for a hearing, with the burden of proof on the seller to show that it lacks, 
or has adequately mitigated, market power, and for the imposition of a refund 
obligation.  In addition, if a seller is granted market-based rate authority, it must 
comply with post-approval reporting requirements, including the quarterly filing of 
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transaction-specific data in EQRs,
1105 change of status filings for all sellers, and 
regularly-scheduled updated market power analyses for Category 2 sellers.     
963.  In addition, we disagree with State AGs and Advocates’ arguments that the 
Commission failed to show how competitive market-based rates are just and 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.   The standard for judging 
undue discrimination or preference remains what it has always been:  disparate rates 
or service for similarly situated customers.
1106  As the Commission has held in prior 
cases, and as the courts have upheld, rates that are established in a competitive market 
can be just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.
1107  Rates do not have to be set 
by reference to an accounting cost of service to be just, reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory.  When the Commission determines that a seller lacks market power, it 
is therefore making a determination that the resulting rates will be established through 
competition, not the exercise of market power.  Furthermore, the Commission’s 
market-based rate program includes many ongoing regulatory protections designed to 
                                              
1105 The Ninth Circuit found the pre-EQR quarterly reporting requirements to be 
“integral to the [market-based rate] tariff” and that they, together with the Commission’s 
initial approval of market-based rate authority, comply with the FPA’s requirements.  
Lockyer, 383 F.3d at 1016.  As discussed elsewhere in this Final Rule, through the EQRs, 
the Commission has enhanced and updated the post-transaction quarterly reporting filing 
requirements that were in place during the period at issue in Lockyer. 
1106 See, e.g., Southwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC, 347 F.3d 975, 981 
(D.C. Cir. 2003). 
1107 See, e.g., Lockyer, 383 F.3d at 1012-13; Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 980 F.2d 
998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Docket No. RM04-7-000   551 
 
ensure that rates are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  
The filing and reporting requirements incorporated into the market-based rate 
program (EQRs, change in status filings, regularly-scheduled updated market power 
analyses) help the Commission to prevent, to discover and to remedy exercises of 
market power and unduly discriminatory rates.  In addition, the adoption of pro forma 
transmission tariff provisions that apply industry-wide ensures that potential 
customers are treated similarly in obtaining transmission access to energy providers.  
Moreover, Commission-approved RTOs and ISOs run real-time energy markets 
under Commission-approved tariffs.
1108  These single price auction markets set 
clearing prices on economic dispatch principles, to which various safeguards have 
been added to protect against anomalous bidding. 
964.  Thus, the Commission, through its ongoing oversight of market-based rate 
authorizations and market conditions, may take steps to address seller market power 
or modify rates should those steps be necessary.  For example, based on its review of 
updated market power updates, its review of EQR filings made by market-based rate 
sellers, and its review of required notices of change in status, the Commission may 
institute a section 206 proceeding to revoke a seller’s market-based rate authorization 
                                              
1108 In response to State AGs and Advocates’ argument about the rate of return for 
a seller receiving a market clearing price for power sold in an auction process, the issue 
does not concern whether a particular seller should have market-based rate authority, and 
it is more appropriately addressed in the context of an RTO/ISO proceeding rather than in 
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if it determines that the seller may have gained market power since its original 
market-based rate authorization.  The Commission may also, based on its review of 
EQR filings or daily market price information, investigate a specific utility or 
anomalous market circumstances to determine whether there has been any conduct in 
violation of RTO/ISO market rules or Commission orders or tariffs, or any prohibited 
market manipulation, and take steps to remedy any violations.  These steps could 
include, among other things, disgorgement of profits and refunds to customers if a 
seller is found to have violated Commission orders, tariffs or rules, or a civil penalty 
paid to the United States Treasury if a seller is found to have engaged in prohibited 
market manipulation or to have violated Commission orders, tariffs or rules. 
965.  In the NOPR that preceded Order No. 2001,
 the Commission noted that it 
needed to make changes to keep abreast of developments in the industry, e.g., it had 
approved umbrella tariffs for market-based rates by public utilities and there had been 
a significant increase in the number of section 205 filings after the Commission’s 
open access initiatives in Order Nos. 888 and 889.
1109  The Commission explained: 
  Under the Commission’s current filing requirements in 18 C.F.R. 
Part 35, individual service agreement filings associated with approved 
                                              
1109 Open Access Same-Time Information System and Standards of Conduct, 
Order No. 889, 61 FR 21737 (1996), FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles ¶ 31,037 
(1996), order on reh'g, Order No. 889-A, 62 FR 12484 (1997), FERC Stats. & Regs., 
Regs. Preambles ¶ 31,049 (1997), reh'g denied, Order No. 889-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,253 
(1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom  Transmission Access Policy Study Group 
v. FERC,  225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 
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tariffs require a significant amount of time, effort, and expense on the part 
of public utilities to prepare and serve on their customers and the 
Commission.  These individual filings also require a significant amount of 
staff time and effort associated with docketing, noticing, loading the 
information onto RIMS, and other processing tasks.  Further, the 
information contained in such filings that is most relevant to customers and 
the Commission could also be provided in an alternative, streamlined form, 
thus continuing to satisfy the requirements of FPA section 205(c), but in a 
more efficient manner.  Accordingly, we propose to replace the filing of 
individual service agreements and Quarterly Transaction Reports with the 
filing of an electronic Index of Customers.  This format will greatly 
increase the accessibility and usefulness of the relevant data, which will 
confer greater benefits to the public.[
1110] 
 
966.  The Commission implemented the revised filing requirements in Order No. 
2001.  In so doing, it further explained that: 
The revised filing public utility requirements adopted in this Final Rule 
create a level playing field vis-à-vis the filing requirements applicable to 
traditional utilities and power marketers.  While the data to be reported in 
the data sets reduces public utilities’ overall reporting burden as compared 
to existing requirements, it is hoped that the Electric Quarterly Reports’ 
more accessible format will make the information more useful to the public 
and the Commission will better fulfill the public utilities’ responsibility 
under FPA section 205(c) to have rates on file in a convenient form and 
place.  The data should provide greater price transparency, promote 
                                              
1110 Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
FERC Stats. & Regs., Proposed Regulations 1999-2003, ¶ 32,554 at 34,062 (2001). Docket No. RM04-7-000   554 
 
competition, enhance confidence in the fairness of markets, and provide a 
better means to detect and discourage discriminatory practices.[
1111] 
 
967.  Thus, we find that the multiple layers of filing and reporting requirements 
incorporated into the market-based rate program meet the filing requirements of the 
FPA and, in conjunction with our enhanced market oversight and enforcement 
functions within the Commission, as well as the ability of the public to file section 
206 complaints, provide adequate protection from excessive rates. Given our broad 
discretion to determine the procedures to carry out our statutory duties, our market-
based rate program fully complies with the requirements of the FPA.
1112   
968.  Although State AGs and Advocates also argue that the legal presumptions that 
follow from the Commission’s market power screens would unduly shift the burden 
of demonstrating the existence of market power to intervenors, the Commission 
previously addressed and rejected this argument.  On rehearing of the April 14 Order, 
the Commission explained that nothing in that order shifts the burden of proof that 
section 205 imposes on the filing utility.  Passing both screens or failing one merely 
                                              
1111 Order No. 2001, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles 2001-2005 ¶ 31,127 
at P 31. 
1112 Moreover, the decision to eliminate the filing of market-based rate contracts 
was made almost five years ago in a generic rulemaking proceeding that was open to 
participation by all interested parties.  Commenters’ failure to raise this concern in that 
proceeding precludes them from attacking the Commission’s well-settled practice here. Docket No. RM04-7-000   555 
 
establishes a rebuttable presumption.  To challenge a seller who passes both screens, 
the intervenor need not conclusively prove that the seller possesses market power.  
Rather, the intervenor need only meet a burden of going forward with evidence that 
rebuts the results of the screens.  At that point, the burden of going forward would 
revert back to the seller to prove that it lacks market power.
1113  Ultimately, the 
burden of proof under section 205 belongs to the seller. 
969.  With respect to NASUCA’s and AARP’s concern about long-term affiliate 
sales contracts not being filed, we note that since 2002, the Commission’s regulations 
have provided that long-term market-based rate power sales service agreements, with 
affiliates or otherwise, are not to be filed with the Commission.
1114  Although 
commenters acknowledge that the Commission first considers in a separate 
proceeding whether to authorize affiliate transactions, they believe that the 
Commission should nevertheless review the resulting rates in a proceeding under 
FPA section 205 before they go into effect.   
970.  NASUCA and AARP have not convinced us that this practice needs to be 
modified as a legal or policy matter.  Our market-based rate program incorporates 
numerous protections against excessive rates, regardless of the identities of the parties 
to a transaction, and commenters do not provide any compelling reason why affiliate 
                                              
1113 July 8 Order, 108 FERC  ¶ 61,026 at P 29. 
1114 See 18 CFR 35.1(g) (“[A]ny market-based rate agreement pursuant to a tariff 
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transactions should be treated any differently.  To the extent that a particular affiliate 
relationship presents issues of concern, they will be considered in the context of our 
determination whether to authorize any affiliate sales.  Accordingly, we will continue 
to direct sellers not to file long-term market-based rate sales contracts, unless 
otherwise permitted by Commission rule or order. 
971.  Regarding NASUCA’s assertion that our proposals would allow sellers with 
cost-based rates to declare their own rates without filing them, we emphasize that all 
mitigation proposals, whether based on the default cost-based rates or some other 
cost-based rates, must be filed with the Commission for review.  As we make clear 
above in the Mitigation section of this Final Rule, any such filings are noticed, and 
interested parties are given an opportunity to intervene, comment on, or protest the 
submittal.    
972.      
2.  Whether Existing Tariffs Must Be Found to Be Unjust and 
Unreasonable, and Whether the Commission Must Establish a Refund 
Effective Date 
Comments 
973.  NASUCA states that the Commission invokes sections 205 and 206 of the 
FPA as authority for the proposed action, including modifying all existing market-
based rate authorizations and tariffs so they will be expressly conditioned on or 
revised to reflect certain new requirements.  NASUCA submits that any action taken 
under section 206 must be prefaced by a Commission finding that existing rates are 
unjust and unreasonable and the fixing of a refund effective date.  It argues that the Docket No. RM04-7-000   557 
 
Commission has failed to make express findings necessary to support its proposal to 
modify all existing market-based rate tariffs under section 206 or to explain how it 
can modify the existing tariffs without finding that they are not just and reasonable 
and establishing a refund effective date.
1115 
Commission Determination 
974.  As discussed above in the MBR Tariff section, in requiring all sellers to revise 
their existing market-based rate tariffs to include certain standard provisions, the 
Final Rule finds that continuing to allow basic inconsistencies in the market-based 
rate tariffs on file with the Commission is unjust and unreasonable.  Thus, 
NASUCA’s concern in that regard is addressed.   
975.  We disagree with NASUCA that we must establish a refund effective date 
because we are establishing rules under section 206.  Even if section 206 were read to 
require the establishment of a refund effective date in rulemakings initiated under 
section 206, rather than only in case-specific section 206 investigations initiated by 
complaints or sua sponte by the Commission,
1116 we have broad discretion to adopt 
                                              
1115 NASUCA at 32. 
1116 The Congressional intent of the Regulatory Fairness Act of 1988 (RFA), 
which added the refund effective date provision to section 206, was to expedite the 
resolution of complaint proceedings.  Congress believed that, pre-RFA, public utilities 
had little incentive to settle meritorious section 206 complaints since any relief was 
prospective only, and the public utilities kept any revenues collected during the pendency 
of a section 206 proceeding.  The purpose of the legislation was to “correct this problem 
by giving FERC the authority to order refunds, subject to certain limitations.”  S.Rep. No. 
491, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2684, 2685.  In so 
                              ( c o n t i n u e d … )  
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generic policy or make generic findings through either a rulemaking or adjudication, 
and we have discretion whether to order refunds.
1117  This proceeding is not an 
adjudicatory investigation of public utilities’ existing market-based rate tariffs for 
which refunds will be required.  Rather, we are modifying existing market-based rate 
tariffs prospectively only through this rulemaking.
1118  Accordingly, the 
establishment of a refund effective date in this rulemaking would be meaningless. 
H.  Miscellaneous 
1.  Waivers 
Commission Proposal 
976.  The Commission has granted certain entities with market-based rate authority, 
such as power marketers and independent or affiliated power producers, waiver of the 
Commission’s Uniform System of Accounts (USofA) requirements, specifically 
waiver of Parts 41, 101, and 141 of the Commission’s regulations.
1119  The 
                                                                                                                                                  
doing, Congress left it to the Commission’s discretion to determine when the public 
interest would be served by requiring refunds under section 206, stating “Because the 
potential range of these situations cannot be fully anticipated, no attempt has been made 
to enumerate them here.”  S.Rep. No. 491, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2688.  Nowhere in the Senate Report does Congress mention setting refund 
effective dates in rulemakings.  
1117 See, e.g., Lockyer, 383 F.3d at 1016. 
1118 E.g., Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1985); SEC 
v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202-03, reh’g denied, 332 U.S. 747 (1947). 
1119 Part 41 pertains to adjustments of accounts and reports; Part 101 contains the 
Uniform System of Accounts for public utilities and licensees; Part 141 describes 
required forms and reports. Docket No. RM04-7-000   559 
 
Commission has also granted blanket approval under Part 34 of the Commission’s 
regulations for future issuances of securities and assumptions of liability where the 
entity seeking market-based rate authority, such as a power marketer or power 
producer, is not a franchised public utility.  
977.  In the NOPR, the Commission noted that, as the development of competitive 
wholesale power markets continues, independent and affiliated power marketers and 
power producers are playing more significant roles in the electric power industry.  In 
light of the evolving nature of the electric power industry, the Commission sought 
comment on the extent to which these entities with market-based rate authority 
should be required to follow the USofA; what financial information, if any, should be 
reported by these entities; how frequently it should be reported; and whether the Part 
34 blanket authorizations continue to be appropriate. 
978.  The Commission noted that some sellers have had their market-based rate 
authority revoked, or have elected to relinquish their market-based rate authority after 
a presumption of market power, and have begun or resumed selling power at cost-
based rates.  As discussed in the April 14 Order, any waivers previously granted in 
connection with those sellers’ market-based rate authority are no longer applicable.  
Thus, the Commission currently rescinds any accounting and reporting
1120 waivers 
for mitigated sellers in the mitigated control area.  Similarly, the Commission stated 
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in the April 14 Order that it would rescind any blanket authorizations under Part 34 
for the mitigated seller and its affiliates.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed 
that, in the case of any affiliates, this would entail rescission of blanket authorizations 
in all geographic areas, not just the mitigated control area.   
979.  The Commission proposed in the NOPR that any repeal of previously granted 
waivers become effective 60 days from the date of an order repealing such waivers in 
order to provide the affected utility with time to make the necessary filings with the 
Commission and to allow for an orderly transition from selling under market-based 
rates to cost-based rates.  The Commission sought comment on that proposal.  The 
Commission also sought input regarding any difficulties sellers may have when 
transitioning to cost-based rates and whether a prior waiver of the accounting 
regulations would leave them without adequate data to come into conformance with 
the accounting rules.     
a.  Accounting Waivers 
Comments 
980.  The majority of commenters who comment on this topic urge the Commission 
to retain existing waivers of the accounting regulations.
1121  They submit that the 
Commission’s accounting requirements are only relevant when the utility or marketer 
that is being regulated charges cost-based rates.  EPSA states that where a market-
                                              
1121 See, e.g., Ameren at 23-24; EPSA at 33-36; Constellation at 23-27; EEI at 49-
52; Morgan Stanley at 9-10; Ormet at 15-17; PPM at 6-7. Docket No. RM04-7-000   561 
 
based rate seller neither has cost-of-service rates nor captive customers from which to 
recover cost-of-service rates, requiring such entities to comply with the USofA would 
be burdensomely expensive and would serve no purpose.  The commenters explain 
that there has been no change in the industry that warrants a departure from the 
Commission’s precedent.  Commenters state that a change in policy would serve no 
public benefit, and the costs that such market-based rate sellers would have to incur 
in order to collect and report such data would substantially outweigh the benefit of 
collecting and reporting it.     
981.  Financial Companies state that there is no reason for the Commission to run 
the risk of discouraging participation in the energy markets and chilling investment 
by requiring power marketers and power producers who currently lack market power 
to comply with the USofA absent concrete evidence that the wholesale power 
markets are being harmed by the Commission’s current practice of granting waivers 
or blanket authority.
1122   
982.  Absent special circumstances, Sempra supports the current waivers and 
explains that the electric quarterly transaction reports submitted pursuant to Order 
No. 2001
1123 provide detailed information regarding transactions entered into by 
                                              
1122 Financial Companies at 18. 
1123 Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, Order No. 2001, 67 FR 31043 
(May 8, 2002), FERC Stats. & Regs.  ¶ 31,127 (2002); reh’g denied, Order 2001-A, 100 
FERC ¶ 61,074 (2002); reconsideration and clarification denied, Order No. 2001-B, 100 
FERC ¶ 61,342 (2002); further order, Order No. 2001-C, 101 FERC ¶ 61,314 (2002). Docket No. RM04-7-000   562 
 
entities authorized to make market-based rate sales.  Sempra also notes that the 
retention of these waivers for market-based rate entities is also consistent with the 
treatment of power marketers and exempt wholesale generators (EWGs) under the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005 and the Commission’s regulations 
promulgated thereunder.
1124  
983.  APPA/TAPS suggest that the Commission provide waivers to Category 1 
sellers, but not for Category 2 sellers.
1125  In response to the Commission’s question 
about the orderly transition from market-based to cost-based rates and the role that 
waivers may play in making that transition more difficult, APPA/TAPS suggest that 
Category 2 sellers are more likely than Category 1 sellers to lose market-based rate 
authority and find themselves subject to cost-based rates; accordingly, not providing 
the waivers for Category 2 sellers should address these transition concerns. 
Commission Determination 
984.  We will continue the Commission’s historical practice of granting waiver of 
Parts 41, 101, and 141 of the Commission’s regulations to certain entities with 
market-based rate authority.  We agree with EPSA that little purpose would be served 
to require compliance with accounting regulations for entities that do not sell at cost-
                                              
1124 Sempra at 8-9, citing Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-58 1261 et seq., 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (PUHCA 2005). 
1125 However, any such waivers should not exempt a holding company or service 
company from applicable reporting requirements under the Commission’s PUHCA 2005 
regulations.  APPA/TAPS at 29-30. Docket No. RM04-7-000   563 
 
based rates and do not have captive customers.  Such entities typically include power 
marketers and independent and affiliated power producers that are not franchised 
public utilities.
1126    
985.  We conclude that the costs of complying with the Commission’s USofA 
requirements and, specifically Parts 41, 101, and 141 of the Commission’s 
regulations, outweigh any incremental benefits of such compliance where the seller 
only transacts at market-based rates.
1127  Further, the risk of discouraging 
participation in the energy markets and the potential chilling effect on investment 
caused by requiring power marketers and power producers, who do not otherwise 
have a cost-based rate on file with the Commission, to comply with the USofA 
outweigh the added oversight the Commission might gain in this regard.  
986.  As we have done in the past, previously granted waivers of the accounting 
requirements will continue to be rescinded where a seller is found to have market 
power (or where the seller accepts a presumption of market power) and the seller 
                                              
1126 Likewise, we will continue to grant waiver of Subparts B and C of Part 35 of 
the Commission’s regulations requiring the filing of cost-of-service information, except 
for 18 CFR 35.12(a), 35.13(b), 35.15 and 35.16.  We note that this waiver would not be 
granted to an entity that makes sales at cost-based rates. 
1127  We have previously stated that Parts 41, 101 and 141 prescribe certain 
accounting and reporting requirements that focus on the assets that a utility owns, and 
waiver of these requirements is appropriate where the utility “will not own any such 
assets, its jurisdictional facilities will be only corporate and documentary, its costs will be 
determined by utilities that sell power to it, and its earnings will not be defined and 
regulated in terms of an authorized return on invested capital.” Citizens Power & Light 
Corp., 48 FERC ¶ 61,210 at 61,780 (1989). Docket No. RM04-7-000   564 
 
proposes cost-based rate mitigation or the Commission imposes cost-based rate 
mitigation.  Although the Commission stated in the NOPR that it would also revoke 
the accounting waivers for any of the mitigated seller’s affiliates with market-based 
rates in the mitigated balancing authority area, we clarify that we will not require 
revocation of the accounting and reporting waivers for a power marketer affiliated 
with a mitigated seller where such power marketer has no assets, no cost-based rate 
on file, and its applicable tariff prohibits sales in the mitigated balancing authority 
area.
1128   
987.  With regard to APPA/TAPS’s suggestion that the Commission provide 
waivers to sellers that qualify for Category 1 and not to sellers that qualify for 
Category 2, we decline to adopt such an approach.  While APPA/TAPS may be 
correct that Category 2 sellers are more likely than Category 1 sellers to possess 
market power, we do not grant such accounting waivers based on the size of the seller 
(which is, to a great extent, the critical factor in determining in which category the 
seller is placed).  Rather, as discussed above, the waivers are granted on the basis of 
whether the seller is a franchised public utility or otherwise is selling at cost-based 
rates. 
988.  Finally, we note that all sellers, irrespective of accounting or other waivers, 
must file EQRs regarding their transactions.  In addition, we agree with APPA/TAPS 
                                              
1128 See, e.g., APS Energy Services Company, Inc., 117 FERC ¶ 61,158 (2006).   Docket No. RM04-7-000   565 
 
that any waivers in this rule do not exempt a holding company or service company 
from applicable reporting requirements under the Commission’s PUHCA 2005 
regulations. 
b.  Timing 
Comments 
989.  Regarding the proposal that rescission of accounting and reporting waivers 
become effective 60 days from the date of an order rescinding such waivers, several 
commenters state that 60 days may not be enough time for sellers who have their 
market-based rate authority revoked, or have elected to relinquish their market-based 
rate authority after a presumption of market power and have begun or resumed selling 
power at cost-based rates, to conform to the Commission’s accounting 
requirements.
1129   
990.  EEI supports providing such companies at least six months post revocation to 
comply with USofA recordkeeping requirements.
1130  EEI states that the Commission 
should allow the companies to begin keeping records under the USofA starting at the 
beginning of the next calendar year, or the companies’ fiscal year, if different, and to 
                                              
1129 See Ameren at 24; EEI at 48-49; Mirant at 15-16. 
1130 Mirant also supports providing six months to comply with the reporting 
requirements and states that, in addition, the Commission should grant extensions to that 
deadline based upon a demonstration that the entity is working in good faith to comply 
with the deadline but, due to factors beyond the entity’s control, the deadline needs to be 
extended.  Mirant at16. Docket No. RM04-7-000   566 
 
report the information the following year.
1131  EEI argues that to put USofA in place 
and begin complying with the Commission’s reporting requirements such as the 
annual FERC Form 1 and quarterly FERC Form No. 3-Q takes substantial company 
time and resources.  EEI explains that companies must put the necessary accounts and 
reporting formats in place within their accounting systems.  This involves substantial 
training of staff, modification of accounting software, testing to ensure proper 
internal controls under the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002,
1132 and review by company 
management and internal and external auditors to ensure accuracy under the 
securities laws and the Sarbanes Oxley Act.  EEI submits that these measures can be 
quite costly – in the millions of dollars for larger companies – and they take time to 
implement. 
991.  Constellation supports the 60-day transition period as reasonable but seeks 
clarification that under this approach the entity would be required to (1) maintain its 
accounts in accordance with the Commission’s USofA only for periods beginning at 
the end of such transition period, and (2) obtain specific authorization for securities to 
be issued, or liabilities to be assumed, subsequent to the end of such transition 
period.
1133  
                                              
1131 EEI at 48-49. 
1132 Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
1133 Constellation at 33.  See also PPL at 26-27 (supports proposal to keep waivers 
effective for 60 days from date of order revoking market-based rate authority). Docket No. RM04-7-000   567 
 
Commission Determination 
992.  We adopt the NOPR proposal that rescission of waivers of Parts 41, 101 and 
141 of the Commission’s regulations granted in connection with a seller’s market-
based rate authority will become effective 60 days from the date of an order revoking 
such waivers.  We believe that this strikes a reasonable balance between the need to 
have adequate financial information on file with the Commission and the desire to 
provide sellers adequate time to comply. 
993.  In our consideration of the transition period for complying with the accounting 
and reporting requirements, the Commission finds that commenters have not 
sufficiently supported their request for a transition period of six months or more.  
EEI’s arguments with respect to the time and money required to train staff and 
modify and test accounting software do not outweigh the need for the Commission to 
obtain financial information with regard to mitigated sellers so that we can meet our 
obligation under the FPA to ensure that rates remain just and reasonable and not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential.  We note that our experience has shown that a 
60 day transition period is sufficient time for a mitigated seller to comply with the 
accounting requirements.
1134 
                                              
1134 See Entergy Services, Inc, 115 ¶ FERC 61,260 (2006) (revoking waivers and 
authorizations previously granted to certain Entergy Affiliates).  Accounting systems 
were in place within 60 days from the effective date of the order rescinding the waivers 
and the company was granted an additional 30 day extension to file the upcoming 
quarterly report.  See Entergy Services, Inc., Docket No. AC06-257-000 (Nov. 21, 2006) 
(unpublished letter order).    Docket No. RM04-7-000   568 
 
994.  In response to Constellation’s request for clarification, we clarify that a seller 
losing or relinquishing its market-based rate authority will be required to maintain its 
accounts in accordance with the Commission’s USofA
1135 and will be subject to 
quarterly and annual reporting requirements (FERC Form Nos. 3-Q, 1, or 1-F)
1136 as 
of the effective date of the rescission of such waivers, i.e., 60 days from the date of 
the order rescinding the waivers.  In this regard, such sellers will be required to 
comply with our accounting regulations (Part 101) beginning with the effective date 
of the rescission of such waiver.  For quarterly reporting in FERC Form No. 3-Q, the 
seller will be required to submit FERC Form No. 3-Q beginning with the quarter in 
which the rescission of the accounting and reporting waivers becomes effective.
1137  
The seller will also be required to submit a FERC Form No. 1 or 1-F, as applicable, 
beginning in the year in which the rescission of the accounting and reporting waivers 
becomes effective.
1138  For example, if the effective date of rescission occurs on May 
15, the seller must make the 3-Q filing for the second quarter (April-June) at its 
                                              
1135 18 CFR Part 101. 
1136 See 18 CFR 141.1, 141.2, 141.400. 
1137 The first quarterly filing made by the seller will include information from the 
effective date of the rescission through the end of the calendar quarter. 
1138 The first annual filing of FERC Form No. 1 or 1-F will include information 
beginning with the effective date of the rescission through the end of the calendar year.  
Additionally, there is a requirement that goes along with these forms that requires the 
submission of a CPA Certification Statement (18 CFR 41.10 – 41.12).  Docket No. RM04-7-000   569 
 
regularly scheduled time even though it has not previously filed a Form 1.
1139   If a 
particular seller is unable to meet the applicable filing dates, it may petition the 
Commission for an extension.  We will consider such requests on a case-by-case 
basis.   
c.  Part 34 Waivers Blanket Authorizations 
Comments 
995.  In response to the Commission’s inquiry regarding whether Part 34 blanket 
authorizations (pertaining to issuances of securities or assumptions of liabilities) 
continue to be appropriate, all commenters addressing the issue urge the Commission 
to retain its current policy.
1140  They submit that Commission oversight of securities 
issuances and assumptions of liabilities is only relevant for franchised public utilities 
and that prior authorization under section 204 is not necessary for market-based rate 
sellers that do not intend to “’become a public service franchised providing electricity 
to consumers dependent upon [their] services.’’
1141  Financial Companies state that 
there is no reason for the Commission to risk adversely affecting energy markets by 
                                              
1139 In this example, the seller’s 3-Q for the second quarter must reflect our 
accounting regulations as of May 15, the effective date of rescission of such waivers.  
1140 See, e.g., Cogentrix at 3-6; PPL at 25-27; TXU at 5-7; AWEA at 4-5; Duke 
supplemental comments at 1-8; Powerex at 26-28. 
1141 See Cogentrix at 5, citing Citizens Energy Corp., 35 FERC ¶ 61,336 at 61,455 
(1986).  Cogentrix notes that entities with such blanket authorizations do not provide the 
service that franchised utilities are obligated to offer to their captive customers and that 
FPA section 204 and 18 CFR Part 34 are intended to protect. Docket No. RM04-7-000   570 
 
requiring entities that currently lack market power to secure agency approval each 
time they want to issue securities or assume liabilities. 
996.  With regard to the statement in the NOPR that the Commission will rescind 
blanket authorizations for the mitigated seller and its affiliates in all geographic areas, 
not just the mitigated control area, Duke strongly opposes rescission of blanket 
section 204 authorizations for all affiliates of the mitigated seller in all markets.  
Duke urges the Commission to limit such rescission only to those market-based rate 
sellers making sales to captive customers in areas where there is a finding of market 
power.
1142  Duke states that the purpose of section 204 is to ensure the financial 
viability of franchised public utilities.  As a result, prior authorization is appropriate 
for independent and affiliated power marketers with market-based rate authority who 
do not intend to assume public service franchise obligations. 
997.  Duke argues that the Commission has not explained how issuance of a security 
or assumption of a liability by an affiliated marketer or merchant generator could be 
contrary to the public interest merely because an affiliate is deemed to have market 
power in power sales markets in a particular geographic area.  Duke asserts that there 
is no evidence presented in the NOPR that would support the presumed linkage 
between a determination of a seller’s market power in a particular geographic market 
                                              
1142 Duke supplemental comments at 1-8.  See also PPL at 26 (loss of any waiver 
should apply only to the seller or affiliates that make wholesale sales in the control area 
where market-based rate authority is lost, but not to affiliates that do not conduct business 
in that control area). Docket No. RM04-7-000   571 
 
and the ability of that seller’s affiliates to leverage such market power in other 
geographic markets through their issuances of securities or debt.  Duke says that this 
is especially true in the case of entities such as the Duke affiliates, which have 
amended their tariffs to preclude market-based rate sales in the Duke Power control 
area, the only geographic market where the company was determined to have market 
power.  Given that no market-based rate sales will be made by the affiliates in the 
only geographic area where there was even an issue of market power, Duke states 
that there is no possible nexus between securities issuances by these entities and 
protecting the franchised customers of Duke’s traditional utility affiliates.  
998.  Duke concludes that the Commission should determine that blanket 
authorizations under section 204 for market-based rate sellers should not be affected 
by a finding that a utility affiliate can exercise market power in its control area or 
other geographic markets.  In the alternative, Duke asks the Commission to determine 
that, in cases where sellers cannot sell power at market-based rates in the geographic 
market(s) where an affiliated traditional utility is found to have market power, there 
can be no anti-competitive effects or need to protect franchise customers, and thus 
affiliated sellers should be able to obtain (or retain) blanket section 204 
authorizations.  
Commission Determination 
999.  We will continue to grant blanket approval under Part 34 for future issuances 
of securities and assumptions of liability where the entity seeking market-based rate 
authority, such as a power marketer or power producer, is not a franchised public Docket No. RM04-7-000   572 
 
utility or does not otherwise provide requirements service at cost-based rates.
1143  The 
Commission traditionally has granted blanket authorization for the issuance of 
securities and assumptions of liability to power sellers not subject to cost-based rate 
regulation, i.e., power sellers that have market-based rate authority.
1144  As the 
Commission has explained in previous cases involving market-based rate authority in 
which the sellers sought blanket authorization of issuances of securities or 
assumptions of liability, the purpose of section 204 of the FPA, which Part 34 
implements, is to ensure the financial viability of public utilities obligated to serve 
consumers of electricity.
1145  Accordingly, where the seller is not a franchised public 
utility providing electric service to customers under cost-based regulation and has 
market-based rate authority, the Commission’s practice is to grant the blanket 
authorization, subject to consideration of objections by an interested party. 
1000.  We do not adopt the NOPR proposal concerning the rescission of blanket 
authorizations for affiliates of mitigated sellers.  After careful consideration of the 
comments received, we will limit such rescission to the mitigated seller and its 
                                              
1143 See, e.g., Golden Spread Electric Coop., Inc., 97 FERC ¶ 61,025 at 61,070 
(2001) (“While Golden Spread has been granted market-based rate authority, it also 
makes requirements sales under Commission-accepted, cost-based rates.  Since Golden 
Spread sells power at cost-based rates and not solely at market-based rates, it fails to 
qualify for blanket approval to issue securities.”). 
1144 Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 108 FERC ¶ 61,233 at P 16 (2004).  
1145 Id. (citing Citizens Energy Corp., 35 FERC ¶ 61,198 at p. 61,455 (1986); 
Howell Gas Management Co., 40 FERC ¶ 61,336 at p. 62,026 (1987). Docket No. RM04-7-000   573 
 
affiliates making sales within the mitigated balancing authority area.  Our decision 
here takes into account Duke’s and PPL’s arguments against rescission of blanket 
authorization for all affiliates in all markets.  We conclude that it is not necessary to 
rescind such blanket authorizations in the case of affiliates that make sales outside of 
the mitigated balancing authority area because the seller retains its market-based rate 
authority in unmitigated markets.   We clarify that the effective date for rescinding 
blanket authorization under Part 34 will be commensurate with the date on which a 
mitigated seller begins to sell power at cost-based rates.  Further, sellers losing their 
market-based rate authority must file with the Commission to obtain specific 
authorization for securities to be issued, or liabilities to be assumed, prior to the date 
the seller first sells at cost-based rates. 
2.  Sellers Affiliated with a Foreign Utility 
Commission Proposal 
1001.  Under existing policy, a seller affiliated with a foreign utility selling in the 
United States (and each of its affiliates) must not have, or must have mitigated, 
market power in generation and transmission and not control other barriers to entry.  
In addition, the Commission considers whether there is evidence of affiliate abuse or 
reciprocal dealing.  However, for sellers affiliated with a foreign utility, the 
Commission has allowed a modified approach to the current four prongs. 
1002.  With regard to generation market power, should any of the seller’s first-tier 
markets include a United States market, the seller performs the market power screens 
in that control area(s).  With regard to transmission market power, the Commission Docket No. RM04-7-000   574 
 
requires the seller affiliated with a foreign utility seeking market-based rate authority 
to demonstrate that its transmission-owning affiliate offers non-discriminatory access 
to its transmission system that can be used by its competitors to reach United States 
markets.  The Commission does not consider transmission and generation facilities 
that are located exclusively outside of the United States and that are not directly 
interconnected to the United States.  However, the Commission would consider 
transmission facilities that are exclusively outside the United States but nevertheless 
interconnected to an affiliate’s transmission system that is directly interconnected to 
the United States.  A seller affiliated with a foreign utility must inform the 
Commission of any potential barriers to entry that can be exercised by either it or its 
affiliates in the same manner as a seller located within the United States.  Regarding 
affiliate abuse, the requirement that a power marketer with market-based rate 
authority file for approval under section 205 of the FPA before selling power to a 
utility affiliate does not apply to situations involving sales of power to a foreign 
utility outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction.   
1003.  The Commission proposed in the NOPR to retain its current policy when 
reviewing the application for market-based rate authorization by a seller affiliated 
with a foreign utility, and sought comment regarding whether the current policy is 
adequate to grant market-based rate authorization to such sellers.  No comments were 
submitted on the broad question of whether our current policy, in general, is Docket No. RM04-7-000   575 
 
adequate.  However, Powerex and NL Hydro
1146 raise specific issues that are 
addressed below.  As discussed below, we conclude that our current approach needs 
no modification.  Accordingly, we will adopt the NOPR proposal to retain our current 
policy when reviewing an application for market-based rate authority by a seller 
affiliated with a foreign utility.   
Comments 
1004.  Powerex notes that comparability for non-jurisdictional United States-based 
transmission providers ("unregulated transmitting utilities" under the FPA) is now 
defined by statute to mean service "at rates that are comparable to those that the 
unregulated transmitting utility charges itself" and "on terms and conditions that are 
comparable to those under which the unregulated transmitting utility provides 
transmission services to itself and that are not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential."
1147  Powerex notes that, in the OATT Reform NOPR, the Commission 
proposed to apply the comparability requirement of FPA section 211A on a case-by-
case basis, i.e., by complaint.
1148  Powerex states that, under principles of national 
treatment as set out in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
Commission should impose no more stringent a burden on similarly non-
                                              
1146 NL Hydro is a Crown Corporation owned by the Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 
1147 16 U.S.C. 824j-1(b).   
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jurisdictional Canadian and Mexican transmission-owning utilities.  For that reason, 
Powerex urges the Commission to clarify that it will presume that Canadian and 
Mexican transmitting utilities are providing comparable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential transmission service unless this presumption is 
otherwise rebutted by third party or Commission-instituted complaint.
1149  
1005.  NL Hydro urges the Commission to reject Powerex’s suggestion that the 
Commission no longer should require market-based rate sellers to affirmatively 
demonstrate that non-discriminatory access is offered on transmission facilities that 
they or their affiliates own, control, or operate outside of the United States.  NL 
Hydro argues that the comparability standard of FPA section 211A does not govern 
the Commission’s market-based rate analysis of transmission market power.
1150  It 
states that the Commission has not suggested, in either this proceeding or the OATT 
rulemaking, that the comparability standard in FPA section 211A should create a 
presumption that any market-based rate seller (domestic or affiliated with a foreign 
utility) should be presumed to have passed the transmission market power test.
1151 
1006.  NL Hydro supports the Commission’s proposal to retain its existing 
requirements with respect to the mitigation of transmission market power when 
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reviewing the market-based rate applications of sellers affiliated with a foreign utility.  
According to NL Hydro, these requirements establish a reasonable balance among 
important regulatory objectives by:  (1) requiring non-discriminatory access to 
foreign transmission facilities for access to United States markets as a condition of 
market-based rate authority; (2) complying with the national treatment requirements 
of NAFTA; and (3) applying principles of comity to the jurisdiction of foreign 
regulatory authorities with direct regulatory jurisdiction over foreign transmission 
entities.
1152  Accordingly, NL Hydro believes that the Commission should codify in 
its regulations the requirement that a market-based rate seller, or its affiliate, that 
owns, controls, or operates transmission facilities outside of the United States must 
demonstrate that non-discriminatory access is offered on those facilities so that 
competitors of the seller may reach United States markets. 
Commission Determination 
1007.  We will continue to require a seller seeking market-based rate authority that is 
a foreign utility or is affiliated with a foreign utility to affirmatively demonstrate that 
any owned or affiliated transmission is offered on a non-discriminatory basis that can 
be used by competitors of the seller or its affiliate to reach United States markets.  
Accordingly, we reject Powerex’s suggestion that the Commission should presume 
that foreign transmitting utilities are providing comparable and not unduly 
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discriminatory or preferential transmission service unless this presumption is 
rebutted.  The Commission did not propose to implement section 211A of the FPA in 
Order No. 890 and section 211A is not relevant to the Commission’s analysis for 
purposes of granting or denying market-based rate authority.
1153 
1008.  We will codify in § 35.37(d) of the Commission’s regulations the requirement 
that a market-based rate seller affiliated with a foreign utility, or its affiliate, that 
owns, controls, or operates transmission facilities outside of the United States and is 
interconnected with the United States must demonstrate that comparable, non-
discriminatory access is offered on those facilities so that competitors of the seller 
may reach United States markets. 
3.  Change in Status 
Commission Proposal 
1009.  In early 2005, the Commission clarified and standardized market-based rate 
sellers’ reporting requirements for any change in status that departed from the 
characteristics the Commission relied on in initially authorizing sales at market-based 
rates.  In Order No. 652,
1154 the Commission required, as a condition of obtaining and 
retaining market-base rate authority, that sellers file notices of such changes no later 
than 30 days after the change in status occurs.  In the NOPR, the Commission sought 
comment on a number of issues that the Commission identified in Order No. 652 as 
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issues that could be pursued in this proceeding.  The Commission solicited comment 
on whether ownership of any new inputs to electric power production, including fuel 
supplies, should be reportable.  To the extent that any such information is deemed 
reportable, the Commission proposed to align this reporting requirement to reflect the 
consideration of other barriers to entry as part of the vertical market power analysis.  
1010.  The Commission proposed, consistent with Order No. 652, not to require the 
reporting of transmission outages per se as a change in status.  However, to the extent 
a transmission outage affects on a long-term basis whether the seller satisfies the 
Commission’s concerns regarding horizontal or vertical market power, a change of 
status filing would be required.  The Commission sought comment on this proposal. 
The Commission declined in Order No. 652 to narrow or delineate the definition of 
control.  The Commission concluded that it is not possible to predict every contractual 
agreement that could result in a change of control of an asset; however, the Commission 
indicated that to the extent that parties wish to propose specific definitions or 
clarifications to the Commission’s historical definition of control, they may do so in the 
course of the instant rulemaking.
1155    
1011.  As proposed in the NOPR (§ 35.43 of the proposed regulations), events that 
constitute a change in status include the following:  first, ownership or control of 
generation capacity that results in net increases of 100 MW or more, or of 
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transmission facilities, or of inputs to electric power production other than fuel 
supplies; or, second, affiliation with any entity not disclosed in an application for 
market-based rate authority that owns, operates, or controls generation or 
transmission facilities or inputs to electric power production, or affiliation with any 
entity that has a franchised service area.
1156 
The Commission invited comment generally on whether the Commission should expand 
the triggering events for a change in status filing beyond what was adopted in Order No. 
652.  In Order No. 652, we concluded that the reporting obligation should extend only to 
changes in circumstances within the knowledge and control of the seller.   
a.  Fuel Supplies 
Comments  
1012.  Some commenters in general support the idea that ownership of fuel supplies 
should not be a factor in the vertical market power analysis and should not trigger a 
requirement to file a notice of change in status.
1157  APPA/TAPS support the 
reporting of the acquisition of the means of production or transportation of fuel but 
not the reporting of the acquisition of fuel itself.  APPA/TAPS explain that 
acquisition or control over companies that produce or deliver fuel and acquisitions of, 
or affiliations (including through joint ventures) with, production or transportation 
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resources (including LNG facilities) are inputs into electric power production that can 
raise significant competitive concerns.  APPA/TAPS submit that, unlike fuel, the 
means of production or transportation of fuel are not so readily obtainable from 
alternative sources.
1158  They argue that while entry from new storage or 
transportation facilities/transporters is possible, such entry involves sufficient siting 
difficulties and capital requirements that it cannot be assumed to be timely, likely or 
sufficient to remove competitive concerns. 
1013.  Constellation suggests that the Commission should clearly distinguish between 
fuel supplies (including the capacity to produce and process them) and physical 
facilities used to transport or distribute fuel supplies.  Constellation believes that 
ownership of fuel supply does not contribute to market power because of the 
availability of alternative suppliers.  Constellation states that, while ownership or 
control of physical facilities to transport or distribute fuel has the potential to 
contribute to market power in some cases, such potential generally is blunted by 
regulation or by the availability of substitutes.  Constellation asserts that ownership of 
facilities for the production or processing of coal or other fuels should not be 
reportable because alternative sources of supply can substitute for the coal or other 
fuels that can be produced or processed by such facilities.  Constellation states that in 
specific instances, if any intervenor believes that fuel supplies (or fuel production or 
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processing facilities) are not available from alternative suppliers for delivery in the 
relevant geographic region, the party could provide appropriate information in an 
attempt to rebut a market-based rate seller’s statement that it cannot erect barriers to 
entry in relevant markets.
1159 
1014.  Constellation believes that the purchase of natural gas transportation or storage 
on intrastate or interstate pipelines should not trigger any change in status reporting 
requirement.  It states that these transactions do not involve ownership or control of 
physical facilities for the transportation or storage of natural gas.  Moreover, because 
capacity is available from the natural gas transportation and storage providers 
themselves, and through capacity release programs from other customers of such 
providers, Constellation believes that the purchase of such capacity does not 
contribute to the seller’s vertical market power.
1160  
Commission Determination 
1015.  The Commission will not expand the change in status reporting requirement to 
include the reporting of a change in ownership or control of natural gas and oil 
supplies, or affiliation with an entity that owns or controls such fuel supplies.  
However,  we will require the reporting of a change in status with regard to the 
ownership or control of, or affiliation with, any entity not disclosed in the application 
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for market-based rate authority that owns, or controls “inputs to electric power 
production,” where that term is defined as “intrastate natural gas transportation, 
intrastate natural gas storage or distribution facilities; sites for new generation 
capacity development; sources of coal supplies and the transportation of coal supplies 
such as barges and railcars.”  The Commission adopts this approach to align the 
change in status reporting requirement to reflect the other barriers to entry part of the 
vertical market power analysis.   
1016.  We will adopt the current change in status requirement with the following 
modifications.
1161  We will delete the phrase “other than fuel supplies” from proposed 
§ 35.43(a)(1) (now § 35.42(a)(1)).  We originally proposed that events that constitute 
a change in status include “[o]wnership or control of generation capacity that results 
in net increases of 100 MW or more, or transmission facilities or inputs to electric 
power production other than fuel supplies.”  In light of the definition of “inputs to 
electric power production” that we adopt in this Final Rule, there is no longer a need 
in § 35.42(a)(1) for the phrase “other than fuel supplies.”  As noted above in the 
discussion on vertical market power, in this Final Rule we modify the definition of 
“inputs to electric power production” to mean “intrastate natural gas transportation, 
intrastate natural gas storage or distribution facilities; sites for new generation 
capacity development; sources of coal supplies and the transportation of coal supplies 
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such as barges and railcars.”  The definition of “inputs to electric power production” 
includes “sources of coal supplies,” and therefore, including the phrase “other than 
fuel supplies” would be inaccurate.  However, we note that the ownership or control 
of certain other fuel supplies (i.e., gas and oil supplies) will not require a notice of 
change in status. 
1017.  Next, we are modifying the change in status provisions to be consistent with 
the horizontal and vertical market power provisions which we are adopting.  Section 
35.42, as adopted herein, differs from the NOPR proposal in that we will require 
change in status notifications for changes in ownership or control of inputs to electric 
power production.  Additionally, change in status notifications will be required for 
changes in operation, in addition to ownership and control, of transmission facilities.  
Similarly, we will require a change in status notification for affiliation with any entity 
not disclosed in the application for market-based rate authority that owns or controls 
generation facilities or inputs to electric power production and any entity not 
disclosed in the application for market-based rate authority that owns, operates or 
controls transmission facilities.   
1018.  In response to APPA/TAPS, we clarify that the Commission’s change in status 
requirements are intended to track the requirements embedded in the horizontal and 
vertical analysis as well as the affiliate abuse representations.  As clarified in the 
other barriers to entry part of the vertical market power analysis described in this 
Final Rule, the Commission will not require an analysis or affirmative statement with 
regard to ownership or control of, or affiliation with, an entity that owns or controls Docket No. RM04-7-000   585 
 
natural gas and oil supplies, the interstate transportation of natural gas, or the 
transportation of oil.  In contrast, we will require a seller to provide a description of 
its ownership or control of, or affiliation with, an entity that owns or controls 
intrastate natural gas transportation; intrastate natural gas storage or distribution 
facilities; sites for generation capacity development; and sources of coal supplies and 
the transportation of coal supplies (defined as “inputs to electric power production” in 
the regulations); however, we adopt a rebuttable presumption that sellers cannot erect 
barriers to entry with regard to inputs to electric power production.  Thus, while a 
seller is required to describe in a change in status filing any ownership of, control of 
or affiliation with entities that own or control inputs to electric power production (just 
as it must do in an initial application for market-based rate authority and an updated 
market power analysis), we will rebuttably presume that such ownership, control or 
affiliation does not allow a seller to raise entry barriers.  We will, however, allow 
intervenors to demonstrate otherwise. 
1019.  Further, in response to Constellation, we note that we presently do not require 
the reporting of capacity contracted for, but for which control is not transferred, with 
regard to interstate or intrastate natural gas pipeline or storage capacity and we agree 
that there is no compelling reason to begin doing so.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   586 
 
b.  Transmission Outages 
Comments 
1020.  Numerous commenters support the Commission’s current policy and proposal 
not to require the reporting of transmission outages per se as a change in status.
1162   
1021.  Some commenters support the proposal not to require the reporting of all 
transmission outages per se because they believe that requiring sellers to report all 
transmission outages as changes in status would prove an overwhelming 
administrative burden with no market benefits.
1163  Indianapolis P&L states that this 
approach balances the need for the Commission to have updated information with the 
need for sellers to focus on their business, rather than administrative filings.
1164  EEI 
supports the current policy that only long-term transmission outages that could affect 
the Commission’s analysis of vertical and horizontal market power should be 
reportable.
1165 
1022.  APPA/TAPS state that at least some transmission outage information is (or 
should be) publicly available on OASIS sites, suggesting less of a need to impose a 
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separate reporting requirement for such outages.
1166  However, APPA/TAPS urge that 
certain outages be reported to the Commission’s Office of Enforcement on a non-
public basis and that the Commission reserve its authority to require change of status 
reports for other, significant outages.
1167  We note, however, that APPA/TAPS fail to 
provide examples of the types of outages that they believe should be reportable.   
1023.  APPA/TAPS also suggest that the Commission identify for specific market-
based rate sellers generation and transmission facilities that, if there is an extended or 
repeated outage, could produce significant transmission constraints or reductions in 
the amount of available generation in that seller’s market(s).  They suggest that the 
Commission, in conjunction with an RTO/ISO market monitor (where one exists), 
could identify and designate in that seller’s market-based rate authorization the key 
transmission facilities and/or generation units that are likely to increase competitive 
concerns if they go out of service.  Because of the increased potential for market 
power harm associated with the outage of these facilities, APPA/TAPS suggest that 
the Commission could require a market-based rate seller under the terms of its 
market-based rate authorization to report publicly as a change in status outages of 
these specified facilities.
1168 
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1024.  Powerex believes that additional clarification is necessary to determine what 
the Commission means by "long-term outages" that may affect a seller's market 
power analysis.  Powerex also requests that the Commission consider whether 
transmission outages on a non-jurisdictional or foreign affiliate's transmission system 
should be considered a change in status that is reportable under Order No. 652, given 
the limits of the Commission's jurisdictional interests. 
Commission Determination 
1025.  We adopt the NOPR proposal not to require the reporting of transmission 
outages per se as a change in status.  We agree that the reporting of all transmission 
outages, including the most routine, would be an excessive burden on sellers with no 
apparent countervailing benefit.  However, consistent with Order No. 652, we 
reiterate that to the extent a long-term transmission outage affects one or more of the 
factors of the Commission’s market-based rate analysis (e.g., if it reduces imports of 
capacity by competitors that, if reflected in the generation market power screens, 
would change the results of the screens from a “pass” to a “fail”), a change of status 
filing is required.
1169  
1026.  We reject APPA/TAPS’s suggestion that the Commission should require the 
automatic reporting of some transmission outages to the Office of Enforcement.  
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APPA/TAPS fails to adequately explain why we should assume certain transmission 
outages are, as a matter of routine, an enforcement matter to be investigated for 
wrongdoing.     
1027.  We also reject APPA/TAPS’ suggestion that the Commission identify certain 
generation and transmission facilities that could produce significant transmission 
constraints or reductions in the amount of generation available in that market-based 
rate seller’s market(s).  Public identification of such generation and transmission 
facilities could cause CEII and security concerns.  In addition, outages that could 
affect a seller’s market-based rate analysis will change over time.  The burden 
remains on the market-based rate seller to identify the outages that should be reported 
as a change in status.  We also remind commenters that entities may file a complaint 
or call the Office of Enforcement hotline if they are concerned that an outage 
provides the opportunity for a seller to exercise market power. Regarding Powerex’s 
request that the Commission consider whether transmission outages on a non-
jurisdictional or foreign affiliate's transmission system should be considered 
reportable under Order No. 652, given the limits of the Commission's jurisdictional 
interests, we clarify that, consistent with our change in status reporting requirement in 
general, to the extent that a transmission outage reflects a change in the 
characteristics that the Commission relied on (e.g., if it reduces imports of capacity 
by competitors that, if reflected in the generation market power screens for U.S. 
markets, would change the results of the screens from a “pass” to a “fail”), a change 
of status filing would be required.  The change in status requirement is an important Docket No. RM04-7-000   590 
 
element of the Commission’s market power oversight.  If a seller affiliated with a 
foreign utility wishes to retain market-based rate authority in the United States, such 
seller must comply with the notice of change in status requirements, including the 
reporting of transmission outages that may change the results of the screens from a 
“pass” to a “fail.”  The Commission finds no reason to exempt a seller affiliated with 
a foreign utility from this requirement.   
c.  Control  
Comments 
1028.  Several commenters note that increased precision in the Commission's 
definition of control would be particularly helpful to sellers, especially in light of the 
increased emphasis on reporting accuracy and completeness and the Commission’s 
general practice of accepting change in status filings in letter orders, without 
providing much detailed analysis or explanation as to whether the filings were 
required in the first place.
1170  These commenters seek clarification that energy 
contracts that are not associated with a specific resource (do not specify a “source”) 
do not transfer control.  EEI and SoCal Edison argue that such contracts or liquidated 
damages call option contracts do not transfer control because, at their core, they are 
financial transactions used to mitigate the buyer’s price risk.
1171  According to 
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commenters, the option holder does not actually control any particular capacity that 
might be used to meet the contract needs.  The energy could come from the seller, 
from the market through the seller, or directly from the market to the buyer if the 
seller opts to pay liquidated damages.  They submit that if such a contract were 
deemed to transfer “control,” execution of such routine contracts would trigger a 
change in status filing for each incremental 100 MW purchased thereby, which is 
most likely not what the Commission intended.   
1029.  APPA/TAPS support a reporting obligation for all of the types of contractual 
arrangements that could confer control, as consistent with the discussion in the 
horizontal market power section of the NOPR.  They argue that these arrangements 
could provide a market-based seller with the means to determine whether capacity is 
offered into a market and whether a competitor can or will enter a market.  They state 
that these arrangements also create opportunities for sellers to coordinate their 
behavior with other competitors.  If the contracts do not raise competitive concerns, 
the seller could explain the factors supporting that conclusion in its report.
1172  
                                                                                                                                                  
facilities or buying energy from the competitive market, with the obligation to pay 
liquidated damages equal to the difference in price between the pre-agreed price and the 
cost to the buyer of buying replacement power from another source for failure to deliver.  
EEI argues such contract should not be deemed to transfer “control” and therefore should 
not be reportable. 
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1030.  SoCal Edison urges the Commission to consider whether, and to clarify how, 
the emerging, non-traditional capacity and electrical energy products that are 
routinely transacted in hybrid electricity markets today would fit within its 
construction of its test for control (“…affecting ability of the capacity to reach the 
relevant market”).  It warns that buyers may be hesitant to routinely purchase 
products that require continual change in status filings.
1173  
Commission Determination 
1031.  Pursuant to the change in status reporting requirement, a market-based rate 
seller is required to report a change in control to the extent the seller acquires a net 
100 MW or more generation capacity through contract.  Our determination of what 
constitutes control is discussed above in the horizontal market power analysis section 
and we adopt that discussion for purposes of the change in status requirement.  That 
is, the Commission concludes that the determination of control is appropriately based 
on a review of the totality of circumstances on a fact specific basis.  No single factor 
or factors necessarily results in control.  If a seller has control over certain capacity 
such that the seller can affect the ability of the capacity to reach the relevant market, 
then that capacity should be attributed to the seller for purposes of complying with 
the change in status requirement. 
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1032.  Further, as the Commission has previously clarified, sellers making a change 
in status filing to report an energy management agreement are required to make an 
affirmative statement in their filing as to whether the agreement at issue transfers 
control of any assets and whether the agreement results in any material effect on the 
conditions that the Commission relied upon for the grant of market-based rate 
authority.  On some occasions, and at the Commission’s discretion, the Commission 
may request the seller to submit a copy of the agreement and provide supporting 
documentation.
1174    
1033.  We reiterate here that a seller making a change in status filing is required to 
state whether it has made a filing pursuant to section 203 of the FPA.
1175  To the 
extent the seller has made a section 203 filing that it submits is being made out of an 
abundance of caution without conceding that the Commission has section 203 
jurisdiction, the seller will be required to incorporate this same assumption in its 
market-based rate change in status filing (e.g., if the seller assumes that it will control 
a jurisdictional facility in a section 203 filing, it should make that same assumption in 
its market-based rate change in status filing and, on that basis, inform the 
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Commission as to whether there is any material effect on its market-based rate 
authority).
1176 
d.  Triggering Events 
Comments  
1034.  In the NOPR, the Commission invited comments on whether it should expand 
the triggering events for a change in status filing beyond ownership or control of 
facilities or inputs and affiliation with entities that own or control facilities or inputs 
or that have a franchised service territory, as set forth in Order No. 652.  No 
commenters suggest additional triggering events, and several commenters oppose any 
general expansion of categories.
1177  Several commenters specifically oppose any 
requirement to report actions taken by competitors or natural events as a change in 
status.  They argue that, in many cases, the seller may be unaware of actions taken by 
a competitor, making compliance virtually impossible.
1178 
Commission Determination 
1035.  We will not expand the events that trigger a change in status filing.  Further, 
we will not expand triggering events to include actions taken by a competitor (such as 
a decision to retire a generation unit or take transmission capacity out of service) or 
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natural events (such as hydro-year level, higher wind generation, or load disruptions 
due to adverse weather conditions) beyond those adopted in Order No. 652.  As we 
describe above in the vertical market power analysis discussion, with regard to 
barriers to entry erected or controlled by other than the seller, we find that it is not 
reasonable to routinely require sellers to make a showing regarding potential barriers 
to entry that others might erect and that are beyond the seller’s control.  However, we 
will entertain on a case-by-case basis claims that the existence of barriers to entry 
beyond the seller’s control may affect the seller’s ability to exercise market power.  
For similar reasons we will not expand the events that trigger a change in status filing 
to include actions taken by a competitor or natural events.  However, we will 
entertain on a case-by-case basis claims that such actions may affect the seller’s 
ability to exercise market power.   
e.  Timing of Reporting 
Comments 
1036.  At present, the Commission requires the reporting of changes in status to be 
“filed no later than 30 days after the legal or effective date of the change in status, 
including a change in ownership or control, whichever is earlier.”
1179  The proposed 
regulatory text maintains this requirement. 
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1037.  CAISO supports the current requirement that entities with market-based rate 
authority must report changes of status no later than 30 days after the change has 
occurred.  CAISO proposes that any change in status be reported not only to the 
Commission but also to the relevant market monitor where the facilities are located.  
CAISO states that this minimal additional burden on the supplier will ensure that 
RTO and ISO staff are operating with the latest possible information.
1180  
1038.  SoCal Edison recommends that the Commission revise the change in status 
reporting requirement to focus upon the actual acquisition of the resources in question 
– for power sales contracts, the date of physical power delivery.  SoCal Edison states 
that the Commission’s current policies make it virtually impossible for a seller to 
provide a meaningful evaluation of whether or not a forward contract with delivery 
months or years in the future creates a departure from the characteristics the 
Commission relied upon in granting market-based rate authority as much as three 
years previously.  SoCal Edison notes that, as currently written, the policy requires 
reporting of procurement activities potentially years in advance of any power delivery 
because the effective date of the contract – usually the execution date – may 
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significantly precede the date of physical delivery – that is, the actual transfer of 
control over generation resources.
1181  
Commission Determination 
1039.  We provide clarification regarding when a change in status filing should be 
filed.  In Order No. 652, we determined that reports of changes in status must be filed 
no later than 30 days after the legal or effective date of the change in status, including 
a change in ownership or control, whichever is earlier.
1182  However, it was not the 
Commission’s intention, as SoCal Edison notes, to require reporting of procurement 
activities potentially years in advance of any power delivery.  We agree with SoCal 
Edison that the current policy may be unclear and may cause an entity to file a notice 
of change in status years in advance of the actual transaction, i.e., change in 
ownership or transfer of control.  The Commission requires a meaningful evaluation 
of whether a change creates a departure from the characteristics the Commission 
relied upon in granting market-based rate authority.  It would be difficult for the 
Commission to accurately evaluate whether or not, for example, a forward contract 
with delivery months or years in the future will affect the conditions the Commission 
relied upon for the market-based rate authorization.  Accordingly, we will modify § 
35.42(b) (formerly § 35.43(b)) to provide that, in the case of power sales contracts 
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with future delivery, such contracts are reportable 30 days after the physical delivery 
has begun.   
1040.  We reject CAISO’s proposal that any change in status also be reported to the 
relevant market monitor where the facilities are located.  We find that informing the 
Commission of changes in status is sufficient.  Change in status filings are noticed 
and therefore interested entities will have notice of any such filing. 
f.  Sellers Affiliated with a Foreign Utility 
1041.  The change in status requirement is applicable to all market-based rate sellers 
regardless whether they are domestic or affiliated with a foreign utility. 
Comments 
1042.  Powerex notes that the Commission stated in the NOPR that it “does not 
consider transmission and generation facilities that are located exclusively out of the 
United States and that are not directly interconnected to the United States [but] would 
consider transmission facilities that are exclusively outside the United States but 
nevertheless interconnected to an affiliate’s transmission system that is directly 
interconnected to the United States.”
1183  Powerex submits that the NOPR fails to 
clarify the Commission's proposed treatment of foreign-sited generation facilities 
interconnected to an affiliated transmission system that, in turn, is directly 
interconnected to the United States transmission grid.  Powerex argues that, based on 
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the nature of the Commission's concerns with respect to facilities outside the United 
States, the details concerning such generation capacity should not be relevant to the 
Commission's determination in circumstances where the affiliated uncommitted 
capacity exceeds the transmission limits of the intertie(s) directly interconnecting the 
affiliated foreign transmission system to the United States grid.  Powerex states that 
foreign sellers with foreign generating facilities can make that generation available to 
United States markets only to the extent that transmission capacity is available on the 
interties crossing the international boundaries.  In such instances, Powerex argues that 
the seller's participation in United States jurisdictional markets is constrained by the 
total transfer capability (TTC) of the transmission system of the intertie (a 
measurement of the level of imports that can access a market from a particular 
location).  Powerex asserts that those intertie limits represent the foreign seller's 
maximum uncommitted foreign capacity available to United States markets.
1184  
Thus, according to Powerex, only changes in the TTC of the intertie itself should be 
considered a change in the circumstances upon which the original market-based rate 
authorization was based, for purposes of Order No. 652 filings.
1185   
1043.  Powerex also argues that complying with the change in status requirements of 
Order No. 652 would require foreign sellers to demand routine updates of potentially 
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non-public information from their foreign generation-owning affiliates; it contends 
that Order No. 652 imposes a continuous updating requirement any time an affiliate 
acquires additional generation assets, re-rates an existing facility, or enters into third-
party contracts that confer some degree of control.
1186  Powerex states that in certain 
circumstances, release of information could be inconsistent with the standards and 
policies of the foreign utility regulatory agency regulating the foreign generation 
owner.
1187   Powerex argues that concerns related to these types of frequently non-
public changes to an affiliate’s generation profile are appropriately limited to United 
States assets located in United States markets. 
Commission Determination 
1044.  The Commission treats foreign-sited generation facilities interconnected to an 
affiliated transmission system that, in turn, is directly interconnected to the United 
States transmission grid in the same way that it treats the first-tier generation facilities 
of non-foreign sellers.  For the purpose of determining total uncommitted capacity, 
the affiliates’ capacity is combined. 
1045.  In response to Powerex, we agree that if the Commission’s grant of market-
based rate authority was based on the seller’s, including its affiliate’s, uncommitted 
capacity exceeding the transmission limits of the intertie(s) directly interconnecting 
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the seller to the United States grid, only changes in the TTC of the intertie would be 
considered a change in status subject to a reporting requirement.  
1046.  Further, if a foreign utility believes that release of specific information is 
inconsistent with the policies of a foreign utility regulatory agency, the foreign utility 
should specifically inform the Commission of this, and the Commission will take the 
matter under advisement when considering whether to grant a request for special 
treatment. 
4.  Third-Party Providers of Ancillary Services 
Commission Proposal 
1047.  In Order No. 888, the Commission required transmission providers to offer 
certain ancillary services at cost-based rates as part of their open access commitment 
but also contemplated that third parties (parties other than the transmission provider 
in a particular transaction) could provide certain ancillary services.
1188  The 
Commission also left open the door for ancillary services to be provided on other than 
a cost-of-service basis.  In Order No. 888, the Commission stated that it would 
entertain requests for market-based pricing related to ancillary services on a case-by-
case basis if supported by analyses that demonstrate that the seller lacks market 
power in these discrete services.
1189  
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1048.   In Ocean Vista Power Generation, L.L.C.,
1190 the Commission explained that, 
as a general matter, a study of ancillary service markets should address the nature and 
characteristics of each ancillary service, as well as the nature and characteristics of 
generation capable of supplying each service, and that the study should develop 
market shares for each service.  In particular, the Commission stated that an 
individual seller’s market power analysis for ancillary services markets should:  (1) 
define the relevant product market for each ancillary service; (2) identify the relevant 
geographic market, which could include all potential sellers of the product from 
whom the buyer could obtain the service, taking into account relevant factors which 
may include the other sellers' locations, the physical capability of the delivery system 
and the cost of such delivery, and important technical characteristics of the sellers' 
facilities; (3) establish market shares for all suppliers of the ancillary services in the 
relevant geographic markets; and (4) examine other barriers to entry.  The 
Commission also noted that it would entertain alternative explanations and 
approaches. 
1049.  The Commission adopted in Avista Corporation
1191 a general policy stating 
that third-party ancillary service providers that could not perform a market power 
study would be allowed to sell ancillary services at market-based rates, but only in 
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conjunction with a requirement that such third parties establish an Internet-based 
OASIS-like site for providing information about and transacting ancillary services.  
The authorization in Avista extended only to the following four ancillary services:  
Regulation Service, Energy Imbalance Service, Spinning Reserves, and Supplemental 
Reserves.  The Commission based its Avista policy on the expectation that, as entry 
into ancillary service markets occurs, prices will decrease from the level established 
by the transmission provider’s cost-based rate.  Under these circumstances, customers 
will pay prices for ancillary services that are no higher than and will very likely be 
lower than the transmission provider’s cost-based rate.  The Commission explained 
that the ancillary services customer is protected in part by the availability of the same 
ancillary services at cost-based rates from the transmission provider.  The backstop of 
cost-based ancillary services from the transmission provider provides, in effect, a 
limit on the price at which customers are willing to buy ancillary services.
1192 
1050.  To further monitor market entry, the Commission required third-party 
suppliers to file with the Commission one year after their Internet-based site was 
                                              
1192 We note that the Commission has authorized several utilities to use market 
index pricing for energy imbalance service.  See, e.g., PacifiCorp, 95 FERC ¶ 61,145 
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protected by the transmission provider’s obligation to offer the service at rates the 
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operational (and at least every three years thereafter) a report detailing their activities 
in the ancillary services market.
1193   
1051.  The Commission stated that that it would apply this policy only to sellers that 
are authorized to sell power and energy at market-based rates.  In addition, the 
Commission stated that it would not apply this approach to sales of ancillary services 
by a third-party supplier in the following situations:  (1) sales to an RTO or an ISO, 
i.e., where that entity has no ability to self-supply ancillary services but instead 
depends on third parties;
1194 (2) to address affiliate abuse concerns, sales to a 
traditional, franchised public utility affiliated with the third-party supplier, or sales 
where the underlying transmission service is on the system of the public utility 
affiliated with the third-party supplier; and (3) sales to a public utility that is 
                                              
1193 The Commission subsequently established an EQR requirement for all market-
based rate sellers.    
1194   With the formation of RTOs and ISOs, several RTOs/ISOs performed market 
analyses to demonstrate whether various ancillary services are competitive.  The result 
has been as follows:  California Independent System Operator:  Regulation, Spinning 
Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve.  ISO New England:  Regulation and Frequency 
(Automatic Generation Control), Operating Reserve – Ten-Minute Spinning, Operating 
Reserve – Ten-Minute Non-Spinning, and Operating Reserve – Thirty Minute.  New 
York Independent System Operator:  Regulation and Frequency Response Service, 
Operating Reserve Service (including Spinning Reserve, 10-Minute Non-Synchronized 
Reserves and 30-Minute Reserves).  PJM Independent System Operator:  Regulation and 
Frequency Response, Energy Imbalance, Operating Reserve – Spinning, and Operating 
Reserve – Supplemental.  Thus, in markets where the demonstration has been made, 
sellers are afforded the opportunity to sell at market-based rates subject to any other 
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purchasing ancillary services to satisfy its own open access transmission tariff 
requirements to offer ancillary services to its own customers.
1195  
1052.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to retain the Avista policy but sought 
comment on whether to modify or revise that current approach and, if so, how.  The 
Commission also sought comment on whether its current conditions, such as the 
requirement to establish an Internet-based site, continue to be necessary. 
a.  Internet Postings and Reporting Requirements 
Comments 
1053.  A number of commenters support modifications to the Commission’s current 
approach to third-party sales of ancillary services on the basis that they believe the 
current policy has not succeeded in engendering robust markets for ancillary services.  
Avista, Puget, Cogentrix and Powerex state that the existing Internet posting and 
reporting policy is unnecessary.
1196  Avista and Puget note that the current EQR 
requirement, which did not exist when the Commission first adopted the Internet 
posting requirement, provides sufficient information for the Commission to monitor 
ancillary services markets for market power.  They argue that abandoning the Internet 
posting and reporting conditions would contribute to the development of more robust 
reserves markets.  Similarly, Cogentrix and Powerex maintain that those requirements 
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are burdensome and hard to implement, especially for independent sellers that are not 
transmission owners and do not have the responsibility to maintain an OASIS.  
Instead of safeguarding against possible abuses of market power, these commenters 
state that the posting and reporting requirements have probably hindered the 
development of robust markets for ancillary services. 
1054.  Puget states that virtually all ancillary services outside of RTO/ISO markets 
are provided at cost-based rates by the host transmission provider.  Puget states that it 
conducted a review of the reports filed in dockets in which the Commission has 
granted market-based rate authority to sell ancillary services under the Avista 
provisions, which revealed that only a handful of ancillary services sales have been 
made.  Based on the small number of market-based ancillary services sales that Puget 
found in its review of existing dockets, it concludes that companies have determined 
that the potential commercial gains from entering this market do not justify the cost 
and risks associated with the special posting and reporting requirements. 
1055.  Avista and Powerex state that, to the extent that the Commission is concerned 
about market power, purchasers of ancillary services are protected from the exercise 
of market power because they may purchase these services from the transmission 
provider at cost pursuant to the OATT.  Powerex maintains that the Commission can 
monitor these transactions via the EQRs and can encourage purchasers to file 
complaints under FPA section 206 should they believe a seller has exercised market 
power when making such sales. Docket No. RM04-7-000   607 
 
1056.  In contrast, APPA/TAPS urge the Commission not to relax standards for 
market-based pricing of ancillary services.   They support continuation of the 
Commission’s current approach for pricing ancillary services, including the 
requirement for a cost-based backstop for ancillary services provided by a 
transmission provider.  They argue that ancillary services markets remain very much 
dependent upon control area operation and are closely connected to the operations of 
the transmission system.  APPA/TAPS state that locational reserves requirements 
limit the geographic scope of potential ancillary service suppliers, and that capacity 
on automatic generation control cannot easily sell regulation service in its home 
market today and switch to sales in an adjoining market tomorrow.  Further, they 
state that customers cannot shop for such services.  According to APPA/TAPS, 
limitations of transmission and technology counsel against adopting short-cuts for 
assessing the appropriateness of market-based pricing of ancillary services.
1197 
1057.  Morgan Stanley supports efforts to establish market-based ancillary service 
markets both inside and outside of ISOs and RTOs.  Morgan Stanley recommends 
that the Commission investigate what is necessary to establish local ancillary services 
markets on a nationwide basis.  Morgan Stanley supports eliminating barriers to entry 
in the ancillary services market and states that to further this goal, the Commission 
should allow market participants to negotiate over-the-counter (OTC) ancillary 
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services contracts outside of established ISOs and RTOs.  Morgan Stanley mentions 
that this option should be open to all sellers with market-based rates and that the 
posting requirement should remain mandatory for mitigated entities.   
Commission Determination 
1058.  We will modify our current approach for third-party sellers of ancillary 
services at market-based rates as announced in Avista.  We appreciate the concerns 
raised by a number of commenters that the posting and reporting requirements 
imposed in Avista may be hindering the development of ancillary services markets 
particularly by third-party providers.  As noted above, some commenters have 
indicated that the costs and responsibilities associated with establishing and 
maintaining an internet-based site may outweigh the benefits that third party sellers 
could derive from the sale of the additional products.  We conclude that our EQR 
filing requirement provides an adequate means to monitor ancillary services sales by 
third parties such that the posting and reporting requirements established in Avista are 
no longer necessary.  Through their EQR filings, third party providers of ancillary 
services provide information regarding their ancillary services transactions for the 
quarter, including the ancillary service provided, the price, and the purchaser.  As a 
result, we will no longer require third-party providers of ancillary services to 
establish and maintain an internet-based OASIS-like site for providing information 
about their ancillary services transactions. 
1059.  In addition, we will no longer require third-party suppliers to file with the 
Commission one year after their internet-based site is operational (and at least every Docket No. RM04-7-000   609 
 
three years thereafter) a report detailing their activities in the ancillary services 
market.  We note that the Commission retains the ability to require such a report by a 
third-party supplier of ancillary services at any time.    
1060.  All sellers that seek authority to sell ancillary services at market-based rates 
pursuant to Avista
1198 must make a filing with the Commission to request that 
authority and must include language in their market-based rate tariffs identifying the 
ancillary services that they offer.
1199   
1061.  Moreover, we will retain our current policy of not allowing sales of ancillary 
services by a third-party supplier in the following situations:  (1) sales to an RTO or 
an ISO, i.e., where that entity has no ability to self-supply ancillary services but 
instead depends on third parties; (2) sales to a traditional, franchised public utility 
affiliated with the third-party supplier, or sales where the underlying transmission 
service is on the system of the public utility affiliated with the third-party supplier; 
and (3) sales to a public utility that is purchasing ancillary services to satisfy its own 
open access transmission tariff requirements to offer ancillary services to its own 
customers.
1200  These standard applicable tariff provisions appear in Appendix C to 
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this Final Rule.  As we stated in Avista, we are open to considering requests for 
market-based rate authorization to make such sales on a case-by-case basis. 
1062.  At this time, the Commission will not adopt Morgan Stanley’s 
recommendation to investigate what is necessary to establish local ancillary services 
markets on a nationwide basis.  We believe that the elimination of certain reporting 
requirements for third party providers of ancillary services adopted herein will 
adequately balance the need to encourage the development of ancillary services 
markets and the Commission’s responsibility to provide oversight and protection 
from market power.  We find Morgan Stanley’s suggestion that the Commission 
allow market participants to negotiate OTC ancillary services contracts outside of 
established RTO/ISO markets unsupported and lacking in detail.
1201 
b.  Pricing for Ancillary Services in RTOs/ISOs  
Comments 
1063.  As noted above, the Commission stated in Order No. 888 that it would 
entertain requests for market-based pricing related to ancillary services on a case-by-
case basis if supported by analyses which demonstrate that the seller lacks market 
                                              
1201 Morgan Stanley’s comments provide an insufficient basis for us to determine 
whether such OTC ancillary services contracts would be jurisdictional.  The Commission 
has previously stated that it is not concerned with management transactions (such as 
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power in these discrete services.
1202  To date, the Commission has permitted market-
based rate pricing for certain ancillary services in a number of RTOs and ISOs.
1203  
Although Ameren supports retaining the Commission’s current approach, Ameren 
urges the Commission to address what it describes as a critical market design flaw 
regarding pricing for ancillary services in RTO/ISO markets with Day 2 energy 
markets but no market for ancillary services, such as the Midwest ISO.  Ameren 
explains that providing regulation service and spinning reserves in the Midwest ISO 
market at traditional cost-based rates is uneconomic at present because owners of 
ancillary services capacity generally find it more profitable to sell energy from the 
capacity at market-based rates rather than to offer the capacity as reserves at cost-
based rates.  Ameren recommends that the Commission ensure that its approach to 
sales of ancillary services provides flexibility by allowing sellers for cost-based rates 
for regulation service and spinning reserves in the Midwest ISO footprint to propose 
a component for recovery of lost opportunity costs where such costs are shown to be 
legitimate and verifiable.  Ameren submits that the Commission has recognized the 
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FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048 at 30,230. 
1203 AES Redondo Beach, L.L.C., et al., 85 FERC ¶ 61,123 (1998), order on reh'g, 
87 FERC ¶ 61,208 (1999), order on reh'g and clarification, 90 FERC ¶ 61,036 (2000); 
New England Power Pool, 85 FERC ¶ 61,379 (1998), reh'g denied, 95 FERC ¶ 61,074 
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need for opportunity cost recovery in other circumstances, and should consider an 
opportunity cost component in the future.
1204 
1064.  CAISO states that it agrees with the Commission’s decision to distinguish 
sales within an RTO or ISO from those not within an RTO or ISO.
 1205  It agrees that 
the Commission can rely on the market monitoring unit of the RTO or ISO to assess 
competitiveness in the RTO or ISO’s ancillary service markets.
1206 
1065.  However, CAISO also notes that the size of the ancillary service market is 
subject to change based on system conditions and the need to meet applicable 
reliability criteria.  It says that at times the CAISO may be able to procure ancillary 
services on a system-wide basis, whereas at other times factors such as the 
proportionate mix of hydro and thermal resources, transmission path operating 
transfer capability limits or deratings, forecasted path flows, anticipated load and 
weather conditions, and generator outages may require the CAISO to procure 
ancillary services on a zonal or even more location-specific basis.  CAISO also states 
that because not every facility has the capability to provide every ancillary service, 
the market power analysis for the energy market does not automatically ensure that 
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61,363-64 & n.47 (2001). 
1205 CAISO at 16-18.  
1206 CAISO recommends that the Final Rule emphasize the importance of 
appropriate RTO or ISO market power mitigation tariff provisions for sales involving 
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market power cannot be exercised with respect to sales of ancillary services.  
Accordingly, CAISO states that there may be the need for more targeted market 
power mitigation procedures specifically applicable to sales of ancillary services.  
1066.  NYISO supports the Commission’s proposed approach to the extent it is 
predicated on all eligible sellers being able to benefit from the Commission’s 
authorization of the NYISO to purchase ancillary services for loads at market-based 
rates.
1207   It states that all eligible sellers should receive the market-clearing prices 
for ancillary services that are supplied on a market basis and that the final regulations 
should not impose burdensome and duplicative market data requirements on a 
potential seller of ancillary services, either directly or through data demands to an 
ISO if the ISO has already received Commission authorization for market-based 
ancillary services. 
1067.  APPA/TAPS urge caution for market-based pricing of ancillary services in 
RTO/ISO areas.  Even if the Commission finds that conditions exist to permit market-
based pricing of some ancillary services in some RTO/ISO-administered markets, 
APPA/TAPS state that such pricing would not be appropriate where vertically 
integrated utilities are also control area operators, such as in Midwest ISO and SPP, 
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because the locational, control-area dependent nature of ancillary services increases 
the risk that control area operators will have market power.
1208 
1068.  Powerex recognizes that in some control areas, there are locational reserve 
requirements that can be met by a limited number of resources and therefore limit the 
geographic scope of potential suppliers.
1209  Powerex believes, however, that this 
situation can be mitigated on a case-specific basis, and therefore that it should not be 
the basis for generally rejecting the benefits of competitive supply of ancillary 
services.  Powerex believes that it is the combination of the Commission's existing 
regulatory framework and administrative barriers raised by transmission providers 
that has effectively stifled the incentives for third-party suppliers to participate in 
ancillary services markets.
1210  In support, Powerex states that experience with the 
California organized markets demonstrates that a third-party provider can sell 
operating reserves and regulation service services to an adjoining market and that 
these services can be provided from resources located two markets and more than a 
thousand transmission miles away.   
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Commission Determination 
1069.  We will continue our current approach regarding market-based pricing for 
certain ancillary services in RTOs and ISOs.  Where an RTO or ISO performs a 
market analysis demonstrating a lack of market power for certain ancillary services, 
the Commission has approved the sale of those ancillary services at market-based 
rates.  As reflected in the NOPR, the Commission has approved the sale of certain 
ancillary services at market-based rates in CAISO, ISO New England, NYISO, and 
PJM.  Moreover, the Commission considers on a case-by-case basis market power 
mitigation measures for sales involving ancillary services in these markets. 
1070.  Ameren’s request that the Commission address what Ameren considers to be a 
critical market design flaw regarding pricing for ancillary services in the Midwest 
ISO is beyond the scope of this rulemaking proceeding.  Ameren’s concerns are more 
appropriately addressed upon an appropriate record in the context of proceedings 
involving the Midwest ISO market. 
1071.  With regard to APPA/TAPS’ concern that market-based pricing of ancillary 
services would not be appropriate where vertically integrated utilities are also 
balancing authority area operators, such as in Midwest ISO and SPP, we note that the 
Commission carefully analyzes ancillary service markets in ISOs and RTOs before 
authorizing market-based rate pricing, ensuring that protections, such as market 
monitors, are established to reduce the risk that market power can be exercised.  
APPA/TAPS has had the opportunity to intervene and participate in such 
proceedings, including in proceedings involving Midwest ISO and SPP.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   616 
 
1072.  The Commission also imposes mitigation where necessary.  For example, the 
Commission in its PJM West/South Regulation Zone order permitted sellers that lack 
market power in PJM to submit market-based rate bids in the market for regulation 
service, while mitigating bids submitted by American Electric Power Company and 
Virginia Electric and Power Company, because PJM has not sufficiently 
demonstrated that they lack the potential to exercise market power in this market.
1211   
5.  Reactive Power and Real Power Losses 
Commission Proposal 
1073.  In the NOPR, the Commission did not provide a proposal with regard to the 
treatment of reactive power and real power losses.  However, several commenters 
submitted comments about these services.     
a.  Reactive Power 
Comments 
1074.  Cogentrix asks the Commission to reconsider the existing requirements for the 
sale of reactive power by independent generators.  It notes that currently generators 
                                              
1211 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 111 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2005) (PJM West/South 
Regulation Zone).  Similarly, the Commission in New York Independent System 
Operator, Inc., 91 FERC ¶ 61,218 at 61,798-802(2000), suspended market-based pricing 
in the non-spinning reserve market for a temporary period.  The Commission imposed 
bidding restrictions on 10 minute non-spinning operating reserves suppliers and a 
mandatory bid requirement which required that all available capacity held by eastern 
suppliers of 10 minute non-spinning reserves, and that is not subject to a bona fide outage 
or conflicting contractual obligation, be bid into the market.  The Commission indicated 
that the mandatory bid requirement was necessary to protect against the physical 
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can sell reactive power only upon the submission to the Commission of separate cost 
filings.  Cogentrix submits that the requirement of cost justification of reactive power 
rates should be eliminated.  Cogentrix states that this requirement is unnecessary 
because generators with market-based rate authority are found to lack market power 
and are subject to the EQR and change in status reporting requirements, which ensure 
that they continue to lack market power and, therefore, that they cannot dictate the 
pricing of reactive power services.  Cogentrix submits that because reactive power is 
a service that purchasers require generators to provide, it should be left to the parties 
to negotiate the proper rate under the interconnection agreement or the power 
purchase agreement, without requiring the generator to submit additional cost 
filings.
1212 
Commission Determination 
1075.  We reject Cogentrix’s proposal that the Commission reconsider in this 
proceeding existing requirements for the sale of reactive power by independent 
generators and eliminate the requirement that generators submit separate cost filings 
supporting reactive power sales.  Consistent with our precedent,
1213 we will continue 
to analyze reactive power sales on a case-by-case basis.  
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b.  Real Power Losses 
Comments 
1076.  Powerex requests that the Commission explicitly permit sellers to offer third-
party loss compensation services
1214 on non-affiliated transmission systems under 
their general market-based rate authority.
1215  Powerex states that it believes that third 
parties currently are making real power losses sales pursuant to their market-based 
rate authority.
1216   Powerex believes that the provision of real power losses is no 
different than the provision of other energy.  It notes that in some control areas, the 
provision of such services comes with other attendant duties such as acting as the 
scheduling party for the losses.   
                                              
1214 Although Powerex does not directly define loss compensation energy, we 
interpret it to be equivalent to real power losses associated with all transmission service.  
The Commission’s pro forma OATT in Order No. 890, sections 15.7 and 28.5, refer to 
real power losses.  For purposes of this Final Rule, we will refer to loss compensation 
service or energy as real power losses. 
1215 Powerex initial comments at 38-40.   
1216 Powerex cites to a filing in which Ameren stated its understanding that it “may 
sell the energy that will be used by customers that choose to self-supply energy to meet 
their transmission losses to such customers under its general market-based power sales 
authority.  [Ameren] will merely be selling the power the customer will use to meet its 
losses and obligations and, from [Ameren’s] standpoint, this will be no different than any 
other power sale.  Such sales are also consistent with the Commission’s decision to treat 
the provision of losses as a service that can be provided by multiple entities, rather than 
one that the transmission provider is uniquely situated to provide.”  Powerex at 39, citing 
Letter Transmitting Compliance Filing, Ameren Energy Marketing Co., Docket No. 
ER01-1945, at n.3 (July 27, 2001).  Docket No. RM04-7-000   619 
 
Commission Determination 
1077.   We agree with Powerex that the provision of real power losses is no different 
than the provision of other energy.  We clarify that we permit sellers to offer third-
party real power losses on non-affiliated transmission systems under their market-
based rate authority.     
V.  Section-by-Section Analysis of Regulations  
1.    Section 35.27  Authority of State Commissions 
1078.  In the NOPR, we explained that the first two paragraphs of this section were 
added by Order No. 888, while Order No. 652 later added subsection (c) to 
implement the change in status reporting requirement.  The Commission proposed to 
move or delete subsections (a) and (c), leaving only (b), which clarifies that nothing 
in this part should be construed as preempting or affecting the authority of state 
commissions.  The NOPR did not propose to revise the language of subsection (b) in 
any way, and proposed only to amend the heading from “Power Sales at Market-
Based Rates” to “Authority of State Commissions.”  NASUCA filed comments in 
support of “assuring that there will be no preemption of state prerogatives under the 
proposed new regulations . . ..”
1217   
1079.  We reiterate that the Commission is not proposing to add or revise this 
provision at this time.  It remains unchanged from when the Commission adopted it 
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in Order No. 888.  The fact that it is renumbered in this proceeding will not have any 
impact, positive or negative, on the prerogatives of state commissions. 
2.  Section 35.36  Generally 
1080.  This section defines certain terms specific to Subpart H and explains the 
applicability of Subpart H.  Some of these terms were put in place when the 
Commission codified certain market behavior rules in Order No. 674.
1218   
1081.  The NOPR proposed to define “Seller” in paragraph (a)(1) as a public utility 
with authority to, or seeking authority to, engage in sales for resale of electric energy 
at market-based rates in order to make clear that Subpart H deals exclusively with 
market-based rate power sales.  NASUCA comments that the explanation for the 
definition of “Seller” does not mention any language in FPA section 205 regarding 
“market-based rates,” and further, that there is no reference to market-based rates in 
that section of the Act.  Thus, NASUCA contends that “the reference in the definition 
of “seller” to “market-based rates under section 205 of the Federal Power Act” is a 
non sequitur, lacks support in the statutory language, and should be deleted.”
1219   
1082.  We do not agree that the limiting language should be deleted.  We believe that 
it is essential that the regulations in subpart H apply only to the specific sales that we 
are regulating herein (i.e., market-based rates for wholesale sales of electric energy, 
                                              
1218 Conditions for Public Utility Market-Based Rate Authorization Holders, Order 
No. 674, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,208, 114 FERC ¶ 61,163 (2006). 
1219 NASUCA at 32. Docket No. RM04-7-000   621 
 
capacity and ancillary services by public utilities) and not to any sales made at cost-
based rates or under any other authority; the definition should make this scope clear.  
To the extent that NASUCA is challenging the Commission’s ability to authorize 
market-based rates at all, the Commission addresses NASUCA’s arguments in that 
regard in the legal authority section of this Final Rule.    
1083.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed definitions for Category 1 Sellers and 
Category 2 Sellers to assist in understanding the parameters of the updated market 
power analysis filing requirement.  The definition of Category 1 Sellers is being 
clarified, consistent with the discussion above in Implementation Process. 
1084.  Paragraph (a)(4) defines inputs to electric power production in order to 
simplify § 35.37(e) regarding other barriers to entry.  The Final Rule revises the 
definition consistent with the discussion in the vertical market power section.  
1085.  Paragraph (a)(5) indicates that where the term franchised public utility is used, 
it is meant to include only those public utilities with a franchised service obligation 
under state law.  The Commission modifies the definition as proposed in the NOPR 
so that the term “franchised public utility” does not include only utilities with captive 
customers.  Instead, throughout the final regulations, references to franchised public 
utilities with captive customers are explicitly identified, where applicable.    
1086.  New paragraph (a)(6) provides a definition of captive customers, the genesis 
of which is discussed above in the Affiliate Abuse section. 
1087.  Paragraph (a)(7) (which was proposed as § 35.36(a)(6) in the NOPR) provides 
a definition for market-regulated affiliated entities.  Docket No. RM04-7-000   622 
 
1088.  New paragraph (a)(8) provides a definition of market information.   
1089.  Paragraph (b) is a basic description of the applicability of Subpart H. 
3.  Section 35.37  Market power analysis required 
1090.  This section describes the market power analysis the Commission employs, as 
discussed in the preamble, and when sellers must file one.  It is intended to identify 
the key aspects of the analysis.   
1091.  The Final Rule adds paragraph (a)(2), which codifies the requirement 
mentioned in the NOPR for each seller to include an appendix identifying specified 
assets with each market power analysis filed.  The paragraph also directs readers to 
Appendix B for a sample asset appendix.   
1092.  New language in paragaphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) clarifies that both sellers and 
intervenors may file alternative evidence to support or rebut the indicative screens, 
and addresses the use of the Delivered Price Test and its role in the analysis of market 
power, respectively.  Further, at paragraph (c)(4), the regulations codify the 
requirement that each seller use a standard format for the indicative screens, the use 
of which was proposed in the NOPR. 
1093.  Paragraph (d) specifies the requirement that a seller with transmission facilities 
must have on file an Open Access Transmission Tariff.  The Final Rule adds a 
description of how this requirement applies to sellers affiliated with foreign utilities. 
1094.  Paragraph (e) describes the information that must be provided to demonstrate a 
lack of vertical market power.  The text is revised in several respects reflecting the 
discussion in the section of the Final Rule on vertical market power.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   623 
 
1095.  The Final Rule adds a new paragraph (f) to address concerns that CEII claims 
in market-based rate filings have been overbroad.  The subsection provides a process 
for intervenors to gain access to data for which the filer has claimed privileged 
treatment under 18 CFR 388.112.   
4.  Section 35.38  Mitigation 
1096.  The regulatory text proposed in the NOPR did not propose specific changes to 
the current approach to mitigation, and intended to capture the Commission’s existing 
requirements.  The Final Rule does not depart from this approach, and adopts the 
same regulatory text regarding mitigation as proposed in the NOPR, with the addition 
of a clarification that mitigation will apply only to the market or markets in which a 
seller is found, or presumed, to have market power. 
5.    Section 35.39  Affiliate restrictions 
1097.  This section governs affiliate transactions and affiliate relationships and 
establishes certain conditions that a seller must satisfy as a condition of its market-
based rate authority.  New paragraph (a) explains that, as a condition of obtaining and 
retaining market-based rate authority, the provisions set forth in the entire section, 
including the restriction on affiliate sales of electric energy and the affiliate 
restrictions, must be satisfied on an ongoing basis.  Paragraph (b) expressly prohibits 
sales between a franchised public utility with captive customers and any of its 
market-regulated power sales affiliates without first receiving authorization for the 
transaction under section 205 of the FPA.  This paragraph requires that, where the 
Commission grants a seller authority to engage in affiliate sales under its MBR tariff, Docket No. RM04-7-000   624 
 
any and all such authorizations must be listed in the seller’s tariff.  The language 
varies from that proposed in the NOPR to reflect changes to the definition of 
“franchised public utility.”   
1098.  Paragraphs (c)-(f) contain provisions governing the relationship between a 
franchised public utility with captive customers and its market-regulated power sales 
affiliates (formerly, code of conduct).  The provisions of these paragraphs apply to all 
franchised public utilities with captive customers.  These paragraphs include 
provisions governing the separation of employees, the sharing of market information, 
sales of non-power goods or services, and power brokering.  The language varies 
from that proposed in the NOPR to reflect changes to the definition of “franchised 
public utility” and a number of other changes discussed in greater detail in the 
affiliate abuse section of this Final Rule. 
1099.  As discussed above in Affiliate Abuse, the Commission is adding several 
provisions concerning separation of functions and information sharing to more 
closely model the Commission’s standards of conduct, as appropriate.  In addition, 
the final regulations include a new paragraph (g) with a general prohibition on using 
anyone as a conduit to circumvent any of the affiliate restrictions, and a new 
paragraph (h) explaining that, if necessary, affiliate restrictions involving two or more 
franchised public utilities, one or more of whom has captive customers and one or 
more of whom does not, will be imposed on a case-by-case basis. 
6.   Section 35.40  Ancillary services 
1100.  This provision restricts sales of ancillary services to those specific geographic Docket No. RM04-7-000   625 
 
markets for which the Commission has authorized market-based rate sales of such 
services.  In the Final Rule, we delete proposed paragraph (b), which reflected the 
Internet posting and reporting requirements found in Avista Corporation,
1220 and 
which we find are no longer necessary, as discussed above in the section on Ancillary 
Services.   We also delete proposed subsection (c), which described limitations on 
sales of ancillary services by third-party providers; we believe that the standard 
applicable tariff provision, which will be available on the Commission’s website as it 
may be revised from time to time, will adequately apprise sellers of the current policy 
concerning third-party providers. 
7.  Section 35.41  Market behavior rules 
1101.  In Order No. 674, the Commission rescinded two of its market behavior rules 
and codified the remainder in § 35.37 of new Subpart H.  The NOPR proposed to 
move these market behavior rules, unchanged, from § 35.37 to § 35.41.  NASUCA 
submitted a number of substantive comments on these provisions.  Because we did 
not propose any revisions to these rules, and we are not revising them substantively in 
this Final Rule, NASUCA’s comments are beyond the scope of this proceeding.  We 
are, however, taking this opportunity to make several minor corrections and stylistic 
edits to the market behavior rules. 
8.  Section 35.42  Change in status reporting requirement 
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1102.  This section incorporates the provision previously found at paragraph 
35.27(c), which was codified by Order No. 652.  The final regulatory text clarifies 
distinctions between generation facilities and transmission facilities, and incorporates 
minor revisions as discussed above in the section on Changes in Status. 
1103.  The Final Rule adds paragraph (c), which codifies the requirement that each 
seller include an appendix identifying specified assets with each pertinent change in 
status notification filed.  The paragraph also directs readers to Appendix B for a 
sample asset appendix. 
9. Miscellaneous  
1104.  The final regulations add the phrase “unless otherwise permitted by 
Commission rule or order” in several places throughout the regulations to make clear 
that these general provisions are not meant to override approvals granted in particular 
circumstances in other orders or rules.   
1105.  In this Final Rule, the Commission has deleted proposed § 35.42, MBR Tariff, 
which required sellers to have on file the MBR tariff of general applicability.  That 
requirement has been modified, as explained above in the section on the MBR tariff; 
accordingly the regulation will not be adopted.   
VI.  Information Collection Statement 
1106.  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require approval of 
certain information collection and data retention requirements imposed by agency Docket No. RM04-7-000   627 
 
rules.
1221  Upon approval of a collection of information and data retention, OMB will 
assign an OMB control number and an expiration date.  Respondents subject to the 
filing requirements of this rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to these 
collections of information unless the collections of information display a valid OMB 
control number.  As discussed herein, the Commission is amending its regulations to 
codify its requirements for obtaining and retaining market-based rate authorization, 
implementing a market-based rate tariff, and incorporating the change in status 
reporting requirement for sellers seeking market-based rate authority.   
Initial Market Power Analysis 
1107.  The Commission has previously required utilities seeking market-based rate 
authority to file a market power analysis with the Commission; the Commission now 
codifies that requirement in the Commission’s regulations.  This Final Rule reflects 
the Commission’s existing practice developed over the years through individual cases 
and will not impose any additional burden, with the following exception.   
1108.  Section 35.27(a) of the Commission’s regulations
1222 currently provides that 
any public utility seeking market-based rate authority shall not be required to submit 
a generation market power analysis with respect to sales from capacity for which 
construction commenced on or after July 9, 1996.  Under current procedures, if all the 
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generation owned or controlled by an applicant for market-based rate authority and its 
affiliates in the relevant balancing authority area is post-July 9, 1996 generation, such 
seller is not required to submit a generation market power analysis.  In this Final 
Rule, the Commission eliminates the express exemption provided in § 35.27(a).  This 
change means that all new sellers seeking market-based rate authority on or after the 
effective date of the Final Rule issued in this proceeding, whether or not all of their 
and their affiliates’ generation was built or acquired after July 9, 1996, must provide a 
market power analysis of their generation to support their application for market-
based rate authority. 
1109.  Because the Commission allows a seller to make simplifying assumptions, 
where appropriate, and therefore to submit a streamlined analysis, the Commission 
believes that any burden of document preparation occasioned by the elimination of § 
35.27(a) should be minimal.  To the extent that there are greater costs for some 
sellers, the benefit of ensuring that markets do not become less competitive over time 
outweighs any additional costs.   
Updated Market Power Analyses 
1110.  To retain market-based rate authority, the Commission currently requires that 
sellers file an updated market power analysis every three years.  In this Final Rule, 
the Commission codifies the requirement that certain sellers with market-based rate 
authority file an updated analysis with the Commission to retain that authority.  
However, Category 1 sellers will be relieved of their existing obligation to file 
regularly scheduled updated market power analyses, as explained in the Docket No. RM04-7-000   629 
 
Implementation Process section of this Final Rule.  Instead, sellers that believe they 
fall into Category 1 will be required to submit a filing with the Commission at the 
time that updated market power analyses for the seller’s relevant market would 
otherwise be due (based on the regional schedule for updated market power analyses 
adopted in this Final Rule) explaining why the seller meets the Category 1 criteria, 
including a list of all generation assets (including nameplate or seasonal capacity 
amounts) owned or controlled by the seller and its affiliates grouped by balancing 
authority area.  Once the Commission agrees that a seller meets the Category 1 
criteria, that seller will not have to file regularly scheduled updated market power 
analyses.  Category 2 sellers will retain their existing obligation to file a regularly 
scheduled updated market power analysis.  Thus, Category 2 sellers will not face a 
greater burden to provide the Commission with the information required for an 
updated market power analysis.   
1111.  In addition, the elimination of § 35.27(a) also means that existing Category 2 
sellers filing updated market power analyses on or after the effective date of the Final 
Rule issued in this proceeding, whether or not all of their and their affiliates’ 
generation was built or acquired after July 9, 1996, must provide a market power 
analysis of their generation to support their continued market-based rate authority. 
1112.  Mirant argues that, with the elimination of the § 35.27(a) exemption, its cost of 
compliance will increase because it will have to prepare four updated market power 
analyses, each costing $20,000 to prepare and file, for companies that would have 
qualified for the § 35.27(a) exemption.  Mirant states that only one of its subsidiaries Docket No. RM04-7-000   630 
 
would qualify as a Category 1 seller and Mirant still would have to make four 
updated market power analysis filings.  On the other hand, other commenters state 
that the benefits of eliminating the § 35.27(a) exemption outweigh any added 
burdens. 
1113.  Because the Commission allows a seller to make simplifying assumptions and 
rely on previously filed analyses by other market participants, where appropriate, and 
therefore to submit a streamlined analysis, the Commission believes that any burden 
of document preparation occasioned by the elimination of § 35.27(a) should be 
minimal.  To the extent that there are greater costs for some sellers, the benefit of 
ensuring that markets do not become less competitive over time outweighs any 
additional costs.   
Regional Review and Schedule 
1114.  In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require each seller to file an 
updated market power analysis for its relevant geographic market(s) on a schedule 
that will allow examination of the individual seller at the same time the Commission 
examines other sellers in these relevant markets and contiguous markets within a 
region from which power could be imported.  The regional reviews would rotate by 
geographic region. 
1115.  Some commenters expressed concern that regional review would increase the 
burden associated with filing updated market power analyses.  Reliant, for example, 
states that companies which engage in business in multiple regions of the United 
States would have to file several times over the three year schedule instead of once as Docket No. RM04-7-000   631 
 
is required currently.
1223  Other commenters support the regional review proposal.  
For example, NRECA maintains that the proposed regional approach will not impose 
an undue compliance burden on sellers.  It notes that the regional review approach 
will ensure greater consistency in the data used to evaluate Category 2 sellers, citing 
the Commission’s statement in the NOPR that the Commission “will have before it a 
complete picture of the uncommitted capacity and simultaneous import capability 
into the relevant geographic markets under review.”
1224   NRECA states that any 
increase in the burden on sellers hardly outweighs these substantial benefits.  NRECA 
submits that the Commission has proposed a reasonable procedure to better ensure 
that market-based rate authority is granted only in appropriate circumstances.  When 
compared with the burden, cost and time required by a cost-of-service rate regime, 
NRECA asserts that the burden of complying with the regional review approach will 
be minimal.  APPA/TAPS describe the regional review proposed in the NOPR as a 
sensible proposal to conduct updated market power analyses on a rotating, regional 
basis to improve the quality and quantity of the data relied upon for market-based rate 
determinations and to provide the Commission with a more comprehensive picture of 
competitive conditions in regional markets.  They assert that the Commission should 
                                              
1223 Similarly, Allegheny, Mirant, FP&L, EEI, FirstEnergy, MidAmerican, TXU, 
Morgan Stanley, Financial Companies, and EPSA argue that large corporate families 
could find themselves in a perpetual triennial review that would place a substantial 
regulatory burden and expense on them.   
1224 NRECA reply comments at 28, citing NOPR at P 154. Docket No. RM04-7-000   632 
 
not sacrifice improvements to its market-based rate program to the interests of a few 
companies and that any increased financial cost to companies associated with 
regional reviews is outweighed by the companies’ profits from market-based rate 
sales.    
1116.  We believe that the Commission’s proposal properly and fairly balances the 
need to effectively, comprehensively, and accurately assess market power in 
wholesale markets with the desire to minimize any administrative burden associated 
with the filing and review of updated market power analyses.  While we recognize 
that some sellers may file updates more frequently than currently, we have carefully 
balanced the interests of all involved, and we believe that regional reviews of updated 
market analyses will result in more accurate and complete data.  This in turn will 
enhance the Commission's ability to continue to ensure that sellers either lack market 
power or have adequately mitigated such market power.  
1117.  Further, in light of commenters’ concern with the regional review schedule, 
the Commission has modified the schedule as proposed in the NOPR.  The NOPR 
proposed that regional reviews would rotate by geographic region with three regions 
reviewed per year.  Some commenters expressed concerned that, because they 
operate in multiple regions, they would be required to file updated market power 
analyses every year rather than every three years.  To address this concern, we are 
reducing the number of filings that sellers with generation in multiple regions will 
have to make by consolidating the regions and reducing the total number from nine to 
six.  With fewer and larger regions, sellers will likely occupy fewer regions, Docket No. RM04-7-000   633 
 
necessitating fewer filings. 
Market-Based Rate Tariff 
1118.  The NOPR proposed a tariff of general applicability (MBR tariff), which 
would provide greater consistency and reduce confusion regarding tariffs.  The 
Commission recognized that the requirement to file the specified MBR tariff might 
cause a minimal burden of document preparation and organization for existing 
market-based rate sellers, but stated that long-term benefits would be realized for 
market participants as well as the Commission.   
1119.  In this Final Rule, we do not adopt the NOPR proposal to require all sellers to 
adopt a tariff of general applicability.  Instead, we adopt a set of standard tariff 
provisions that we will require each seller to include in its market-based rate tariff.  
While we will require all market-based rate sellers to make compliance filings to 
modify their existing tariffs to reflect these standard provisions, these compliance 
filings are to be made by each seller the next time the seller proposes a tariff change, 
makes a change in status filing, or submits an updated market power analysis in 
accordance with the schedule in Appendix D, whichever occurs first.  
1120.  In the NOPR, the Commission also proposed that all market-based rate sellers 
file one market-based rate tariff per corporate family.  Many commenters expressed 
concern with this proposal.  In light of these concerns, we are not requiring sellers to 
file one market-based rate tariff per corporate family.  Instead, we will allow sellers 
to elect whether to transact under a single market-based rate tariff for an entire 
corporate family or under separate tariffs.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   634 
 
General 
1121.  The Commission’s regulations in 18 CFR Part 35 specify those reporting 
requirements that must be followed in conjunction with the filing of rate schedules 
under the FPA.  The information provided to the Commission under 18 CFR Part 35 
is identified for information collection and records retention purposes as FERC-516.  
Data collection FERC-516 applies to all reporting requirements covered in 18 CFR 
Part 35 including:  electric rate schedule filings, market power analyses, tariff 
submissions, market-based rate analyses, and reporting requirements for changes in 
status for public utilities with market-based rate authority. 
1122.  The Commission is submitting these reporting and records retention 
requirements to OMB for its review and approval under § 3507(d) of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act.
1225  The Commission solicited comments on the Commission’s need 
for this information, whether the information will have practical utility, the accuracy 
of provided burden estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected, and any suggested methods for minimizing the 
respondent’s burden, including the use of automated information techniques.  The 
Commission did not receive comments specifically addressing the burden estimates 
in the NOPR.  With the exceptions of estimates regarding sellers’ market-based rate 
tariffs, the number of market-based rate sellers, and the burden estimates for Category 
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1 sellers, we will use the same estimates here as in the NOPR.
1226   
1123.  The number of respondents expected to file to revise market-based rate tariffs 
has increased from the estimate set forth in the NOPR, given our decision not to 
require one MBR tariff per corporate family.  We expect some sellers will opt to 
submit a single corporate tariff, but we will estimate the total number to be filed to be 
approximately 1230, rather than 650 as reported in the NOPR.  We will conform the 
number of responses to reflect this new estimate as well.  However, we note that this 
number may be significantly less if sellers choose the option to file one market-based 
rate tariff per corporate family.  Additionally, the Commission proposed in the NOPR 
that sellers file their MBR tariffs as directed in the rulemaking proceeding requiring 
the submission of electronic tariffs.  However, in this Final Rule, we are requiring 
that sellers file their modified tariffs the next time sellers propose a tariff change, 
make a change in status filing, or submit an updated market power analysis.  We have 
adjusted the number of responses to reflect this requirement.  
Burden Estimate:  The Public Reporting and records retention burden for all four 
reporting requirements and the records retention requirement is as follows.
1227  
Title:  Electric Rate Schedule Filings (FERC-516). 
Action:  Revised Collection. 
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OMB Control No:  1902-0096 
Data Collection  No. of 
Respondents 
No. of 
Responses 
Hours Per 
Response 
Total Annual 
Hours 
Initial Market 
Power Analysis 
120 120 130 15,600 
Market-Based 
Rate Tariff 
1230 410
1228 6 2460 
  Category 1 
Qualification 
Filings
1229
630 210
1230 15
1231 3150 
Updated 
Analyses 
Category 2
1232
600 200
1233 250 50,000 
Totals     71,210 
                                              
1228 We expect responses to be staggered over the course of three years.  
Accordingly, the number of respondents (1230) has been divided by three. 
1229 Category 1 sellers are power marketers and power producers that own or 
control 500 MW or less of generating capacity in aggregate and that are not affiliated 
with a public utility with a franchised service territory.  In addition, Category 1 sellers 
must not own, operate or control transmission facilities, and must present no other 
vertical market power issues.  There are approximately 630 Category 1 sellers.   
1230 To determine the number of responses, the number of respondents (630) has 
been divided by 3 because the Category 1 filings will be submitted to the Commission on 
a staggered basis over the course of a three-year period.  After the first three years, the 
number of responses will be zero. 
1231 This estimate reflects the limited scope of the filing required by Category 1 
sellers, i.e., a filing explaining why the seller meets the Category 1 criteria and including 
a list of all generation assets owned or controlled by the seller and its affiliates grouped 
by balancing authority area.  
1232 Category 2 sellers are any sellers not in Category 1. 
1233 To determine the number of responses, the number of respondents (600) has 
been divided by 3 because the responses will be submitted to the Commission on a 
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Total Annual hours for Collection:  (Reporting + record retention, (if appropriate)= 
71,210 hours. 
Information Collection Costs:  The total annual cost for Initial Market Power Analyses is 
estimated to be $2,340,000.  Total annual cost for market-based rate tariffs is projected to 
be $369,000 for the first year.  Total annual cost for Category 1 Qualification Filings is 
projected to be $472,500.
1234  Total annual cost for Updated Market Power Analyses 
Category 2 is projected to be $7,500,000.  The hourly rate of $150 includes attorney fees, 
engineering consultation fees and administrative support.  There are 2080 total work 
hours in a year.  There are no filing fees associated with applications for market-based 
rate authority. 
Respondents (Market Power Analysis; MBR Tariff; Triennial Review):  Businesses or 
other for profit. 
Frequency of Responses 
Market Power Analyses:  Occasionally; consistent with current practice, a market power 
analysis must be filed for each utility seeking market-based rate authority. 
Market-Based Rate Tariffs:  once, consistent with the requirement that all sellers file 
modifications to their existing tariffs in accordance with the provisions in Appendix C. 
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Updated market power analyses:  Updated market power analysis filed every three years 
for Category 2 sellers seeking to retain market-based rate authority. 
Necessity of the Information 
Market Power Analyses:  Consistent with current practice, the market power analysis 
helps inform the Commission as to whether an entity seeking market-based rate authority 
lacks market power, and whether sales by that entity will be just and reasonable.  
Market-Based Rate Tariff:  Market-based rate tariffs with standard provisions will 
improve the efficiency of the Commission in its analysis and determination of market-
based rate authority.  These will reduce document preparation time overall and provide 
utilities with the clearly defined expectations of the Commission.   
Updated Market Power Analyses:  The updated market power analyses allow the 
Commission to monitor market-based rate authority to detect changes in market power or 
potential abuses of market power.  The updated market power analysis permits the 
Commission to determine that continued market-based rate authority will still yield rates 
that are just and reasonable. 
Internal review:  The Commission has conducted an internal review of the public 
reporting burden associated with the collection of information and assured itself, by 
means of internal review, that there is specific, objective support for this information 
burden estimate.  Moreover, the Commission has reviewed the collections of information 
and has determined that these collections of information are necessary and conform to the Docket No. RM04-7-000   639 
 
Commission’s plans, as described in this order, for the collection, efficient management, 
and use of the required information.
1235   
1124.  Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by 
contacting:  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., 
Washington, D.C. 20426 [Attention:  Michael Miller, Office of the Executive 
Director, Phone: (202) 502-8415, fax: (202) 273-0873, e-mail:  
michael.miller@ferc.gov or the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office 
of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. 
VII.  Environmental Analysis 
1125.  The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental Assessment or an 
Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may have a significant adverse 
effect on the human environment.
1236  The Commission concludes that neither an 
Environmental Assessment nor an Environmental Impact Statement is required for 
this Final Rule under § 380.4(a)(15) of the Commission’s regulations, which provides 
                                              
1235 See 44 U.S.C. 3506(c). 
1236 Order No. 486, Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles 1986-1990 ¶ 30,783 
(1987). Docket No. RM04-7-000   640 
 
a categorical exemption for approval of actions under sections 205 and 206 of the 
FPA relating to electric rate filings.
1237 
VIII.  Regulatory Flexibility Act 
1126.  The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA)
1238 generally requires a 
description and analysis of rules that will have significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
1239  The Final Rule will be applicable to all 
public utilities seeking and currently possessing market-based rate authority.  The 
Commission finds that the regulations adopted here should not have a significant 
impact on small businesses.   
1127.  The submission of a market power analysis is currently required of all entities 
seeking authority to sell at market-based rates, and the Final Rule does not expand 
which entities will be required to file these analyses.  The Final Rule does not create a 
new reporting requirement.  It does, however, expand the scope of the analysis that 
must be submitted for those entities that previously were exempted from preparing a 
                                              
1237 18 CFR 380.4(a)(15). 
1238 5 U.S.C. 601-12. 
1239 The RFA definition of “small entity” refers to the definition provided in the 
Small Business Act, which defines a “small business concern” as a business that is 
independently owned and operated and that is not dominant in its field of operation.      
15 U.S.C. 632.  The Small Business Size Standards component of the North American 
Industry Classification System defines a small electric utility as one that, including its 
affiliates, is primarily engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of 
electric energy for sale and whose total electric output for the preceding fiscal year did 
not exceed 4 million MWh.  13 CFR 121.201 (section 22, Utilities, North American 
Industry Classification System, NAICS). Docket No. RM04-7-000   641 
 
generation market power analysis by virtue of 18 CFR 35.27(a).  The Commission is 
concerned that the continued use of the § 35.27(a) exemption, in time, would 
encompass all market participants as all pre-July 9, 1996 generation is retired.  
Nevertheless, because the Commission allows a seller to make simplifying 
assumptions, where appropriate, and therefore to submit a streamlined analysis, the 
Commission believes that any additional burden imposed by the elimination of the § 
35.27(a) exemption will be minimal.   
1128.  Standard tariff provisions will decrease document preparation by clearly 
defining the information sought by the Commission.   
1129.  For certain sellers, the triennial review submissions that provide updated 
market power analyses are required for the retention of market-based rate authority.  
Category 2 utilities shall continue to submit this analysis, which poses no greater 
burden than that already in place.  However, the regulations will result in fewer 
filings with the Commission after the next three years than currently required for 
qualified smaller (Category 1) utilities’ retention of market-based rate authority.  
Thus, the Final Rule will be less burdensome economically and reduce the frequency 
of document preparation for market-based rate authority retention for qualified 
smaller utilities.  The Commission concludes that this Final Rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
IX.  Document Availability 
1130.  In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, 
the Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print Docket No. RM04-7-000   642 
 
the contents of this document via the Internet through FERC's Home Page 
(http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's Public Reference Room during normal business 
hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, N.E., Room 2A, 
Washington D.C. 20426. 
1131.  From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is available on 
eLibrary.  The full text of this document is available on eLibrary in PDF and 
Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or downloading. To access this 
document in eLibrary, type the docket number excluding the last three digits of this 
document in the docket number field. 
1132.  User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's website during 
normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202) 502-6652 (toll-free at 1-
866-208-3676) or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference 
Room at (202) 502-8371 Press 0, TTY (202) 502-8659.  E-Mail the Public Reference 
Room at public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. 
X.  Effective Date and Congressional Notification 
1133.  These regulations are effective [insert date 60 days from the date the rule is 
published in the FEDERAL REGISTER]. The Commission has determined, with 
the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a “major rule” as defined in section 351 of the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.  The Commission will 
submit the Final Rule to both houses of Congress and to the General Accounting 
Office. Docket No. RM04-7-000   643 
 
 
 
 
List of subjects in 18 CFR Part 35  
 
Electric power rates, Electric utilities, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 
 
By the Commission.  Commissioner Moeller dissenting in part with a 
                                  separate statement attached. 
( S E A L ) 
       
 
 
 
     Kimberly D. Bose, 
   Secretary.    
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
 
Market-based Rates for Wholesale Sales of  
Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services  
by Public Utilities              Docket No. RM04-7-000 
 
                                                              (Issued June 21, 2007) 
  
MOELLER, Commissioner, dissenting in part: 
 
I find persuasive the arguments raised by commenters
1 that a limited 
grandfathering provision for the “1996 exemption”
2 is warranted, to avoid modifying the 
understanding that certain generators relied upon to finance and construct new 
generation.  It is my position that, with respect to sales from capacity for which 
construction commenced on or after July 9, 1996, but before the effective date of this 
Final Rule, any public utility that has authority to engage in market-based rate sales 
should not be required to demonstrate a lack of market power in generation consistent 
with the terms of the exemption.  That is, any public utility that qualified and received a 
1996 exemption should retain its exemption from filing a generation market power 
analysis (now termed horizontal market power analysis).  However, any increase in such 
capacity after the effective date of this Final Rule would terminate the exemption.   
 
As I have stated previously, I am interested in providing regulatory certainty, and 
promoting infrastructure investment and independent power production.  A limited 
grandfathering of the 1996 exemption would, on one hand, allow entities to continue to 
preserve the bargain they received when they relied on the exemption and, on the other 
hand, support the majority’s reasons for revoking the exemption for all generators.   
 
                                              
1 Such commenters include EPSA, Mirant and Constellation. 
2 18 C.F.R. 35.27(a) (2006), which states “Notwithstanding any other 
requirements, any public utility seeking authorization to engage in sales for resale of 
electric energy at market-based rates shall not be required to demonstrate any lack of 
market power in generation with respect to sales from capacity for which construction 
has commenced on or after July 9, 1996.” Docket No. RM04-7-000   2 
 
Also, my understanding is that very few entities would be eligible for this limited 
grandfathering; even without the grandfathering, they would probably be classified as 
“Category 1 sellers.”
3  Moreover, this exemption neither precludes any entity from 
presenting evidence to the Commission, nor disallows the Commission of its own accord, 
to investigate an allegation of market power abuse by an exempt generator.  This should 
allay any fears that these smaller entities will be able to exercise generation market 
power.
4
 
 
      _______________________ 
                                                                                  Philip D. Moeller 
                                                                                    Commissioner 
 
 
                                              
3 “The sellers that have taken advantage of the exemption will largely qualify as 
Category 1 sellers, and thus will be unaffected to the extent that they will not be required 
to file a regularly scheduled updated market power analysis.”  Final Rule at P 321. 
4 In defending our decision to create Category 1 sellers, the majority observes that 
no commenter has submitted compelling evidence that Category 1 sellers have 
unmitigated market power.  Final Rule at P 334.    
 
  In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission amends part 35, Chapter I, Title 
18, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:   
 
1.  The authority citation for part 35 continues to read as follows: 
Authority:  16 U.S.C. 791a-825r, 2601-2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 7101-
7352.   
2.  In § 35.27, the title and the section are revised to read as follows: 
 
§ 35.27  Authority of State Commissions. 
 
  Nothing in this part – 
  (a) Shall be construed as preempting or affecting any jurisdiction a state 
commission or other state authority may have under applicable state and federal law, or 
  (b) Limits the authority of a state commission in accordance with state and federal 
law to establish 
  (1) Competitive procedures for the acquisition of electric energy, including 
demand-side management, purchased at wholesale, or 
  (2) Non-discriminatory fees for the distribution of such electric energy to retail 
consumers for purposes established in accordance with state law. 
3.  Subpart H is revised to read as follows: 
 
Subpart H – Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services at 
Market-Based Rates 
 
Sec. 
35.36   Generally. Docket No. RM04-7-000   2 
 
35.37    Market power analysis required. 
35.38   Mitigation. 
35.39   Affiliate  restrictions. 
35.40   Ancillary  services. 
35.41    Market behavior rules. 
35.42    Change in status reporting requirement. 
 
Appendix A to Subpart H  Standard Screen Format 
 
Appendix B to Subpart H   Corporate Entities and Assets 
 
§ 35.36  Generally.  
  (a)  For purposes of this subpart: 
  (1)  Seller means any person that has authorization to or seeks authorization to 
engage in sales for resale of electric energy, capacity or ancillary services at market-
based rates under section 205 of the Federal Power Act. 
  (2)  Category 1 Sellers means wholesale power marketers and wholesale power 
producers that own or control 500 MW or less of generation in aggregate per region; that 
do not own, operate or control transmission facilities other than limited equipment 
necessary to connect individual generating facilities to the transmission grid (or have 
been granted waiver of the requirements of Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 
31,036); that are not affiliated with anyone that owns, operates or controls transmission 
facilities in the same region as the seller’s generation assets; that are not affiliated with a 
franchised public utility in the same region as the seller’s generation assets; and that do Docket No. RM04-7-000   3 
 
not raise other vertical market power issues. 
  (3)  Category 2 Sellers means any Sellers not in Category 1. 
  (4)  Inputs to electric power production means intrastate natural gas transportation, 
intrastate natural gas storage or distribution facilities; sites for generation capacity 
development; sources of coal supplies and equipment for the transportation of coal 
supplies such as barges and rail cars. 
  (5)  Franchised public utility means a public utility with a franchised service 
obligation under state law. 
  (6)  Captive customers means any wholesale or retail electric energy customers 
served under cost-based regulation. 
(7)  Market-regulated power sales affiliate means any power seller affiliate other 
than a franchised public utility, including a power marketer, exempt wholesale generator, 
qualifying facility or other power seller affiliate, whose power sales are regulated in 
whole or in part on a market-rate basis. 
(8)  Market information means non-public information related to the electric 
energy and power business including, but not limited to, information regarding sales, cost 
of production, generator outages, generator heat rates, unconsummated transactions, or 
historical generator volumes.  Market information includes information from either 
affiliates or non-affiliates. 
  (b)  The provisions of this subpart apply to all Sellers authorized, or seeking 
authorization, to make sales for resale of electric energy, capacity or ancillary services at 
market-based rates unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. Docket No. RM04-7-000   4 
 
§ 35.37  Market power analysis required. 
  (a) (1)  In addition to other requirements in subparts A and B, a Seller must submit 
a market power analysis in the following circumstances:  when seeking market-based rate 
authority; for Category 2 Sellers, every three years, according to the schedule contained 
in Order No. ___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,___; or any other time the Commission 
directs a Seller to submit one.  Failure to timely file an updated market power analysis 
will constitute a violation of Seller’s market-based rate tariff. 
  (2)  When submitting a market power analysis, whether as part of an initial 
application or an update, a Seller must include an appendix of assets in the form provided 
in Appendix B of this subpart. 
  (b)  A market power analysis must address whether a Seller has horizontal and 
vertical market power. 
  (c) (1)  There will be a rebuttable presumption that a Seller lacks horizontal market 
power if it passes two indicative market power screens:  a pivotal supplier analysis based 
on the annual peak demand of the relevant market, and a market share analysis applied on 
a seasonal basis.  There will be a rebuttable presumption that a Seller possesses 
horizontal market power if it fails either screen.   
  (2)  Sellers and intervenors may also file alternative evidence to support or rebut 
the results of the indicative screens.  Sellers may file such evidence at the time they file 
their indicative screens.  Intervenors may file such evidence in response to a Seller’s 
submissions.  
(3)  If a Seller does not pass one or both screens, the Seller may rebut a Docket No. RM04-7-000   5 
 
presumption of horizontal market power by submitting a Delivered Price Test analysis.  
A Seller that does not rebut a presumption of horizontal market power or that concedes 
market power, is subject to mitigation, as described in § 35.38.  
  (4)  When submitting a horizontal market power analysis, a Seller must use the 
form provided in Appendix A of this subpart and include all supporting materials 
referenced in the form. 
  (d)  To demonstrate a lack of vertical market power, a Seller that owns, operates or 
controls transmission facilities, or whose affiliates own, operate or control transmission 
facilities, must have on file with the Commission an Open Access Transmission Tariff, as 
described in § 35.28; provided, however, that a Seller whose foreign affiliate(s) own, 
operate or control transmission facilities outside of the United States that can be used by 
competitors of the Seller to reach United States markets must demonstrate that such 
affiliate either has adopted and is implementing an Open Access Transmission Tariff as 
described in § 35.28, or otherwise offers comparable, non-discriminatory access to such 
transmission facilities.   
  (e)  To demonstrate a lack of vertical market power in wholesale energy markets 
through the affiliation, ownership or control of inputs to electric power production, such 
as the transportation or distribution of the inputs to electric power production, a Seller 
must provide the following information:    
(1)  A description of its ownership or control of, or affiliation with an entity that 
owns or controls, intrastate natural gas transportation, intrastate natural gas storage or 
distribution facilities;  Docket No. RM04-7-000   6 
 
(2)  Sites for generation capacity development; and  
(3)  Sources of coal supplies and the transportation of coal supplies such as barges 
and rail cars.   
(4)  A Seller must ensure that this information is included in the record of each 
new application for market-based rates and each updated market power analysis.  In 
addition, a Seller is required to make an affirmative statement that it has not erected 
barriers to entry into the relevant market and will not erect barriers to entry into the 
relevant market.   
  (f)  If the seller seeks to protect any portion of the application, or any attachment 
thereto, from public disclosure pursuant to § 388.112 of this chapter, the seller must 
include with its request for privileged treatment a proposed protective order under which 
the parties to the proceeding will be able to review any of the data, information, analysis 
or other documentation relied upon by the seller for which privileged treatment is sought.  
A seller must grant access to privileged data to any party that signs a protective order 
within 5 days from the date that the party executes the protective order.  
§ 35.38  Mitigation. 
  (a)  A Seller that has been found to have market power in generation or that is 
presumed to have horizontal market power by virtue of failing or foregoing the horizontal 
market power screens, as described in § 35.37(c), may adopt the default mitigation 
detailed in paragraph (b) of this section or may propose mitigation tailored to its own 
particular circumstances to eliminate its ability to exercise market power.  Mitigation will 
apply only to the market(s) in which the Seller is found, or presumed, to have market Docket No. RM04-7-000   7 
 
power. 
  (b)  Default mitigation consists of three distinct products:   
(1)  Sales of power of one week or less priced at the Seller’s incremental cost plus 
a 10 percent adder;  
(2)  Sales of power of more than one week but less than one year priced at no 
higher than a  cost-based ceiling reflecting the costs of the unit(s) expected to provide the 
service; and  
(3)  New contracts filed for review under section 205 of the Federal Power Act for 
sales of power for one year or more priced at a rate not to exceed embedded cost of 
service. 
§ 35.39  Affiliate restrictions. 
  (a)  General affiliate provisions.  As a condition of obtaining and retaining market-
based rate authority, the conditions provided in this section, including the restriction on 
affiliate sales of electric energy and all other affiliate provisions, must be satisfied on an 
ongoing basis, unless otherwise authorized by Commission rule or order.  Failure to 
satisfy these conditions will constitute a violation of the Seller’s market-based rate tariff. 
(b)  Restriction on affiliate sales of electric energy.  As a condition of obtaining 
and retaining market-based rate authority, no wholesale sale of electric energy may be 
made between a franchised public utility with captive customers and a market-regulated 
power sales affiliate without first receiving Commission authorization for the transaction 
under section 205 of the Federal Power Act.  All authorizations to engage in affiliate 
wholesale sales of electric energy must be listed in a Seller’s market-based rate tariff. Docket No. RM04-7-000   8 
 
  (c)  Separation of functions. 
  (1)  For the purpose of this paragraph, entities acting on behalf of and for the 
benefit of a franchised public utility with captive customers (such as entities controlling 
or marketing power from the electrical generation assets of the franchised public utility) 
are considered part of the franchised public utility.  Entities acting on behalf of and for 
the benefit of the market-regulated power sales affiliates of a franchised public utility 
with captive customers are considered part of the market-regulated power sales affiliates. 
(2) (i)  To the maximum extent practical, the employees of a market-regulated 
power sales affiliate must operate separately from the employees of any affiliated 
franchised public utility with captive customers. 
 (ii) Franchised public utilities with captive customers are permitted to share 
support employees, and field and maintenance employees with their market-regulated 
power sales affiliates.   Franchised public utilities with captive customers are also 
permitted to share senior officers and boards of directors with their market-regulated 
power sales affiliates; provided, however, that the shared officers and boards of directors 
must not participate in directing, organizing or executing generation or market functions. 
(iii) Notwithstanding any other restrictions in this section, in emergency 
circumstances affecting system reliability, a market-regulated power sales affiliate and a 
franchised public utility with captive customers may take steps necessary to keep the bulk 
power system in operation.  A franchised public utility with captive customers or the 
market-regulated power sales affiliate must report to the Commission and disclose to the 
public on its website, each emergency that resulted in any deviation from the restrictions Docket No. RM04-7-000   9 
 
of section 35.39, within 24 hours of such deviation. 
  (d)  Information sharing. 
  (1) Unless simultaneously disclosed to the public, market information may not be 
shared between a franchised public utility with captive customers and a market-regulated 
power sales affiliate if the sharing could be used to the detriment of captive customers.   
  (2) Permissibly shared support employees, field and maintenance employees and 
senior officers and board of directors under §§ 35.39(c)(2)(ii) may have access to 
information covered by the prohibition of § 35.39(d)(1), subject to the no-conduit 
provision in § 35.39(g). 
  (e) Non-power goods or services. 
  (1)  Unless otherwise permitted by Commission rule or order, sales of any non-
power goods or services by a franchised public utility with captive customers, to a 
market-regulated power sales affiliate must be at the higher of cost or market price. 
  (2)  Unless otherwise permitted by Commission rule or order, sales of any non-
power goods or services by a market-regulated power sales affiliate to an affiliated 
franchised public utility with captive customers may not be at a price above market. 
  (f)  Brokering of power. 
  (1)  Unless otherwise permitted by Commission rule or order, to the extent a 
market-regulated power sales affiliate seeks to broker power for an affiliated franchised 
public utility with captive customers:   
(i) The market-regulated power sales affiliate must offer the franchised public 
utility’s power first;  Docket No. RM04-7-000   10 
 
(ii) The arrangement between the market-regulated power sales affiliate and the 
franchised public utility must be non-exclusive; and  
(iii) The market-regulated power sales affiliate may not accept any fees in 
conjunction with any brokering services it performs for an affiliated franchised public 
utility.  
  (2)  Unless otherwise permitted by Commission rule or order, to the extent a 
franchised public utility with captive customers seeks to broker power for a market-
regulated power sales affiliate:   
(i) The franchised public utility must charge the higher of its costs for the service 
or the market price for such services;  
(ii) The franchised public utility must market its own power first, and 
simultaneously make public (on the Internet) any market information shared with its 
affiliate during the brokering; and  
(iii) The franchised public utility must post on the Internet the actual brokering 
charges imposed. 
  (g)  No conduit provision.  A franchised public utility with captive customers and 
a market-regulated power sales affiliate are prohibited from using anyone, including asset 
managers, as a conduit to circumvent the affiliate restrictions in §§ 35.39(a) through (g).  
  (h)  Franchised utilities without captive customers.  If necessary, any affiliate 
restrictions regarding separation of functions, power sales or non-power goods and 
services transactions, or brokering involving two or more franchised public utilities, one 
or more of whom has captive customers and one or more of whom does not have captive Docket No. RM04-7-000   11 
 
customers, will be imposed on a case-by-case basis. 
§ 35.40  Ancillary services. 
  A Seller may make sales of ancillary services at market-based rates only if it has 
been authorized by the Commission and only in specific geographic markets as the 
Commission has authorized. 
§ 35.41  Market behavior rules. 
 (a)  Unit  operation.  Where a Seller participates in a Commission-approved 
organized market, Seller must operate and schedule generating facilities, undertake 
maintenance, declare outages, and commit or otherwise bid supply in a manner that 
complies with the Commission-approved rules and regulations of the applicable market.  
A Seller is not required to bid or supply electric energy or other electricity products 
unless such requirement is a part of a separate Commission-approved tariff or is a 
requirement applicable to Seller through Seller’s participation in a Commission-approved 
organized market. 
 (b)  Communications.  A Seller must provide accurate and factual information 
and not submit false or misleading information, or omit material information, in any 
communication with the Commission, Commission-approved market monitors, 
Commission-approved regional transmission organizations, Commission-approved 
independent system operators, or jurisdictional transmission providers, unless Seller 
exercises due diligence to prevent such occurrences. 
 (c)  Price  reporting.  To the extent a Seller engages in reporting of transactions 
to publishers of electric or natural gas price indices, Seller must provide accurate and Docket No. RM04-7-000   12 
 
factual information, and not knowingly submit false or misleading information or omit 
material information to any such publisher, by reporting its transactions in a manner 
consistent with the procedures set forth in the Policy Statement issued by the 
Commission in Docket No. PL03-3-000 and any clarifications thereto.  Unless Seller has 
previously provided the Commission with a notification of its price reporting status, 
Seller must notify the Commission within 15 days of the effective date of this regulation 
or within 15 days of the date it begins making wholesale sales, whichever is earlier, 
whether it engages in such reporting of its transactions.  Seller must update the 
notification within 15 days of any subsequent change in its transaction reporting status.  
In addition, Seller must adhere to such other standards and requirements for price 
reporting as the Commission may order.  
 (d)  Records  retention.  A Seller must retain, for a period of five years, all data 
and information upon which it billed the prices it charged for the electric energy or 
electric energy products it sold pursuant to Seller’s market-based rate tariff, and the 
prices it reported for use in price indices.  
§ 35.42  Change in status reporting requirement. 
  (a)  As a condition of obtaining and retaining market-based rate authority, a Seller 
must timely report to the Commission any change in status that would reflect a departure 
from the characteristics the Commission relied upon in granting market-based rate 
authority.  A change in status includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
  (1) Ownership or control of generation capacity that results in net increases of 100 
MW or more, or of inputs to electric power production, or ownership, operation or Docket No. RM04-7-000   13 
 
control of transmission facilities, or 
  (2) Affiliation with any entity not disclosed in the application for market-based 
rate authority that owns or controls generation facilities or inputs to electric power 
production, affiliation with any entity not disclosed in the application for market-based 
rate authority that owns, operates or controls transmission facilities, or affiliation with 
any entity that has a franchised service area. 
  (b)  Any change in status subject to paragraph (a) of this section must be filed no 
later than 30 days after the change in status occurs.  Power sales contracts with future 
delivery are reportable 30 days after the physical delivery has begun.  Failure to timely 
file a change in status report constitutes a tariff violation. 
  (c)  When submitting a change in status notification regarding a change that 
impacts the pertinent assets held by a Seller or its affiliates with market-based rate 
authorization, a Seller must include an appendix of assets in the form provided in 
Appendix B of this subpart.   Docket No. RM04-7-000   14 
 
Appendix A 
Standard Screen Format 
(Data provided for Illustrative Purposes only) 
 
Part I -- Pivotal Supplier Analysis 
 
Row Generation  MW  Reference 
 
  Seller and Affiliate Capacity     
A  Installed Capacity  19,500  Workpaper   
B  Long-Term Firm Purchases  500  Workpaper  
C  Long-Term Firm Sales  -1,000  Workpaper  
D  Imported Power  0  Workpaper  
  Non-Affiliate Capacity 
E  Installed Capacity  8,000  Workpaper  
F  Long-Term Firm Purchases  500  Workpaper  
G  Long-Term Firm Sales  -2,500  Workpaper  
H  Imported Power  3,500  Workpaper      
      
I  Balancing Authority Area Reserve Requirement   -2,160  Workpaper  
J  Amount of Line I Attributable to Seller, if any  -2,160  Workpaper  
      
K  Total Uncommitted Supply (SUM A,B,C,D,E,F,G,I)  9,840   
      
  Load    
L  Balancing Authority Area Annual Peak Load  18,000  Workpaper  
M  Average Daily Peak Native Load in Peak Month  -16,500  Workpaper  
N  Amount of Line M Attributable to Seller, if any  -16,500  Workpaper  
      
O  Wholesale Load (SUM L,M)  1,500   
      
P  Net Uncommitted Supply (K-O)  8,340   
      
Q  Seller's Uncommitted Capacity (SUM A,B,C,D,J,N)  340   
      
Result of Pivotal Supplier Screen (Pass if Line Q < Line P)      PASS   
                                        (Fail if Line Q > Line P)     
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Part II – Market Share Analysis 
(Data provided for Illustrative Purposes only) 
 
Row     Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Reference 
   (MW)  (MW)  (MW) (MW)   
  Seller and Affiliate Capacity 
A  Installed Capacity  19,500  19,500  19,500  19,500  Workpaper  
B  Long-Term Firm Purchases  500  500  500  500  Workpaper  
C  Long-Term Firm Sales  -1,000  -1,000  -1,000  -1,000  Workpaper  
D  Seasonal Average Planned Outages  -4,000  -3,000  -800  -3,500  Workpaper  
E  Imported Power  0  0  0  0  Workpaper  
    
 
  Capcacity Deductions          
F  Average Peak Native Load in the Season  -11,500  -10,000  -12,500  -11,500  Workpaper  
G  Amount of Line F Attributable to Seller, if any  -11,500  -10,000  -12,500  -11,500  Workpaper  
H  Amount of Line F Attributable to Others, if any  0  0  0  0  Workpaper  
I  Balancing Authority Area Reserve Requirement  -1,500  -1,320  -1,560  -1,500  Workpaper  
J  Amount of Line I Attributable to Seller, if any  -1,500  -1,320  -1,560  -1,500  Workpaper  
K  Amount of Line I Attributable to Others, if any  0  0  0  0  Workpaper  
 
  Non-Affiliate Capacity          
L  Installed Capacity  8,000  8,000  8,000  8,000  Workpaper  
M  Long-Term Firm Purchases  500  500  500  500  Workpaper  
N  Long-Term Firm Sales  -2,500  -2,500  -2,500  -2,500  Workpaper  
O  Local Seasonal Average Planned Outages  -800  -200  -300  -400  Workpaper  
P  Uncommitted Capacity Imports   5,000  4,500  3,500  4,000  Workpaper  
      
  Supply Calculation     
Q  Total Competing Supply (SUM L,M,N,O,P,H,K)  10,200  10,300  9,200  9,600   
R  Seller's Uncommitted Capacity (SUM A,B,C,D,E,G,J)  2,000  4,680  4,140  2,500   
S  Total Seasonal Uncommitted Capacity (SUM Q,R)  12,200  14,980  13,340  12,100   
            
T  Seller's Market Share (R/S) 16.39%  31.24%  31.03%  20.66%   
  Results (Pass if < 20%)  PASS  FAIL  FAIL  FAIL   
                   (Fail if ≥ 20) Docket No. RM04-7-000   16   
Appendix B 
 
This is an example of the required appendix listing the filing entity and all its energy affiliates and their associated assets 
which should be submitted with all market-based rate filings.  
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Market-Based Rate Authority and Generation Assets 
Location 
Filing Entity and 
its Energy 
Affiliates 
Docket # 
where MBR 
authority 
was 
granted 
Generation 
Name 
Owned 
By 
Controlled 
By 
Date 
Control 
Transferred 
Balancing 
Authority 
Area  
Geographic 
Region (per 
Appendix 
D) 
In-service 
Date 
Nameplate 
and/or 
Seasonal 
Rating 
ABC Corp.     ER05-23X-
000 
ABC falls 
plant #1 
ABC 
Corp.  ABC Corp.  NA* 
ABC 
balancing 
authority 
area 
Central 8/12/1981  153.5 MW 
(seasonal) 
                             
xyz Inc.         ER94-79XX-
000  NA NA NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
                             
RST LLC       ER01-2XX5-
000 
Green 
CoGen 
WWW 
Corp  RST LLC  5/23/2005   New York 
ISO  Northeast 12/20/2003 2000 MW 
(nameplate)
                             
Sample Co.          ER03-
XX45-000 
Sample Co. 
3 
Sample 
Co.  YYY Corp  2/1/1982  
Sample 
Co. 
balancing 
authority 
Southwest 5/13/1973  10 MW 
(seasonal) 
*if an entity has no assets or the field is not applicable please indicate so by inputting (NA). Docket No. RM04-7-000   17   
 
 
Page 2 of 2 
 
Electric Transmission Assets and/or Natural Gas Intrastate Pipelines and/or Gas Storage Facilities 
Location 
Filing Entity and 
its Energy 
Affiliates  
Asset Name 
and Use 
Owned 
By 
Controlled 
By 
Date 
Control 
Transferred Balancing 
Authority Area 
Geographic 
Region (per 
Appendix 
D) 
Size 
ABC Corp. 
CBA Line, 
used to 
interconnect 
Green Cogen 
to New York 
ISO 
transmission 
system 
ABC 
Corp.  ABC Corp.  NA*  New York ISO  Northeast 
approximately 
five-mile, 500 
kV line 
                       
Etc. LP 
Nowhere 
Pipeline, used 
to connect 
Storage LLC’s 
-  Longway 
Pipeline to 
ABC falls plant 
#1 
Etc. LP  Etc. LP  NA  ABC balancing 
authority area  Central 
approximately 
14 miles of 
natural gas 
pipeline and 
related 
equipment with 
50 MMcf/d 
capacity. 
*if the field is not applicable please indicate so by inputting (NA). Docket No. RM04-7-000   18
   
 
Note:  The following appendices will not be published in the Code of Federal 
Regulations. 
Appendix C 
 
Required Provisions of the Market-Based Rate Tariff 
 
Compliance with Commission Regulations 
 
Seller shall comply with the provisions of 18 CFR Part 35, Subpart H, as applicable, and 
with any conditions the Commission imposes in its orders concerning seller’s market-
based rate authority, including orders in which the Commission authorizes seller to 
engage in affiliate sales under this tariff or otherwise restricts or limits the seller’s 
market-based rate authority.  Failure to comply with the applicable provisions of 18 CFR 
Part 35, Subpart H, and with any orders of the Commission concerning seller’s market-
based rate authority, will constitute a violation of this tariff. 
 
Limitations and Exemptions Regarding Market-Based Rate Authority 
[Seller should list all limitations (including markets where seller does not have 
market-based rate authority) on its market-based rate authority and any 
exemptions from or waivers granted of Commission regulations and include 
relevant cites to Commission orders].  
 
Include All Of The Following Provisions That Are Applicable 
 
Mitigated Sales 
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Sales of energy and capacity are permissible under this tariff in all balancing authority 
areas where the Seller has been granted market-based rate authority.  Sales of energy and 
capacity under this tariff are also permissible at the metered boundary between the 
Seller’s mitigated balancing authority area and a balancing authority area where the 
Seller has been granted market-based rate authority provided: (i) legal title of the power 
sold transfers at the metered boundary of the balancing authority area; (ii) any power sold 
hereunder is not intended to serve load in the seller’s mitigated market; and (iii) no 
affiliate of the mitigated seller will sell the same power back into the mitigated seller’s 
mitigated market.  Seller must retain, for a period of five years from the date of the sale, 
all data and information related to the sale that demonstrates compliance with items (i), 
(ii) and (iii) above. 
 
Ancillary Services 
 
 RTO/ISO  Specific  –  Include All Services the Seller Is Offering 
 
PJM:  Seller offers regulation and frequency response service, energy imbalance service, 
and operating reserve service (which includes spinning, 10-minute, and 30-minute 
reserves) for sale into the market administered by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM") 
and, where the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff permits, the self-supply of these 
services to purchasers for a bilateral sale that is used to satisfy the ancillary services 
requirements of the PJM Office of Interconnection.  
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New York:  Seller offers regulation and frequency response service, and operating 
reserve service (which include 10-minute non-synchronous, 30-minute operating 
reserves, 10-minute spinning reserves, and 10-minute non-spinning reserves) for sale to 
purchasers in the market administered by the New York Independent System Operator, 
Inc. 
 
New England:  Seller offers regulation and frequency response service (automatic 
generator control), operating reserve service (which includes 10-minute spinning reserve, 
10-minute non-spinning reserve, and 30-minute operating reserve service) to purchasers 
within the markets administered by the ISO New England, Inc. 
 
California:  Seller offers regulation service, spinning reserve service, and non-spinning 
reserve service to the California Independent System Operator Corporation ("CAISO") 
and to others that are self-supplying ancillary services to the CAISO. 
 
  Third Party Provider 
 
Third-party ancillary services [include all of the following that the seller is offering: 
Regulation Service, Energy Imbalance Service, Spinning Reserves, and Supplemental 
Reserves].  Sales will not include the following:  (1) sales to an RTO or an ISO, i.e., 
where that entity has no ability to self-supply ancillary services but instead depends on 
third parties; (2) sales to a traditional, franchised public utility affiliated with the third-Docket No. RM04-7-000   21 
 
party supplier, or sales where the underlying transmission service is on the system of the 
public utility affiliated with the third-party supplier; and (3) sales to a public utility that is 
purchasing ancillary services to satisfy its own open access transmission tariff 
requirements to offer ancillary services to its own customers. Docket No. RM04-7-000   22 
 
Appendix D 
 
Regions and Schedule for Regional Market Power Update Process 
 
The six regions are combinations of NERC regions; RTOs and ISOs and are depicted in 
the map that follows.  
 
Map of Geographic Regions 
 
 
 
[   ] Northeast (ISO-NE, NYISO, PJM) 
 
[   ] Southeast (NERC Regions SERC and FRCC (not including PJM or Midwest ISO)) 
 
[   ] Central (Midwest ISO, NERC Region MRO) 
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[   ] Southwest Power Pool (NERC region SPP) 
 
[   ] Southwest (California, NERC region WECC-AZNMSNV) 
 
[   ] Northwest (NERC Regions WECC-NWPP and WECC-RMPA) 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional Market Power Update Schedule 
 
Study 
Period    
 
Filing Period 
(Anytime between)  Entities Required to File 
2006  December 1-30, 2007 
Northeast 
Transmission 
Operators 
 
2006  June 1-30, 2008 
Southeast 
Transmission 
Operators 
All others in Northeast that 
did not file in December 
including all power marketers 
that sold in the Northeast. 
2006  December 1-30, 2008   
All others in Southeast that 
did not file in June including 
all power marketers that sold 
in the Southeast and have not 
already been found to be 
Category 1 sellers. 
2007  December 1-30, 2008 
Central 
Transmission 
Operators 
 
2007  June 1-30, 2009  SPP Transmission 
Operators 
All others in Central that did 
not file in December 
including all power marketers 
that sold in the Central and 
have not already been found 
to be Category 1 sellers. 
2007  December 1-30, 2009   
All others in SPP that did not 
file in June including all 
power marketers that sold in 
SPP and have not already Docket No. RM04-7-000   24 
 
been found to be Category 1 
sellers. 
2008  December 1-30, 2009 
Southwest 
Transmission 
Operators 
 
2008  June 1-30, 2010 
Northwest 
Transmission 
Operators 
All others in Southwest that 
did not file in December 
including all power marketers 
that sold in the Southwest and 
have not already been found 
to be Category 1 sellers. 
2008  December 1-30, 2010   
All others in Northwest that 
did not file in June including 
all power marketers that sold 
in the Northwest and have not 
already been found to be 
Category 1 sellers. 
2009  December 1-30, 2010 
Northeast 
Transmission 
Operators 
 
All Category 1 sellers should be identified by the Commission prior to the 
subsequent filing periods.  Only Category 2 sellers will continue to file updated 
market power analyses according to the repeating schedule below.   
2009  June 1-30, 2011 
Southeast 
Transmission 
Operators 
Others in Northeast that did 
not file in December and have 
not been found to be 
Category 1 sellers. 
2009  December 1-30, 2011   
Others in Southeast that did 
not file in June and have not 
been found to be Category 1 
sellers. 
2010  December 1-30, 2011 
Central 
Transmission 
Operators 
 
2010  June 1-30, 2012  SPP Transmission 
Operators 
Others in Central that did not 
file in December and have not 
been found to be Category 1 
sellers. 
2010  December 1-30, 2012    Others in SPP that did not file 
in June and have not been Docket No. RM04-7-000   25 
 
found to be Category 1 
sellers. 
2011  December 1-30, 2012 
Southwest 
Transmission 
Operators 
 
2011  June 1-30, 2013 
Northwest 
Transmission 
Operators 
Others in Southwest that did 
not file in December and have 
not been found to be 
Category 1 sellers. 
2011  December 1-30, 2013   
Others in Northwest that did 
not file in June and have not 
been found to be Category 1 
sellers. 
This review cycle will be repeated in subsequent years. 
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 Appendix E 
 
List of Commenters and Acronyms 
 
Allegheny Energy Supply Co. and Allegheny Power - Allegheny Energy Companies 
Alliance for Cooperative Energy Services Power Marketing LLC - Alliance Power  
       Marketing 
Ameren Services Co., Inc. - Ameren 
AARP - AARP 
American Public Power Association/Transmission Access Policy Study Group –  
      APPA/TPAS 
American Wind Energy Association - AWEA 
Avista Corp. - Avista 
Board of Water, Light and Sinking Fund Commissioners of the City of Dalton, Georgia –  
      Dalton Utilities 
California Electricity Oversight Board  - California Board 
California Independent System Operator Corp. - CAISO 
California Public Utilities Commission - California Commission 
Coalition of Midwest Transmission Customers, PJM Industrial Customer Coalition, 
      NEPOOL Industrial Customer Coalition, Industrial Energy Users of Ohio, Southeast 
      Electricity Consumers Association, Southwest Industrial Customer Coalition – 
      Industrial Customers 
Cogentrix Energy, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Group - Cogentrix/Goldman 
Constellation Energy Group, Inc. - Constellation 
Consumers Energy Co. - Consumers 
Dominion Resources Services, Inc. - Dominion 
Duke Energy Corp. - Duke 
Duquesne Power, LLC; Duquesne Light Company; Duquesne Keystone, LLC; Duquesne 
     Conemaugh, LLC; and Monmouth Energy, Inc. - Duquesne Companies 
E.ON U.S. LLC - E.ON U.S.  
Edison Electric Institute - EEI 
ElectriCities of North Carolina, Inc. and Piedmont Municipal Power Agency – Carolina 
    Agencies 
Electricity Consumers Resource Council - ELCON 
El Paso E&P Co. L.P. - El Paso E&P 
Electric Power Supply Association - EPSA 
Entergy Services, Inc. - Entergy 
FirstEnergy Service Co. - FirstEnergy 
Florida Power & Light Company and FPL Energy, LLC - FP&L 
Indianapolis Power & Light Co. - Indianapolis P&L 
ISO New England Inc. - ISO-NE Docket No. RM04-7-000   27 
 
Joe Pace, PhD. - Dr. Pace 
Mark B. Lively - Mr. Lively 
Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc., J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corp. and Bear Energy – 
     Financial Companies 
MidAmerican Energy Co. and PacifiCorp - MidAmerican 
Midwest Energy, Inc. – Midwest Energy 
Mirant Corp. - Mirant 
Montana Consumer Counsel - Montana Counsel 
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. - Morgan Stanley 
National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates - NASUCA 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association - NRECA 
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities - New Jersey Board 
New Mexico Office of Attorney General, Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel, Utah 
     Committee of Consumer Services, Public Citizen, Public Utility Law Project of New 
     York, Rhode Island Office of Attorney General, and Rhode Island Division of Public 
     Utilities and Carriers - State AGs and Advocates 
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. - NYISO 
New York State Public Service Commission - New York Commission 
Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro - NL Hydro 
Newmont Mining Corp. - Newmont 
NiSource Inc. - NiSource 
NRG Energy, Inc. - NRG 
Oregon Public Utilities Commission - Oregon Commission 
Ormet Power Marketing - Ormet 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. - PG&E 
Piedmont Municipal Power Agency and ElectriCities of North Carolina – Carolina 
     Agencies 
Pinnacle West Companies - Pinnacle 
Powerex Corp. - Powerex 
PPL Companies - PPL 
PPM Energy, Inc. - PPM 
Progress Energy, Inc. - Progress Energy 
Public Service Electric and Gas Company, PSEG Power LLC and PSEG Energy 
    Resources & Trade LLC - PSEG Companies 
Public Service Co. of New Mexico/Tuscon Electric Power Company - PNM/Tuscon 
Public Works Commission for the City of Fayetteville, North Carolina - Fayetteville 
Puget Sound Energy, Inc. - Puget 
Reliant Energy, Inc. – Reliant 
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General for the State of Connecticut and the People of the 
     State of Illinois, by and through the Illinois Attorney General, Lisa Madigan – 
     Attorneys General of Connecticut and Illinois  Docket No. RM04-7-000   28 
 
Romkaew Broehm, PhD. and Peter Fox-Penner - Drs. Broehm and Fox-Penner 
Sempra Energy - Sempra 
Southern California Edison Co. - SoCal Edison 
Southern Company Services, Inc. - Southern 
Southwest Industrial Customer Coalition - Southwest Coalition 
Suez Energy North America, Inc. and Chevron USA Inc. - Suez/Chevron 
 
Towns of Black Creek, NC; Dallas, NC; Forest City, NC; Lucama, NC; Sharpsburg, NC; 
     Stantonsburg, NC; and Waynesville, NC - NC Towns 
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems - TDU Systems 
TXU Portfolio Management Co. LP - TXU Wholesale 
Westar Energy, Inc. and Kansas Gas and Electric Co. - Westar 
Williams Power Co., Inc. - Williams 
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. - Wisconsin Electric 
Xcel Energy Services Inc. - Xcel 
 
 
 
 
 
 